Panda v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   PANDA -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2017] WASCA 5

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA
MITCHELL JA

HEARD:   4 AUGUST 2016

DELIVERED          :   12 JANUARY 2017

FILE NO/S:   CACR 186 of 2015

CACR 187 of 2015

BETWEEN:   RANJIT KUMAR PANDA

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :DAVIS DCJ

File No  :IND BUN 25 of 2013

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Appellant a medical practitioner - Appellant charged with multiple sex offences against numerous patients ­ Whether the trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury that an acquittal on one count would undermine the likelihood of the appellant having a tendency to offend against that or another complainant - Whether the trial judge told the jury, in effect, that a finding of guilt on one count could be used to find another count proved

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Manifest excess - Totality principle - Whether the trial judge erred in characterising the appellant's offending as involving a 'serious breach of trust'

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 323, s 325(1)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Leave to appeal against conviction refused
Appeal against conviction dismissed

Leave to appeal against sentence refused
Appeal against sentence dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     ABMS Lawyers

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Carr v The Queen [1988] HCA 47; (1988) 165 CLR 314

Crofts v The Queen [1996] HCA 22; (1996) 186 CLR 427

Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213; (2012) 226 A Crim R 61

Director of Public Prosecutions v Joseph [2001] VSCA 151

Free v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 259

GGM v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 248

Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520

Kilby v The Queen [1973] HCA 30; (1973) 129 CLR 460

Longman v The Queen [1989] HCA 60; (1989) 168 CLR 79

Mahmood v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 220

Narkle v Hamilton [2008] WASCA 31

R v BAS [2005] QCA 97

R v Davies (1985) 3 NSWLR 276

R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 91 ALJR 131

R v Moodley [2013] QCA 253

R v Smith [2004] WASCA 44

RPS v The Queen [2000] HCA 3; (2000) 199 CLR 620

Sayed v The Queen [2012] WASCA 17; (2012) 220 A Crim R 236

Tapper v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 140

Tully v The Queen [2006] HCA 56; (2006) 230 CLR 234

Williams v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 110

  1. BUSS P:  The appellant has applied for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.

  2. He was a medical practitioner.  The complainants…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASCA 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Panda appeals against both his conviction and sentence following his conviction for multiple sex offences against numerous patients. The appeal against conviction argues that the trial judge erred in not directing the jury that an acquittal on one count would undermine the likelihood of the appellant having a tendency to offend against that or another complainant. The appeal against sentence claims the trial judge erred in characterising the appellant's offending as involving a 'serious breach of trust', resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence. The appeal against conviction raises questions about the proper use of propensity evidence in jury trials and the trial judge's directions to the jury regarding the inter-relationship of the counts in the indictment.

The appeal against conviction focuses on whether the trial judge failed to properly direct the jury about the inter-relationship of the counts. The appellant contends that the trial judge did not sufficiently explain that an acquittal on one count could not be used to bolster the likelihood of guilt on another count. The appeal against sentence argues that the trial judge's characterisation of the offending as a 'serious breach of trust' was inappropriate, as it led to an overestimation of the severity of the offending and a resultant manifestly excessive sentence. The appeal against sentence also contends that the trial judge failed to properly apply the totality principle in assessing the appropriate sentence.

In dismissing the appeal, the Court found that the trial judge did not err in the way he directed the jury on the inter-relationship of the counts. The Court held that the jury was properly directed that they could only convict the appellant on a count if they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, and that an acquittal on one count would not undermine the likelihood of the appellant's guilt on another count. The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in characterising the offending as a 'serious breach of trust'. The Court found that the trial judge had properly considered the totality of the offending and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The appeal against conviction and sentence is dismissed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act provides, relevantly:(1)In this section ‑ propensity evidence means ‑ (a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers ‑ (a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. In s 31A(1), 'propensity evidence' is defined by reference to the conduct, character or reputation of the accused or a tendency that the accused has or had. It includes similar fact evidence. Section 31A(1) defines 'relationship evidence' in more specific terms, by reference to the accused's attitude or conduct towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. The test for admissibility in s 31A(2)(a) and s 31A(2)(b) applies to both 'propensity evidence' and 'relationship evidence', as defined. Neither 'propensity evidence' nor 'relationship evidence' will be admissible under s 31A unless 'the court considers' that:(a)the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and (b)the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. In Daniels v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213; (2012) 226 A Crim R 61 [49], I made the following observations (Martin CJ & Mazza JA agreeing) about s 31A:(a)Evidence has 'probative value' if the evidence could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(b)The test in s 31A(2)(a) will be satisfied if the court 'considers' (that is, thinks) that the propensity evidence 'would' (as distinct from could), either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, rationally affect, to a significant extent, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue.(c)The adjective 'significant', in the phrase 'significant probative value' in s 31A(2)(a), connotes 'important' or 'of consequence'.(d)If propensity evidence has 'probative value' then whether the probative value is 'significant' will depend upon the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant, and the significance or importance which the propensity evidence, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, has in proving that fact.