Nasih v Nguyen

Case [2018] NSWDC 153


District Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Nasih v Nguyen [2018] NSWDC 153
Hearing dates: 8 June 2018
Date of orders: 15 June 2018
Decision date: 15 June 2018
Jurisdiction:Civil
Before: Russell SC DCJ
Decision:

1. Defendant’s Notice of Motion filed on 25 May 2018 is dismissed.
2. Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs.

Catchwords: MOTOR ACCIDENTS – whether Statement of Claim filed out of time – suspension of time under s 109(2) Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 – certificate of exemption from assessment – whether application for exemption and issue of certificate operates to suspend time for commencing proceedings
Legislation Cited: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999
Cases Cited: Paice v Hill [2009] NSWCA 156
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Sanaa Nasih (plaintiff)
Yen Ngec Thi Nguyen (defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Cleary (plaintiff)
D O’Dowd (defendant)

  Solicitors:
Stephen Smart & Associates (plaintiff)
Hall & Wilcox (defendant)
File Number(s): 2018/110096

Judgment

Introduction

  1. This case raises a limitation point which has apparently not been decided in the 19 years since the commencement of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (the Act).

  2. The plaintiff sued the defendant by a Statement of Claim filed on 9 April 2018, alleging that the defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle which collided with the plaintiff who was a pedestrian. Negligence is alleged. The accident occurred on 11 January 2015. By s 109(1)(a) of the Act a claimant is not entitled to commence proceedings in respect of a claim more than three years after the date of the motor accident to which the claim relates. The plaintiff commenced her proceedings on 9 April 2018 which is more than three years after the date of the motor accident. Section 109(2) of the Act provides:

“Time does run for the purposes of this section from the time that a claim has been referred to the Authority for assessment and until two months after a certificate as to the assessment or exemption from assessment is issued.”

  1. By a Motion filed on 25 May 2018 the defendant seeks the dismissal of the Statement of Claim pursuant to s 109 of the Act.

  2. The plaintiff has not sought leave of the court to commence the proceedings out of time, as she could have done under s 109(1). Rather, the plaintiff argues that she is within time because of the operation of s 109(2).

The Legislation

  1. Section 3 of the Act defines “claim” to mean “a claim for damages in respect of the death of or injury to a person caused by the fault of the owner or driver of a motor vehicle in the use or operation of the vehicle”.

  2. The Act is designed to promote the early resolution of claims. A claimant is obliged to provide as much information as possible to the insurer and the insurer is obliged to consider and if appropriate make an attempt to settle the case. If the claim cannot be settled, then the parties are directed to have the…

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Nasih v Nguyen [2018] NSWDC 153
Case
[2018] NSWDC 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Nasih, sought damages for injuries sustained in a motor accident against the defendant, Nguyen. The plaintiff filed a Statement of Claim after the three-year limitation period stipulated by section 109 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 had expired. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds of being filed out of time. The court was required to determine whether the defendant's application for a certificate of exemption from assessment and the subsequent issuance of the certificate under section 109(2) of the Act operated to suspend the time for commencing proceedings.

The court examined the provisions of section 109(2) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, which allows for the suspension of the limitation period if an application for a certificate of exemption from assessment is made and a certificate is subsequently issued. The court considered whether the application and issuance of the certificate could retroactively suspend the limitation period. The court concluded that the legislative intent was not to retroactively suspend the limitation period but rather to provide a mechanism for suspension during the period when the application is being considered. Consequently, the court found that the application for exemption and the issuance of the certificate did not operate to suspend the time for commencing proceedings.

The defendant’s Notice of Motion filed on 25 May 2018 is dismissed. The plaintiff is ordered to recover their costs from the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Defendant’s Notice of Motion filed on 25 May 2018 is dismissed.

2. Order the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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