P Vivante and Co Pty Ltd v Yap [No 2]

Link copied
Case Copied 7 min read

JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   P VIVANTE & CO PTY LTD -v- YAP [No 2] [2011] WADC 166

CORAM:   DAVIS DCJ

HEARD:   30 SEPTEMBER 2011

DELIVERED          :   30 SEPTEMBER 2011

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1536 of 1989

BETWEEN:   P VIVANTE & CO PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

CHENG SEE YAP
Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application by defendant to set aside default judgment from 1989 - Abuse of process - Leave of a judge required to issue application

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 67 r 5

Result:

Leave to file application refused

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Not applicable

Defendant:     In Person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Not applicable

Defendant:     Not applicable

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206

P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd v Yap [2007] WADC 149

Yap v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2008] FCA 534

Yap v P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd (Unreported, WASCA, Library No. 930339, 10 June 1993)

Yap v P Vivante & Co Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 287

DAVIS DCJ: [This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 30 September 2011 and edited from transcript.]

  1. The defendant, Mrs Yap, has, by a chamber summons dated 25 August 2011, sought orders to set aside default judgment entered against her over 22 years ago on 10 April 1989.

  2. The chamber summons is before me pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 67 r 5. It has been referred to a judge of this court because it appears to the principal registrar that the chamber summons is an abuse of the process of the court. He has accordingly refused to file and issue the chamber summons without Mrs Yap first obtaining the leave of a judge.

  3. The chamber summons seeks orders that:

    1.Default judgment entered 10 April 1989 be set aside unconditionally;

    2.Any other orders as the court thinks just; and

    3.The plaintiff do pay the defendant's out of pocket expenses as the court sees fit.

  4. Mrs Yap was, in fact, successful in setting aside the default judgment in 1992, but it was set aside conditionally.  By orders made on 23 June 1992, she was given leave to defend the action on conditions, including payment of the sum of $39,000 into court within 14 days from the date of the order, the filing of an appearance within three days, and the filing of a defence within 10 days from the date of the order.  It was further ordered that in the event that the $39,000 was not paid into court within the time specified, the plaintiff had liberty to enter judgment.

  5. Other than the filing of an appearance, Mrs Yap did not comply with the conditions, and so judgment in the action was entered against her in favour of the plaintiff on 25 August 1992.

  6. Mrs Yap was unsuccessful in her attempt to appeal from the orders made by the registrar on 23 June 1992; taking the matter first to a District Court…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read P Vivante and Co Pty Ltd v Yap [No 2] and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] WADC 166
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves a defendant, Yap, who sought to set aside a default judgment entered against them in 1989. The plaintiff in the matter is P Vivante and Co Pty Ltd. The application was made in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the matter was originally heard. The defendant argued that the original judgment should be set aside due to an abuse of process, specifically that the plaintiff had failed to serve the defendant with the statement of claim within the required time frame, thus denying them the opportunity to defend the matter.

The court was required to determine whether the defendant's application to set aside the default judgment was appropriate and whether the defendant had demonstrated a sufficient cause of action to warrant the setting aside of the judgment. The court also needed to consider whether the defendant's application was an abuse of process and whether leave of a judge was required to issue the application.

The court found that the defendant's application to set aside the default judgment was an abuse of process and that leave of a judge was required to issue such an application. The court held that the defendant had not demonstrated a sufficient cause of action to warrant the setting aside of the judgment, and that the application was an abuse of process. The court noted that the defendant had had a number of opportunities to defend the matter, but had failed to do so. The court also found that the defendant's delay in bringing the application to set aside the judgment was unreasonable and that the defendant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the setting aside of the judgment.

The court dismissed the defendant's application to set aside the default judgment. The court held that the defendant's delay in bringing the application was unreasonable and that the defendant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the setting aside of the judgment. The court also found that the defendant's application was an abuse of process and that leave of a judge was required to issue such an application. The court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established