Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 311

File number(s): SYG 2625 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE ELDERSHAW
Date of judgment: 10 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student visa – Impermissible merits review – Unparticularised grounds – Application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 474, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl 500 sch 2

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

Jordan (a pseudonym) v Secretary of Department of Home Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1315

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2020) 274 FCR 646

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] 236 FCR 593

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 59
Date of hearing: 10 February 2025
Place: Sydney
Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr M. Gao (HWL Ebsworth)
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 2625 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

JAYESHKUMAR MAHESHBHAI PATEL

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE ELDERSHAW

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 19 November 2020 be dismissed.

2.The applicant must pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to these proceedings, fixed in the sum of $5,600. 

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE ELDERSHAW

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for judicial review made under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 29 October 2020 (Decision) concerning an application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Student (subclass 500) visa (Student Visa). 

  2. The applicant seeks that the Tribunal’s Decision be quashed and a writ of mandamus directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the applicant’s application according to law.  The applicant also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, neither of which pertain to this application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal concerning a student visa. 

  3. The Minister seeks that the application be dismissed with costs.

  4. The applicant, Mr Jayeshkumar Patel, is a citizen of India.  He…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 311
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Mr. Patel, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to dismiss his application for review of a delegate's decision to refuse his application for a student visa. The Tribunal found that the delegate's decision was not legally erroneous and, therefore, dismissed the application. Mr. Patel claimed that the Tribunal did not act in his best interest and did not consider all relevant aspects of his case, which he argued amounted to a procedural fairness issue.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its handling of Mr. Patel's application for judicial review, specifically whether it had breached procedural fairness by failing to consider all relevant aspects of his case. The court considered whether the Tribunal had complied with its statutory obligations and whether it had given Mr. Patel a fair opportunity to present his case.

The court found that the Tribunal had complied with its statutory obligations and had provided Mr. Patel with a real and meaningful opportunity to present his case. The Tribunal had clearly outlined the legal framework and policy considerations that guided its decision and had considered Mr. Patel's evidence against these factors. While the Tribunal did not refer to every matter raised by Mr. Patel, it was evident that it had not considered all provided material and claims irrelevant to the issue under review. The court further noted that the Tribunal's task was to assess Mr. Patel's intentions in accordance with the Migration Regulations, not to investigate his claims or conduct an inquiry into his case. The court held that Mr. Patel's assertion that he was "not in breach" of the Regulations invited the court to engage in impermissible merits review, which was beyond the court's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed Mr. Patel's application for judicial review and ordered him to pay the Minister's costs of $5,600. The court exercised its discretion under section 214(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021, considering the event-based scale for migration proceedings as a benchmark, along with other relevant factors such as the complexity of the grounds, the duration of the hearing, and the quality of the submissions. The court determined that the prescribed costs were fair and just in the circumstances of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

This Court’s power to review the Tribunal’s decision is limited to review for judicial error: s 474 of the Act; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. The Court is not permitted to undertake a review of the merits of the application for a visa: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [53]-[54].BACKGROUND AND MIGRATION HISTORY The applicant arrived in Australia on 26 February 2017 for the purpose of studying a Master of Commerce on a student visa. According to the Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS) record found at page 77 of the Court Book, the applicant completed this degree. The visa relating to that course of study expired in March 2019. The applicant travelled to India for 41 days in January 2018 for a family visit but has otherwise been in Australia since February 2017. On 12 March 2019, the applicant applied for the Student Visa that is the subject of this judicial review proceeding. In that application, the applicant identified that he intended to study “Automotive Mechanical”. The PRISMS record identifies that the applicant applied for, but later cancelled, three automotive related courses in 2020, being Certificate III in Light Vehicle Mechanical Technology, Certificate IV in Automotive Mechanical Diagnosis and Diploma of Automotive Technology. On 27 May 2019, the Delegate refused the application for a Student Visa. Paragraph 4 of the Minister’s submissions fairly summarise the Delegate’s decision record, which I adopt: 4. On 27 May 2019, a delegate refused to grant the Applicant a Student visa. In the decision record, the delegate reproduced the genuine temporary entrant criterion in cl 500.212 in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) and outlined the factors referred to in Ministerial Direction No. 69 (Direction), made pursuant to s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), to which decision-makers must have regard in assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion. The delegate had regard to a number of factors in assessing the Applicant's circumstances, including the Applicant's previous study and immigration history, his ties to Australia and India, and the Applicant's evidence regarding the value of the proposed courses to his future. The delegate considered that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate the genuineness of the future benefit of the proposed courses of study and that his circumstances presented a significant incentive for him not to return to India. The delegate concluded that the Applicant did not genuinely intend to stay in Australia temporarily and consequently found that he did not meet the requirements of cl 500.212 of the Regulations. (References omitted) On 13 June 2019, the applicant lodged an Application with the Tribunal for Review of the Delegate’s decision. On 7 May 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant to provide sufficient information to satisfy the Tribunal that he met the requirements that he was enrolled in a registered course of study and was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. The letter explained that the Tribunal would have regard to the Direction when considering whether the applicant satisfied the genuine temporary entrant criteria and enclosed a copy of same.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The ground of review fails. CONCLUSION ON APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal has not been demonstrated, for which reason the application will be dismissed. APPLICATION FOR COSTS As the application has been dismissed, the Minister seeks costs of $5,600. Legal Framework In Jordan (a pseudonym) v Secretary of Department of Home Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1315 at [14] to [23], Judge Mansini summarised the principles relating to costs orders in migration matters as follows: [14] The Court has a wide discretion to make costs orders: s.214(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act).[15] Division 22.2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (GFLRules), which applies to migration proceedings, provides a number of options to the Court in the exercise of its discretion under s.214(3). Relevantly, at r.22.02, that an application for costs may be made within a time allowed by the Court and, in making an order for costs in a proceeding, the Court may:(a) set the amount of the costs; or(b) set the method by which the costs are to be calculated; or(c)refer the costs for taxation under Part 40 of the Federal Court Rules; or(d)set a time for the payment of the costs, which may be before the proceeding is concluded. [16] The Court may specify the maximum costs that may be recovered on a party and party basis, whether on its own initiative or on application of a party subject only to a specified amount not including an amount that a party is ordered to pay because the party has failed to comply with Court orders, has sought leave to amend a document or has otherwise caused a party to incur costs that were not necessary for the economic and efficient progress of the proceeding or the hearing of the proceeding: rr.22.03(1) and (2). [17] Division 22.3 then outlines a process for quantification of costs where not specified in the order. [18] Whilst expressly not precluding an application under Part 22, in migration proceedings the Court may order an unsuccessful party to the proceeding to pay the costs of the successful party in accordance with the event based scale at Division 1 of Part 2 of Schedule 2: rr.29.13(1) and (3). For final proceedings, that amount is presently $8,371.30.[19] Whilst the GFL Rules deal with the way in which the Court’s discretion may be exercised they do not require the exercise of the discretion in a particular manner: Gehlert at [65]. The Full Court’s guidance as to the exercise of the discretion in Gehlert relevantly including the following:[66]However, the presence of r 29.13, and the presence of Pt 2 of Sch 2 in the scheme for the award of costs by the FCFCOA in migration proceedings evinces an intention that any application for costs be measured or assessed in a context where the Court (or Judge) is conscious that a majority of the Judges of the Court have agreed to fix a scale of costs considered to be generally applicable to migration proceedings, and considered to provide an express benchmark for what may be seen as fair and just in a given case.[67]The same is true of Pt 1 of Sch 2 in relation to GFL proceedings other than migration proceedings. However, the critical point is that both parts of Sch 2 are to operate as benchmarks or guidance, informed as they are by the external review processes to which the parties referred in argument, and consideration of what is likely to be incurred in conducting proceedings in the GFL jurisdiction. It remains up to an individual Judge, in the particular circumstances of the case before them, and being faithful to the broad discretion in s 214(3) of the FCFCOA Act, informed by r 22.02 of the GFL Rules, to decide if the scale costs are in fact fair and just in the circumstances of the particular costs application before the Court.[20] The overarching principle in regards to whether it is appropriate to fix costs in the amount prescribed by the GFL Rules is that costs should be set to provide the successful party a fair indemnity for the costs they have incurred in having had to litigate: CIQ17 v MICMSMA (No 2) [2020] FCCA 3467 (Manousaridis J) at [26].[21] The guidance from the established case authorities as to the (non-exhaustive) factors that may be relevant includes: number and complexity of the grounds; number of interlocutory proceedings and hearing duration; the usual steps involved in a migration matter (see AYT22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G 256 (Given J)); retention of Counsel by one or both parties; length and quality of written submissions and the Court book. [22] The Court was not asked to do so here but, for completeness, the inability to meet a costs order without more is not sufficient reason to deny a successful party his or her costs: Yilan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1212.[23] The event-based scale at Division 1 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the GFL Rules is a guide and a relevant benchmark to take into account. Consideration

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 29 October 2020, the applicant commenced proceedings in this Court alleging one ground of review, namely: Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not acted in the best interest of the applicant (procedural fairness issue) as mentioned in affidavit attached herewith.CONSIDERATIONSubmissions The applicant’s affidavit states: 3. Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not acted in the best interest of the applicant (procedural fairness issue)First of all delegate mentioned in decision Record that, "The Tribunal does not have Jurisdiction. Then The delegate in this case refused to grant the visas on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the requirements of cl.500.2 l 2(a). please have a look annexure A .I hope that I have put forward my position in a simple, clear and honest manner and that you will see that I am not in the breach of cl 500.2 I 2(a) condition.I sincerely request that you give due consideration to the compelling and compassionate circumstances.Also please acknowledge that current global circumstances, that being the pandemic of Covid-19, may impact on my ability to depart Australia. May I request you to look into the grounds.I think I am become a victim of a procedure fairness issue/matter here as Administrative Appeals Tribunal has an error in my decision. This is not fair work by any department while making a decision and department or tribunal should be fair to make it decision and must look into all necessary aspects. I have treated paragraph [3] of the applicant’s affidavit as a submission. The applicant provided no other written submissions nor made any oral submissions. In his written submissions, the Minister says that the applicant does not particularise the “procedural fairness issue” and that:(a)the Tribunal complied with its statutory obligations under Division 5 of Part 5 of the Act; (b)the applicant was on notice of the dispositive issues under review as they were the same as were before the Delegate; (c)the applicant was informed by letter dated 7 May 2020 that he was required to demonstrate that he was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, and had been provided with a copy of the Direction; (d)the applicant was invited to, and did, attend a hearing before the Tribunal at which time the Tribunal received evidence from the applicant about the dispositive issues; and (e)the Tribunal gave the applicant a real and meaningful opportunity to participate in the hearing and give evidence in support of his application. The Minister submits that the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal “must look into all necessary aspects” reflects a misunderstanding of the Tribunal’s role. The Minister submits that the task for the Tribunal was that it should assess whether the applicant intended “genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily” having regard to the matters identified in clause 500.212 (a)(i) to (iv) of the Regulations with the guidance of the Direction. The Minister further submits that: 19. The choice of weight to be given to the factors for consideration under cl 500.212 and to evidence adduced to satisfy this criterion are matters exclusive to the Tribunal: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41; [1986] HCA 40; Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46]. Further, the Tribunal had no obligation to investigate the Applicant's claims or conduct an inquiry to discover whether the Applicant’s case might be better put or supported by other evidence: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575; [2010] FCAFC 41 at [36]. 20. The First Respondent submits that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrate that it correctly attended to its statutory task in this respect. The Tribunal identified the law and policy which should guide its decision and considered the Applicant's evidence against the factors outlined in Direction No. 69. The Tribunal's reasons indicate that it considered the Applicant's circumstances in his home country, his potential circumstances in Australia, the value of the proposed course to his future and his immigration history. 21. There was limited evidence submitted by the Applicant in support of his application. While the Tribunal did not refer to every matter raised by the Applicant, the First Respondent submits that it can be inferred that the Tribunal did not consider all of the provided material and claims to be relevant to the issue under review: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [69]. Further, this is not a case where the Tribunal failed to consider a substantial, clearly articulated argument: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 at [55]. 22. Insofar as the Applicant asserts that he was "not in breach" of cl 500.212 of the Regulations, the First Respondent considers that this invites the Court to engage with the Tribunal's factual findings which is, in essence, an attempt at impermissible merits review: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 136 ALR 481 at 491; [1996] HCA 6 (Wu Shan Liang). The Court's jurisdiction extends only to the correction of legal error and the task of fact finding is entrusted to the original decision maker: Wu Shan Liang. Further contentions raised in the Applicant's Affidavit 23. In his affidavit, the Applicant asks the Court to consider the compelling and compassionate circumstances of his matter and that his ability to depart Australia may be affected by COVID-19. The First Respondent considers that these statements misunderstand the role of the Court. 24. The Applicant also states "the delegate mentioned in decision Record that, "The Tribunal does not have Jurisdiction". The First Respondent considers that it is unclear what the Applicant means by this statement, as the delegate's decision does not comment on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (nor does the Tribunal's decision). (References Omitted)