Parsons v The Queen - [1998] HCATrans 470

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M42 of 1998

B e t w e e n -
ROUMALD CHARLES PARSONS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for bail

HAYNE J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON TUESDAY, 22 DECEMBER 1998, AT 9.31 AM

MR G.D. WENDLER: If the Court please, I appear for the appellant. (instructed by Allan McMonnies)

MR P.A. COGHLAN, QC: If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.A. ELSTON, for the respondent. (instructed by P. Wood, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Victoria))

HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Wendler.

MR WENDLER: If the Court pleases.

HIS HONOUR: I have read, Mr Wendler, the affidavit of Mr McMonnies of 15 December.

MR WENDLER: Yes, thank you, your Honour. As your Honour knows, this is an application for bail pending the making of orders in relation to the appellant’s appeal. As your Honour knows, judgment stands reserved from August of this year.

The appellant has completed three-quarters of the minimum term of imprisonment. If one assumes that he will not receive judgment this year, and that may be a fair assumption, then the earliest one might expect that he would be in possession of a judgment of this Court would be February at some stage. He is due to be released on 12 May of next year. So if he were to receive judgment in February and judgment is in his favour, he will have virtually completed all bar about three months of the minimum term.

On the last occasion before your Honour, my friend who appeared for the Victorian Director said to your Honour – and I am reading from the transcript which is the second annexure identified in paragraph 7 of the affidavit of the appellant’s solicitor – on page 5 at about point 5 my friend told your Honour that:

As the matter presently stands, I think it is clear that if the matter proceeds in the way that it now appears that it might proceed to August and a decision given thereafter, irrespective of the result of the appeal, I think it is most unlikely that the director would continue with the matter because the appellant would find himself in the position of having served so much portion of the minimum that it would seem unjust then to proceed. However, as the matter is presently left, I think he would have to be told that if he got bail now, the director would have to reconsider whether or not there were offences with which he would proceed as to the mere practicality of the matter.

In other words, what my friend was at least insinuating was that if the appeal was successful, at a time soon after August, for instance, it would be unlikely that the appellant would be put up again, so to speak, having regard to the portion of the minimum term completed.

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Parsons v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Parsons v The Queen [1998] HCATrans 470
Case: [1998] HCATrans 470
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Parsons appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial for murder.

The primary legal issue before Hayne J, sitting in chambers, was whether the evidence in question, which had been admitted at trial, was improperly obtained and therefore should have been excluded under the common law. This involved considering the principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained in circumstances that might be considered unfair or unlawful.

Hayne J applied the common law principles relating to the admissibility of evidence, particularly the discretion to exclude evidence obtained improperly or unfairly. His Honour considered the nature of the evidence, the circumstances of its acquisition, and the potential prejudice to the appellant. The decision ultimately turned on whether the admission of the evidence had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The application for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders