FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Patial v Schmidt [2025] FCA 748
File number(s): NSD 39 of 2025 Judgment of: GOODMAN J Date of judgment: 10 July 2025 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of Registrar’s decision pursuant to r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to refuse to accept for filing an originating application and statement of claim lodged by the applicant – where the Registrar formed the view that the application that the applicant sought to bring was an abuse of process within the meaning of r 2.26 – Registrar took into account an irrelevant consideration, being documents that the applicant had previously sought to file – orders made setting aside the decision and referring the originating application and statement of claim to the Registrar (as defined in the Rules) for further consideration Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), ss 3, 5, 11, 16
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) , rr 2.26, 31.01, 31.03
Cases cited: Dunstan v Morgan [2024] FCA 982
Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; (2018) 261 FCR 164
Paramasivam v Randwick City Council [2005] FCA 369
Prateek Patial v Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd T/A Kailash Lawyers and Consultants [2021] FWC 4167
Reaper v Luxton [2017] FCA 949
Shaw v Buljan [2016] FCA 829; (2016) 153 ALD 252
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 40 Date of hearing: 26 June 2025 Solicitor for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: The respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 39 of 2025 BETWEEN: PRATEEK PATIAL
Applicant
AND: PETER SCHMIDT, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REGISTRAR & DISTRICT REGISTRAR, QUEENSLAND REGISTRY, FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
GOODMAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s decision to refuse to accept for filing the originating application and the statement of claim lodged by the applicant on 5 January 2025 be set aside.
2.The question whether the originating application and the statement of claim the subject of Order 1 should be accepted for filing be remitted to a Registrar (as defined in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)), other than the respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GOODMAN J:
A. INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Mr Patial, seeks judicial review of the decision of a Registrar of this Court made under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to refuse to accept for filing an originating application and statement of claim lodged by Mr Patial. I will refer to these documents as the proposed originating application and the proposed statement of claim respectively.
For the reasons set out below, the decision under review should be set aside and the…
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- Patial v Schmidt [2025] FCA 748
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- [2025] FCA 748
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue was whether the Registrar took into account an irrelevant consideration when making the decision. The court examined the criteria for refusing to accept a document under Rule 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which includes considering whether the document is an abuse of the process of the Court, frivolous, or vexatious. The court also looked at the definition of "abuse of process" and whether the Registrar's decision was based on a proper understanding of these terms.
The court found that the Registrar had taken into account an irrelevant consideration, being the previous documents that Mr Patial had sought to file. This was an error of law, as the previous filings were not relevant to the merits of the current application. The court held that the Registrar's decision should be set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration by a different Registrar. The court emphasised that the decision to refuse filing should be based on the merits of the current application, not on previous filings.
The court's final orders were to set aside the Registrar's decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by a different Registrar. The court also noted that entry of orders would be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s decision to refuse to accept for filing the originating application and the statement of claim lodged by the applicant on 5 January 2025 be set aside.
2. The question whether the originating application and the statement of claim the subject of Order 1 should be accepted for filing be remitted to a Registrar (as defined in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)), other than the respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The grounds for review set out in the present originating application are numerous and detailed. However, for the reasons set out below it is sufficient to address only one of those grounds.D. CONSIDERATION Rule 2.26 provides:2.26Refusal to accept document for filing—abuse of process or frivolous or vexatious documentsA Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious:(a) on the face of the document; or(b) by reference to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document. “Registrar” is defined in the Dictionary in Schedule 1 to the Rules as follows:Registrar means:(a) the Chief Executive Officer, or a Registrar, District Registrar or Deputy District Registrar of the Court; and(b) any officer from time to time authorised to perform the duties of the Chief Executive Officer, or a Registrar, District Registrar or Deputy District Registrar of the Court. The discretion in r 2.26 to refuse to accept a document is enlivened when a Registrar forms the opinion that a document lodged for filing: (1) constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court; (2) is frivolous; or (3) is vexatious. As Justice Charlesworth explained in Shaw v Buljan [2016] FCA 829; (2016) 153 ALD 252 at 259 to 260 ([31] to [32]):[31] The power conferred on a Registrar by r 2.26 of the Rules is substantively the same as that conferred by O 46 r 7A of the former Rules. The power is preconditioned by the requirement that the Registrar be “satisfied” that a document sought to be filed constitutes an abuse of process or is frivolous or vexatious. As Perram J observed in Rahman v Hedge [2012] FCA 68 (Rahman) at [6], r 2.26:[6] … confers a power to refuse to accept a document for filing in circumstances where the Registrar is ‘satisfied’ of the particular state of affairs referred to in the rule. The manner and circumstances in which judicial review of powers subject to the formation of a satisfaction or of an opinion are to be conducted are well-known and usefully, with respect, collected by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; 162 ALR 577; 54 ALD 289; [1999] HCA 21 at [128]–[137]. His Honour referred, with approval, to the judgment of Gibbs J in Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110 at 118–9; 9 ALR 481 at 487:In all such cases the authority must act in good faith; it cannot act merely arbitrarily or capriciously. Moreover, a person affected will obtain relief from the courts if he can show that the authority has misdirected itself in law or that it has failed to consider matters that it was required to consider or has taken irrelevant matters into account. Even if none of these things can be established, the courts will interfere if the decision reached by the authority appears so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could properly have arrived at it. However, where the matter of which the authority is required to be satisfied is a matter of opinion or policy or taste it may be very difficult to show that it erred in one of these ways, or that its decision could not reasonably have been reached.[32] The state of satisfaction to be reached by the Deputy Registrar is not one involving policy or taste. Rather, it is in the nature of an opinion concerning mixed questions of fact and law. Cases may arise under r 2.26 in which the formation of such an opinion involves the making of an evaluative judgment in respect of which reasonable minds may differ. In such cases, an applicant for judicial review may well have difficulty establishing reviewable error affecting the Registrar’s decision. However, where an opinion formed by a Registrar is founded upon an error of law, or based upon an irrelevant consideration, the opinion will not be one that is open to the Registrar to form and the requisite state of satisfaction prescribed under the rule will not have been reached. …(emphasis added)