[2018] TASSC 62
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: Parsons v Director of Housing [2018] TASSC 62
PARTIES: PARSONS, Gregory
v
DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
FILE NO: LCA 3016/2017
DELIVERED ON: 7 December 2018
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 12 December 2017
JUDGMENT OF: Geason J
CATCHWORDS:
Leases and Tenancy Agreements – Termination of the tenancy – Notice to quit– Residential tenancies legislation – Recovery of possession – Residential Tenancy Act 1997 – Section 45(3) – Genuine or just – Statutes – Construction – Words and phrases.
Aust Dig Leases and Tenancy Agreements [173] [178] [217-218][1092] [1209-1215]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: R Merkel QC, M Norton
Respondent: P Turner
Solicitors:
Appellant: Tenants Union
Respondent: Office of the Solicitor General
Judgment Number: [2018] TASSC 62
Number of paragraphs: 64
Serial No 62/2018
File No LCA 3016/2017
GREGORY PARSONS v DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT GEASON J
7 December 2018
Mr Parsons is intellectually impaired, and lives in a unit at Glenorchy, pursuant to an agreement with the respondent which began on 27 June 2007. When it commenced, the agreement was for a term of three months, expiring on 27 September 2007. By a series of agreements, the tenancy period has been extended 14 times, over many years. The most recent extension to the agreement occurred on 2 November 2016, extending the lease period to 27 June 2017.
He is an "eligible person" under the Homes Act 1935. An "eligible person" is a person, in respect of whom the Director is satisfied "is, or will be, in need of housing assistance" under the Homes Act because of "particular circumstances or characteristics" of the person.
On 4 May 2017 a "Notice to Vacate" (notice) was served on Mr Parsons requiring him to vacate his unit by 28 June 2017. The reason for the notice was stated to be that the lease was coming to an end.
He did not leave, so the Director made an application to the Magistrates Court for an order requiring him to do so.
When the matter came before the court, Magistrate Webster determined that he had no discretion to refuse an order requiring the appellant to vacate. That was because the lease was terminable on notice to the tenant, and he was satisfied that the procedures under the Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (RTA) had been followed.
An order was made requiring Mr Parsons to deliver vacant possession of the premises by 5pm on 6 December 2017.
That order is the subject of this appeal. It has been stayed pending its determination.
The order is challenged on these grounds:
"1The learned Magistrate lacked jurisdiction, exceeded his jurisdiction, alternatively constructively failed to exercise his jurisdiction by ordering that vacant possession of the premises at Unit 18, 26 Windsor Street, Glenorchy in Tasmania be delivered by the appellant to the respondent by 5.00pm on 6 December 2017:
a without considering whether the respondent's reason for serving the Notice to Vacate on the appellant was…
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- Case
- [2018] TASSC 62
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was the correct interpretation of Section 45(3) of the Residential Tenancy Act 1997. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Director of Housing, as the landlord, had valid grounds to terminate the tenancy and recover possession of the property. This required an analysis of the statutory language, including the meaning of "genuinely" and "justly" in the context of the legislation. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Director had followed the correct procedural steps in issuing the notice to quit.
In reaching its decision, the court meticulously examined the statutory language and relevant case law to interpret the terms "genuinely" and "justly" within Section 45(3). The court concluded that the Director of Housing had demonstrated that the recovery of possession was genuinely required, as there were compelling circumstances that justified the termination of the tenancy. The court found that the Director had followed the appropriate procedures in issuing the notice to quit and that the notice was valid. Consequently, the court upheld the Director's decision to terminate the tenancy and recover possession of the property.
The court ordered that the tenancy agreement be terminated and that the Director of Housing recover possession of the property in question. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the statutory language and the specific circumstances of the case, ensuring that the Director's actions were in accordance with the provisions of the Residential Tenancy Act 1997.
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