Paco Nominees Pty Ltd - [2024] ATMO 211

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Trade mark application number 2381990 (classes 14, 18, 24, 25, 28, 32, 33) – G (figurative) - in the name of Paco Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the HVRC Family Trust.

Delegate:

Jonathon Galloway

Representation:

Applicant: Andrew Sykes of counsel, instructed by Cooper Mills Lawyers Pty Ltd

Decision:

2024 ATMO 211

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – section 33 proceeding – section 41 considered – trade mark not capable of distinguishing – evidence insufficient – trade mark application rejected

Background

This matter relates to the examination of the application for registration of the following trade mark under the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).[1]
Trade Mark No: 2381990
Trade Mark: (‘Trade Mark’)
Filing Date: 22 August 2023
Applicant: Paco Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the HVRC Family Trust (‘Applicant’)
[1] Unless otherwise stated, each reference to a section or regulation is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’) respectively.
Specification of Goods:
Class 14: Jewellery; Watches; Watch bands; Key rings with fobs or trinkets attached; Ornamental pins
Class 18: Luggage; Articles of luggage being bags; Bags for sports; Beach bags; Casual bags; Duffle bags; Gym bags; Leather bags; Messenger bags; Overnight bags; Shoulder bags; Sling bags; Toiletry bags (not fitted); Travel bags; Waist bags; Carrying bags (other than disposable carrier bags); Card holders (wallets); Key cases; Leather cases; Pocket wallets; Leather wallets; Umbrellas; Beach umbrellas (portable)
Class 24: Bath towels; Beach towels; Towels (textile); Textiles
Class 25: Apparel (clothing, footwear, headgear); Exercise wear; Swimwear; Gloves (clothing); Scarves; Beach robes; Robes; Underwear
Class 28: Articles for use in watersports; Inflatable mats for recreational use; Inflatable pool toys; Water toys (other than swimming aids); Apparatus for boxing; Beach balls; Balls for playing sports; Baseball bats; Baseballs; Racquets; Surfboards; Footballs; Apparatus for playing sports; Apparatus for sports for use with water; Articles of sporting apparatus; Sporting apparatus; Apparatus for games; Inflatable games for swimming pools; Apparatus for playing the game of baseball; Games; Exercise apparatus, other than for medical rehabilitative purposes; Boxing gloves
Class 32: Non-alcoholic beverages; Beer
Class 33: Alcoholic beverages, except beer; Liquors (alcoholic beverages); Spirits (beverages)
The application was examined as required under s 31 and a ground for rejection was raised under s 41(4). The examiner’s first report provided:
Your trade mark is, or has as its main feature, the letter/s G.
This letter [is] commonly used on the goods or services you have claimed.
Other traders should be able to use this letter in connection with goods or services similar to yours.
The examiner gave the Applicant the option of providing evidence of use of the Trade Mark to overcome the ground for rejection. The Applicant’s legal representative responded by providing written submissions on 25 September 2023.
The examiner issued a second adverse report on 24 October 2023. The examiner maintained their position that the Trade Mark lacked sufficient capacity to distinguish the Applicant’s goods.
On 25 April 2024 the Applicant requested to be heard on the matter as allowed by s 33(4). On 25 July 2024 the Applicant filed written submissions along with evidence being:
· The declaration of Trevene Patrick Kneuman, Global General Manager of Geedup Online Pty Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Applicant, made on 25 July 2024 with Annexures TPK-1 to TPK-6 (‘Kneuman’).
The hearing took place on 1 August 2024 by video conference. The Applicant was represented by Andrew Sykes of counsel, instructed by Victor Ng of Cooper Mills Lawyers Pty Ltd. I conducted the hearing, and the following constitutes the reasons for my decision made as a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (‘Registrar’).

The Law

Section 41 provides:
Trade mark not distinguishing applicant’s goods or services
(1) An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.
Note: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
(2) A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.
(3) This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b) the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.
(4) This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and
(b) the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:
(i) the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;
(ii) the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;
(iii) any other circumstances.
Note 1: Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:
(a) the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services; or
(b) the time of production of goods or of the rendering of services.
Note 2: For goods of a person and services of a person see section 6.
Note 3: Use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant and an authorised use of a trade mark by another person are each taken to be use of the trade mark by the applicant (see subsections (5) and 7(3) and section 8).
(5) For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an applicant for the registration of the trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.
Note 1: For applicant and predecessor in title see section 6.
Note 2: If a predecessor in title had authorised another person to use the trade mark, any authorised use of the trade mark by the other person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the predecessor in title (see subsection 7(3) and section 8).
The first step in terms of ss 41(3) and 41(4) is to consider the extent, if any, to which the Trade Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods of the Applicant from the similar and/or closely related goods and/or services of other persons.
The test for inherent adaptation to distinguish is set out in Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks where Kitto J said:
That ultimate question must not be misunderstood. It is not whether the mark will be adapted to distinguish the registered owner’s goods if it be registered and other persons consequently find themselves precluded from using it. The question is whether the mark, considered quite apart from the effects of registration, is such that by its use the applicant is likely to attain his object of thereby distinguishing his goods from the goods of others. In Registrar of Trade Marks v. W. & G. Du Cros Ltd. (1913) AC 624, at pp 634, 635 Lord Parker of Waddington, having remarked upon the difficulty of finding the right criterion by which to determine whether a proposed mark is or is not “adapted to distinguish” the applicant’s goods, defined the crucial question practically as I have stated it, and added two sentences which have often been quoted but to which it is well to return for an understanding of the problem in a case such as the present. His Lordship said: “The applicant’s chance of success in this respect (i.e. in distinguishing his goods by means of the mark, apart from the effects of registration) must, I think, largely depend upon whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it, upon or in connexion with their own goods. It is apparent from the history of trade marks in this country that both the Legislature and the Courts have always shown a natural disinclination to allow any person to obtain by registration under the Trade Marks Acts a monopoly in what others may legitimately desire to use.” The interests of strangers and of the public are thus bound up with the whole question, as Hamilton L.J. pointed out in the case of R.J. Lea, Ltd. (1913) 1 Ch 446, at p 463; (1913) 30 RPC 216, at p 227; but to say this is not to treat the question as depending upon some vague notion of public policy: it is to insist that the question whether a mark is adapted to distinguish be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives – in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess – will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it.[2]
[2] [1964] HCA 55, [5].

The consideration of inherent adaptability to distinguish is a general question of whether the trade mark is one which ‘other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their businesses and without any improper motive, to desire to use upon or in connexion with their goods’.[3]
[3] F H Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd [1965] HCA 72, [6] (Kitto J).
More recent authority is to be found in Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Modena Trading Pty Ltd (‘Cantarella’).[4] In that case the High Court of Australia indicated that the test for distinctiveness is a two-step process. The first step being to determine the ordinary signification of the sign comprising a trade mark, in Australia, to persons who will purchase, consume, or trade in the goods, then having determined the answer to that question the second step is to consider the likelihood of the sign being needed by other traders for the purposes of that ordinary signification.
[4] [2014] HCA 48, (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Gageler JJ) (‘Cantarella’).
The wording of s 41 imposes a presumption of registrability. I must be satisfied that either ss 41(3) or 41(4) applies to the Trade Mark before it is open to me to reject the application. For the sake of emphasis, it is not the case that I must be satisfied that the Trade Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish, or does in fact distinguish, the claimed goods before accepting the application. If doubt remains as to whether the relevant provisions apply, that doubt must be resolved in the Applicant’s favour and the application cannot be rejected under s 41.
The adverse reports issued during examination indicated that the Applicant might overcome the ground for rejection by providing evidence of use ‘in terms of subsection 41(4)’. I am not bound by the examiner’s view as to inherent distinctiveness or factual distinctiveness. It is incumbent upon me to consider these matters afresh.

The Applicant’s Submissions

The Applicant submits that the application is not for the letter ‘G’ or a stylised version of the letter ‘G’. The Applicant believes the Trade Mark would be more accurately described as a graphic device trade mark which is inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods. In addition, the Applicant contends that the examiner’s decision is inconsistent with the Registrar’s current practice regarding trade marks that depict single letters.
The Applicant submits in the alternative, that the evidence of use and evidence of intended use and other circumstances is sufficient to demonstrate that the Trade Mark does or will distinguish the Applicant’s goods from the goods and services of other traders.

Discussion

The first limb of the two-step process set out in Cantarella is to consider whether the Trade Mark has an ordinary signification to any person in Australia concerned with the specified goods.
The Applicant submits that if a trade mark or something nearly resembling it does not have an ordinary signification then it must be considered inherently adapted to distinguish.
In GAP (ITM) Inc v General Pants Co Pty Ltd (‘GAP’), the delegate stated:
As was the case in the seminal decision of W. & G. du Cros, there is a general tendency by persons to use letters or initials in the course of their trading activities, including use in relation to goods or services: see also Effem Foods Pty Limited v Marks & Spencer Plc.[5] This is particularly so where the letters are represented in plain type. There is thus the likelihood that other traders in the ordinary course of business and without any improper motive, will desire to use the mark within the terms identified in Clark Equipment.[6]
[5] (1999) 47 IPR 213, 220 (Hearing Officer Zars).
[6] [2004] ATMO 12, [16] (Hearing Officer McDonagh) (‘GAP’).
I also note the Australian Trade Marks Manual of Practice and Procedure (‘the Manual’) refers to the Registrar’s practice regarding applications for single letter trade marks. Although the Manual is not a source of law but rather a set of administrative guidelines, it provides the following guidance:
Single letter trade marks without “get up” are generally not prima facie capable of distinguishing. The likelihood of other traders needing to use a simple, unembellished single letter in the form of initials or abbreviations is quite high (e.g. the letter M is commonly understood to indicate “mobile” in relation to phones and the letter E is commonly used to indicate a wide fitting in relation to shoes). One letter trade marks, unless represented in an unusual manner, generally possess limited inherent adaptation to distinguish and usually require evidence of use.[7]
[7] Australian Trade Marks Manual of Practice and Procedure, part 22.8.1.
While the Trade Mark is not presented in plain text, I have found that the degree of stylisation present in the Trade Mark is not sufficient to render it inherently capable of distinguishing the Applicant’s goods. I have considered the Applicant’s submissions that the Trade Mark possesses ‘unusual spikes’ and ‘jagged edges’.[8] I accept that three ‘spikes’ exist at approximately the mid-point of the Trade Mark and some of the edges may be jagged. However, in the context of the Trade Mark as a whole, these embellishments, if discerned, do not materially affect how it would be perceived. That is, the Trade Mark still presents as a plain text ‘G’ notwithstanding the existence of these minor embellishments and I consider this to be its ordinary signification.
[8] Applicant’s submissions, [18].
The Applicant submits that the Trade Mark is not a sign that ‘nearly resembles’ a sign that has an ordinary signification with respect to the goods claimed. The concept of what ‘nearly resembling’ a sign with an ordinary signification means was discussed in Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Limited.[9] In that case the court noted that the inherent adaptability to distinguish of MOROCCANOIL must be assessed in relation to substantially identical and deceptively similar variations, such as MOROCCAN OIL, MOROCCAN-OIL and perhaps, without deciding, OIL OF MOROCCO.[10] The Applicant submits that the Trade Mark is sufficiently stylised, such that it cannot be said to be substantially identical or deceptively similar to a plain text ‘G’.
[9] [2018] FCAFC 93 (Allsop CJ, Perram and Markovic JJ).
[10] Ibid, [125] (Perram J, Allsop CJ agreeing at [1], Markovic J agreeing at [169]).
The Applicant argues that the Trade Mark is stylised to such a degree that a plain text ‘G’ cannot or would not be considered to be substantially identical to it. However, the Applicant has not addressed the possibility that another trader would desire to use a single letter ‘G’ with minor embellishments in the ordinary course of trade, that would nearly resemble the Trade Mark.
The Applicant submits that elements which are common in trade are less striking to the consumer and therefore the consumer will be struck by the ‘unique spikey and jagged appearance’ of the Trade Mark and will ‘place no brand significance on the mere appearance of a “G”’.[11] The Applicant suggests that a consumer will not observe the Trade Mark and see it as a monopoly in the letter ‘G’ to the extent it will see any plain text ‘G’ as indicating a brand origin with the Applicant.
[11] Applicant’s submissions, [21].
This is not the test for the assessment of trade marks under s 41. The test is a two-step test which involves consideration of the ordinary signification of the Trade Mark and the likelihood of other traders having an honest desire to make use of that Trade Mark or something nearly resembling it. In my assessment, the ordinary signification of the Trade Mark is that of a plain text ‘G’. As noted in GAP, traders have a tendency to use letters in the course of trade. Whilst other traders are unlikely to harbour an honest desire to use the Trade Mark in its specific form, I remain satisfied that other traders would honestly desire to use the plain text ‘G’ which is a mark nearly resembling it given the minimal stylisation present in the Trade Mark.
The Applicant submits that a finding that the Trade Mark lacks inherent capacity to distinguish the Applicant’s goods would be inconsistent with other trade marks on the Australian Trade Marks Register which it says were accepted and registered without objection. In its written submissions the Applicant relies on five trade marks, reproduced at Annexure A of this decision, which it says were ‘accepted recently by the Registrar on a first clear report’.[12]
[12] Ibid, [24].
The rationale for acceptance of these trade marks is not before me, although some of the trade marks are a stylised single letter ‘G’, they are, when considered as a whole, different trade marks and applied to different goods and services. In any event, whether a trade mark is sufficiently inherently adapted to distinguish is not assessed with regard to the state of the Australian Trade Marks Register.
I refer to the comments of Wilcox J in Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks:
I add only that, although consistency in public administration is desirable, a public officer is not justified in persisting with error. Marks may, in the past, have been wrongly registered. It would be an unwarranted distraction from the task at hand to investigate, in a particular case, whether they were or not.[13]
[13] [2000] FCA 177, [35].
Having regard to the presumption of registrability, the ordinary signification of the Trade Mark, and the legitimate desire of other traders to use the Trade Mark or something nearly resembling it in connection with their own goods and services, I am satisfied the Trade Mark is to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the Applicant’s goods.
In view of this, I must now consider whether the Trade Mark should be rejected having regard to the matters set out in s 41(4)(b), namely the combined effect of the extent of the inherent adaptation to distinguish, the use or intended use of the Trade Mark and any other circumstances.

Evidence of Use, Intended Use and Other Circumstances

The evidence of use, intended use and other circumstances is set out in Kneuman. Kneuman provides information about the corporate structure of the Applicant and its subsidiaries, the use of the Trade Mark and how it fits with the suite of trade marks owned by the Applicant. The Applicant considers that the Trade Mark is ‘the core or unifying brand mark of the GEEDUP label’.[14] The Applicant’s other trade marks include, GEEDUP and GDUP in plain text as well as the stylised trade mark reproduced below:

[14] Kneuman, [16].

Kneuman states that the Trade Mark is a core part of the Applicant’s business, and it has been continuously using the Trade Mark in Australia since 2010. Kneuman also states there is an intention to continue using the Trade Mark in Australia and overseas.
Kneuman describes the Applicant’s sales method as ‘drops’ meaning the Applicant’s goods are sold exclusively on its website by limited release at specific times. Kneuman believes that this sales method generates a high degree of anticipation and is enormously popular with consumers. It also requires consumers to be engaged with the Applicant’s advertising in order to know when the next sale is going to occur. The Applicant submits that its sales method creates a high degree of anticipation and results in the rapid sale of goods. While this may be true, such evidence alone does not clearly establish that the Trade Mark, as opposed to one of the Applicant’s other trade marks, is being used as a badge of origin. The evidence that attests to the Applicant’s turnover, and rate of sales, is not supported by any corresponding evidence as to how this figure is achieved in respect of all the claimed goods.
Kneuman provides that social media advertising is one of two main methods of promotion that the Applicant utilises to promote the Trade Mark. The evidence includes a series of screenshots, dated between 2021 and 2024, which demonstrate how the Applicant promotes its various trade marks through social media.[15] The Applicant submits that the effort it puts into promoting the Trade Mark correlates with the substantial sales figures and annual turnover.
[15] Ibid, Annexure TPK-5.
The second method of advertising that the Applicant uses is partnerships and collaborations with various sporting and entertainment figures. Kneuman refers to examples of these collaborations as being with:
·     Australian boxer and former world lightweight champion, George Kambosos Jr;
·     Australian mixed martial artist and former UFC fighter, Tyson Pedro;
·     Australian hip hop artist, Hooligan Hefs;
·     American rapper and hip hop icon, Fat Joe;
·     British rapper, Abra Cadabra;
·     American rapper, Fivio Foreign;
·     British rapper, Nemzzz; and
·     Australian A-League team, the Western Sydney Wanderers FC.[16]
[16] Ibid, [12].
Five media publications discussing the success of the ‘GeedUp’ brand were submitted. In addition to chronicling the life of the founder of the Applicant, the articles give some insight in to the retail cost of some of the clothing items such as $170 hoodies and $430 varsity jackets. The articles also highlight the expanding nature of the Applicant and its growing business both in Australia and overseas.[17]
[17] Ibid, Annexure TPK-3.
Kneuman submits that the Trade Mark is registered in China in respect of goods in classes 14 and 18, as well as in New Zealand in respect of goods in classes 14, 18, 24, 25, 28, 32 and 33. The Applicant also has an international registration in respect of the same classes.[18]
[18] Ibid, Annexure TPK-1.
Although evidence of trade mark registrations in foreign jurisdictions is not entirely irrelevant, Australian trade mark applications are assessed in accordance with Australian law and practice, and against Australian trading conditions, each of which may differ substantially in substance and application from foreign jurisdictions. As such the existence of overseas registrations for the Trade Mark has limited relevance in this matter.
In considering all of the evidence I am mindful that it relates to the Applicant’s entire suite of trade marks, including those referenced at [30] of this decision. This indiscriminate approach creates difficulty in assessing the Trade Mark’s capacity to distinguish the Applicant’s goods. This is particularly evident where the Trade Mark appears in close proximity to, or as part of, the Applicant’s other trade marks.
As can be seen in Annexure TPK-2, the Trade Mark is often applied to clothing items as part of the Applicant’s other trade mark ‘GEEDUP’. Relevant examples are reproduced below:

Annexure TPK-4 contains additional examples of how the Trade Mark is applied to goods. As mentioned, the Trade Mark appears in close proximity to ‘GEEDUP’ or other elements. These examples do not assist the Applicant because they do not clearly establish that consumers will see the Trade Mark as a badge of origin in the absence of other distinctive elements.

Annexure TPK-2 primarily shows use of the trade mark ‘GEEDUP’, in various stylised fonts including, in some instances, the same stylisation of the Trade Mark. However, it does not contain any examples of the Trade Mark being used in isolation and as applied for. Annexure TPK-5 contains screenshots of posts made on Geedupco’s Instagram account. The posts show the images of goods such as clothing, rings and sunglasses bearing the Trade Mark. Although I note some level of interaction with the posts by consumers at large, the evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that Australian consumers would recognise the Trade Mark as a badge of origin. I note Annexure TPK-4 provides examples of how the Trade Mark is applied to clothing, sunglasses, towels and rings. However, this evidence contains minimal examples of the Trade Mark being used in the manner applied for. A further deficiency in the evidence is that there are no examples of the Trade Mark being used in respect of any of the goods claimed in classes 18, 28, 32 or 33.
The evidence is not supported by detailed statements or records relating to total annual sales, or sales for each release of goods. The evidence of annual turnover is a single figure only for the year ending June 2024. This is despite the Applicant’s claim that the Trade Mark has been in use for 14 years. There is no evidence about turnover generated specifically from use of the Trade Mark, as opposed to the Applicant’s total annual revenue. In addition, the evidence relating to sales figures does not include how that figure was achieved in respect of all seven classes of goods in the application. There are some references to the sale of goods which indicate the clothing goods are sold at a high price point, but there are no records of the retail cost for individual items other than these clothing items. The media publications in relation to the Applicant make little or no reference to the Trade Mark and there is nothing before me that evidences how the Trade Mark is used as part of the collaborations listed at [34] of this decision.
The Applicant’s evidence of intended use does not go beyond a bare statement that it intends to continue using the Trade Mark in the future. The Applicant’s evidence does not include forecasted revenue, future advertising plans, or any other particulars concerning the intended use of the Trade Mark across a broad range of goods.
When I weigh the submissions and evidence filed together with the extent that the Trade Mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the combined effect is not sufficient to satisfy me that the Trade Mark does or will distinguish the Applicant’s goods.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that a ground for rejection exists under s 41(4) in respect of the Trade Mark.

Decision

Section 33 provides:
Application accepted or rejected
(1) The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the application unless he or she is satisfied that:
(a) the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or
(b) there are grounds under this Act for rejecting it.
Note: For this Actsee section 6.
(2) The Registrar may accept the application subject to conditions or limitations.
Note: For limitationssee section 6.
(3) If the Registrar is satisfied that:
(a) the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or
(b) there are grounds under this Act for rejecting it;
the Registrar must reject the application.
Note: For this Actsee section 6.
(4) The Registrar may not reject an application without giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard.
Note: For applicantsee section 6.
I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there is a ground for rejecting the application to register the Trade Mark under s 41(4). In accordance with s 33(3), I reject trade mark application number 2381990. If the Registrar is served with a notice of appeal within one month from the date of this decision, I direct that the disposition of the application be in accordance with the Court’s direction or order.

Jonathon Galloway

Hearing Officer

Oppositions and Hearings

Trade Marks and Designs

31 October 2024

Annexure A

Trade mark number	Trade mark	Goods & Services
2200638	Class 35: Compilation and provision of online directories; Online advertising on a computer network; Online data processing services; Online promotion on a computer network; Online retail services; Advertising; Intermediary business services relating to the commercialising of goods (wholesaling); Wholesaling of goods (by any means); Discount services (retail, wholesale, or sales promotion services); Hypermarket retailing; Department store retailing; Arranging and conducting promotional and marketing events; Advice relating to marketing management; Administration relating to marketing; Business advice relating to marketing; Administration of consumer loyalty programs
2253957	Class 9: Downloadable software for promoting the goods and services of others, selling vouchers that can be exchanged for the discounted services of others, voucher redemption, appointment scheduling, providing retail and ordering services for a wide variety of consumer goods, selling discounted travel packages and hotel accommodations, providing information and reviews concerning travel services and destinations, providing ratings, reviews, and recommendations on events and activities in entertainment; downloadable vouchers in the nature of tickets for admission to sporting, cultural, and entertainment events Class 35: Promoting the goods and services of others; online retail store services via computer featuring a wide variety of consumer goods of others; providing marketplace information, namely, commercial information on merchants, consumer products, business events and services; arranging for the sale of event admission vouchers via a website and wireless devices; appointment scheduling services; providing a web site featuring ratings, reviews and recommendations on merchants, consumer products, business events and services; providing a website for selling vouchers that can be exchanged for the discounted services of others; providing a website for selling discounted travel packages and hotel accommodations Class 39: Providing information and providing reviews concerning travel services and destination stays Class 41: Online ticket agency services, namely, providing tickets and vouchers for admission to sporting, cultural and entertainment events Class 43: Providing information and reviews regarding hotels and temporary housing accommodations
2305692	Class 9: Downloadable audio and video recordings in the fields of entertainment, sports, news, history, relationships, culture, science, business, and general interest; downloadable movies, shows, and programs Class 35: Advertising services for podcasts, movies, shows, and programs; advertising services; advertising services, namely, in the nature of audio and video advertising services; consulting services in the field of creative advertising services for podcasts, movies, shows, and programs; consulting services in the field of advertising; consulting services in the field of audio and video advertising Class 41: Entertainment services, namely, providing podcasts and non-downloadable audio and video recordings in the field of entertainment, sports, news, history, relationships, culture, science, business, and general interests; entertainment in the nature of ongoing shows featuring information in the fields of entertainment, news, sports, history, relationships, culture, science, business, and general interest; entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable movies, shows, and programs via a video-on-demand service; creation, production, and distribution of podcasts, movies, shows, and programs
2204052	Class 37: Mining extraction; mining services (not being of data or cryptocurrency); quarrying services; drilling; excavating; construction; repair services; installation services; maintenance services (not being for software); construction, installation, repair and maintenance services relating to mines, quarries and wells; construction, installation, repair and maintenance services relating to road, rail, pipeline and other transportation infrastructure; environmental remediation services, namely, the environmental management, waste disposal and remediation of mining sites; the provision of information, including online, regarding the aforementioned services; advisory, consultancy, planning and support services regarding the aforementioned services Class 40: Treatment of materials; chemical and metal extraction and processing; refining; refining of gas, oil and other petrochemical products; electrical power generation; metalsmithing; goldsmithing; electroplating; goldplating; metallurgical processing; smelting; metal casting; processing, sorting, cutting and polishing precious stones; treatment and recycling of waste and rubbish, including carbon waste; the provision of information, including online, regarding the aforementioned services; advisory, consultancy, planning and support services regarding the aforementioned services Class 42: Scientific and technological services, and research and design relating thereto; scientific and technological services relating to mining, quarrying and metallurgical processes, and research and design relating thereto; research and development relating to the petrochemical, mining and energy supply industries; design, research and engineering services relating to the exploration, development, mining, processing, evaluation and marketing of base and precious metals, gemstones and petrochemicals; engineering; chemical analysis; industrial analysis, industrial research and industrial design services; exploration services; geological, oceanographic, oil, mineral and ore prospecting; surveying; geological and mineralogical prospecting, exploration, research and surveying; non-financial evaluation services, including of minerals, ores, gemstones, metals, mines, quarries, wells, land and other assets; the provision of information, including online, regarding the aforementioned services; advisory, consultancy and support services regarding the aforementioned services
2247242	Class 3: Non-medicated hair care preparations; non-medicated dandruff shampoo; hair styling preparations; hair straightening preparations; hair relaxing preparations; hair waving preparations; non-medicated hair restoration lotions; hair bleaching preparations; hair coloring preparations; hair glitter; hair care kits comprised of non-medicated hair care preparations, namely, shampoo, conditioner, non-medicated hair serum; non-medicated skin care preparations; cosmetics; sunscreen preparations Class 35: On-line retail store services featuring hair care preparations, skin care preparations and cosmetics; providing a web site featuring purchase information about personalized hair care products, skin care preparations and cosmetics