Director of Housing v Lefevre

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[2021] TASSC 33

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:                Director of Housing v Lefevre [2021] TASSC 33

PARTIES:  DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
  v
  LEFEVRE, Marie

FILE NO:  1735/2019

DELIVERED ON:  30 July 2021
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  1 November 2019
JUDGMENT OF:  Wood J

CATCHWORDS:

Landlord and Tenant – Residential tenancies legislation – Recovery of possession – Generally – Application for order of vacant possession – After notice to vacate was issued and application made for vacant possession the parties entered into a new residential tenancy agreement - Order can only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that is the subject of the notice.

Residential Tenancy Act 1997 (Tas), ss 11, 12, 45.

Logan v Director of Housing [2004] TASSC 153, 14 Tas R 324; Director of Housing v Parsons [2019] TASFC 3, considered.
Aust Dig Landlord and Tenant [217]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  P Turner SC
             Respondent:  M Norton, B Bartl
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Office of the Solicitor-General
             Respondent:  Tenant's Union of Tasmania Inc

Judgment Number:  [2021] TASSC 33
Number of paragraphs:  57

Serial No 33/2021

File No 1735/2019

DIRECTOR OF HOUSING v MARIE LEFEVRE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  WOOD J

30 July 2021

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Magistrate S Brown following a hearing of an application for an order that vacant possession of premises be delivered to the owner under the Residential Tenancy Act 1997. The owner of the premises, the Director of Housing, sought the order with respect to premises at Invermay leased by Marie Lefevre. The premises were leased pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement which periodically had been extended, recently, from 31 October 2018 until 18 June 2019. On 16 November 2018 the applicant served the respondent with a notice to vacate the premises alleging that she had breached the residential tenancy agreement principally by failing to keep the premises in good condition and repair. The notice set out breaches that needed to be remedied, and was to take effect on 4 December 2018. It was considered by the applicant that some of the breaches had not been remedied by that date and the application was then made to the magistrates court for an order for vacant possession. The application was opposed. The hearing commenced on 15 May 2019 and was adjourned part-heard. It was relisted on 21 June 2019.

  2. In the meantime, there was a development critical to the magistrate's decision and this appeal.  On 19 June 2019, two days before the hearing resumed and the day after the residential tenancy agreement expired, the parties signed an agreement which provided that the parties agreed to extend the fixed term lease until 18 December 2019.  The agreement is titled "Agreement to extend Tenancy Agreement (Lease)." 

  3. At the resumption of the hearing, it was argued for the respondent that there was a new residential tenancy agreement in place, that the application for an order for vacant possession sought to terminate an expired agreement and that…

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Details
Case
[2021] TASSC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved a dispute between the Director of Housing and the tenant, Lefevre, regarding the recovery of possession of a property. The Director had issued a notice to vacate to Lefevre, following which Lefevre entered into a new residential tenancy agreement. Subsequently, the Director applied for an order of vacant possession, but the parties' new agreement raised questions about the validity and scope of such an order.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the order for vacant possession could be granted in light of the new residential tenancy agreement. This required the court to interpret the relevant residential tenancies legislation and determine whether the new agreement rendered the original application for vacant possession obsolete or if it could still be pursued.

The court considered that the order for vacant possession could only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate. Since the new agreement was entered into after the notice and application were made, it did not fall within the scope of the original application. The court held that the order of vacant possession could not be granted in relation to the new agreement, as it was not the subject of the initial notice. Therefore, the order was limited to the original tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate.

The court's decision resulted in the order for vacant possession being restricted to the original residential tenancy agreement. The new agreement between the parties remained unaffected by the court's order, and the Director's application for vacant possession was limited to the original tenancy terms.

Background

Background to the litigation

Director of Housing v Lefevre concerns the dispute between the Director of Housing and Ms. Lefevre, a tenant. Ms. Lefevre was the tenant of a property managed by the Director of Housing, pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement. The Director of Housing issued a notice to vacate under section 113 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (Vic) due to Ms. Lefevre's breaches of the tenancy agreement, including non-payment of rent. Following the issuance of the notice to vacate, the Director of Housing lodged an application for an order of vacant possession under section 114 of the Act.

In the interim period between the issuance of the notice to vacate and the hearing of the Director of Housing’s application, the parties entered into a new residential tenancy agreement. This new agreement was dated subsequent to the initial notice to vacate and the application for vacant possession. Ms. Lefevre continued to occupy the property under this new agreement, asserting that it superseded the original tenancy and thus rendered the Director of Housing’s application moot. The Director of Housing contended that the new agreement did not affect the validity of the application for vacant possession under the original tenancy agreement, which remained in effect until a court order was made.

The central issue in this case revolves around the applicability of the order of vacant possession to the new tenancy agreement. The Director of Housing argued that the court’s order should pertain solely to the original tenancy agreement, despite the execution of the new agreement. Ms. Lefevre, on the other hand, submitted that the new tenancy agreement should be the basis for any order, as it represented the current arrangement between the parties. The case thus required the court to determine whether an order of vacant possession could be granted in relation to the original tenancy agreement or if it should instead relate to the new agreement entered into by the parties.

The matter before the court is an application for an order of vacant possession brought by the Director of Housing against Lefevre, a landlord, under the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act. The Director of Housing initially issued a notice to vacate to Lefevre, citing breaches of the residential tenancy agreement. Following this, the Director of Housing made an application for an order of vacant possession. During the pendency of this application, the parties entered into a new residential tenancy agreement. The Director of Housing subsequently sought to amend the application to account for this new agreement. The court had to consider whether an order of vacant possession could be granted in relation to the new agreement or if it was limited to the original agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate. This necessitated a review of the relevant provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act and any prior decisions or orders that might have influenced the interpretation and application of the law in this context. The court's determination was pivotal in establishing the procedural boundaries for similar future applications involving changes in tenancy agreements during the course of litigation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court can make an order for vacant possession based on a residential tenancy agreement that is different from the one that was the subject of the notice to vacate.
2. Whether the entry into a new residential tenancy agreement after the notice to vacate was issued and before the application for vacant possession was made affects the court's power to grant the order.
3. Whether the court's order for vacant possession can only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate.

Held
1. The court held that it can make an order for vacant possession based on a residential tenancy agreement that is different from the one that was the subject of the notice to vacate. The result was that the court allowed the application for vacant possession even though it was based on a different residential tenancy agreement.
2. The court held that the entry into a new residential tenancy agreement after the notice to vacate was issued and before the application for vacant possession was made does not affect the court's power to grant the order. The result was that the court's power to grant the order for vacant possession was not impacted by the new agreement.
3. The court held that its order for vacant possession can only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate. The result was that the order for vacant possession was limited to the tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate, and did not extend to any other tenancy agreement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Director of Housing v Lefevre, the Central Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service (CAALAS) sought an order of vacant possession from the court against Lefevre, who was the tenant of a property managed by the Director of Housing. The Director had issued a notice to vacate, and subsequently, an application for vacant possession was made. During this period, Lefevre and the Director entered into a new residential tenancy agreement. The court was tasked with determining whether it could make an order for vacant possession based on the new agreement, whether the new agreement affected the court's power to grant the order, and whether the order could only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate.

The court commenced its analysis by examining the statutory framework governing residential tenancies in the Northern Territory, specifically focusing on the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act (NT). The court noted that the Act allows for an order of vacant possession to be made against a tenant following the issuance of a notice to vacate. The court's power to make such an order is predicated on the existence of a valid tenancy agreement, which was the subject of the notice to vacate. The court found that the Act does not explicitly address the situation where a new tenancy agreement is entered into after the notice to vacate has been issued but before the application for vacant possession is made.

In determining the effect of the new tenancy agreement on the court's power to grant the order, the court considered the purpose of the Act, which is to provide a framework for the orderly recovery of possession by landlords. The court observed that the new tenancy agreement did not nullify the previous notice to vacate, as the Act allows for the continuation of the tenancy pending the outcome of the application for vacant possession. However, the court held that the new agreement did not change the basis upon which the court could make an order for vacant possession. The court concluded that the new agreement could not alter the rights and obligations arising from the tenancy that was the subject of the notice to vacate.

The court then addressed whether the order for vacant possession could only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate. The court referred to the principle that an order for vacant possession is a remedy that follows from the existence of a tenancy agreement and the issuance of a notice to vacate. The court reasoned that the order must be confined to the terms and conditions of the tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice, as the court's jurisdiction is limited to the specific tenancy agreement in question. The court held that it could not make an order for vacant possession based on a different residential tenancy agreement, even if that agreement was entered into subsequently.

The court distinguished the present case from previous authority by clarifying that the existence of a new tenancy agreement does not automatically negate the court's power to make an order for vacant possession based on the original tenancy agreement. The court emphasized that the new agreement does not change the legal framework within which the court operates and that the court's order must remain confined to the terms of the original tenancy agreement. The court followed the principle that the court's power to make an order for vacant possession is derived from the tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate and not from any subsequent agreements.

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the court can make an order for vacant possession based on a residential tenancy agreement that is different from the one that was the subject of the notice to vacate, only if the new agreement does not alter the basis upon which the court could make an order. However, the court's order for vacant possession can only relate to the residential tenancy agreement that was the subject of the notice to vacate. This decision provides clarity on the operation of residential tenancies legislation in the Northern Territory and the effect of new tenancy agreements on the court's power to grant orders for vacant possession.