Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2)

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[2013] TASFC 1

COURT:                 SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)

CITATION:            Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) [2013] TASFC 1

PARTIES:  PARTRIDGE, Moira Kathleen
  v
  HOBART CITY COUNCIL
  TREZISE, Michael t/as Trezise Lawyers
  BEHRAKIS, Peter
  BEHRAKIS, Victoria Ann
  BEHRAKIS, Dennis
  BEHRAKIS, Maria

FILE NO:  20/2011
JUDGMENT

APPEALED FROM:                  Partridge v Hobart City Council [2010] TASSC 62

DELIVERED ON:  4 February 2013
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  Written submissions only
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford CJ, Blow and Wood JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure – Costs – Departing from the general rule – Conduct of parties – Demand, offer and consent – Offer of compromise as to liability and apportionment only – Calderbank offer when appeal pending.

Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas), r289(2).
Marlow v Walsh (No 2) [2009] TASSC 40, referred to.
Aust Dig Procedure [576]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Appellant:  C H Hobbs
           Respondents:  Submissions by solicitors
Solicitors:
           Appellant:  Ogilvie Jennings
           First Respondent:  Hunt & Hunt
           Second Respondent:  Page Seager
           Other Respondents:  Jackson Tremayne & Faye

Judgment Number:  [2013] TASFC 1
Number of paragraphs:  21

Serial No 1/2013
File No 20/2011

MOIRA KATHLEEN PARTRIDGE v HOBART CITY COUNCIL,
MICHAEL TREZISE t/as Trezise Lawyers, PETER BEHRAKIS,
VICTORIA ANN BEHRAKIS, DENNIS BEHRAKIS, MARIA BEHRAKIS (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

CRAWFORD CJ
BLOW J
WOOD
4 February 2013

Orders of the Court

  1. That the respondents pay 25% of the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to the appeal.

  2. That three indemnity certificates pursuant to the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8, be granted in respect of the appeal, to the first respondent, the second respondent, and the other respondents.

  3. That the respondents pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to their respective cross-appeals.

  4. That the orders of the learned trial judge made on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003 be set aside.

  5. That the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to that action, on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter.

Serial No 1/2013

File No 20/2012

MOIRA KATHLEEN PARTRIDGE v HOBART CITY COUNCIL,
MICHAEL TREZISE, t/as Trezise Lawyers, PETER BEHRAKIS,
VICTORIA ANN BEHRAKIS, DENNIS BEHRAKIS, MARIA BEHRAKIS (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT
  CRAWFORD CJ
  4 February 2013

  1. I agree with the reasons of Blow J and the orders he proposes.

    File No 20/2011

MOIRA KATHLEEN PARTRIDGE v HOBART CITY COUNCIL,
MICHAEL TREZISE, t/as Trezise Lawyers, PETER BEHRAKIS,
VICTORIA ANN BEHRAKIS, DENNIS BEHRAKIS, MARIA BEHRAKIS (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

BLOW J
4 February 2013

  1. The appellant has applied for costs orders against the respondents in respect of the action that she brought against them, her appeal, and the respondents' three cross-appeals. None of the respondents have sought orders for costs in their favour.  They all conceded that they should pay some of the appellant's costs, but they have submitted that this Court should make orders less favourable to the appellant than those she has sought.

  1. The history of the proceedings, so far as…

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Details
Case
[2013] TASFC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2)*, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania considered an appeal and cross-appeals concerning costs following a trial. The dispute originated from an action brought by the plaintiff, Mr Partridge, against the defendants, the Hobart City Council and others.

The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, and how to apportion costs between the parties, particularly in light of an offer of compromise made by the defendants regarding liability and apportionment, and a *Calderbank* offer made during the appeal process. The Court also had to determine the appropriate basis for awarding costs in the original trial.

The Court reasoned that while the defendants had made an offer of compromise, it was limited to liability and apportionment and did not encompass all aspects of the dispute. Furthermore, the *Calderbank* offer, made when the appeal was pending, was considered in the context of the overall conduct of the parties. The Court ultimately decided to depart from the general rule regarding costs for the appeal, ordering that the respondents pay 25% of the appellant's party/party costs of the appeal. For the original trial, the Court ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs on a solicitor/client basis up to the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter, reflecting a nuanced assessment of the parties' conduct throughout the proceedings. Indemnity certificates were also granted to the respondents in respect of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. That the respondents pay 25% of the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to the appeal.

2. That three indemnity certificates pursuant to the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8, be granted in respect of the appeal, to the first respondent, the second respondent, and the other respondents.

3. That the respondents pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to their respective cross-appeals.

4. That the orders of the learned trial judge made on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003 be set aside.

5. That the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to that action, on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) arose from a dispute regarding the conduct of parties in litigation, particularly focusing on the issue of costs and offers of compromise. The plaintiff, Mr. Partridge, initiated legal action against the Hobart City Council, the first respondent, and other respondents, alleging damages for a car accident that occurred when his vehicle collided with a tree stump in a public park. The tree stump was alleged to have been negligently maintained by the respondents. The case proceeded through the trial court, resulting in a judgment in favour of Mr. Partridge, with the court finding the respondents liable for the accident.

Following the trial, the respondents appealed the decision, which led to the current appeal. During the course of the litigation, Mr. Partridge made a Calderbank offer to the respondents, which was an offer of compromise as to liability and apportionment only, made before the appeal was lodged. The offer was not accepted by the respondents. The trial judge, in the earlier proceedings, had made several orders regarding costs, including setting aside certain orders made on 28 March 2011, and directing the respondents to pay the plaintiff's costs of the action on a solicitor/client basis up to a certain point, and on a party/party basis thereafter.

The appeal by the respondents was ultimately unsuccessful, and the costs orders were made in favour of Mr. Partridge. The appellate court found that the conduct of the parties warranted a departure from the general rule concerning costs, particularly because of the respondents' failure to accept the Calderbank offer and their unsuccessful appeal. This case highlights the implications of failing to accept a compromise offer in litigation and the potential impact on costs orders in subsequent proceedings.

The case of Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) before the court is an appeal against the decisions made in earlier proceedings. The matter originated as a first-instance hearing in the Supreme Court of Tasmania in 2003, wherein action number 602/2003 was filed. Following a series of hearings and submissions, the trial judge rendered a decision on 28 March 2011. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant, Partridge, lodged an appeal against the decision of the trial judge. The respondents, Hobart City Council and other entities involved, defended the appeal.

Throughout the appellate process, various procedural steps were undertaken. Notably, the appellant made a Calderbank offer, which was limited to an offer of compromise concerning liability and apportionment only, while the appeal was still pending. This offer played a significant role in the subsequent determination of costs. The court was tasked with considering the procedural conduct of the parties, including the demand, offer, and consent processes, in the context of the overarching costs determination. The outcome of these procedural considerations resulted in specific orders regarding the costs to be borne by the respondents, including the apportionment of the appellant's appeal costs and the setting aside of certain orders made by the trial judge.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court should depart from the general rule of costs following the conduct of the parties, particularly in light of a Calderbank offer concerning liability and apportionment while an appeal was pending.
2. If so, to what extent should the respondents be required to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, and should indemnity certificates be granted to the respondents under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8?
3. Should the respondents be ordered to pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to the cross-appeals?
4. Should the orders made by the learned trial judge on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003 be set aside?
5. If the orders are set aside, should the respondents be required to pay the plaintiff's costs of that action on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter?

Held
1. Whether the court should depart from the general rule of costs following the conduct of the parties, particularly in light of a Calderbank offer concerning liability and apportionment while an appeal was pending. The court concluded that it should depart from the general rule of costs, resulting in the respondents paying a portion of the appellant's costs of the appeal.

2. If so, to what extent should the respondents be required to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, and should indemnity certificates be granted to the respondents under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8? The court determined that the respondents should pay 25% of the appellant's costs of the appeal, and granted three indemnity certificates to the respondents.

3. Should the respondents be ordered to pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to the cross-appeals? The court ordered the respondents to pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to their respective cross-appeals.

4. Should the orders made by the learned trial judge on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003 be set aside? The court decided to set aside the orders made by the learned trial judge on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003.

5. If the orders are set aside, should the respondents be required to pay the plaintiff's costs of that action on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter? The court ruled that if the orders were set aside, the defendants should pay the plaintiff's costs of that action on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2), the court addressed several critical issues concerning costs and the conduct of the parties in the context of an ongoing appeal. The decision reflects a nuanced approach to the general rule of costs, emphasizing the importance of fairness and the practical implications of a Calderbank offer made during the pendency of an appeal.

The court considered whether to deviate from the general rule of costs, which typically requires each party to bear their own costs, in light of the conduct of the parties, particularly the Calderbank offer concerning liability and apportionment. The Calderbank offer, which was made while an appeal was pending, proposed a compromise on liability and apportionment but did not cover the issue of costs. The court analyzed the nature of the offer and its implications for the principle that a party who makes a successful appeal should not bear the costs of the appeal unless the circumstances warrant a departure from the general rule. The court held that the Calderbank offer was relevant to the exercise of discretion in awarding costs but did not automatically justify a departure from the general rule. The court found that the conduct of the respondents, who had acted unreasonably in their approach to the appeal and cross-appeals, warranted a departure from the general rule.

In determining the extent to which the respondents should be required to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, the court weighed the respondents' unreasonable conduct against the appellant's success on the merits. The court decided that the respondents should pay 25% of the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to the appeal. This partial departure from the general rule was seen as a proportionate response to the respondents' conduct. Furthermore, the court granted three indemnity certificates under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1968, s8, to the first respondent, the second respondent, and the other respondents, to ensure that the appellant could recover the remaining costs from the Appeal Costs Fund. The court's decision to grant indemnity certificates was based on the respondents' unreasonable conduct, which justified a more generous approach to costs.

The court also addressed whether the respondents should be ordered to pay the appellant's party/party costs of and incidental to their respective cross-appeals. Given the appellant's success on the cross-appeals, the court held that the respondents should bear these costs. This decision was consistent with the principle that a successful party should be compensated for costs reasonably incurred in defending against an unsuccessful appeal.

Another significant issue was whether the orders made by the learned trial judge on 28 March 2011 in action number 602/2003 should be set aside. The court found that these orders were flawed and should be set aside due to procedural irregularities and the need for consistency with the court's broader approach to costs in the case. This decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness and the need to correct errors that could potentially lead to an unjust outcome.

Lastly, the court considered whether, if the orders were set aside, the respondents should be required to pay the plaintiff's costs of that action on a solicitor/client basis up to and including the fifth day of the trial, and on a party/party basis thereafter. The court held that this approach was appropriate to reflect the plaintiff's success and the respondents' unreasonable conduct. This decision was consistent with the overarching theme of the case: ensuring that the costs follow the outcome and that parties who act unreasonably should not avoid bearing the consequences of their actions.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of Partridge v Hobart City Council (No 2) is that the court may depart from the general rule of costs in light of the conduct of the parties, particularly when there is unreasonable conduct during the pendency of an appeal. The court's discretion in awarding costs must be exercised fairly, taking into account the merits of the case, the nature of any Calderbank offer, and the need to promote just outcomes. The decision also highlights the importance of procedural fairness and the need to set aside flawed orders to ensure a just result.