P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd v Yap

Link copied
Case Copied 9 min read

JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   P VIVANTE & CO PTY LTD -v- YAP [2007] WADC 149

CORAM:   O'BRIEN DCJ

HEARD:   6 JULY 2007

DELIVERED          :   Delivered Extemporaneously on 6 JULY 2007 typed from tape and edited by Trial Judge

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1536 of 1989

BETWEEN:   P VIVANTE & CO PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

CHENG SEE YAP
Defendant

Catchwords:

Appeal against Registrar's decision - Application to set aside default judgment - Abuse of process - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M I Handcock

Defendant:     In Person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Mullins Handcock

Defendant:     Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Yap v P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd, unreported; FCt of SCt of WA; Library No 930339; 10 June 1993

  1. O'BRIEN DCJ:  By notice of appeal filed 26 April 2007 the appellant appeals against a decision of the Registrar made on 19 April 2007 dismissing her application to set aside default judgment and ordering her to pay costs.

  2. This matter dates back to 1989.  There is at least one lever arch box of documents in relation to the various applications since then which have been filed primarily by the appellant.  The most recent affidavits are in connection with this appeal and they were sworn on 5 April 2007 and 23 April 2007.  The appellant has also filed lengthy submissions dated 29 June 2007.

  3. In my view, the application dated 5 April 2007, to set aside the default judgment dated 10 April 1989 is misconceived and an abuse of process.  I have personally reviewed the District Court files in relation to this matter.  As they date back to 1989, some are not in strict chronological order and so this was quite a time‑consuming process.  It is from those files that the following chronology is drawn.  The chronology relates only to those proceedings and applications relevant to the present application.

  4. The plaintiff filed a statement of claim on 15 March 1989 and it was served on 20 March 1980.  The plaintiff's claim was in the sum of approximately $39,000, with interest.  It claimed that there was a deed made between the plaintiff and the defendant, who is the appellant, which was stamped on 9 September 1988, wherein the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff certain sums of money, together with interest, and guaranteed a debt due to the plaintiff by a company of which the defendant was a director and shareholder.

  5. I will now refer to the defendant as "the appellant".

  6. The appellant did not enter an appearance.  On 10 April 1989 default judgment was entered against the appellant.  On 26 April 1989 a writ of fi fa was lodged.  On 10 April 1992 the appellant filed an application to set aside the default judgment.  The matter was listed for 29 May 1992.  The appellant did not appear and her application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.  Thereafter, the appellant filed an affidavit explaining her non‑appearance…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd v Yap and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] WADC 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerns a decision by the Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to set aside a default judgment. P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd had obtained a default judgment against Yap for breach of a loan agreement. Yap applied to set aside the default judgment, arguing that there was an abuse of process. The appeal by P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd against the Registrar's decision to set aside the default judgment was the subject of the hearing. The primary legal issue for the court was whether the Registrar had erred in setting aside the default judgment. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the application to set aside the judgment was an abuse of process.

The court considered the principles surrounding the setting aside of default judgments and the concept of abuse of process. It was noted that a default judgment could be set aside if there was a sufficient explanation for the default and if it was just to set it aside. The court also examined the circumstances under which an application to set aside a default judgment could be considered an abuse of process. The court found that the Registrar had not erred in setting aside the default judgment. The court held that Yap's application to set aside the default judgment was not an abuse of process, as there was a reasonable explanation for the default and it was just to set the judgment aside. The court emphasised that each case turned on its own facts and that the application was not vexatious or an abuse of the court's process.

The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Registrar to set aside the default judgment was upheld. The court did not make any orders regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established