FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Parker v HG Innovations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 906
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 906
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the primary Judge did not adequately consider the evidence presented by Mr Parker, particularly regarding his employment status. The Court held that the appellant was entitled to be heard and that the primary Judge should have considered all evidence. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary Judge did not properly apply section 570 of the Fair Work Act in awarding costs, which mandates consideration of certain factors before deciding on costs. The Court concluded that the primary Judge's failure to properly consider the evidence and statutory provisions warranted setting aside the summary judgment and remitting the case to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing.
The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary Judge. The case was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing and determination, ensuring that the appellant's right to be heard and the proper application of statutory provisions were upheld. This decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness and adherence to statutory requirements in employment law proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court in Parker v HG Innovations [2019] FCCA 278 made on 11 February 2019 be set aside.
3. The application filed on 17 August 2018 in proceeding BRG 857 of 2018 be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing and determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On the basis of those grounds, the appellant seeks the following orders:1. That the Orders of [the primary Judge] be set aside2. That the matter be set [sic] back down for trial in the Federal Circuit Court3. That the respondent pays the appellants appeal costsCONSIDERATION As Dixon J observed in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; [1949] HCA 1:A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the court with or without a jury. Similarly, in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28, French CJ and Gummow J said:24.The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.”More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”(Citations omitted.)See also for example General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; [1964] HCA 69 and British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30; [2003] HCA 47 at [103]. In seeking summary judgment, the applicant bears the onus for orders to that effect: Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328 at 333; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372; [2008] FCAFC 60 at [127]. In summary, the appellant appeals from the decision of the primary Judge on the grounds that:(1)The primary decision and hearing before the primary Judge were affected by procedural unfairness; and(2)The primary Judge failed to consider s 570 of the Fair Work Act in awarding costs. Submissions of both the appellant and the respondents address the grounds of appeal, as well as grounds contained in the appellant’s draft notice of appeal (annexed to the appellant’s application for leave to appeal) that have not been maintained by the appellant in the notice of appeal filed 6 September 2019. In particular, the appellant did not rely on the following two grounds in his notice of appeal:·That certain findings of fact made by the primary Judge were unsupported by evidence; and·That the primary Judge erred in law by either failing to consider if the appellant had a claim under item 3 of s 342 of the Fair Work Act, or failing to make an order permitting the application to be amended to address item 3 of s 342 of the Fair Work Act.