Clark v State of Tasmania (No 2)

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[1999] TASSC 130

CITATION:                 Clark v State of Tasmania (No 2) [1999] TASSC 130

PARTIES:  CLARK, David John
  v
  TASMANIA State of (No 2)

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S:  2304/1997
DELIVERED ON:  25 November 1999
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  18 November 1999
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood J

CATCHWORDS:

Procedure - Costs - General rule - Costs follow the event - Costs of whole action - Where money paid into court or offer of compromise made - Offer of compromise made - Judgment for plaintiff no less favourable than the offer - Costs of whole action taxed on solicitor/client basis.

Maitland Hospital v Fisher[No 2] (1992) 27 NSWLR 721; Freemantle's Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett & Ors [1999] VSC 188; Grbavac v Hart [1997] 1 VR 154, followed.
MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd & Anor (No 4) (1996) 140 ALR 707, referred to.

Rules of Court (Tas), O24A, r11(1).

Aust Dig Procedure [555]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  K E Read
             Defendant:  P Turner
Solicitors:
             Plaintiff:  Phillips Taglieri
             Defendant:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [1999] TASSC 130
Number of Paragraphs:  21

Serial No 130/1999
File No 2304/1997

DAVID JOHN CLARK v THE STATE OF TASMANIA (No 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  UNDERWOOD J
  25 November 1999

  1. On 28 October 1999, I ordered that judgment in this action be entered for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $163,000.  The plaintiff sought an order for costs in accordance with the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1).  The application was adjourned for argument at a later, more convenient, time.

  1. Upon the resumption of the hearing, and before embarking on submissions with respect to a costs order, both parties agreed that the judgment should be reduced by $8,985.69, this sum having been paid to the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. I was advised of this payment by counsel during the course of the trial, and told that it was agreed that it should be deducted from any judgment sum. However, due to inadvertence, I omitted to take it into account before ordering judgment.

  1. In addition, Mr Read, for the plaintiff, submitted that inadvertent error may have occurred in the following paragraph of the reasons for judgment:

"67Together the plaintiff's present medical and pharmaceutical needs cost $75.41 per week.  Dr McArdle's opinion was that these needs will probably last indefinitely.  I find accordingly, but reduce the award for attending the gymnasium as I find it unlikely that the plaintiff will attend there after he reaches the age of about 60 years.  The plaintiff's life expectancy is 35.7 years.  Application of the 7% discount tables, taking into account mortality, to the weekly figure of $76.74 produces a figure of $47,432.  This figure must be reduced to $46,000 to take account of the finding that the plaintiff will not use the gymnasium after he reaches the age of about 60 years.  Interestingly, the…

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Details
Case
[1999] TASSC 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Tasmania, David John Clark brought an action against the State of Tasmania, claiming damages for personal injuries sustained in a workplace incident. The case, Clark v State of Tasmania (No 2), was presided over by Justice Underwood. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff, having made an offer of compromise under the Rules of Court, was entitled to an order for his costs of the whole action to be taxed on a solicitor/client basis, as stipulated by O24A, r11(1).

The court considered the arguments presented by both parties, with the defendant asserting that the costs should be taxed on a party and party basis up to the date of the offer and thereafter on a solicitor/client basis. The court dismissed this argument, noting that the plain language of O24A, r11(1) conferred a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs if the conditions were met. The court referenced several precedents, including Maitland Hospital v Fisher, Freemantle's Pastoral Pty Ltd v Hyett, and Grbavac v Hart, to affirm the philosophy behind offers of compromise rules. These rules aim to encourage early and realistic offers of compromise, thereby saving private and public costs and indemnifying the plaintiff who makes a reasonable offer. The court found no basis to import additional conditions into the rule that were not explicitly stated, emphasising that the intention of the rule was to penalise the rejecting party and encourage proper settlement of litigation.

Ultimately, the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, ordering that judgment be entered for $154,014.31 and that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the action taxed on a solicitor/client basis. The court found that the plaintiff's offer of compromise, made well before the trial, and the substantial difference between the judgment sum and the offer, did not present any circumstances warranting deviation from the presumptive entitlement established by the rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

David John Clark initiated legal proceedings against the State of Tasmania, seeking compensation for injuries sustained in an incident. The factual background reveals that Mr. Clark was involved in an incident on 26 April 1994, which led to significant personal injuries. He was hospitalised and underwent multiple surgeries and medical treatments. The incident caused severe and permanent impairments, impacting his physical and psychological well-being. Mr. Clark's medical expenses, ongoing care requirements, and the impact on his ability to work were central to his claim. The defendant, the State of Tasmania, denied liability and contested the extent of Mr. Clark's injuries and resultant damages. The trial involved extensive evidence, including medical reports, expert testimonies, and submissions from both parties regarding the appropriate compensation.

During the trial, it was revealed that Mr. Clark had made an offer of compromise on 9 June 1999, proposing to settle the claim for $130,000, which was substantially less than the amount he ultimately sought. The defendant did not accept this offer, leading to the current proceedings. The Court was tasked with determining the appropriate compensation for Mr. Clark's injuries and the associated costs of the litigation. The factual events leading to the legal dispute centred on the validity and impact of the offer of compromise, the extent of Mr. Clark's injuries, and the reasonable costs associated with the litigation.

This case, Clark v State of Tasmania (No 2), came before the Supreme Court of Tasmania as an original proceeding. The matter originated from an earlier decision where the plaintiff, David John Clark, was awarded damages against the defendant, the State of Tasmania, following an injury sustained during his employment. The initial proceedings resulted in a judgment being entered in Clark's favour, which was subsequently appealed. The appeal was dismissed, leading to the present application for costs. The plaintiff sought an order for costs in accordance with the Rules of Court, specifically Order 24A, rule 11(1), which provides for costs on a solicitor/client basis if certain conditions are met, including the making of an offer of compromise that the defendant did not accept and which the judgment did not exceed. During the trial, an error was identified in the initial judgment amount, leading to a reduction in the awarded damages. The plaintiff had previously made an offer of compromise to settle the claim for $130,000, significantly less than the judgment sum. The defendant argued for a taxation of costs on a party and party basis up to the date of the offer and a solicitor/client basis thereafter, or alternatively, a discretionary order that costs be taxed on a party and party basis. The court considered the philosophy behind offers of compromise rules, which aims to encourage early and realistic offers to settle litigation and to penalise defendants who unreasonably reject such offers. The court rejected the defendant's submissions, finding that the clear wording of the rule provided for a presumptive entitlement to costs on a solicitor/client basis for the whole action if the prescribed conditions were met. The court determined that the plaintiff's offer of compromise, made well before the trial, and the substantial difference between the offer and the judgment sum did not warrant altering the presumptive entitlement. Consequently, the plaintiff's application for costs was successful, and an order was made for the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs on a solicitor/client basis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What is the appropriate basis for taxing the plaintiff's costs of the action when a successful plaintiff has made an offer of compromise in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court?
2. Does the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1) provide a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs when a plaintiff satisfies the conditions prescribed by the subrule, or should the taxation of costs be confined to those costs incurred after the date the offer of compromise was made?
3. In the context of offers of compromise rules, what weight should be given to a "Calderbank letter" when exercising the discretion to award costs, and how does this compare to the provisions of the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1)?
4. Are there circumstances that may displace the presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs under the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1), and if so, what factors should be considered in determining whether such circumstances exist in this case?

Held
1. The appropriate basis for taxing the plaintiff's costs of the action when a successful plaintiff has made an offer of compromise in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court is on a solicitor and client basis for the entire action. The court concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to an order for costs against the defendant taxed on a solicitor and client basis in accordance with O24A, r11(1) of the Rules of Court. Result: Costs ordered to be taxed on a solicitor/client basis.

2. The Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1) provides a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs when a plaintiff satisfies the conditions prescribed by the subrule. The court held that the taxation of costs should not be confined to those costs incurred after the date the offer of compromise was made. Result: Costs not confined to those incurred after the offer of compromise.

3. In the context of offers of compromise rules, the weight to be given to a "Calderbank letter" when exercising the discretion to award costs is that it is no more than a factor in the exercise of the discretion. The court concluded that the application in this case is based on the provisions of the Rules of Court O24A, r11(1), not on a "Calderbank letter." Result: Costs not determined based on "Calderbank letter."

4. There may be circumstances that can displace the presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs under the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1). The court determined that in this case, there were no circumstances to displace the presumption that the plaintiff is entitled to his costs of the action taxed on a solicitor/client basis. Result: Presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs not displaced.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Clark v State of Tasmania (No 2), the Supreme Court of Tasmania addressed several issues regarding the taxation of costs in the context of offers of compromise under the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1). The court commenced by affirming that the appropriate basis for taxing the plaintiff's costs of the action, where a successful plaintiff has made an offer of compromise in accordance with the Rules of Court, is on a solicitor/client basis for the entire action. This conclusion was derived from a literal interpretation of O24A, r11(1), which provides a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs if the plaintiff satisfies the conditions prescribed by the subrule. The court explicitly rejected the defendant's submission that costs should be taxed on a party and party basis up until the date of the offer of compromise, and thereafter on a solicitor/client basis, stating that such an interpretation would be contrary to the plain words of the rule.

The court further elaborated on the weight to be given to a "Calderbank letter" in the context of offers of compromise rules. While acknowledging that some authorities suggest a division in how such letters should influence the exercise of discretion to award costs, the court emphasized that the application in this case was based on the provisions of O24A, r11(1), not on a Calderbank letter. It was held that the Rules of Court, O24A, r11(1) provides a presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs when a plaintiff satisfies the conditions prescribed by the subrule, and this entitlement should not be limited to costs incurred after the date the offer of compromise was made.

In terms of whether there are circumstances that may displace the presumptive entitlement to indemnity costs under O24A, r11(1), the court acknowledged that it is not possible to identify all such circumstances. However, it noted that factors such as the timing of the offer of compromise and the manner in which the plaintiff conducted the case could be relevant. In this particular case, the court found no circumstances to displace the presumptive entitlement, as the offer of compromise was made almost three months before the trial began, and the plaintiff's conduct of the case was unremarkable.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that when a plaintiff satisfies the conditions prescribed by O24A, r11(1), there is a presumptive entitlement to have his or her costs of the entire action taxed on a solicitor/client basis. This entitlement is not limited to costs incurred after the date the offer of compromise was made and is not displaced in the absence of specific circumstances such as a late offer or misconduct by the plaintiff. The court's decision followed the philosophy of offers of compromise rules, which aim to encourage the settlement of litigation and to penalize parties who unreasonably refuse reasonable offers of compromise.