Parsa and Parsa and Ors - [2019] FCWA 208

JURISDICTION : FAMILY COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
ACT: FAMILY LAW ACT 1975
CHILD SUPPORT (ASSESSMENT) ACT 1989
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: PARSA and PARSA & ORS [2019] FCWA 208
CORAM: TYSON J
HEARD: 17, 18 and 19 JULY 2019
DELIVERED : 23 SEPTEMBER 2019
FILE NO/S: PTW 2606 of 2016
BETWEEN: MR PARSA
Applicant
AND
MS PARSA
Respondent
AND
LAW FIRM A
Interveners

Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY - Long marriage – Approach to be adopted – Post separation inheritance - Two pool approach – Assessment as to contributions - Assessment of section 75(2) factors - Where the husband’s previous solicitors have intervened in relation to outstanding legal fees – Case turns on its own facts

CHILD SUPPORT – Child support departure order sought by consent - Case turns on its own facts

Legislation:

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Category: Not Reportable

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Self Represented Litigant
Respondent	:	Mrs Farmer
Interveners	:	Mr Davies

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Self Represented Litigant
Respondent	:	Calverley Johnston
Interveners	:	Law Firm A

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Biltoft & Biltoft (1995) FLC 92-614
Bonnici & Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272
Calvin & McTier (2017) FLC 93-785
Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204
Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244
Froth & Froth [2007] FamCA 1608
Goodwin & Goodwin Alpe (1991) FLC 92-192
Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490
Holland & Holland (2017) FLC 93-798
In re LC (Children) [2014] UKSC 1
Khademollah & Khademollah (2000) FLC 93-050
Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092
Lenehan & Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072
Reynolds & Reynolds [1990] FamCA 50
Sinclair & Sinclair [2012] FamCA 388
Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108
Trevi & Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858
Vokic & Vlass [2012] FamCA 56
Zaruba & Zaruba (2017) FLC 93-776
Zyk & Zyk (1995) FLC 92-644

TYSON J:

WORDS IN SQUARE BRACKETS REPLACE WORDS USED IN THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT – PARTIES’ NAMES AND IDENTIFYING DETAILS HAVE BEEN CHANGED

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Parsa and Parsa & Ors has been approved by the Family Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1[Mr Parsa] [“the husband”] and [Ms Parsa] [“the wife”] were married for approximately 20 years, separating on a final basis in 2016. From 2011, the parties’ marriage was strained: they were effectively living separate lives under the one roof. They have since divorced. The husband and wife have four sons, one of whom is now an adult.
2The husband and wife are unable to agree on the division of property following the breakdown of their marriage. As a result, the Court is required to make a determination. Complicating the dispute, is the fact the parties do not agree on the asset pool.
3These proceedings are governed by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). There is no assumption that the husband and wife have a right to have their property divided or that either has the right to property that is fixed. While each party wants the Court to do so, that is not enough. To decide these matters, I must determine the following issues:
Firstly what is the property of the husband and wife?
Secondly, what is the value of the assets, liabilities and superannuation entitlements of the parties?
Thirdly, is it just and equitable to make an order altering the husband’s and the wife’s interests in their property? If I decide that it is just and equitable to make an order, then I must determine:
•What have been the husband’s and the wife’s contributions?
•Whether there should be an adjustment in favour of either party, as a result of their respective future needs?
•What outcome is just and equitable to both parties?

WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE THAT IS RELIED UPON?

4The husband relies upon his affidavits filed 24 June 2019, 31 May 2019, and 27 February 2018 together with his financial statement filed 24 June 2019, and book of exhibits. The wife relies upon her affidavits filed 21 June 2019, 12 and 29 October 2018 and 24 April 2018, book of exhibits, and her financial statement filed 21 June 2019. The wife also relies upon an affidavit of [R Matheson] filed 24 April 2018.
5A number of documents were tendered by consent, including an updated valuation by the Single Expert Witness [Mr O] from [Property Valuation Company A], of [the Suburb C property].[1]
[1] Affidavit sworn 18 July 2019.

WHAT IS AGREED?

6The parties will each retain their car, savings and the wife will retain her superannuation entitlements. Each party will indemnify the other in relation to their personal liabilities. The husband will retain [Company A Pty Ltd], [Company B Pty Ltd] and [Company G Pty Ltd].
7The parties agree to depart from the administrative assessment of child support, to fix each party’s income and for each party to pay 50% of [Child A] and [Child B]’s education and health expenses. The parties agreed to liaise with the Department of Human Services as to the form of the orders and to provide the minute to me in chambers. I have since received from Calverley Johnston the signed minute. Subject to confirmation from the Department, having heard the evidence and given the consent of the parties, I am satisfied there are special circumstances to support the departure orders, where the children are being cared for, educated or trained in a manner expected by the parents in accordance with s 117(2)(b)(ii) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth). I consider it is just and equitable and otherwise proper to make an order pursuant to s 124(1) of the Assessment Act, taking into account the matters prescribed in s 124(4).

WHAT ARE THE PROPOSALS OF THE PARTIES?

8The husband seeks orders in terms of his minute filed 5 July 2019. The wife seeks orders in terms of her minute filed 15 March 2019. Each party wants to retain the Suburb C property and refinance the secured loans into their sole name.
9The husband proposes the furniture and contents at the Suburb C property be divided equally and failing agreement, in accordance with his list. The wife seeks to retain the contents, apart from a nominated list of items which the husband can retain.
10The wife seeks that the husband pay her such amount so she retains 55% of the net property and superannuation entitlements, excluding her inheritances received since separation. The husband seeks the net property and superannuation entitlements, including the wife’s inheritances, be divided equally.

THE TRIAL

11The husband represented himself at trial. I spent some time at the commencement of the hearing explaining various matters to ensure he understood the process. I explained the importance of cross-examination if he was seeking to challenge factual statements which could properly be regarded as relevant to the matters in dispute. The husband was aware of the law. He was well prepared. He asked a number of relevant questions and conducted himself appropriately. I acknowledge he, and the wife, found parts of the trial difficult. However, the husband was able to fully participate in the proceedings. I am aware of the guidelines regarding the manner in which a judicial officer should deal with unrepresented litigants.[2] I applied those guidelines and am comfortable that the trial was fair.
[2] See Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072 at [209] to [253].

WHAT IS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PARTIES AND WITNESSES?

12Baroness Hale in the matter of In re LC (Children) [2014] UKSC 1 at [67] said:
Almost every witness engages in a certain amount of (conscious or unconscious) manipulation of their recollection of past events to meet their present interests.

13In my view, those comments are relevant in the current case. For the most part, I considered the husband and the wife attempted to give truthful evidence, but both saw matters very much from their own perspective and with a view to the outcome sought in these proceedings.
14The wife tended to minimise the husband’s contributions, especially his financial contributions and his construction of the parties’ homes. Similarly the husband tended to minimise the wife’s financial contributions in terms of her income and inheritances. I consider the husband overstated and emphasised his parenting contributions, at the expense of properly recognising the wife’s care of the children.
15The wife repeatedly stated that she wanted her inheritance back, which she described as “my blood and family money”, and nothing to do with the husband. The wife presented as angry and frustrated at the husband’s financial decisions. She considers he has failed to properly exercise his income earning capacity. She was frank explaining she did not understand commercial matters.
16The husband repeatedly stated that he was a shattered businessman and family did not end on separation. He was aggrieved about the circumstances in which he was excluded from the Suburb C property and holds ongoing animosity towards the wife. He considers if the wife had been rational and amicable, the parties could have resolved matters without litigation.
17The wife does not trust the husband and called him a liar. The husband does not trust the wife, noting that she lied to him about having obtained legal advice prior to their physical separation in 2016.[3] The parties’ lack of trust meant they were deeply suspicious of one other.
[3] Refer to Exhibit 10 – Email from the wife to the husband dated 23 March 2015.
18The husband attempted to give his evidence honestly and as he saw it. He struggled to respond directly to questions, preferring to make lengthy statements. He needed to be directed to answer questions on many occasions. There were aspects of the husband’s evidence which I did not accept. For example, in March 2017 the husband asked [Child C] and [Child D] to remove items from the Suburb C property, which they delivered to him. The husband’s lawyers wrote denying that he had instructed the children to remove the items. That was untrue.
19At times, the husband referred to his investments being successful, pointing to the potential sale price of shares at various times. At other stages, the husband referred to the shares as simply “digits on paper” when he was criticised for the transfer of shares to third parties. His evidence in this regard was confusing and contradictory.
20The wife was generally honest and gave evidence as she saw it. The wife was more direct in her answers but she also needed to be directed to respond to questions.
21The wife relied on an affidavit of R Matheson, who was not required for cross-examination. I accept his unchallenged evidence. R Matheson was the joint executor of the estate of the late [N Matheson] and the joint executor of the estate of the late [C Matheson]. The wife received $706,135 from the two estates in the following manner:
(a)In February 2009 $48,000
(b)In January 2010 $3,378
(c)In August 2010 $462,500
(d)In March 2012 $150,000
(e)In November 2014 $38,000
(f)In December 2015 $4,257

THE ASSET POOL

22The parties handed up a joint schedule of assets, liabilities and superannuation entitlements, which became Exhibit 1. By the conclusion of the trial, the scope of disputed items reduced. The parties disagreed as to what approach I should adopt. Central to that dispute was how the Court should treat the inheritances which the wife has received since separation.
23The husband proposes that a global approach be adopted, with the wife’s inheritance from her aunt and mother to be included in the joint schedule. The wife proposes the Court adopt a two pools approach, with her inheritance from her aunt to be in a separate pool, the joint property into another pool and her inheritance from her mother to be treated as a financial resource.

I Murray

24The wife’s aunt [Ms I Murray] passed away [in late] 2018. The wife’s cousin [Mr C] was the executor and trustee of the estate. The wife was the sole beneficiary.[4]
[4] Exhibit C to the wife’s affidavit filed 21 June 2019.
25The wife inherited $1,008,520, of which she has spent the following:
(a)Legal fees $83,643
(b)Interest payments on ANZ Equity Manager
· account [“A”] $5,923
· account [“B”] $16,092
(c)Rates on the Suburb C property $2,589
(d)Valuation fees for [the Suburb M property] as part of
her mother’s estate $495
(e)Bank fees $10

26The wife retains the balance, of $881,885. She expects to be reimbursed from her mother’s estate for the valuation fees.

One Pool or Two Pools Approach?

27 The authorities suggest that in most cases the global approach is generally preferred. However, depending on the circumstances, the Court has discretion as to which approach to adopt.[5]

[5] See Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513; Lenehan & Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814; and Zyk & Zyk (1995) FLC 92-644.

28The Full Court in Zaruba & Zaruba (2017) FLC 93-776 at [38] stated:
In the vast majority of cases, it will be appropriate to address the s 79(2) question by ascertaining the legal and equitable interests in property without making distinctions between individual assets. This is because [referring to Stanford] the ‘express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements’ can be seen to apply to all of the property of the parties or either of them, including property in which the legal interests vary.

29The Full Court noted there are exceptions, as:[6]
[6] Zaruba (supra) at [39].
…the position is likely to be different in circumstances where, as here, the characteristics of the property and the circumstances of its acquisition, improvement and the like can be seen to differ significantly and where, as here, the parties’ relationship has taken on quite different characteristics during the period to which the s 79 inquiry is directed.

30In Holland & Holland (2017) FLC 93-798 the Full Court referred to the decision in Zaruba (supra), noting:[7]
[7] See Holland & Holland (2017) FLC 93-798 at [30].
… nothing said by the High Court in Stanford calls into question what was earlier said by that court in Norbis v Norbis.

31They went on to conclude:
[31]Thus, the nature of a particular interest or interests in property and when and how it was acquired, utilised, improved or preserved may be very relevant to each or all of three central questions: should a s 79 order be made at all; whether contributions should be assessed ‘globally’ or ‘asset by asset’ or by reference to two or more ‘pools’; and, what is the nature and extent of each party’s contributions. However, there is no basis for excluding from consideration any property in which the parties have an existing legal or equitable interest.
(citations omitted)

32It is well established that:
(a)Property does not fall into a protected category merely because it was an inheritance, but it can be quarantined in the hands of the inheriting party if sufficient funds are available to meet the appropriate required settlement.[8]
[8] See Bonnici & Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272.
(b)The Court retains discretion as to how it treats assets acquired after separation. It is at liberty to include an inheritance received post separation globally in an assessment.[9]
[9] See Calvin & McTier (2017) FLC 93-785.
(c)The circumstances of each case, including the timing of receipt of the inheritance, and the extent to which the parties’ entitlements can be met without drawing on the inheritance, may impact upon how the Court treats the inheritance.
(d)Courts have adopted a variety of approaches, including quarantining the inheritance and dividing the balance, making appropriate adjustments.[10]
[10] See Vokic & Vlass [2012] FamCA 56 and Froth & Froth [2007] FamCA 1608.

33The wife’s counsel referred to the decision of Cronin J in Sinclair & Sinclair [2012] FamCA 388 in which almost all of the asset pool arose from an inheritance received by the wife. His Honour reviewed the authorities and stated:
23.Isolating or quarantining an inheritance must be cautiously done to ensure that earlier important contributions to the family in particular, are not ignored. As will be seen by the evidence here, there is a distinct possibility of that happening if the focus is entirely on the assets received by the wife from inheritances and gifts.
24.As was pointed out in Farmer and Bramley [2000] FamCA 1615; (2000) FLC 93-060 the power in s 79(1) to alter the interests of parties in property extends without limitation to all property regardless of when it was received. As Finn J pointed out (at paragraph 56):
If it was to be determined that a majority of the community considered that one spouse should, as a general rule, have no entitlement to sharing property either by good fortune or good management acquired after separation by the other spouse, then the Act would need to be amended to make this clear. As the Act currently stands, the jurisdiction conferred by s 79(1) to alter the interests of spouses in property extends without limitation to all properties which either spouse is entitled (whether in possession or reversion).

25.Nothing in the Act refers to a requirement that contributions be measured simply by reference to the assets currently held by a party.
26.Accordingly, the assessment and weight to be given to the contributions must be a discretionary one and in circumstances such as the case here, prior cases are of little assistance.

34The wife’s inheritance was received after separation. The husband accepts he has not made any contributions to the inheritance or to the wife’s aunt, within the meaning of s 79. I accept that the husband did not contribute and the funds were received by the wife in her own right.
35The orders I make must be just and equitable. To that end, I consider it would be useful to divide the parties’ property into two categories or pools. The first pool contains property in existence at trial, which reflects the different contributions of the parties to date. The second pool contains the wife’s inheritance acquired solely by her since separation. I will assess the parties’ contributions to the two pools separately, because the different contributions of the parties can be most readily recognised in this way. I consider this approach is also convenient.
36I will adopt the balance of the wife’s inheritance adjusted to include the expected reimbursement. I consider it was reasonable for the wife to apply her inheritance in the manner she has. She has had limited income since separation. Her expenditure to service borrowings and rates on the Suburb C property has benefited both parties. In those circumstances, I will adopt the amount of $882,380.

M Matheson

37The wife is an only child. Her mother [M Matheson] lived with her from late 2017, when the wife assisted in her care. M Matheson passed away [in mid] 2018. The wife, together with her cousins [Mr N and Mr C] are the joint executors, trustees and appointors of the estate.
38M Matheson’s will[11] established the M Matheson Trust. The primary beneficiaries are the wife and the parties’ four children. The children are entitled to benefit from the Trust upon attaining 21 years of age, with provision for earlier distributions at the discretion of the trustees.
[11] Annexure A to the wife’s affidavit filed 12 October 2018.
39When these proceedings have concluded, the wife and the joint trustees intend to obtain legal advice and progress the application for probate.

40The assets of the M Matheson Trust include the Suburb M property, which has been valued at $800,000[12] and savings of $90,410.39. The wife anticipates the savings will be reduced by meeting the cost of her mother’s gravestone, the outgoings and maintenance on the Suburb M property, in addition to legal fees associated with the estate and Trust.
[12] As at 4 August 2018 - annexure B to the wife’s affidavit filed 21 June 2019.
41The husband accepts that he made no contribution towards the wife’s inheritance. The husband assisted the wife’s mother with some painting and a bore during the marriage. He did not otherwise suggest he had contributed to the wife’s inheritance. I find that the husband did not contribute.
42The husband seeks to include the M Matheson Trust as property worth $1,064,231, based upon his view that the Suburb M property is worth $970,000, together with the cash of the estate. The wife seeks her interest in the Trust be considered as a financial resource.

Property or a Financial Resource?

43The nature of a party’s interest in trust property is a question of fact. In the unreported decision of Reynolds & Reynolds,[13] cited in Goodwin & Goodwin Alpe (1991) FLC 92-192, the Court found:
[13] Reynolds & Reynolds [1990] FamCA 50.
…the question whether the property of the trust is, in reality, the property of the parties or one of them, or a financial resource of the parties or one of them, is a matter dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case including the terms of the relevant Trust Deed.

44Recently, the High Court in Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490 considered the meaning of the term “financial resource”, which is not defined in the Act. The majority said:[14]
[14] At [55].
Whether a potential source of financial support amounts to a financial resource of a party turns in most cases on a factual inquiry as to whether or not support from that source could reasonably be expected to be forthcoming were the party to call on it.

45The wife, Mr N and Mr C are the joint trustees of the Trust. The trustees are required to apply the Trust Fund, as defined, “in the shares in amounts and at such times as my trustee (exercising their absolute discretion) thinks fit.” The Trust is established for such period as the trustees shall nominate, or 80 years after the death of Mrs Matheson, whichever is the sooner.[15] The trustees are not obliged to make equal or any payment to any or all of the beneficiaries.[16] The trustees are required to act jointly and unanimously.[17] The powers of the trustees are broad.[18]
[15] Clause 11 of the Will of M Matheson.
[16] Clause 6(b)(ii) of the Will of M Matheson.
[17] Clause 9(a) of the Will of M Matheson.
[18] Clause 10 of the Will of M Matheson.
46The husband’s approach is that the Trust belong to the wife. That ignores the terms of the Trust and the rights of the other beneficiaries. The wife is not the sole beneficiary. She is one of three trustees, who are required to act jointly. No funds have been made available to any of the beneficiaries. The Trust does not vest until 80 years after the death of M Matheson, unless the trustees agree to nominate an earlier date.
47I will treat the wife’s interest in the Trust as a financial resource. I consider that to be appropriate given: the wife has not received any distributions; there was no evidence from the other trustees about their attitude towards any proposed distributions to the wife; the trustees are bound to act jointly; they are not required to make equal or any payments; the Trustees must consider the other beneficiaries; there is no certainty as to the distributions which the wife may receive.
48I will now consider the further items, which were in dispute:

Safe Contents

49The parties had a safe in the husband’s bedside table, which contained diamonds, foreign currency, watches, jewellery and sentimental items. The wife says the safe is no longer in the Suburb C property. She suspects the husband took it when he removed items, accompanied by the police. The husband denies removing the safe and says it is not in his possession.
50The wife has reported the safe as stolen to the police. The wife seeks the contents of the safe be included at $30,000. In circumstances where the wife and the husband say they do not have the safe, nor the contents, where it has been reported stolen, and where there was no admissible evidence as to the value of the contents of the safe, I intend to ignore the item, given I cannot be satisfied it exists.

Furniture and Contents at the Suburb C property

51The wife estimates her contents are worth $8,000 while the husband says they are worth $30,000. The husband made no application to appoint a Single Expert to value these items. There is no independent evidence of value.
52It is well established that a person who assets a higher value for an asset, carries the onus of proof.[19] The items are in the wife’s possession. She will be aware of their condition. In the absence of an independent valuation, I accept the wife’s estimate of value.
[19] Khademollah & Khademollah (2000) FLC 93-050.

Rug

53The wife seeks to include a rug which she says is worth $2,000. The husband says the rug belongs to his sister, who purchased it in 2004. The rug was stored in the family’s home and has since been returned to the husband’s sister. The wife thought the rug was a gift from the husband’s family. There was no expert evidence as to the value of the rug.
54This was not the subject of any detailed evidence nor submissions. The husband’s sister was not called to give evidence. I found the husband’s evidence plausible. Doing the best I can with the available evidence, I intend to ignore the item. I am not satisfied to the relevant standard that the rug belongs to the husband.

Unpaid Salary and Fees

55The wife considers [Company E Ltd] owes the husband fees for the past five years and seeks $611,312 be included in the joint schedule as an asset. She has calculated these amounts, based upon Company E Ltd’s published annual reports:

Financial Year End	Amount
2014	$75,000
2015	$180,000
2016	$53,812
2017	$135,000
2018	$167,500
Sub-total	$611,312

56The annual reports record an executive service agreement between Company G and Company E which commenced on 21 March 2013 for 12 months, renewable annually or until terminated. The agreement provides for remuneration of $180,000 per annum plus GST payable to Company G or its nominee.
57The husband has not received those amounts, nor does he expect to, as Company E has limited revenue. The husband did not request Company E to pay the amounts owing to Company G, including at times when Company E’s cash balances were more favourable. Aspects of the husband’s evidence were confusing on this topic: he asserted the agreement between Company G and Company E had been terminated, but accepted no termination agreement had been disclosed. The annual reports refer to the agreement.
58While the wife criticises the husband for not actively pursuing payment, I do not intend to add back the sums as a notional asset. For the past five years, predating separation, Company E has not paid Company G the full amounts owing. The annual reports[20] demonstrate Company E has been poorly performing for many years: in 2017 it reported a loss of $643,074 and in 2016 a loss of $647,571.
[20] For example, documents 14, 23 – 26 to the husband’s book of exhibits.
59Correspondence from Company E[21] confirmed the board’s resolution to limit payment of salaries to directors, to preserve the company’s cash position. It was agreed Company G would only be paid consultancy fees for the services the husband provided, when Company E was in a financially secure position.
[21] Document 116 of the husband’s book of exhibits.
60In light of the poor financial position of Company E, the fact Company G has not been paid in full since 2013, instead receiving shares in lieu of directors’ fees, I am not satisfied that Company G is likely to recover these funds. Instead, in the exercise of my discretion, I will take it into account when considering s 75(2)(o).

Funds withdrawn by the husband from Equity Manager Accounts

61After separation, the husband withdrew $61,300 from the ANZ Equity Manager account A and $16,800 from the ANZ Equity Manager account B. The wife seeks $78,100 be treated as the husband’s notional property.
62The husband unilaterally withdrew those amounts. He has not satisfactorily explained how he expended those funds. He deposed he “had to withdraw $78,100 …to pay for rental accommodation, payments on my credit card to fund expenses on …[the Suburb C property], … general living expenses and to fund initial legal costs”.[22] He says $10,000 was spent on accommodation, $5,000 on household items and “items of personal necessity”,[23] approximately $10,000 on legal costs, and medical costs which he estimated cost $1,000 prior to any Medicare rebate. He did not explain how the balance was applied.
[22] The husband’s affidavit filed 27 February 2018, paragraph 283.
[23] Correspondence from [Law Firm B] dated 20 April 2016 - Document 10 from the husband’s book of exhibits.
63The Full Court of the Family Court in Trevi & Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858 said:
[27] The Full Court held in Omacini & Omacini that addbacks fall into "three clear categories": where the parties have expended money on legal fees; where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and “waste” or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of assets.
[28] However, the Full Court also made it clear that an addback does not necessarily occur whenever "a party has expended money realised from the disposition of assets that existed as at the date of separation", the Full Court describing such a proposition as "unduly simplistic". An earlier Full Court made the same point, saying that adding back is "the exception rather than the rule".
[29] The fundamental precept that addbacks are exceptional, reflected in the decisions just referred to, also mirrors what has been said in earlier decisions of the Full Court that, for example, "the Family Court must take the property of a party to the marriage as it finds it" at trial. An important parallel proposition is that the parties do not “go into a state of suspended economic animation” after separation. Thus, reasonably incurred expenditure does not usually come within accepted categories of addback.
[30] Two fundamental premises emerge from Omacini and the authorities preceding it. First, "adding back" is a discretionary exercise. When the discretion is exercised in favour of adding back, it reflects a decision that, exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of a case, justice and equity requires it. The second premise is its corollary: in cases that are not “exceptional” justice and equity can be achieved, not by adding back, but by the exercise of a different discretion — usually by taking up the same as a relevant s 75(2) factor. Indeed, it has been said that the latter is “a course which is, perhaps, technically more correct” than adding back to the list of existing interests in property.
(citations omitted)

64The power conferred by s 79(1) of the Act is to make orders for the alteration of existing interests in existing property. The Full Court has made it clear that so-called add backs are the exception and not the rule. I have discretion to include an item as notional property, to do justice in the particular case.
65In the exercise of my discretion, I intend to include these amount as the husband’s notional property. The funds existed at separation, such that both parties can be seen having an interest in them. His actions represented disposal of property that would otherwise have been available for division. I do not consider the husband’s actions were reasonably explained. The husband was clearly on notice throughout the proceedings about these matters. He failed to discharge the onus of adequately explaining and disclosing how the funds were applied.

Paid Legal Fees and Personal Loans

66Both parties have spent significant funds on legal fees. The husband paid $48,779 to [Law Firm B],[24] $36,627 to [Law Firm C][25] and $189,188 to [Law Firm A]. The husband owes $46,718 to [Law Firm A] and $11,000 to Dr Ingleby.[26] The husband’s costs with [Law Firm D] related only to the VRO.
[24] Exhibit 5 – Law Firm B Debtor Statement.
[25] Exhibit 4 - Email from Law Firm C dated 11 April 2018 and trust statement.
[26] Exhibit 3 - Email from Law Firm A dated 10 July 2019.
67The husband borrowed money to pay his legal costs including $145,000 from his brother-in-law [Mr A], $5,000 from his nephew [S Parsa], $10,000 from [F Super Fund], an entity controlled by [Mr Z]. He asserts funds withdrawn from ANZ, to which I have referred, were also utilised for his legal fees, together with the proceeds of sale of shares. The husband seeks these loans and his unpaid legal fees be included in the joint schedule.
68The wife has paid $229,081 to Calverley Johnston and $36,934 for counsel’s fees. Her solicitors hold $17,999 on trust. The wife has paid her legal costs from her “own personal resources, such as post separation income and post separation inheritance”.
69Neither party sought that I include each party’s paid legal fees in the schedule. The wife’s counsel submitted if the Court was persuaded to include the husband’s loans with respect to his legal fees, then his paid legal fees should also be included.
70None of the parties who have lent the husband money swore an affidavit or gave evidence. The husband produced loan agreements with Mr Z, [Mr H], [Mr W] and S Parsa only. On the husband’s own evidence, the terms of the loan agreements had not been complied with. There was no evidence about enforcement.
71The Full Court in Biltoft & Biltoft (1995) FLC 92-614 discussed the treatment of an unsecured debt to a third party and indicated it may be appropriate to exclude an unsecured liability in certain circumstances, including where the liability is vague, uncertain, if it is unlikely to be enforced or if it was unreasonably incurred.[27]
[27] Refer to page 82,127.
72The treatment of funds used to pay legal costs remains a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.[28] In exercising that discretion, close attention is required to the source of funds from which those costs have been met.
[28] Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204.
73The Full Court has recently restated[29] that if funds used to pay legal costs existed at separation, such that both parties can be seen as having an interest in them, such funds should be added back as a notional asset of the party who has had the benefit of them. Whereas if the funds used to pay legal fees have been generated by a party since separation or received in their own right, such amounts would generally not be added back, nor would any borrowings incurred by a party since separation to meet their legal fees be included as a liability.
[29] Trevi & Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858.
74Outstanding legal fees are generally not included as a liability. If, in the exercise of discretion, it is determined that legal fees already paid should be taken into account as a notional asset, then normally any liability associated with the acquisition of the monies used to pay legal fees, should also be taken into account.
75The approach towards the treatment of paid legal fees should be that which delivers a just outcome in the circumstances of the case. I am not satisfied it is appropriate to include each party’s paid legal fees where neither party sought that I do so. Different sources have been utilised by each party. To the extent the husband has applied joint property to pay his costs, that has been reflected in the schedule. To treat the husband’s personal loans associated with his legal fees in the schedule, would in effect, require the wife to contribute to his legal costs. That is not appropriate at this stage.
76I am not satisfied that the husband’s personal loans should be included, so that the wife shares in those debts. They have been incurred by the husband, since separation, for his sole benefit. Accordingly the husband’s personal loans and the amount he owes Law Firm A will be excluded from the schedule. I will address this issue when considering s 75(2) of the Act.

The husband’s sold shares

77Since separation the husband has sold 205,000 shares in [Company N] and 8 million shares in Company E Ltd. The wife seeks these amounts, being $54,275 be treated as a notional asset. The husband applied these proceeds towards his legal costs. This issue was ventilated during the Interim Hearing on 3 April 2018. On the basis the shares existed at separation, both parties had an interest in the shares, which have since been sold by the husband to meet his legal costs, in the exercise of my discretion I will include $54,275 as an add back. That approach is consistent with the authorities, to which I have referred. I consider that to be an appropriate exercise of my discretion.

Company E Ltd Shares

78Company G Pty Ltd owns 45,529,696 shares in Company E Ltd, which the wife values at $91,059 based on the trading price of 0.002. The husband says the shares have no value, despite accepting the share price.
79Prior to trial, I made interim orders granting the husband permission to cause the sale of shares, including those owned by Company G Pty Ltd in Company E Ltd. The husband says he was unable to sell the shares, due to a dispute with Company G Pty Ltd’s director [Mr T], who claims the husband owes money to Company G Pty Ltd.
80Mr T was not a witness. The husband relied upon an email from Mr T which refers to Company G Pty Ltd’s payment of $42,717 to [Law Firm E] in relation to the current proceedings.[30] The email states Company G Pty Ltd owes $47,520 to Mr T and Company G Pty Ltd has other outstanding invoices. Mr T’s email acknowledges the husband is the beneficial owner of the shares but writes “you are denying my relevant interest in it as director”. The husband conceded he was able to call a company meeting, remove Mr T as the director of Company G Pty Ltd and appoint a new director to replace him. The husband has not done so, as he considers Mr T may sell the shares in the relevant notice period. Mr T appears to misunderstand the distinction between debts of Company G Pty Ltd and its shareholders.
[30] Exhibit 6 – Dated 9 July 2019.
81I propose to include the shares in the schedule at $91,059.

ATO Debt

82The husband sought to include $3,000 as the anticipated GST payable by Company A Pty Ltd for 30 June 2019. GST has not been lodged. The debt has not yet crystallised. In those circumstances, I do not propose to include the amount as a liability.
83I am satisfied the known assets, liabilities and superannuation entitlements are as follows:

POOL 1
ASSETS	Ownership	Value
Suburb C property	Joint	$1,150,000
Furniture & Contents – Suburb C property	Joint	$8,000
ANZ Progress Saver A/C	Husband	$3,166
CBA Net Bank Saver A/C	Wife	$10
CBA Smart Access A/C	Wife	$32
CBA Passbook A/C	Wife	$542
[Vehicle E]	Wife	$4,500
[Vehicle F]	Husband	$13,000
[P Pty Ltd] - 500 shares	Husband	$500
Add Back Shares sold post separation	Husband	$54,275
Add Back withdrawals Equity Manager A/C [“A”]	Husband	$61,300
Add Back Withdrawals Equity Manager A/C [“B”]	Husband	$16,800
Company G Pty Ltd Shares in Company E Ltd	Husband	$91,059
TOTAL ASSETS	$1,403,184
LIABILITIES
ANZ Equity Manager A/C [“A”]	Joint	$502,458
ANZ Equity Manager A/C [“B”]	Joint	$201,073
Westpac Visa A/C	Wife	$2,590
ANZ Visa A/C	Husband	$6,020
HECS/HELP Loan	Wife	$58,458
TOTAL LIABLITIES	$770,599
SUBTOTAL NET ASSETS	$632,585
SUPERANNUATION
[Super Fund A]	Wife	$23,892
[Super Fund B]	Wife	$19,890
TOTAL SUPERANNUATION	$43,782
TOTAL ASSETS & SUPERANNUATION	$676,367

POOL 2
Bankwest Telenet Saver A/C - adjusted	Wife	$882,380

WHAT ARE THE BACKGROUND FACTS?

84The husband was born [in 1972] in [Central Asia]. The wife was born [in 1972] in Australia. Both parties are 47 years of age. The wife lives in the Suburb C property. The husband lives in a granny flat behind his mother’s home, in [Suburb D].
85The husband described himself as self-employed. The wife is employed on a part-time basis as [an interpreter].
86The parties married and commenced living together [in] 1996.
87There are four children of the marriage: Child C born [in] 2000 who is 19 years of age, Child D born [in] 2002, who is 17 years of age, Child B born [in] 2005 who is 14 years of age and Child A born [in] 2009, who is 10 years of age.
88The parties physically separated in February 2016. The wife subsequently obtained a Violence Restraining Order for her and the children’s protection against the husband. The VRO was settled by an Undertaking.
89Child-related proceedings culminated in a trial in November 2018, which involved an Independent Children’s Lawyer, together with a Single Expert Witness. The parties agreed Child D would spend time with each parent in accordance with his wishes. They agreed from March 2019 Child B would spend week-about with each parent.
90Pursuant to the orders of 14 November 2018 Child A continues to live with the wife and spends time with the husband on a gradually increasing basis. By 2021, Child A will spend week-about with each parent.
91Much of the litigation focussed on parenting matters. The salient aspects of the financial matters are as follows:
(a)On 7 November 2017 the parties attended a Conciliation Conference.
(b)On 16 October 2017 interim orders were made for the husband to provide documents by way of disclosure. The wife was given leave to issue subpoena.
(c)On 5 February 2018 an Interim Hearing was held in respect of the husband’s application for release of funds to meet his legal fees. The application was dismissed on 6 April 2018 and the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s costs of $10,000. Payment was stayed until the final property orders.
(d)On 7 November 2018 the property trial was vacated. Interim orders restrained [Company U Pty Ltd] from selling, transferring, assigning, encumbering or dealing with 204,800,000 shares in Company E Ltd. The husband was similarly restrained both in his personal capacity and in his capacity as any office holder or shareholder from dealing with any shares in which he had a direct or indirect interest. The wife was required to file a written Undertaking as to Damages within 48 hours and her interim application, affidavit in support and the orders were to be served on Company U Pty Ltd. The husband and Company U Pty Ltd had liberty to set aside the injunctions on short notice.
(e)On 14 November 2018, the wife was given permission to issue a subpoena to Law Firm E. The interim application was adjourned to 3 December 2019. On that date the subpoena was dismissed and orders were made to join Company U Pty Ltd, who were named as the Second Respondent. Company U Pty Ltd was relieved of any requirement to file further documents. Directions were made to progress financial matters to trial.
(f)On 21 January 2019 orders were made by consent which included the following recitals:
A.An order was made on 7 November 2018 restraining the Second Respondent by way of injunction from selling, transferring, assigning or in any way encumbering or dealing with 204,800,000 shares held by the Second Respondent in Company E Ltd;
B.The First Respondent gave an Undertaking as to Damages on 9 November 2018;
C.The Second Respondent was joined as a party to the proceedings on 3 December 2018;
D.The Second Respondent undertakes not to bring a claim or action against the First Respondent for damages arising out of the injunction granted on 7 November 2018.

(g)On 21 January 2019, the injunctions made on 14 December 2018 and 7 November 2018 were discharged, together with the wife’s Undertaking as to Damages and any obligation thereunder. The parties’ costs were reserved, with liberty to apply within 28 days of final orders.
(h)On 29 April 2019 the husband filed an application seeking funds to meet his legal fees. The wife filed her responding documents and the matter proceeded to hearing on 18 June 2019. Interim orders were made varying the injunction granted on 7 November 2018 giving the husband permission to sell shares in which he had an interest, providing he gave disclosure to the wife and the net proceeds of sale were characterised by way of partial property settlement. [The directors of Law Firm A] were granted leave to intervene. The Intervenors indicated they did not intend to participate in the trial, apart from making closing submissions.[31]
(i)On 5 July 2019 the parties attended a Status Hearing. Orders were made by consent for the parties to jointly instruct Property Valuation Company A to prepare an updated valuation of the Suburb C property at their shared cost. Various other procedural orders were made. The matter has otherwise progressed through to trial.

IS IT JUST AND EQUITABLE TO MAKE AN ORDER?

[31] Which they did.

92The parties have been separated since 2016. They are now divorced. Following the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage, and where there is no longer any 'common use' of property,[32] both parties seek to alter their property interest and to separate their financial affairs. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it would be just and equitable to make an order by way of alteration of property interests.

WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTIES?

Waste

[32] See Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108.

93The wife considers the husband’s actions prior to and since separation have amounted to waste and that he has embarked on a reckless or negligent course of conduct which has had the effect of dissipating the asset pool available for division. The wife’s counsel relied on the decision of Kowaliw & Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092, where Baker J held that marriage, for most couples, involved an economic partnership in which both parties should share in the economic fruits of the marriage although not necessarily equally. Similarly, financial losses incurred by the parties, or either of them during the course of the marriage, should be shared between them, but not necessarily equally, other than in circumstances where one party has embarked upon a course of conduct designed to reduce or minimise the effective worth of the assets or where one party has acted recklessly, negligently or wantonly with matrimonial assets, the overall effect of which has reduced or minimised their value.
94The husband says he has done his best to provide for the family. While some of his efforts have been profitable, such as [the Parsa Business] and the construction of properties as an owner-builder, some have not, such as his investments in [Company P Ltd] and Company E Ltd. He says the parties should share in those losses, in the same manner they share in the gains.
95To understand the wife’s complaint, it is helpful to consider the husband’s financial dealings.

Company P Ltd

96In 2010 the husband was a shareholder in Company P Ltd. He and other investors had concerns the company was not being properly managed. In 2012 the husband was appointed as a director, until he resigned in 2014.
97Company P Ltd was ultimately suspended. The new directors and investors formed [Company L Ltd]. The husband lost money as a consequence of dilutions in his shareholding and the failure of the company.
98During cross-examination the husband disclosed he had advanced $30,000 worth of Company P Ltd shares to Mr Z, which Mr Z had not repaid. The husband’s evidence about this was most unclear.

Parsa Company Pty Ltd

99The husband established [Parsa Company Pty Ltd] on 18 February 2002. He is the sole director and shareholder. Parsa Company Pty Ltd held 11,558,137 shares in Company E Ltd. Parsa Company Pty Ltd has also invested in other companies, which the husband acknowledges have lost value and some of which have been suspended. The husband lent significant monies to Parsa Company Pty Ltd between 2009 and 2013, which has primarily been sourced from the parties’ ANZ accounts. Parsa Company Pty Ltd has consistently recorded losses since the global financial crisis.

Company E Ltd & Company G Pty Ltd

100The husband was appointed as a director of Company E Ltd in 2013 and as the chairman in 2014. Company E Ltd is a publically listed company, engaged in [business activities] in Australia. When the husband agreed to be a director, he considered Company E Ltd was in a sound financial position. He later learnt [authorities] were involved, with Company E Ltd owing approximately $1 million to creditors and facing insolvency. Company E Ltd has taken measures to reduce its costs and improve its financial performance, with limited success. One strategy has been for directors to receive shares in lieu of salaries and fees.
101In 2013 Company G Pty Ltd entered into a contract with Company E Ltd, for the provision of services, to which I have already referred. While Company E Ltd recorded the husband’s remuneration at $180,000 per annum payable to Company G Pty Ltd, that has not been paid in full for many years. Company E Ltd has issued shares to Company G Pty Ltd in lieu thereof.
102Company E Ltd has relinquished [assets] to reduce its expenditure. It has a number of applications pending in [another State], subject to negotiations [with third parties].
103Company G Pty Ltd was registered [in] 2010. The husband was the sole director and shareholder. Since 2010 Company G Pty Ltd has been involved with the provision of corporate services and investment in what the husband describes as “high risk, sophisticated commercial deals in the form of mandates, agreements and bare-trusts with other investors or companies”.[33]
[33] The husband’s trial affidavit filed 27 February 2018, paragraph 375.
104Since Company G Pty Ltd’s inception, it has acquired shares primarily in Company P Ltd and Company E Ltd. The husband says Company G Pty Ltd holds an 18% interest in Company E Ltd, because he traded Company E Ltd shares to third parties, in lieu of cash. The husband entered into agreements with various third parties, some of which were documented in bare trust agreements. He says the original signed agreements were in the home office, and not returned to him.
105The wife says she had no knowledge and has never seen any such agreements. The husband says he was reluctant to ask the other parties for copies of the agreements after separation, for fear they would call upon the shares. He eventually did so. When the husband’s trial affidavit was filed, some of the agreements were disclosed for the first time.[34] The husband has not disclosed any alleged agreements with [Mr D] and [Mr Q].
[34] For example, see the husband’s book of exhibits documents 32 – 40 inclusive.
106The husband says Company G entered into the following agreements:
a.March 2013 to pay Mr Z 3 million shares in lieu of $15,000 for him promoting Company G and assisting with Company P.
b.August 2013 to pay [Mr Y] 300,000 shares in lieu of $3,000 worth of property maintenance services.
c.January 2014 to pay to Mr T, 30 million shares in lieu of $150,000 for his consulting services with Company G, to seek opportunities in Central Asia.
d.In February 2014 to pay to [N Construction Company] 55 million shares in lieu of $220,000 for the provision of cash to invest in [medical equipment] in [South-East Asia], for sale in Central Asia by Company G.
e.February 2014 to pay to [A Bank Pty Ltd] 8 million shares in lieu of cash for the investment of $50,000 to assist in the development of [a] website.
f.In August 2014 to pay to N Construction Company a further 50 million shares in lieu of $200,000 invested in the establishment of commercial [sporting] facilities in Central Asia.
g.In March 2014 to pay to [Company S] 52.5 million shares in lieu of $210,000 for training, supply of medical equipment and associated costs for Company G.
h.In 2014/2015 to pay to Mr H 500,000 shares in lieu of $4,000 worth of services including promoting [clothing] for [a Central Asian] sporting team and marketing material.
i.In January 2015 to pay to [Ms C] 300,000 shares in lieu of $1,500 worth of office and administrative work for Company G.
j.In 2015 to pay to Mr Q 200,000 shares in lieu of $1,000 for the supply of clothing, which Company G sold at [a local event].

107The husband borrowed $50,000 from Mr D to invest in Company P. When the investment failed and the husband was unable to repay the loan, he agreed to convert the loan to $25,000, and Company G transferred 5 million shares to Mr D.
108On 2 March 2018, the husband resigned as a director of Company G and appointed Mr T as the sole director and secretary. The husband wrote to the Department of Human Services, in response to the wife’s application for a change of assessment, as follows:
As at 2^nd of March 2018, I was advised by my Family Lawyer that [Ms Parsa’s] allegations of me being the full beneficial and legal owner of [Company G] and its business dealings, were to be defended by [Company G] as a separate entity in Court. I was advised to resign and only focus on Personal Family Court issues such as children and cash at bank.

109In March 2018 Law Firm E wrote, advising they were acting on behalf of Company G in its capacity as trustee for the bare trust agreements. The wife disputed the authenticity of the bare trust agreements.
110On 29 May 2018 the husband resigned as Company E’s executive director. He remains a non-executive director.
111On 23 October 2018 Law Firm E informed the wife that 204.8 million Company E shares had been transferred to Company U Pty Ltd. The wife says the shares were then worth $750,000. She complains Law Firm E’s previous advice was that 199.8 million Company E shares were beneficially owned, leaving 5 million shares unaccounted for.
112It has emerged some weeks prior to the husband filing his first trial affidavit, he and his solicitors were consulting with Law Firm E.
113Mr T is the sole director of Company U Pty Ltd and holds 40% of the shares. A Bank Pty Ltd holds the remaining 60%. Company U Pty Ltd was registered on 16 October 2018, the day prior to the transfer of the Company E shares.
114The wife was critical of the husband and the alleged bare trust agreements. She complained about his non-disclosure of any agreements until his trial affidavit was filed. None of the agreements were stamped. None provided any detail to support the arrangements. No information was disclosed to vouch the alleged services provided, or how the amounts were calculated.
115Since the commencement of proceedings the husband has maintained Company G has an 18% interest in the Company E shares, consistent with the alleged trust agreements.
116The wife initially sought to add back the Company E shares which had been transferred. In closing, her counsel conceded that add back was not being pursued. I considered that concession was appropriate.
117The husband did not discuss the various transactions with the wife prior to entering the same. The wife’s criticisms of the husband’s disclosure in this regard were fairly made.
118Having heard the husband’s evidence, I am not satisfied that he deliberately embarked upon a campaign to dissipate assets. I accept the husband entered into these transactions, as a means through which to gain credit or services, which he was otherwise unable to afford. Most of those transactions pre-date separation by many years.
119These transactions resulted in over 200 million Company E shares being transferred to third parties. At the time of trial, those shares were worth around $410,000. I am unable to make any findings as to whether it was prudent or commercially sound for the husband to have entered into those arrangements when he did. Regrettably, Company G’s investments have not been profitable.
120The husband’s financial dealings, particularly since the closure of the Parsa Business, have not been successful. The husband said he was not a “hot shot entrepreneur”. I am not persuaded that the parties’ current financial circumstances are due to any fault by the husband. The reality is that financial decisions were made during the relationship. Some were a success. Some were not.

WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTIES?

121In December 1994 the husband and wife began a relationship, when they were both 22 years of age. The wife was studying and working on a casual basis. The husband was self-employed.
122The parties commenced living together when they married in 1996. At the commencement of cohabitation the wife says she had savings of $5,000, a [Vehicle A] worth $3,500 a [Vehicle B] worth $3,000 and nominal superannuation. The husband says Vehicle A was worth $850, which was its sale price.
123The husband says he had a [Vehicle C] worth $25,000, a [Vehicle D] worth $14,000, household contents worth $20,000 and savings of $5,000. The husband says he had $31,000 equity in a property at [Suburb R]. The wife considers the equity was closer to $6,600 and says the husband sold Vehicle C which he applied towards the purchase of Suburb R. The wife disputes the value of the husband’s contents.
124There was no evidence to support findings as to the precise value of each party’s initial contributions.
125The parties retained separate bank accounts and largely maintained separate finances during their marriage, with the exception of the home loans and ANZ Equity Manager accounts, which were in joint names.
126The wife’s work history is as follows:
(a)Between 1994 and 1997 the wife completed a [university] degree. She also studied at TAFE. She received Austudy, which she supplemented through casual employment modelling and selling [products].
(b)Between 1998 and 2001 the wife completed [another university degree]. She performed casual work as a [foreign language] teacher. She also received job search allowance for approximately five months. Following Child C’s birth, in 2000 the wife received parenting payments.
(c)Between 2002 and 2005 the wife completed a Masters of Science [in her chosen field]. Child D was born in 2002 and Child B was born in 2005. The wife continued to receive parenting payments.
(d)From 2006 until 2010 the wife worked as a [teacher], on a part-time basis. Child A was born in 2009. The wife took around 3 ½ months maternity leave before resuming work on a part time basis.
(e)From 2011 until 2012 the wife worked one day a week. Since 2011 she has worked on a part-time basis with [an interpreter business]. The wife initially worked three days a week, during school hours and since 2017 that has reduced to two days a week.

127The husband’s work history is as follows:
(a)In 1994 to 1995 the husband operated a [mowing] business. That year he completed a [business] course.
(b)In 1995 he established [Parsa Business Australia]. He also studied on a part-time basis for a Bachelor of Business at [university].
(c)In 1996 he worked as a salesman.
(d)Between 1997 and 1999 he operated [an advisory] agency.
(e)From 2001 to 2002 the husband worked as a [sales] supervisor.
(f)In 2001 the husband established Parsa Business, through Parsa Company Pty Ltd. The company was involved in [a retail business]. The business was established through assistance from the husband’s parents, together with an ANZ loan. The husband travelled overseas to source suppliers. The business at one stage operated five retail stores. The last store closed in 2009.

(g)In 2004 the husband commenced investing in small [ventures], including the purchase of shares through Parsa Company Pty Ltd.
(h)Between 2006 and 2008 the husband commenced [Business W], through Parsa Company Pty Ltd, [to provide a specialised service to a particular industry]. Business W was later closed, after it proved unprofitable.
(i)From 2010 the husband commenced Company G, following the closure of the Parsa Business in which he developed interests in [other ventures].
(j)From 2013 to 2017 the husband began [Parsa Ventures Pty Ltd]. Through the entity he sought opportunities in media, education and sporting ventures, including developing contacts in Central Asia. The company was deregistered in 2017.
(k)In 2015 the husband commenced P Pty Ltd as a subsidiary of Company G. The aim was to develop a website service to [a particular] industry. It has not yet been established.

128The parties bought and sold various properties, culminating in the purchase of the Suburb C property.
129In 1995 the husband purchased [Street Address A], Suburb R for approximately $66,000. He borrowed approximately $59,400 and subsequently borrowed a further $85,000 to fund construction of a property. The husband was the owner-builder.
130The Suburb R property was completed in 1996 and sold in 1999 for approximately $178,000. The net proceeds of $170,262 were applied towards the purchase of [Street Address A], [Suburb J] for $114,500.
131The Suburb J property was purchased in the wife’s name, to enable the husband to complete construction as an owner-builder. The parties obtained a loan of $60,000, which increased to $96,000, to meet the construction of townhouses at the Suburb J property, which was subdivided into Lots [xxx] and [xxx].
132The Suburb J property was sold in October 2008 for $550,000. Approximately $269,000 was applied towards reducing the mortgage secured on the Suburb C property.
133The husband’s family provided financial assistance for the construction of the Suburb J property and the Suburb C property. The wife’s aunt also provided the parties with financial assistance.
134The Suburb J property was sold in October 2009 for $578,000. Approximately $240,000 was applied towards reducing the mortgage secured on the Suburb C property.
135In 1998 the husband sought to purchase [another property in Suburb J]. He was unable to raise finance and the property was then purchased by members of his family.
136In 2006 the parties bought the Suburb C property for $785,000. The purchase was funded by way of a deposit of $20,000 and the balance was raised by way of a mortgage with ANZ. The husband again became the owner-builder.
137In 2009 the parties were in financial difficulties, with the husband’s business performing poorly.
138The wife’s uncles N and C Matheson passed away. The wife was a beneficiary of their estates, from which she received:
(a)In February 2009 $48,000 which was deposited into the ANZ Equity Manager account A.
(b)In January 2010, $3,378 which she paid into a CBA account in her name.
(c)In August 2010, $462,500, of which $262,500 was paid into the ANZ Equity Manager account A and $200,000 into the ANZ Residential Loan account, reducing the loans secured against the Suburb C property.
(d)In March 2012, $150,000 which was paid into a term deposit in her name.
(e)In November 2014 $38,000 which was paid into a CBA account in her name.
(f)In December 2015, $4,257 which was paid into a CBA account in her name.

139As a result of the wife’s application of $510,500, the borrowings secured against the Suburb C property were significantly reduced. By September 2010 the ANZ Equity Manager account A had a debit balance of $505 and at 19 August 2010, the ANZ Residential Loan account had a debit balance of $20,229. In June 2013 the ANZ Residential Loan account was paid in full.
140In 2013 the husband’s wrote a cheque from the ANZ line of credit to the wife for $400,000, by way of partial repayment of her inheritance. The cheque was never deposited and was later destroyed.
141In 2013 the husband lent $50,010 to his mother, to assist in the purchase of [a property in Suburb D]. The loan was repaid in 2015.
142In June 2013 the husband asked and the wife agreed to increase the ANZ credit limit from $240,000 to $500,000. The wife was reluctant to do so, given the application of her inheritance to reduce the parties’ borrowings. The husband was the architect and driver of the increased borrowings. He was concerned about the financial losses incurred from the failure of Company P Ltd. He wanted access to funds for future investments.
143This issue was the source of some controversy. The wife considers the husband pressured her into extending their borrowings. The husband was unaware that the wife had further funds available from her inheritance. The wife did not disclose those funds to the husband, because she considered he would pressure her to provide him access to those monies. The husband denies that he would have pressured the wife. He is aggrieved that the wife did not disclose these funds.
144The husband subsequently drew down on both ANZ accounts. By February 2016 approximately $600,000 was owing. The husband spent between $300,000 - $400,000 towards the purchase of Company E shares and on other investments. The husband says some of the funds were applied for the benefit of the family. The wife was unaware of the husband’s withdrawals and application of the funds, which she discovered after separation.
145I accept the husband made deposits into both ANZ accounts. His withdrawals exceeded the deposits.
146Following separation, the husband withdrew a further E$78,000, to which I have already referred. Those actions resulted in the accounts reaching their limit. ANZ issued a notice of demand. The husband did not service repayments of the accounts.
147The wife paid money to ANZ to bring the accounts below their limit. Since 28 June 2016, the wife has paid around $128,572 in interest repayments to ANZ, from her inheritance.
148In the earlier years of the marriage, the husband was earning around $30,000 per annum and while the Parsa Business was operating, up to $60,000 per annum. Since 2010 the husband’s taxable income has been less than $18,500 per annum.
149The husband accepts his investments have largely been unsuccessful and some have entailed, in his words, a “massive loss”. The wife’s counsel questioned the husband, given his acknowledgement of Company E’s difficulties, why he remained a director without being paid his full remuneration, accepting shares instead of cash, instead of seeking alternative employment. The husband was unable to provide a satisfactory answer. While the husband voiced some optimism that through his efforts, Company E may turn around, he has been unable to achieve that to date.
150A theme in the husband’s case was that he regularly discussed with the wife his financial dealings and the pressure he was under. He considers the wife was disinterested and unsupportive. The wife says she was busy working, running the home and caring for the children. She was not aware of the husband’s business dealings and she did not understand what he was doing, because it was constantly changing. The wife said it was “difficult to keep up”.
151Despite the husband’s attempt to have the wife concede she was aware of the intricacies of his business dealings, I accept she was not. I accept the husband did not hide or prevent the wife from access to his home office. Further, from 2011 the parties’ relationship was strained and they appeared to live almost separate lives. I am satisfied they did not discuss financial matters in any detail.
152Since separation the wife discovered the full extent of the parties’ borrowings and the husband learnt of the extent of the wife’s inheritance. That has contributed to each party’s suspicious view of the other.
153The wife was the primary parent and homemaker. The husband assisted in the children’s care, when he was not working. Given the husband’s work commitments the wife had the major care of the children, assisted by her mother and aunt.
154The husband says he provided well for his family. The wife says the husband was frugal and tight with money.
155During the marriage, the husband was the primary breadwinner, particularly up until the Parsa Business ceased. He primarily serviced the parties’ home loans, insurance premiums, telephone and internet accounts, in addition to various other expenses. The wife also made financial contributions in terms of her income and parenting payments. The wife primarily paid for the groceries, private health insurance and some utilities. The husband also bought groceries.
156Each of the parties performed various tasks associated with the running and upkeep of their home.
157Since separation, the husband has paid the wife around $3,500 in child support.[35] Each parent has otherwise had responsibility to meet the costs of caring for the children. At separation, all four children were under 18 and were initially living primarily with the wife.
[35] As at April 2018.
158The parenting arrangements have since progressed, where the children have lived with each parent as agreed, as ordered by the Court or in accordance with the children’s wishes.
159Since separation, the wife has continued to work on a part-time basis. She has otherwise applied her inheritance to supplement her income to support the costs of her household, including the children.
160Since separation, the husband has continued to work. He has had financial assistance from his family, including to support the children.

WHAT IS THE ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS?

161I am required to assess the parties’ contributions holistically. The Full Court said in Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 at [24]:
… However, the task of assessing contributions is holistic and but part of a yet further holistic determination of what orders, if any, represent justice and equity in the particular circumstances of this particular relationship. So much is clear from the terms of s 79 itself and, in particular, s 79(2). The essential task is to assess the nature, form and extent of the contributions of all types made by each of the parties within the context of an analysis of their particular relationship.

162The Court went on to say at [25]:
Doing so is also consistent with the demands of authority that the ultimate assessment of contributions should be made without "giving overzealous attention to the ascertainment of the parties' contributions" (Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 524; 65 ALR 12 at 18; 10 Fam LR 819 at 825; [1986] HCA 17) and the well-established recognition in the authorities (acknowledged specifically by her Honour in this case) that the process required of the court by s 79 is the exercise of a wide discretion, not the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise.

163This was a long marriage. I consider both parties worked hard, for the benefit of the family. The husband was the primary income-earner and the wife was the primary parent and homemaker, particularly in the early stages of their marriage. Both parties’ contributions in this regard were significant. The husband also contributed as a homemaker and parent. The wife contributed financially.
164The husband made substantial contributions as an owner-builder. The husband brought assets to the marriage. In my view, little turns on the initial contributions in the context of the parties’ marriage.
165The parties’ wealth has been generated through real estate and the wife’s inheritances. Over $500,000 from her inheritance was applied directly for the family’s benefit. That is significant and represents 74% of pool 1. The husband did not suggest he made any contribution towards the wife’s inheritance from her uncles.
166In the post separation period, the wife’s contributions have been greater than the husband’s. She has continued as the primary parent. She has shouldered the financial burden for caring for the children, without meaningful financial contributions from the husband. The wife has solely serviced the borrowings secured on the Suburb C property. Those borrowings include over $70,000 which the husband withdrew after separation, for his sole benefit. The wife has applied her inheritances to supplement her and the children’s living expenses, in light of her modest income.
167In my discretion, after careful consideration of the evidence, I consider that the wife’s contributions to pool 1 should be assessed at 68.5% and the husband’s contributions should be assessed at 31.5%. On that basis, the wife is entitled to $463,311 and the husband is entitled to $213,056.
168In my discretion I consider the wife’s contribution to pool 2 should be assessed at 100%. The husband accepts he made no contribution to the wife’s inheritance, which was received over two years after separation. The wife’s is entitled to $882,380.
169The total of the two pools is $1,558,747. It is necessary to look at the global effect of the assessment. The amount which the wife will receive is $1,345,691 which equates to 86% of the two pools. The amount the husband will receive is $213,056 which equates to 14% of the two pools.
170I consider that a differential of 72% or $1,122,298 reflects the parties’ contributions in a way which is just and equitable.

SHOULD THERE BE ANY ADJUSTMENT IN FAVOUR OF EITHER PARTY?

171Both parties are 47 years of age. Separation and the subsequent events have been stressful and difficult for each of them. The wife is in good health. The husband has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety, and is prescribed anti-depressant medication. The husband claimed he resigned as Company E’s chairman because of mental health issues, which the wife disputes. The husband has previously had a shoulder injury. There was no admissible evidence that the husband’s health impacts upon his capacity to work.
172The husband is employed as a non-executive director and earns $30,000 per annum plus GST. His taxable income is less than $20,000 per annum. He has the benefit of a mobile phone. The husband is owed unpaid director’s fees from Company E. It is uncertain what, if any amounts, the husband may ultimately recover given the company’s financial predicament.
173The husband has the capacity to work and generate an income. With the conclusion of these proceedings, the husband will be relieved of some of the stress which he has complained of. The husband conceded he could seek employment.
174The husband struck me as highly motivated to work and committed to support his family. He is working hard, for little remuneration. The husband may decide it is financially prudent to seek employment, with the benefit of a fixed income for his efforts, moving forward.
175The wife is employed on a part-time basis as [an interpreter]. She earns approximately $61,828 per annum.
176Child C is 19, Child D is 17, Child B is 14 and Child A is 10 years of age. The orders to which I have referred set out the arrangements for Child A. Child C and Child D live with both parents, in accordance with their wishes. Child B lives with his parents on a week-about basis.
177The wife lives at the Suburb C property. The husband lives in a flat behind his mother’s home. The husband’s mother and sister appear to assist him with expenses. The husband says he physically cares for his mother.
178The property and financial resources of the parties has been identified earlier in these Reasons. Each party set out their personal commitments in their financial statements.
179The wife is in receipt of family tax benefits together with an energy supplement.
180Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, neither will pay child support to the other, they will share equally in the children’s school, health and other agreed expenses.
181The wife has superannuation entitlements with Super Fund A and Super Fund B, which are referred to in the schedule. The husband does not have any superannuation entitlements.
182Neither party is seeking an order for spousal maintenance.
183The parties were married for approximately 20 years. I am not satisfied the duration of the marriage has impacted upon the income earning capacity of either party, in light of the evidence and the fact that each party has completed further studies during the relationship.
184Both parents will continue to have responsibilities for their three children who are under 18. While Child C is an adult, he continues to live with each of parents, who incur costs when he is part of their home. There is no application for adult child maintenance.
185The parties enjoyed a reasonable standard of living during their marriage. The wife and the husband are entitled to a reasonable standard of living moving forward. Since separation, the wife has had the benefit of her inheritance, to supplement her expenses. The husband has borrowed money to pay his legal fees and his family have otherwise assisted in his support.
186The wife is one of five beneficiaries of the M Matheson Trust, which has assets of approximately $890,000. Subject to the consent of the trustees, of which the wife is one, she may receive distributions in the future.
187Neither party claims to be responsible for any other person.
188The wife will receive a significant portion of the asset pool. She may benefit from future distributions from the M Matheson Trust. The wife seeks to retain the Suburb C property. She intends to apply the cash in pool 2, to discharge the debts and refinance the Suburb C property into her name. The husband similarly wants to retain Suburb C property. He has not identified how he could afford to refinance the debts into his name, given his income and resources. The husband says his family may be able to assist.
189The husband will have further liabilities at the conclusion of these proceedings. While I have ignored the amounts the husband owes in legal fees including $57,718 to his previous solicitors and his personal loans to family and friends of $160,000, I accept these are debts he wants to repay.
190The Intervenors submit the money the husband owes should be taken into account, as the Court has an obligation to consider the ability of any creditor to recover a debt. The wife says the husband’s debt to his previous solicitors should not be given any special recognition.

ASSESSMENT OF SECTION 75(2) FACTORS

191I have considered carefully the parties’ respective positions after a very careful examination of the s 75(2) facts as set out above. I am not satisfied the 5% adjustment proposed by the wife adequately reflects these prospective factors. The total of the two pools is $1,558,747. 5% amounts to $77,937.
192The most relevant factors which warrant an adjustment in the husband’s favour are the disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances, the wife’s financial resources and the disparity in the parties’ respective superannuation entitlements.
193Having balanced all of the relevant factors and exercising the broad discretion which I have, I consider that an adjustment of 10% or $155,875 in favour of the husband is one which will achieve a just and equitable outcome.

IS THE OUTCOME JUST AND EQUITABLE?

194The outcome is one whereby the husband receives $374,099 being 24% and the wife receives $1,184,648 being 76% of the combined property pools. The disparity is 52% which amounts to $810,549.

195I must consider the practical effect of the division I intend to order. The parties have agreed to each retain items as identified.
196I consider the wife should retain Suburb C property, subject to her refinancing the debts. The wife has lived at the Suburb C property since separation. She has serviced the borrowings. She has capital and income available to refinance and/or service the borrowings.
197While the husband also wished to retain the Suburb C property, it has not been his home since 2016. The husband did not adduce any evidence to persuade me he was likely to successfully refinance, given his income and outstanding liabilities.
198The husband seeks the return of items of furniture and contents at the Suburb C property. The wife agrees to return certain items and I will make orders in those terms. This was not the subject of any detailed cross-examination nor submissions. I am not persuaded the disputed items should be returned to the husband. The husband has contents, including items he has purchased since separation. No value has been included for these items in the schedule. The wife has had possession of the furniture since separation. I will provide for the wife to retain the same, with the value of these items reflected in the schedule.
199In accordance with the parties’ proposals and my determination, the husband will receive or retain the following:

ASSETS
ANZ Progress Saver A/C	$3,166
Vehicle F	$13,000
Company P Pty Ltd - 500 shares	$500
Add Back Shares sold post separation	$54,275
Add Back withdrawals Equity Manager “A”	$61,300
Add Back Withdrawals Equity Manager “B”	$16,800
Company G Shares in Company E	$91,059
TOTAL ASSETS	$240,100
LIABILITIES
ANZ Visa	$6,020
NET ASSETS	$234,080

200The wife will receive:

ASSETS
Bankwest Telenet Saver A/C	$882,380
Suburb C property	$1,150,000
Furniture & Contents - Suburb C	$8,000
CBA Net Bank Saver A/C	$10
CBA Smart Access A/C	$32
CBA Passbook A/C	$542
[Vehicle E]	$4,500
TOTAL ASSETS	$2,045,464
LIABILITIES
ANZ Equity Manager A/C “A”	$502,458
ANZ Equity Manager A/C “B”	$201,073
Westpac Visa A/C	$2,590
HECS/HELP Loan	$58,458
TOTAL LIABILITIES	$764,579
NET ASSETS	$1,280,885
SUPERANNUATION
Super Fund A	$23,892
Super Fund B	$19,890
TOTAL SUPERANNUATION	$43,782
NET ASSETS INCLUDING SUPERANNUATION	$1,324,667

201The wife will be required to pay the husband $140,019 to give effect to these Reasons. Subject to hearing from the parties, including the Intervenors, I propose the wife have two calendar months in which to make payment.
202The husband is required to pay the wife $10,000. It is appropriate this is deducted from the wife’s payment to the husband.
203The husband sought the wife pay and indemnify him for any costs incurred by Company U Pty Ltd and Legal Aid. As I explained during the trial, any application for costs will be dealt with separately.
204Legal Aid’s application for costs has been adjourned pending these proceedings. That will be remitted to the Magistrate who heard the parenting trial.

Orders

205Subject to hearing from the parties and the Intervenors as to the form of the orders only, I propose to pronounce orders as follows:
1.Within two calendar months:
(a)The Respondent pay to the Applicant $140,019 less $10,000 which the Applicant is required to pay to the Respondent by way of costs pursuant to the Orders dated 6 April 2018.
(b)The Applicant transfer and assign to the Respondent, all his right, title and interest in the property situate at [Street Address A], [Suburb C] in the State of Western Australia being Lot [xx] on Plan [xx] and being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Volume [xx] Folio [xx] (“[Suburb C]”), at the Respondent’s expense.
(c)The Respondent do all acts and things including signing all documents necessary to refinance the following loans from the joint names of the parties into her sole name:

i. ANZ Equity Manager [“A”];
ii. ANZ Equity Manager [“B”];
and thereafter the accounts be closed and the mortgage [xxxx] registered against [the Suburb C property] in favour of ANZ be discharged.
2.The Applicant’s interest (if any) in the following vest in the Respondent:
(a)Any interest the Respondent may have in any estate of any third person including any inheritance received since separation;
(b)[Vehicle E];
(c)The furniture and contents in her possession, excluding the items referred to in paragraph 7;
(d)The savings standing to the Respondent’s credit in any bank accounts, building societies, credit unions or other financial institutions; and
(e)Any superannuation entitlements of the Respondent including but not limited to [Super Fund A] and [Super Fund B].

3.The Respondent’s interest (if any) in the following vest in the Applicant:
(a)[Company G Pty Ltd], [Parsa Company Pty Ltd] and [Company P Pty Ltd], including any funds owed to the Applicant;
(b)The furniture and contents in his possession and the items referred to in paragraph 7;
(c)The savings standing to the Applicant’s credit in any bank accounts, building societies, credit unions or other financial institutions; and
(d)[Vehicle F].

4.The Respondent pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the Applicant in relation to any liabilities in her sole name including but not limited to:
(a)Any funds owing on her Westpac Visa card; and
(b)Her HELP loan; and
(c)Any taxation liabilities in her name.

5.The Applicant pay and indemnify and keep indemnified the Respondent in relation to any liabilities in his sole name including but not limited to:
(a)Any funds owing on his ANZ credit cards [#1], [#2] and [#3];
(b)Any personal loans including for legal fees and personal expenses; and
(c)Any taxation liabilities in his name.

6.Within 14 days, the parties are to agree a third party to attend [the Suburb C property] on behalf of the Applicant (‘agreed agent’).
7.Within 28 days, the Applicant arrange for his agreed agent to attend [the Suburb C property] for the purposes of collecting the following items with the Applicant to thereafter retain:
(a)Large barbeque;
(b)3 seater big brown leather sofa and two leather recliners;
(c)Silver two door fridge;
(d)White fridge;
(e)Rectangular large wooden table in alfresco and all the wooden chairs;
(f)Television cupboards (3 pieces);
(g)Wooden Asian chair;
(h)Tools from the garage;
(i)Wooden single bed frame from garage;
(j)Numerous boxes of [stock] from [the Parsa Business];
(k)Four drawer green filing cabinet;
(l)Grey glass cabinet;
(m)Two heaters;
(n)Large square coffee table;
(o)Gold vase;
(p)Ornamental swords;
(q)King Chesterfield arm chair;
(r)Large formal dining table with eight chairs; and
(s)Pot of plants in the front garden.

8.Unless otherwise specified, each party is solely entitled to all property and financial resources in their possession on the date of these orders to the exclusion of the other and for this purpose:
(a)Banking and other accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the records of the relevant financial institution;
(b)Insurance policies are deemed to be in the possession of the insured named in the policy;
(c)Superannuation entitlement is deemed to be in the possession of the person named; and
(d)Each party is solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property or financial resource to which that party is entitled under these orders.

9.The parties do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to give full force and effect to these orders.
10.The parties will, as far as they are lawfully able to, use their best endeavours to minimise any tax, stamp duty goods and services tax payments and capital gains tax in respect of the implementation of these orders.
11.The parties have liberty to apply in relation to implementation of these orders.

Child Support
12.Subject to confirmation from the Department of Human Services, as to the form, Pursuant to section 117 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act1989 (Cth) there be a departure from the administrative assessment of child support payable by the Applicant to the Respondent for the children, [CHILD B], born [in] 2005 and [CHILD A], born [in] 2009 (“the children”) as follows:
(a)For the period 30 June 2019 to 29 April 2027 the annual rate of child be set at $1 per child.

13.Pursuant to section 117 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 there be a departure from the administrative assessment of child support payable by the Respondent to the Applicant for the children as follows:
(a)For the period 30 June 2019 to 29 April 2027 the annual rate of child be set at $1 per child.

14.Pursuant to section 124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 the Applicant and Respondent each pay child support otherwise than in the form of periodic amounts as follows:
(a)In respect of the children:
(i)50% of the costs of their attendance at [Suburb X] Senior High School; and
(ii)50% of their private medical, dental and associated expenses.

15.For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, the costs of the children’s attendance at [Suburb X] Senior High School included, but is not limited to:
(a)All uniforms;
(b)Tuition fees;
(c)Excursions, camp, school trips;
(d)Music lessons and instrument hire;
(e)Books, levies and all other associated educational costs as billed by the schools.

16.For the purposes of paragraphs 14 and 15 hereof, the Applicant meet all costs for the children in the calendar year 2020 and each alternate year thereafter, and the Respondent meet all costs for the children in the year 2021, and each alternate year thereafter.
17.In the event the Respondent pays for costs of the children pursuant to paragraphs 14 and 15 hereof in a year during which the Applicant is liable to meet the costs pursuant to paragraph 16 hereof, the Respondent provide the receipt for the costs incurred to the Applicant and he reimburse the Respondent within 7 days.
18.In the event the Applicant pays for costs of the children pursuant to paragraphs 14 and 15 hereof in a year during which the Respondent is liable to meet the costs pursuant to paragraph 16 hereof, the Applicant provide the receipt for the costs incurred to the Respondent and she reimburse the Applicant within 7 days.
19.The Application and Response be dismissed.
20.All documents produced by named persons pursuant to subpoena be returned or destroyed in accordance with the request from the named person on the expiration of 42 days from the date hereof.
21.In relation to material tendered as an exhibit into evidence in these proceedings, on the expiration of 42 days from the date hereof, all material tendered as an exhibit into evidence, save and except for material produced pursuant to subpoena, be destroyed by the Court without notice to the parties.
22.In the event of an appeal being lodged prior to the expiration period of 42 days, paragraphs 20 and 21 above do not apply.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Family Court of Western Australia.
CD
Secretary
23 SEPTEMBER 2019