SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Ozibar Pty Ltd v Laroar Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] QSC 82
PARTIES:
OZIBAR PTY LTD ACN 114 591 721 as trustee of OZIBAR UNIT TRUST
(Plaintiff/Respondent)v
LAROAR HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 011 058 772
(Defendant/Applicant)FILE NO/S:
S20/15
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court Mackay
DELIVERED ON:
12 April 2016
DELIVERED AT:
Rockhampton
HEARING DATE:
9 February 2016. Last submissions received 23 February 2016.
JUDGE:
McMeekin J
ORDERS:
- The Plaintiff’s application filed 27 January 2016 is dismissed;
- The Plaintiff is given leave to file such amended Claim and Statement of Claim as it might be advised on or before 4 pm on 10 May 2016;
- Paragraph 3 of the Order made on 4 December 2015 is vacated and the following order substituted:
3. The Plaintiff, Gregory Charles Long and Narelle Long are ordered to pay the costs of the Defendant of and incidental to this Application and the Defendant’s costs thrown away by reason of:
(a) the striking out of paragraph 46 to 50 and 80 to 118 of the Statement of Claim; and
(b) any subsequent amendment to the Statement of Claim.
4. The Plaintiff, Gregory Charles Long and Narelle Long are ordered to pay:
(a) the costs of and incidental to the application filed on 27 January 2016 by the Plaintiff;
(b) the costs of and incidental to the further hearing of the application filed on 17 September 2015 by the Defendant; and
(c) the Defendant’s costs thrown away by any subsequent amendment to the Statement of Claim;
- The parties have liberty to apply on the giving of three days’ notice to the other.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PROCEDURE UNDER UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND PREDECESSORS – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where the defendant applies for summary judgment or in the alternative to strike out the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim – where the proceedings concern the leasing of a commercial premises owned by the defendant – where the plaintiff has been given leave to re-plead – whether the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 applies – whether a reasonable cause of action is disclosed based on a surrender or assignment of the lease, a lease by attornment, a breach of covenant, a derogation from grant or a nuisance – whether there was a loss of commercial opportunity
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 10, s 11, s 12
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 69
Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld), s 15, s 43Retail Shop Leases Amendment Act 2006 (Qld), s 8
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 149, r 171, r 293
195 Crown Street Pty Ltd v Hoare [1969] 1 NSWR 193
Adamow v Kirk (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 514
Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd; Marklea Pty Ltd v Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd [1998] 1 Qd R 1
Barry v Heider (1914) 19 CLR 197; [1914] HCA 79
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor
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- Case
- [2016] QSC 82
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal principles relevant to the application for summary judgment and the potential applicability of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994. It concluded that the defendant's application for summary judgment was premature, as the plaintiff had been granted leave to amend its Statement of Claim. The court held that the plaintiff’s initial Statement of Claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action on the grounds presented. However, the plaintiff was allowed to re-plead, and thus the application for summary judgment was dismissed. The court also decided that the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 did not apply to the proceedings, thereby affecting the potential causes of action available to the plaintiff.
In light of the above findings, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for summary judgment. It granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended Statement of Claim by a specified deadline and vacated and substituted certain orders regarding costs. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs associated with the defendant's application and any subsequent amendments to the Statement of Claim. The parties were granted liberty to apply for further orders upon providing notice to the other party.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Plaintiff’s application filed 27 January 2016 is dismissed;
2. The Plaintiff is given leave to file such amended Claim and Statement of Claim as it might be advised on or before 4 pm on 10 May 2016;
3. Paragraph 3 of the Order made on 4 December 2015 is vacated and the following order substituted:
3. The Plaintiff, Gregory Charles Long and Narelle Long are ordered to pay the costs of the Defendant of and incidental to this Application and the Defendant’s costs thrown away by reason of:
(a) the striking out of paragraph 46 to 50 and 80 to 118 of the Statement of Claim; and
(b) any subsequent amendment to the Statement of Claim.
4. The Plaintiff, Gregory Charles Long and Narelle Long are ordered to pay:
(a) the costs of and incidental to the application filed on 27 January 2016 by the Plaintiff;
(b) the costs of and incidental to the further hearing of the application filed on 17 September 2015 by the Defendant; and
(c) the Defendant’s costs thrown away by any subsequent amendment to the Statement of Claim;
1. The parties have liberty to apply on the giving of three days’ notice to the other.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case has undergone several procedural steps, starting with an initial application by the defendant seeking summary judgment or to strike out the plaintiff's claims. This was followed by a hearing where the plaintiff was given leave to re-plead. The plaintiff filed an amended claim, which led to the defendant making a further application. The court has reviewed these applications and the content of the plaintiff's claims, leading to the current application and the orders made.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 applies to the lease in question.
2. Whether a reasonable cause of action is disclosed based on a surrender or assignment of the lease, a lease by attornment, a breach of covenant, a derogation from grant or a nuisance.
3. Whether there was a loss of commercial opportunity.
Held
1. The court concluded that the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 does not apply to the lease in question.
2. The court found that a reasonable cause of action was not disclosed based on the plaintiff's claims of a surrender or assignment of the lease, a lease by attornment, a breach of covenant, a derogation from grant or a nuisance.
3. The court did not address the issue of loss of commercial opportunity as it was not necessary to reach a conclusion on this matter.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the application by the defendant for summary judgment and the plaintiff's application for leave to re-plead. It examined the applicability of the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 to the lease in question, finding that the Act did not apply as the premises were not a "retail shop" as defined in the Act. The court also assessed whether the plaintiff had disclosed a reasonable cause of action based on the various grounds alleged, but concluded that none of the claims made were sufficient to establish a reasonable cause of action. The court noted that the plaintiff's claims concerning a surrender or assignment of the lease, a lease by attornment, a breach of covenant, a derogation from grant or a nuisance did not meet the threshold required for a reasonable cause of action. The court did not need to address the loss of commercial opportunity as it found the other issues were determinative of the case. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court will dismiss an application for summary judgment and an application for leave to re-plead if the claims made do not meet the threshold of a reasonable cause of action.