Padgett & Padgett (No 2)
[2024] FedCFamC1A 135
•12 August 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Padgett & Padgett (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 135
Appeal from: Padgett & Padgett [2024] FCWAM 44 Appeal number: NAA 46 of 2024 File number: 3906 of 2018 Judgment of: TREE J Date of judgment: 12 August 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Application in an Appeal – Reinstatement – Where the applicant failed to file her appeal book notwithstanding she was already granted an extension of time – Where she advances no satisfactory explanation for the two month delay – Where the appeal enjoys no merit – Where no prejudice can be suffered by the dismissal of an unmeritorious appeal – Application dismissed – Costs ordered in a fixed sum. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 13.22, 13.44 Cases cited: Bemert & Swallow (2010) FLC 93-441; [2010] FamCAFC 100
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 47; [1990] HCA 30
Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25
Padgett & Padgett [2024] FedCFamC1A 84
Padgett & Padgett [2024] FCWAM 44
Number of paragraphs: 27 Date of hearing: 12 August 2024 Place: Cairns (via video link) The Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Raphael Solicitor for the Respondent: Clement and Co ORDERS
NAA 46 of 2024
3906 of 2018FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS PADGETT
Applicant
AND: MR PADGETT
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
TREE J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 AUGUST 2024
ON 5 AUGUST 2024 THE COURT ORDERED THAT:
1.The Application in an Appeal filed 26 July 2024 is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $1,760 within 28 days.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Padgett & Padgett (No 2) has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TREE J:
On 29 January 2024, a Western Australian Family Law Magistrate made orders as follows:
1.The Applicant, [MS PADGETT], pay to the Respondent, [MR PADGETT], by way of costs, the sum of $20,000, with such payment to be made within 6 months.
2.The Form 2 Applications filed on 4 December 2023, 5 December 2023, 7 December 2023 and the Form 2A Response filed on 24 January 2024, be and are hereby dismissed.
3.All subpoenaed documents be returned or destroyed in accordance with the request from the named person.
4. The said proceedings shall otherwise be dismissed.
On 26 February 2024, Ms Padgett (“the applicant” or “the mother”) filed an appeal challenging all of those orders. In due course, procedural orders were made intended to ready the appeal for hearing, however the applicant did not comply with them. Subsequently O’Brien J extended the time for compliance with the relevant steps which had not been undertaken by the applicant, and Orders 2 and 3 pronounced by his Honour on 10 May 2024 provided:
2.The time in which [the applicant] is to file the appeal book is extended to 4:00pm on 23 May 2024.
3.Pursuant to Rule 13.22 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 the appeal will be taken to be abandoned if [the applicant] fails to file the electronic appeal book (by downloadable link or other electronic means) by the due date.
The applicant mother failed to file the appeal book by 23 May 2024, and thus on that date the appeal was deemed abandoned.
By Application in an Appeal filed 26 July 2024, the applicant sought reinstatement of her appeal. [Mr Padgett] (“the respondent” or “the father”) resisted any reinstatement.
On 5 August 2024, I heard the applicant’s application for reinstatement, and dismissed it for reasons to be later delivered. These are those reasons.
BACKGROUND
I gratefully adopt the background recited by O’Brien J in Padgett & Padgett [2024] FedCFamC1A 84 as follows:
4After an undefended trial in which [the applicant] did not participate, orders were made by Sutherland CJ on 26 March 2021 finalising the parenting and financial proceedings then on foot. The orders provided for the children of the marriage to live with the Respondent and spend time with [the applicant]. Various specific issues orders were also made in the parenting case. Orders were also made for alteration of the parties’ property interests, including for the Respondent to transfer to [the applicant] his interest in the home in which she continues to reside. [The applicant] was to retain certain properties in Surburb B and City D, and the Respondent was to retain certain other properties in Western Australia.
5[The applicant] told me this afternoon that she commenced an Appeal against those orders but subsequently withdrew it.
6[The applicant] commenced further parenting proceedings by an application filed on 14 February 2022. Final orders were made on that application on 10 November 2023, providing for the Respondent to have sole parental responsibility, and for the children to live with him and spend time and communicate with [the applicant] in accordance with their wishes.
7The orders the subject of the present Appeal were made by a Family Law Magistrate on 29 January 2024. The orders dismissed interlocutory applications filed by [the applicant] on 4 December 2023, 5 December 2023, and 7 December 2023, and ordered [the applicant] to pay the Respondent’s costs of those applications and of the proceedings concluded on 10 November 2023, fixed in the sum of $20,000.
8The interlocutory applications just referred to sought a range of orders which are difficult to decipher. Among other things, [the applicant] sought to discharge all orders made by Sutherland CJ on 26 March 2021, 'review' certain of the orders made by the Family Law Magistrate on 10 November 2023, and set aside certain other orders. The applications filed on 4 and 5 December 2023 sought to set aside all orders made on 26 March 2021; but the application filed on 7 December 2023 sought to compel the Respondent to comply with those orders, at least insofar as they related to the parenting proceedings.
9To the extent the interlocutory applications purported to seek orders to discharge the property orders made by Sutherland CJ on 26 March 2021, those applications were incompetent It appears that [the applicant] now recognises that, as she foreshadows an application pursuant to s 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
THE PRIMARY MAGISTRATE’S REASONS
As to the costs order, in her edited ex tempore reasons (Padgett & Padgett [2024] FCWAM 44), the primary magistrate relevantly said:
79.… The mother has not participated properly in the proceedings and, unfortunately, she has caused significant additional and unnecessary costs to be incurred.
80.In terms of the father’s costs application, the mother’s conduct persuades me that a costs order in a substantial sum is appropriate. The Court was informed that the father’s total costs of the two tranches of the proceedings dramatically exceeds the itemised bill of costs presented to the Court. The itemised costs at scale are just over $17,000. There has been an additional $3,000 in costs thrown away as a result of the various recent Form 2 Applications which have been misguided. The father’s total costs exceed $20,000.
81.In my view, the costs sought reflects only a relatively modest portion of the costs the father has incurred in the entirety of the two sets of proceedings including in the second tranche of the proceedings. I consider it appropriate that the mother understand that she cannot keep filing applications without proper legal merit.
Her Honour then addressed the parties’ financial circumstances and concluded:
86.Although I accept that a costs order will cause financial hardship to the mother, I am satisfied that, in the overall circumstances of this matter and given the manner in which the mother has conducted the proceedings and multiple failures by her to attend Court on time, it is appropriate that I make an order for the mother to pay the father’s costs of these proceedings fixed in the sum of $20,000, with six months to pay.
As to the dismissal of the various interlocutory applications, the primary magistrate said:
63.The various Form 2 Applications filed by the mother seek what the mother describes as a review of various orders including the orders of 10 November 2023. She also seeks what she describes as a review of the determination of Chief Justice Sutherland following the final undefended hearing in March of 2021. She seeks discharge of those orders. She seeks a recovery order for the children to be taken by the police and immediately placed in her care. She seeks orders for the father to pay her compensation by way of damages. She seeks orders in terms of an amended Form 1 Application she has filed, and a costs order against the father.
64.The mother has filed four separate Form 2 Applications. Another application seeks that the matter be listed as a matter of urgency, that the 10 November 2023 orders be set aside, that the 27 March 2021 orders be set aside, that the Court determine that the father has contravened the orders of 26 March 2021 and that the father be prevented from monitoring the children’s devices. The Form 2 Applications of the mother appears misconceived and the mother in fact, seeks to appeal the decision to summarily dismiss her application.
65.The Court listed the matter with a view to determining the costs application and the matter was initially listed to 25 January 2024. Although there had been a flurry of documents filed by the mother, the mother did not attend the hearing on 25 January 2024. The matter had been listed at 12:30pm but the matter had not been reached by that time. When the matter was called later in the afternoon, the mother had not attended. Counsel informed the Court that the mother had not attended at 12:30 pm. The Court contacted the mother by telephone link. She advised that she believed the matter was listed the following day on 26 January, a Friday, which in fact was a public holiday. The letter from the Court addressed to the mother clearly informed her that the hearing date was Thursday, 25 January 2024.
66.The mother was very confused and distressed during the telephone call and made a comment to the effect that the error had been made as a result of a form of "black magic". She apologised profusely and the Court agreed to adjourn the matter to 29 January 2024 to deal with the outstanding costs application and the Form 2 Applications filed by the mother.
…
75.The matter has now been before the Court for another two-year period and there is no forensic evidence to support the claims the mother has made about the father’s alleged conduct. I am conscious of the fact that whilst the allegations have not been assessed in the second tranche of the proceedings when I review the case in its entirety, I am persuaded I should summarily dismiss the application because there is no prospect of the mother’s application being successful in any event.
76.Even if the mother was able to factually establish some of the allegations she has raised against the father, the children have now been living in the father’s care for several years without any major incident. Although the mother is critical of the standard of care the father has provided, there have been no major incidents involving the children. Both children are attending school regularly. There does not appear to be any risk to the children in the father’s care on the available evidence.
77.Very sadly, the children currently do not enjoy a relationship with the mother which is troubling and very upsetting for the mother. However, the mother’s own conduct, as [Dr C] has described it, has very much created the dynamics apparent in this case. The mother’s inexplicable actions in refusing to spend time with the children when things did not go her way is at odds with her allegations that the father is a dangerous, aggressive person who is a risk to the children and that he may harm or kill the children or kill the mother. The mother’s own actions in causing the children to have no contact with her over those periods of time are entirely inconsistent with the allegations she makes.
78.I have determined that it is appropriate in these circumstances for me to make orders to summarily dismiss the mother’s application. If the matter were to progress to trial by the time the matter was reached the children would be older, and potentially they would need to be interviewed again. I believe the children have already suffered disadvantage by the very many interviews that have taken place over the life of this litigation.
(Emphasis added)
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
If an appellant fails to file the appeal books in compliance with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) or orders of the Court, the appeal is taken to be abandoned (see r 13.22).
Rule 13.44 provides that “a party may apply to have an appeal taken to be abandoned under this Chapter reinstated”. That rule does not provide any specified criteria to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion by the court, which was confirmed by the Full Court in Bemert & Swallow (2010) FLC 93-441 (“Bemert & Swallow”), where their Honours concluded at [154]:
…[I]n our view, the discretion to reinstate an abandoned appeal is at large and no attempt should be made to limit the exercise of the discretion nor identify in any prescribed way the matters that should be taken into account. However, it is important to appreciate the relevant provisions of Chapter 1 of the Rules in relation to case management and what was said by the High Court in [Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175].
Despite that statement however, the Full Court in Bemert & Swallow identified that the principles applicable in determining an application for an extension of time derived from the authorities, apply equally to an application for reinstatement of an appeal. As McHugh J said in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 47 at 480:
… The grant of an extension of time under this rule is not automatic. The object of the rule is to ensure that those Rules which fix times for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Court or Justice to do justice between the parties: see Hughes v. National Trustees Executors and Agency Co. of Australasia Ltd. [1978] VR 257 at 262. This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time: see Avery v. No.2 Public Service Appeal Board [1973] 2 NZLR 86 at 92; Jess v. Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 194-195. When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal: see Burns v. Grigg [1967] VR 871 at 872; Hughes, at 263-264; Mitchelson v. Mitchelson (1979) 24 ALR 522 at 524. It is also necessary to bear in mind in such an application that, upon the expiry of the time for appealing, the respondent has “a vested right to retain the judgment” unless the application is granted: Vilenius v. Heinegar (1962) 36 ALJR 200, at p 201. It follows that, before the applicant can succeed in this application, there must be material upon which I can be satisfied that to refuse the application would constitute an injustice …
It thus emerges that the central issue is whether reinstatement of the appeal is necessary to enable the court to do justice between the parties, and in considering the attainment of justice, the following factors are relevant:
(a)The extent of the delay and whether there is an adequate explanation for it;
(b)The nature and history of the litigation;
(c)The prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal;
(d)Any prejudice or consequence to the parties depending upon the result of the application.
THE APPLICANT’S DELAY AND HER EXPLANATION FOR IT
Both the transcript and the Appeal Book were filed on 26 July 2024. The delay between the time when O’Brien J ordered them to be filed – 23 May 2024 – and when they were filed, is in excess of two months. The reasons for the applicant’s delay are said to be a miscellany of ill health (flu), computer issues and difficulty seeing a lawyer, however they did not stop the applicant from seeking – albeit unsuccessfully – to file an earlier reinstatement application on 30 May 2024. I am not satisfied that the applicant has reasonably explained her delay.
THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION
It is convenient to adopt the following largely uncontroversial recital of history by the primary magistrate in her edited ex tempore reasons:
3.On 10 November 2023, final orders were made for the children [X Padgett], born [in] 2007 and [Y Padgett], born [in] 2009 to live with the father and for the father to have sole parental responsibility for decisions concerning the children’s welfare. The final orders provided for the children to spend time with and communicate with the mother in accordance with the children’s wishes.
4.At the time the final orders were made on 10 November 2023, [X] was 16 years old, about to turn 17 and [X] was 14 years old. He will turn 15 [in a few months].
…
11.In terms of factual issues arising after the November 2023 hearing in particular, the mother is very concerned for the welfare of the children. She alleges one of the children does not enjoy good health. She is concerned about what she perceives to be [Y’s] poor school performance. She believes the father has overborne the wishes of the children. She believes that despite what the children have said to [Dr C], the appointed Single expert Witness, they do in fact wish to have contact with her. She raises serious concerns for the safety and well-being of the children.
12.The mother has a long history of filing multiple interim applications in these proceedings concerning the children. There have been two tranches of child related proceedings which I will broadly refer to.
13.Unfortunately, the mother has a long history of inadequate participation in the court proceedings. During both the past and finalised first tranche of proceedings and the current proceedings the mother’s history of conduct and the manner of her participation in the litigation has caused the matter to be unnecessarily protracted.
…
18.The children have expressed their views to the Single Expert Witness, [Dr C], on several occasions. [Dr C] provided two single expert witness reports in the first tranche of the proceedings and in the second tranche of the proceedings, a further two reports.
19.The reports of [Dr C] make clear that the children no longer wish to spend regular time with the mother, as they did not feel comfortable with her nor do they wish to communicate with her, particularly the older child [X]. [Y] expressed to [Dr C] that from time to time, he thinks about his mother and on occasions he has reached out to her and spent time with her, but [Y] describes this as always "ending in tears".
20.The first set of proceedings were commenced by the father in May 2018. The first application of the father and the cross-application of the mother ultimately proceeded to an undefended final hearing before Chief Justice Sutherland. On 26 March 2021, her Honour delivered an extempore judgment. The mother had failed to file any trial affidavits leading up to the hearing, notwithstanding that on three separate occasions, the time for her to file her trial material had been extended.
21.The mother failed to file her trial material and to this day, blames the father for the fact the matter proceeded on an undefended basis. Extraordinarily, the mother arrived late at the final hearing. She claimed she had been unable to find a park. The undefended hearing was well under way by the time the mother arrived. The mother was able to observe the proceedings but did not participate in the undefended hearing in any meaningful way.
22.On 26 March 2021, her Honour made an order for the father to have sole parental responsibility, subject to the father conferring with the mother. Her Honour also made orders for the children to live with the father and the mother as agreed between them, for up to a week about with each parent. Orders were also made for contact on special occasions and various other parenting orders were made. Both the child-related and the financial proceedings were otherwise finalised.
…
26.On 4 November 2021, the mother filed an appeal against the orders made on 26 March 2021 and also orders made on 4 November 2021, but that appeal was abandoned. The mother then filed two subsequent Form 2 Applications, which were listed before her Honour. Ultimately those applications were dismissed by her Honour and the proceedings were finalised.
27.Later, on 4 February 2022 the mother filed a further Form 1 Application to reopen the proceedings. In her application the mother complained that despite the final orders made by her Honour on 26 March 2021, the father refused to allow the children to spend time with her and refused to comply with the orders that he confer in the exercise of parental responsibility.
28.The father filed his Form 1A Response on 28 February 2022. The father relied on the history of volatility in the parents’ relationship and the history of past allegations of the mother using extreme physical violence on the children. He also pointed to the long history of the family violence proceedings, which also occurred alongside the Family Court proceedings. The family violence proceedings in the Magistrates Court took place between [early] 2018 through to [early] 2022. Ultimately a Family Violence Restraining Order application was withdrawn on the basis of the parties’ mutual undertakings.
…
30.The mother allegedly also ceased contact with the children between February 2021 until March 2021. After the final hearing, the mother commenced spending time with the children for one night a fortnight until June 2021, when the mother again refused to have the children in her care. On this occasion, the mother had refused to return the children to the father after an agreed visit which caused the children to become upset. The children, when speaking to [Dr C], referred to this incident, describing their feelings of having lost trust in the mother. The father applied for a recovery order and since that time, the children have largely refused to spend time with the mother, other than some sporadic visits that have occurred between the mother and [Y].
…
57.There has been a total of 38 court appearances. The children have been interviewed on multiple occasions. The dispute has been going on now for approximately 67 months, having started in May 2018 and still continuing in January of 2024.
58.On 10 November 2023, the Court made orders with the intention that the Form 1 Application of the mother would be summarily dismissed, and the orders also provided for the father’s cost application to proceed for determination.
It is therefore plain that, left unchecked, the litigation involving the children is likely to continue until the youngest child turns 18.
PROSPECTS OF THE APPEAL SUCCEEDING
The grounds of appeal in the Notice filed 26 February 2024 are as follows:
1. Earrd by failing to take into account provided evidence by the mother.
2. Erred by wrong facts.
3. Erred in fact and Law by discrimination orders.
4.Erred by failing to find that evidence of single expert report was obtained by fraud, and it is itself evidence of the father's fraud.
5.Erred by fact and law by failing to consider Whether the evidence of the single expert is admissible in term of the conclusions drawn by the single expert conclusion and whether they meet the threshold of “relevant evidence” under s 55 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which is not excluded pursuant to s 69ZT(l) of the Act.
6.Erred by failing to consider the fact that the mother was denied by the judges the right to give evidence at two trials and or allow evidence to be tested.
7.Erred by failing to find family violence convicted by the father and children's wishes of they wish to live with is oppressed.
8.Erred by discrimination and unfair orders in that to permit the father to frustrate the condition the mother is requested to satisfy in order to performing right to enforce the children's best interest, and for the children to have meaningful relationship with the mother. The father's behaviours could cause an “interruption” as previously did. It requires 12-months period of monthly period of monthly mediation session to recommence.
9.Erred by failing to consider and make orders in relation to the risk of family violence and the mother's FVRO protection to be consistently with the childes best interest.
10.Erred in fact and Law in finding that the mother refused to see the children and refused to take the child [Y] to school as was set out in the trial judge findings.
11.Erred in fact and Law by failing to find the risk of family violence and father's conduct of manipulating the police to raise false VRO by using the children's friends and friends' parent, it is the father that represent an emotional risk to the children.
12.Erred in fact and law in disregarding the evidence series of contravention excuses was intentional and fraudulent, and the historical contempt of the court by the father were as set in the application of the mother should be considered when finding the children's best interest and cost orders, should be in favour to the mother, and father be convicted for an offence under s 70NFH and or s 112AP (9) of the Family Law Act 1975.
13.Erred in fact and law by failing to find that the father has embarked upon a concerted and at times successful campaign and by all obtained orders since 17 Dec 2019 to disrupt the mother's relationship with the children and to promote the falsehood that she presents as a risk and lack of insight.
14.Erred in fact and Law by failing to find that findings of the trial judge are based on wrong fact as set out in the evidence of the mother's application, where it should consider the miscarriage of justice impact on the mother and children by the financial and parenting orders.
15.Erred by failing to consider the mother's allegations in relation to the factors of the S 79A Act reflect the mother's circumstances as in the application filed by the mother that it impacted the children by the father. It should be noted that the father using the children as way to protect him from raising his fraud and contempt of court in regard of the financial settlement judgment made at trail.
(As per the original)
That said, in her affidavit filed 25 July 2024, the applicant appears to wish to add to her grounds as follows:
Ground of Appeal to Financial orders effecting the Children, if to be considered ground
127.Erred by failing to consider allegation made in regard of the father's disposal to significant fund from the marital asset pool and his failure to declare it intentionally, before the trial judge make finding.
128.Erred by discrimination and unfair by trial judge in putting the wife undefended for not filing trial documents on time were the husband fail to comply with orders in regard of filing financial documents and wife is still awaiting to receive his disclosure which was not served on the wife.
129.Erred in Fact and Law by trial judge in finding that the property interest of the parties and their value were as set in the schedule attached to the husband's papers for the judge.
130.Erred in fact and Law by trial judge in findings that it was Just and equitable for the parties' assets and liabilities should be divided 60% / 40% in favour of the husband.
131.Erred in fact and law by trial judge in finding that overall contributions weigh significantly in the husband favour.
132.Erred in fact and law by trial judge in findings that the S 75(2) factors very slightly in favour of the husband.
(As per the original)
It is very difficult to understand many of those grounds, and simply impossible to discern any merit to any of them. Moreover, they appear not to challenge the costs order at all, and do not engage with the reasoning process which underpins the primary magistrate’s dismissal of the mother’s various interlocutory applications. Rather the grounds appear to be an attempt to revisit the substantive parenting – and perhaps even property – orders made in the past, although such an appeal is now well out of time.
It follows that the appeal as sought to be ventilated by the applicant, does not enjoy merit. My own consideration of the primary magistrate’s decision does not lead to any different conclusion. The reinstatement of the applicant’s appeal would be futile.
PREJUDICE
Since the appeal does not enjoy merit, no prejudice will be suffered by the applicant if it is not reinstated, other than she will be deprived of an opportunity to have a yet another day in court.
On the other hand, if the appeal were reinstated, the husband will suffer the prejudice of having to resist an unmeritorious appeal.
OUTCOME
Weighing those maters told strongly against any reinstatement of the appeal, as doing so is not necessary to enable the court to do justice between the parties. Hence on 5 August 2024, I dismissed the applicant’s Application in an Appeal filed 26 July 2024.
COSTS
In the event the Application in an Appeal was dismissed, the respondent sought his costs fixed in the sum of $1,760. The applicant opposed that order.
Even if the respondent is in a better financial position than the applicant, he has the care of their two children. In any event, impecuniosity is not a bar to a costs order (Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164).
The application arose out of the applicant’s failure to comply with the orders of O’Brien J, and hence arguably even if the application had succeeded, she should have paid the respondent’s costs anyway. The application having failed, the case for costs is irresistible.
Therefore I ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs as claimed within 28 days.
I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Tree. Associate:
Dated: 12 August 2024
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