Paice v Hill

Case [2009] NSWCA 156


Reported Decision: 75 NSWLR 46853 MVR 114[2009] ALMD 6253

New South Wales


Court of Appeal


CITATION: Paice v Hill [2009] NSWCA 156
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
HEARING DATE(S): Tuesday 23 June 2009
 
JUDGMENT DATE: 

7 July 2009
JUDGMENT OF: Allsop P at 1; Giles JA at 4; Ipp JA at 5
DECISION: (a) The application for leave to appeal is granted.
(b) The appeal is upheld.
(c) The orders made by Garling DCJ are set aside.
(d) The action brought by the plaintiff in the District Court in proceedinfgs no. 2494 of 2008 is dismissed with costs including the costs of the motion dated 30 September 2008.
(e) The plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
(f) The plaintiff to be granted a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 if otherwise entitled.
CATCHWORDS: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - acts of parliament - interpretation - effect of delegated legislation on interpretation of act. - TRAFFIC LAW - statutory compensation in respect of motor vehicle accidents - New South Wales - whether application made under s 96 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act suspends time running under s 109 for the commencement of court proceedings.
LEGISLATION CITED: Interpretation Act 1987
Motor Accidents Act 1988
Motor Accidents Authority of NSW, Motor Accidents Assessment Service, Claims Assessment Guidelines (March 2006)
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951
CATEGORY: Principal judgment
CASES CITED: Budge v Kimmorley (NSWSC, Studdert J, 28 June 1991, unreported)
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (SA) v Ellis & Clark Limited [1934] HCA 54; (1934) 52 CLR 85
Hayek v Trujillo [2007] NSWCA 139
Hunter Resources Limited v Melville [1988] HCA 5; (1988) 164 CLR 234
The Great Fingall Consolidated Limited v Sheehan [1905] HCA 43; (1905) 3 CLR 176
Thorn EMI Pty Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 71 ALR 728
Webster v McIntosh (1980) 32 ALR 603
TEXTS CITED: D Pearce and R Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (6th Ed 2006)
PARTIES: Paul Warren Paice (Applicant)
Theresa Mary Hill (Respondent)
FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40021/09
COUNSEL: L King SC (Applicant)
A J Stone (Respondent)
SOLICITORS: CKB Partners Lawyers (Applicant)
Stacks/Taree (Respondent)
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 2494/08
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Garling DCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 31 October 2008






                          CA 40021/09
                          DC 2494/08

                          ALLSOP P
                          GILES JA
                          IPP JA

                          7 JULY 2009

Paul Warren Paice v Theresa Mary Hill

Judgment

1 ALLSOP P: I agree with Ipp JA and would only add the following comments as to the use of the Guidelines to construe the Act.

2 The generally accepted rule in Australia is that delegated legislation should not be taken into account for the purpose of the interpretation of the Act itself: The Great Fingall Consolidated Limited v Sheehan [1905] HCA 43; 3 CLR 176 at 184 (per Griffith CJ); Webster v McIntosh (1980)…

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AGLC
Paice v Hill [2009] NSWCA 156
Case
[2009] NSWCA 156
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in *Paice v Hill* concerned a dispute arising from a motor vehicle accident in New South Wales. The plaintiff, Paice, had commenced proceedings in the District Court against the defendant, Hill, seeking statutory compensation. The primary legal question before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was whether an application made under section 96 of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW) operated to suspend the time limit for commencing court proceedings prescribed by section 109 of the same Act.

The court was required to interpret the interplay between these two sections of the *Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999* (NSW). Specifically, it needed to determine whether the lodging of a claim for statutory compensation under section 96, which involves a process of assessment and potential settlement outside of court, had the effect of pausing or extending the limitation period within which a claimant could initiate formal court proceedings under section 109.

The Court of Appeal held that the application made under section 96 did not suspend the time running under section 109. The court reasoned that the Act did not provide for such a suspension and that the statutory compensation scheme operated independently of the limitation period for commencing court proceedings. Consequently, the plaintiff's action in the District Court was found to be out of time.

The appeal was upheld, and the orders made by the District Court were set aside. The plaintiff's action was dismissed with costs, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.

Orders

Orders of the court

(a) The application for leave to appeal is granted. (b) The appeal is upheld. (c) The orders made by Garling DCJ are set aside. (d) The action brought by the plaintiff in the District Court in proceedinfgs no. 2494 of 2008 is dismissed with costs including the costs of the motion dated 30 September 2008. (e) The plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. (f) The plaintiff to be granted a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 if otherwise entitled.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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