Parker v HG Innovations Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Parker v HG Innovations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 906

Appeal from: Parker v HG Innovations [2019] FCCA 278
File number: QUD 133 of 2019
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 30 June 2020
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – order by primary Judge summarily dismissing proceedings – where appellant claimed contraventions of s 340 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where application dependent upon whether appellant was an “employee” of any of the respondents – whether primary proceeding procedurally fair – where appellant self-represented – where appellant received respondents’ submissions in the hearing – whether appellant provided an opportunity to be heard – whether appellant incorrectly denied opportunity to cross-examine witness – whether primary Judge gave consideration to appellant’s submissions and evidence – where costs awarded – whether failure to consider s 570 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – appeal allowed.
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 342, 570

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A(2)

Cases cited:

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184

Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 166

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27

Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow (2019) 372 ALR 555; [2019] HCA 29

British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30; [2003] HCA 47

BVG17 v BVH17 (2019) 268 FCR 448; [2019] FCAFC 17

C and O (Fam C of A, Full Court, 18 March 1996, unreported)

Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403; [1994] HCA 14

Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2015) 230 FCR 337; [2015] FCAFC 97

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Corinthian Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 351

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33

Council of Kangan Batman Institute of Technology and Further Education v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2006) 156 FCR 275; [2006] FCAFC 199

Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328

Dawson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 56 ALR 367

Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; [1949] HCA 1

Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd (2015) 234 FCR 122; [2015] FCA 370

Fair Work Ombudsman v NSW Motel Management Services Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 508

Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87; [1983] HCA 25

Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 6 VR 1; [2002] VSCA 189

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; [1964] HCA 69

Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 906
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Mr Parker, appealed against the decision of the primary Judge in the Federal Circuit Court who summarily dismissed his claims for declarations and compensation under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The respondents were HG Innovations Pty Ltd and others. The central issue was whether Mr Parker was an employee of any of the respondents. The appeal was heard in the Federal Court where the appellant contended that the proceedings were procedurally unfair and that the primary Judge failed to consider relevant statutory provisions in awarding costs. The Court had to determine if the primary Judge's decision was correct and whether it was fair for the appellant.

The Court found that the primary Judge did not adequately consider the evidence presented by Mr Parker, particularly regarding his employment status. The Court held that the appellant was entitled to be heard and that the primary Judge should have considered all evidence. Additionally, the Court noted that the primary Judge did not properly apply section 570 of the Fair Work Act in awarding costs, which mandates consideration of certain factors before deciding on costs. The Court concluded that the primary Judge's failure to properly consider the evidence and statutory provisions warranted setting aside the summary judgment and remitting the case to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the primary Judge. The case was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing and determination, ensuring that the appellant's right to be heard and the proper application of statutory provisions were upheld. This decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness and adherence to statutory requirements in employment law proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court in Parker v HG Innovations [2019] FCCA 278 made on 11 February 2019 be set aside.

3. The application filed on 17 August 2018 in proceeding BRG 857 of 2018 be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for further hearing and determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is not necessary for the Court in written reasons to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by a party: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184 at [46]. Nonetheless, the Court is required to give proper consideration to the evidence before it: Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48. Further, as the Court of Appeal of Victoria observed in Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v Lines MacFarlane & Marshall Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 6 VR 1; [2002] VSCA 189 at [157]:The duty to deal with facts or evidence is not absolute. The evidence must be significant in the sense that, unless disposed of, it stands in the way of the court’s conclusions. The court need not deal in terms with evidence when its importance falls away because of the manner in which the court disposes of the case. Nevertheless, if evidence is significant, it is not to be peremptorily shunted aside or ignored.(Emphasis added.)(Citations omitted.) See also Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 31 at [44] and New Zealand v Johnston (2011) 274 ALR 509; [2011] FCAFC 2 at [105]. On balance, in the absence of explanation by his Honour, I cannot be satisfied that, in giving summary judgment in favour of the respondents, his Honour has given proper consideration to the evidence on which Mr Parker relied. In particular, I cannot be satisfied that paragraph [6] of his Honour’s judgment demonstrates engagement by his Honour with the totality of Mr Parker’s evidence. While the respondents submitted that granting the appeal would be an exercise in futility because the characterisation of the relationship between Mr Parker and the respondents would remain unchanged from that found by his Honour, I cannot be satisfied that that is the case. So finding would be also, in the circumstances, to make findings of fact and rulings in respect of a key substantive issue in the proceedings, namely whether he was actually in an employment relationship with one or more of the respondents. This is not an appropriate exercise of appellate power: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7; [1986] HCA 33; BVG17 v BVH17 (2019) 268 FCR 448; [2019] FCAFC 17 at [56]-[61]. The appeal should be allowed on this ground. However, in the interests of completeness, I will also examine the other ground of appeal.Ground 2: The primary Judge failed to consider s 570 of the Fair Work Act in awarding costs The appellant submitted that the primary Judge erred in determining that costs ought to follow the event as no reference was made to s 570 of the Fair Work Act. The respondents submitted:·There is nothing that would ordinarily be regarded as imposing a restriction on the manner in which the discretion to award costs is to be exercised, other than the preconditions identified in the legislation. ·Where a court is satisfied that the relevant threshold has been met, and where the factual circumstances warrant it, the discretion can be exercised: Fair Work Ombudsman v NSW Motel Management Services Pty Ltd [2018] FCCA 508. ·In the context of finding the claim was without merit, the discretion to award costs was exercised unexceptionally and should not be disturbed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 August 2019, I granted the appellant leave to appeal from that interlocutory judgment: see Parker v HG Innovations Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1291 (Leave Decision). BACKGROUND The relevant background facts are set out at [3] – [12] of the Leave Decision:3In an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court on 17 August 2018, Mr Parker had claimed declarations and compensation for alleged breach of s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Mr Parker claimed, inter alia, that he was an employee of one or all of the respondents because:•Mr Michael Gleeson offered him a position of General Manager of the first respondent at a meeting on 18 October 2017;•Mr Gleeson and Mr Parker also discussed engagement of Mr Parker as a broker and locum business manager with the second respondent, and on 21 October 2017 Mr Gleeson sent an email outlining a proposal for him to act as a contracted broker and receive a retainer for his employment with the first respondent;•Mr Parker caused an email to be sent to Mr Gleeson on 21 October 2017 asking questions of the contractor’s agreement but received no response;•Mr Parker began employment and attended work on or about 24 October 2017, and was provided a desk, stationery, access to various documents and a work phone;•Mr Parker was directed to answer calls and speak to customers obtaining referrals, and to arrange to rent cars owned by the first respondent to customers that could not be financed by the second respondent; •By 2 November 2018, it had become clear that he would not be provided with any opportunity to act as a broker, and that the Rideshare Management role was his sole employment role;•In a meeting in the following days Mr Gleeson showed Mr Parker an employment contract of a third party who had been a full time employee of the first respondent, and Mr Parker agreed that that would be the best way forward;•On 17 November 2018 Mr Parker and other staff were told by Mr Gleeson that they had no authority to act independently;•On 20 November 2018 Mr Gleeson told Mr Parker that he was to be a contractor paid by the second respondent even though the work he was doing was for the first respondent, or his employment would have to be terminated;•Mr Parker’s weekly payment continued on a regular weekly basis including sick days, public holidays and personal leave;•Mr Gleeson agreed that Mr Parker would be paid a commission each month referable to the total revenue he produced for the first respondent;•Mr Parker had access to company vehicles throughout the period of his employment, for the purposes of his role;•In his termination email Mr Gleeson said “Sounds like a job to me…”;•Mr Gleeson agreed to pay Mr Parker a period of notice; and•Mr Parker had no control over the entities controlled by Mr Gleeson which were paying his salary.4 Mr Parker also claimed:•He had complained to Mr Gleeson on 31 May 2018 because he believed that the respondents were unfairly subjecting him to unfair working hours; and•He was dismissed because of his complaint, in breach of his workplace rights under s 341 (1)(c)(ii) of the Fair Work Act. 5On 4 October 2018 the respondents filed an Application in a Case pursuant to s 17A(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). Section 17A(2) provides that the Federal Circuit Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if the first party is defending the proceeding or part, and the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. The Application in a Case was listed for hearing on 7 February 2019.6On 5 November 2018 at the case management hearing in the Federal Circuit Court before another Judge of that Court (case management Judge), the case management Judge ordered that:(i)The Applicant to file and serve no later than 4.00pm on 3 December 2018 an Affidavit particularising why he was employed as an employee and not a contractor and annexing any supporting evidence as well as his written submissions; and(ii)The Respondent to file and serve any written submissions by no later than 4.00pm than 10 December 2018.7At the hearing before me, Mr Parker submitted that, on 5 November 2018 at the case management hearing he was physically handed written submissions by Counsel for the respondents, however Mr Parker returned those written submissions to Counsel in light of the case management orders of the case management Judge. This submission is not disputed by the respondents.8Mr Parker filed his written submissions and affidavit with exhibits on 3 December 2018.9Mr Michael Green, the solicitor for the respondents, deposed in his affidavit affirmed 10 April 2019 that the respondents filed their joint outline of written submissions on 4 November 2018. Counsel for the respondents submitted, in summary, that those written submissions were the same as had been handed to Mr Parker on 5 November 2018.10Mr Parker submits that there is no record of the respondents’ joint submissions ever appearing on the Commonwealth Courts’ Portal. Insofar as my Chambers is able to ascertain, there is no record in the electronic Court file of the Federal and Federal Circuit Courts of any submissions ever being filed by the respondents in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings in this matter.11I am not satisfied that any submissions were ever filed by the respondents in these Federal Circuit Court proceedings.12Mr Parker further submitted that, at the commencement of the hearing before the primary Judge, the respondents physically handed his Honour and Mr Parker their hard copy written submissions in support of the Application in a Case. Counsel for the respondents submitted that those submissions were the same as had been shown to Mr Parker on 5 November 2018. I am unable to form a view about this in the absence of evidence to this effect.DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the basis of those grounds, the appellant seeks the following orders:1. That the Orders of [the primary Judge] be set aside2. That the matter be set [sic] back down for trial in the Federal Circuit Court3. That the respondent pays the appellants appeal costsCONSIDERATION As Dixon J observed in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91; [1949] HCA 1:A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the court with or without a jury. Similarly, in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28, French CJ and Gummow J said:24.The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. As to the latter, this court in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd said:“The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried.”More recently, in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ repeated a statement by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Agar v Hyde which included the following:“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.”(Citations omitted.)See also for example General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; [1964] HCA 69 and British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30; [2003] HCA 47 at [103]. In seeking summary judgment, the applicant bears the onus for orders to that effect: Crayford Freight Services Ltd v Coral Seatel Navigation Co (1998) 82 FCR 328 at 333; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372; [2008] FCAFC 60 at [127]. In summary, the appellant appeals from the decision of the primary Judge on the grounds that:(1)The primary decision and hearing before the primary Judge were affected by procedural unfairness; and(2)The primary Judge failed to consider s 570 of the Fair Work Act in awarding costs. Submissions of both the appellant and the respondents address the grounds of appeal, as well as grounds contained in the appellant’s draft notice of appeal (annexed to the appellant’s application for leave to appeal) that have not been maintained by the appellant in the notice of appeal filed 6 September 2019. In particular, the appellant did not rely on the following two grounds in his notice of appeal:·That certain findings of fact made by the primary Judge were unsupported by evidence; and·That the primary Judge erred in law by either failing to consider if the appellant had a claim under item 3 of s 342 of the Fair Work Act, or failing to make an order permitting the application to be amended to address item 3 of s 342 of the Fair Work Act.