Osborne v Nursing Board of Tasmania
[2005] TASSC 65
•21 July 2005
[2005] TASSC 65
CITATION: Osborne v Nursing Board of Tasmania [2005] TASSC 65
PARTIES: OSBORNE, Sally Anne
v
NURSING BOARD OF TASMANIA
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: APPELLATE
FILE NO/S: LCA 39/2005
DELIVERED ON: 21 July 2005
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 1 July 2005
JUDGMENT OF: Tennent J
CATCHWORDS:
Professions and Trades – Medical and related professions – Other fields of practice – Nurses – Restrictions on right of practice – Nursing Act 1995 (Tas) – Procedural fairness.
Aust Dig Professions and Trades [219]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: R J Phillips
Respondent: A C R Spence
Solicitors:
Appellant: Phillips Taglieri
Respondent: Page Seager
Judgment Number: [2005] TASSC 65
Number of paragraphs: 54
Serial No 65/2005
File No LCA 39/2005
SALLY ANNE OSBORNE v NURSING BOARD OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TENNENT J
21 July 2005
The Nursing Board of Tasmania ("the Board") is constituted under the provisions of the Nursing Act 1995 ("the Act"). On 6 May 2005 it made a determination in respect of a registered nurse, Sally Osborne ("the appellant"). As a consequence of that determination, the appellant received a notice of suspension from the executive officer of the Board.
The notice of suspension provided as follows:
"NOTICE OF SUSPENSION
(Section 67 of the Nursing Act 1995)
Sally Anne Osborne, on 6 May 2005 the Nursing Board of Tasmania (the Board) determined that pursuant to Section 67(1)(h)) of the Nursing Act 1995 (the Act) your right of practice be partially suspended, pursuant to Section 67(1A)(b) of the Act, for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months. Specifically, the partial suspension is that your practise be directly supervised by another registered nurse.
The Board has resolved that your suspension is necessary due to the following:
That during the period of on or about 24 January 2005 to 3 February 2005, you, Registered Nurse Sally Osborne, in the capacity of your nursing practice at Bellview Manor Nursing Home failed to store medications in compliance with the Nursing Board of Tasmania's Medication Management Standards for Nurses February 2004.
Specifically,
•that on or about 24 January 2005 you, Registered Nurse Sally Osborne, had a white tablet (Temazepam) in your cardigan pocket which was discovered when it fell out of your cardigan when the cardigan was knocked to the floor; and
•that on or about 3 February 2005 you, Registered Nurse Sally Osborne, in the capacity of your nursing practice at Bellview Manor Nursing Home stored medications, in particular a card of Temazepam, under a box containing Nebuliser equipment in a cupboard in the Treatment Room.
As a result of the foregoing you may be guilty of professional misconduct. Section 56(2)(c) of the Nursing Act 1995 provides.
'Without limiting the matters that may constitute professional misconduct, a nurse is guilty of such misconduct if the nurse -
c) contravenes a provision of the Nursing Code.'
The Board believes that as these matters relate to medication management issues, it is in the public interest that your right of practice be partially suspended in this manner as it will provide for the protection of the public interest while not restricting your ability to obtain work.
You are advised that the Suspension takes effect from the time when this Notice is personally served on you or if you are represented by a union or lawyer, service of this Notice on that union or firm/practitioner.
You are advised that you have the right to appeal, pursuant to Section 72 of the Act, to the Supreme Court of Tasmania against the decision of the Board to suspend your right of practice. Such appeal must be made within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Notice.
In accordance with Section 67(6) of the Act, you are required to return your current practising certificate to the Board within seven (7) days of the receipt of this Notice. Penalties apply for failure to comply with above direction.
I also advise you that pursuant to Section 8(1)(a) and (b) of the Act the Board will notify all Nurse Regulatory Authorities and those in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, together with Statewide Nursing Employers of this suspension.
I suggest you seek legal advice upon receipt of this Notice."
On 26 May 2005, the appellant lodged a notice of appeal against that suspension.
Grounds of appeal
The grounds of appeal were as follows:
"Ground 1
That the Appellant was denied natural justice in that the Nursing Board of Tasmania informed itself on the issue of the allegations made against the Appellant without warning the Appellant of that evidence or affording her an opportunity to dispute it.
Ground 2
That the Nursing Board of Tasmania erred in its decision to partially suspend the Appellant before it had conducted and/or finalised an investigation into the allegations against the nurse.
Ground 3
That the Appellant was denied natural justice in that the Nursing Board of Tasmania informed itself on the issue of the allegations made against the Appellant without having a hearing into the matter.
Ground 4
That the Appellant was denied natural justice in that the Nursing Board of Tasmania did not give the Appellant the opportunity to be heard on the issue of an appropriate penalty before a penalty was imposed."
At the hearing, counsel for the appellant was given leave to add a further ground of appeal as follows:
"That the determination of the Nursing Board was beyond its powers in that it imposed a suspension for an indefinite period when the only power was to suspend for no longer than twelve months."
Legislative framework
The Act, Pt4, provides a framework for a disciplinary system in relation to current and former registered or enrolled nurses. Section 55 provides that a person who is aggrieved by the conduct of a nurse may complain to the Board. Any such complaint is to be made in writing to the executive officer of the Board, who is then required to put the matter to the Board. The Board must either investigate the complaint itself or refer it to the Professional Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") created by s62.
The Act provides that the Board may, before deciding whether to refer a complaint to the Tribunal, direct a committee, an inspector or some other person to conduct a preliminary investigation. If it does that, it must give notice of the complaint and full particulars of it to the nurse concerned and allow her to make submissions. That committee, inspector or other person is required to give the Board and the nurse concerned a report of their findings and any opinions based on those findings.
The Board generally has a discretion not to refer a matter to the Tribunal and may deal with less serious matters itself. However in certain circumstances it must refer a matter to the Tribunal.
The Act, s67, specifically empowers the Board to suspend the right of practice or authorisation of a nurse for such period not exceeding 12 months as it deems appropriate. The power to suspend must be exercised by the Board by reference to s67(1)(a) - (h). Any suspension may be partial or total. Section 67(3) provides that if the Board decides to suspend a nurse, it "may" afford that nurse an opportunity to be heard, but is not required to do so. The Board also has the power to revoke any suspension it imposes for any reason it considered sufficient.
In this particular case, the Board, in the notice of suspension, set out that it was exercising its power by reference to s67(1)(h). That subparagraph allows the Board to suspend "if the Board considers that it is in the public interest to suspend the registration".
Nature of the appeal
The right of appeal is pursuant to the Act, s72. It is not confined to a question of law. Section 73 provides that the Court may affirm, vary or quash a decision of the Board on appeal. It may also, if it decides to quash a decision, either substitute its own decision for that of the Board or remit the matter to the Board for further consideration.
Sequence of events
On 25 February 2005, the Board received a complaint from a Sue Graves, the Nursing Manager of the appellant's employer. There were a number of statements attached to her letter of complaint. They were from:
(a) Gaye Blackburn, Extended Care Assistant, dated 22 February 2005 which stated inter alia:
• the appellant had told her that she had a stash of Temazepam in the Treatment Room;
• that Ms Blackburn had found a tablet on the floor of the office that had been knocked out of the appellant's cardigan;
• that Ms Blackburn showed the tablet to Registered Nurse Angela Williams and reported it to Nurse Manager Sue Graves; and
• that Ms Blackburn had witnessed the appellant administering medication from a pouch of tablets carried around her neck.
(b) Angela Williams, RN, which stated that:
• Gaye Blackburn had shown her a small white tablet that she identified as a 10mg Temazepam tablet.
(c) Sue Hutcheon, RN, which stated that:
• she had found a card of Temazepam x9 tablets belonging to a resident that had been ceased months ago under a rectangular box with nebuliser equipment on top of it.
(d) Mary Hodgson, RN, which stated that:
• she had witnessed the appellant making an aggressive gesture regarding an elderly patient; and
• the appellant had behaved angrily and abusively to her when she was checking medication.
(e) Caroline van Riet, RN, which stated that:
• the appellant had shown her a cardigan full of various tablets (unsealed) and the appellant had told her that "this saves me from going to the treatment room".
The complaint also detailed earlier incidents and meetings with the appellant.
On 1 March 2005, Kathryn Terry, Nurse Advisor, submitted a briefing paper to the Board with a recommendation that the matter be investigated.
The Professional Conduct Committee, at its meeting of 8 March 2005, determined that the complaint warranted an investigation.
On 8 March 2005, Ms Graves had provided further information. This included:
· minutes of a meeting with the appellant of 10 February 2005;
· medication incident reports of Gaye Blackburn, Angela Williams, Sue Hutcheon and Sue Graves; and
· details of an earlier incident of January 2005 involving medication being borrowed from another resident's PRN pack.
The Board met on 8 April 2005 and determined that the matter ought to be investigated and also that the appellant's right of practice be partially suspended. It also determined that the appellant be given the opportunity to be heard with respect to this within seven days. Following its meeting on 8 April, the Board advised the appellant by letter dated 12 April 2005 of their intention to investigate the complaint made against her. It also provided her with full details of the complaint and that it had resolved to partially suspend by restricting her right to administer medicine for up to 12 months. She was given a period of seven days to be heard "prior to the Board making a decision as to the suspension issue pursuant to section 67(3) of the Act."
On 19 April 2005 the Board received a notice from the appellant authorising the Australian Nursing Federation ("ANF") to liase with the Board with respect to the complaint.
By letter dated 20 April 2005, the ANF made a submission on behalf of the appellant to the Board. In that letter the ANF submitted that:
· the allegations were false; the appellant did not have Temazepam in her pocket and she did not store the Temazepam as alleged; and
· that many staff had access to sheets of tablets, the treatment room and nebuliser equipment.
On 22 April 2005, the Board received a facsimile letter from a solicitor acting on behalf of the appellant, requesting information. The Board did not respond to this request as the information had previously been provided to the ANF on behalf of the appellant and an ANF representative had had an opportunity to inspect the Board's file. At no time did either the ANF or the appellant's solicitor ask for more time or an opportunity to be heard about the complaint before the suspension issue was dealt with by the Board.
In May 2005, the Board appointed Mr David Paton as investigating officer with respect to the complaint pursuant to s58(1). The investigation commenced on 5 May 2005.
On 6 May 2005, the Board considered the complaint, the briefing paper, the submission by the ANF and the advice that an investigation had commenced and determined to partially suspend the appellant in that she be directly supervised by another registered nurse.
On 12 May 2005, the Board sent a notice of suspension in accordance with s67(4) to the ANF on behalf of the appellant and sent notices of the suspension to relevant nurse regulatory authorities and nurse employers in accordance with s67(8). The notice of suspension provided that the appellant would be suspended for a period not exceeding 12 months pursuant to s67(1A)(b).
Notwithstanding the suspension, the investigation of the complaint continued. It may be referred to the Tribunal.
Appellant's submissions
Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant had not been afforded natural justice in the Board's dealings with her and that argument effectively underpinned the appeal. He referred to a decision of the High Court in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 where, at 582 - 585, Mason J (as he then was) said:
"It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in traditional terms that, generally speaking, when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it (Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 136 CLR 106, at p 109; Salemi (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR, at p 419; Ratu (1977) 137 CLR, at p 476; Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission (1977) 137 CLR 487, at pp 498-499; FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342, at pp 360, 376-377; Annamunthodo v Oilfields Workers' Trade Union (1961) AC 945). The reference to 'right or interest' in this formulation must be understood as relating to personal liberty, status, preservation of livelihood and reputation, as well as to proprietary rights and interests.
The reference to 'legitimate expectation' makes it clear that the doctrine applies in circumstances where the order will not result in the deprivation of a legal right or interest. Take, for example, an application for a renewal of a licence where the applicant, though he has no legal right or interest, may nevertheless have a legitimate expectation which will attract the rules of natural justice.
…
It has been said on many occasions that natural justice and fairness are to be equated - see, eg, Wiseman v Borneman (1971) AC 297, at pp 308, 309, 320; Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) AC 75. And it has been recognized that in the context of administrative decision-making it is more appropriate to speak of a duty to act fairly or to accord procedural fairness.
…
The law has now developed to a point where it may be accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention.
…
When the doctrine of natural justice or the duty to act fairly in its application to administrative decision-making is so understood, the need for a strong manifestation of contrary statutory intention in order for it to be excluded becomes apparent. The critical question in most cases is not whether the principles of natural justice apply. It is: what does the duty to act fairly require in the circumstances of the particular case?"
Counsel acknowledged the Board had the power to suspend in an interim situation, that is pending the completion of any investigation, but argued the power should only be exercised in extraordinary circumstances and that the principles of natural justice should apply. He referred to the words of Blow J in Bryan v Nursing Board of Tasmania [2001] TASSC 69, where his Honour said at [15]:
"In my view, the Board has the power to suspend a nurse's right of practice under s67(1), not only upon the conclusion of a disciplinary investigation, but also before the conclusion of an investigation. Such a course would be appropriate before the conclusion of an investigation if, for example, there was an urgent need to protect patients or nursing home residents from a nurse who was considered likely to harm them. There is nothing in s67 to suggest that Parliament intended the power of suspension to be exercised only after a matter was fully investigated, whereas the presence of s67(1)(g) suggests that Parliament intended the Board to have the power to suspend a nurse prior to the completion of an investigation."
It should be noted that while his Honour, in that paragraph, gave an example of circumstances where he considered it might be appropriate to suspend a nurse before the conclusion of an investigation, he did not use the words used by counsel, and his words must be seen in the context of that particular case. His Honour's findings on the facts in that case make it very clear that he was extremely critical of the Board, which he perceived was acting summarily against two nurses, when in reality it was their employer who should have been the subject of scrutiny. This is apparent from his comment in par24 where he said that he strongly suspected that the Board's suspension was a "bloody-minded act of retaliation to their employer's lack of co-operation ...".
Counsel argued that when the Board met on 8 April 2005 and determined to suspend, it had given the appellant no notice of that determination. The letter of 12 April 2005 was not akin to a notice to show cause, but advice that she would be suspended and inviting her to say why that decision should not be implemented. During the course of argument I raised with counsel whether the practical effect of the process was that the appellant was given notice of intention to suspend and given an opportunity to be heard. He submitted that this did not constitute the application of natural justice principles as expounded in Kiao v West because Mason J said in the passage quoted earlier "when an order is to be made", that is, he anticipated the opportunity to be heard should be offered before a decision is made.
The problem with that particular argument, however, is that no determination made at the meeting of 8 April is the subject of any review and no notice of suspension arose from that meeting. All that followed was the letter of 12 April.
The minutes of the meeting of 8 April 2005, insofar as they related to the appellant, were:
"NURSING BOARD OF TASMANIA
MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD 8 APRIL 2005
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT - POINT 7, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5,
7.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3 ,7.2.4, 7.2.5, 7.2.6, 7.2.7 and 7.37.2.6 OSBORNE Sally
Board members having discussed the matter of Sally Osborne and given due consideration to the following documents:
· Briefing Paper dated 1 March 2005; and
· Letter dated 24 February 2005 from Island Health Care with attachments.
Determined to endorse the Professional Conduct Committee's recommendation that having considered the correspondence in relation to Sally Osborne determined that the matter be investigated pursuant to section 57(B) 1 of the Nursing Act 1995.
The Board also determined that pursuant to section 67(1)f and or section 67(1)h and section 67(1)a that Sally Osborne's right of practice as a nurse be partially suspended in that her right to manage scheduled substances be totally removed for up to twelve (12) months and that Sally Osborne be given seven (7) days to be heard prior to the Board making a decision as to the suspension issue pursuant to section 67(3) of the Nursing Act 1995.
Reasons for Decision:
Information provided by the complainant is sufficient to warrant that the matters be investigated and to suspend the nurse is protecting the public against unsafe, incompetent and unethical nursing.
Moved D Haslem and seconded S Hughes that:
That having considered the correspondence in relation to Sally Osborne the Nursing Board of Tasmania (the Board) determined that the matter be investigated pursuant to section 57(B)1 of the Nursing Act 1995. In particular
That during the period of on or about 24 January 2005 to 3 February 2005, Registered Nurse Sally Osborne, in the capacity of her nursing practice at Bellview Manor Nursing Home failed to store medications in compliance with the Nursing Board of Tasmania's Medication Management Standards for Nurses February 2004.
Specifically,
That on or about 24 January 2005 registered Nurse Sally Osborne, had a white tablet (Temazepam) in her cardigan pocket which was discovered when it fell out of her cardigan when the cardigan was knocked to the floor; and
That on or about 3 February 2005 Registered Nurse Sally Osborne, in the capacity of her nursing practice at Bellview Manor Nursing Home stored medications, in particular a card of Temazepam, under a box containing Nebuliser equipment in a cupboard in the Treatment Room.
The Board also determined that pursuant to section 67(1)f and or section 67(1)h and section 67(1)a of the Nursing Act 1995 that Sally Osborne's right of practice as a nurse be partially suspended in that her right to manage scheduled substances be totally removed for up to twelve (12) months and that Sally Osborne be given seven (7) days to be heard prior to the Board making a decision as to the suspension issue pursuant to section 67(3) of the Nursing Act 1995.
CARRIED"
It is patently obvious that the Board had regard to the matters in s67(1) that they considered they had to have regard to in determining whether suspension was warranted. They did then say they determined to suspend her, but went on to decide "and that Sally Osborne be given seven (7) days to be heard prior to the Board making a decision as to the suspension issue pursuant to section 67(3) …".
The wording which preceded that may have been inelegant. However, quite clearly the Board had not suspended the appellant at that point, but had decided that they would. They were then giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard. That position was reinforced in the letter from the Board to the appellant dated 12 April 2005. By that letter, the appellant was given until the close of business on 22 April 2005 to put submissions to the Board about her suspension.
The other matter of complaint about the process at that time (that is, in the first half of April 2005) was that the Board did not tell the appellant why it was they considered it was in the public interest to suspend her. Counsel submitted that as a consequence of that failure, neither the appellant nor the ANF representative she engaged addressed that particular issue in their submission.
With respect, some points need to be made about that process. Firstly and most importantly, the nature of the complaint, ie, a medication issue, was obviously on the table. Any complaint which involves the medication of patients with dangerous drugs must have the potential to affect the interests of patients, ie, the public. The ANF representative had inspected the Board's file and then written to the Board on the appellant's behalf. By that letter the allegations against the appellant were denied. The representative dealt with the nature of the penalty and its potential effect on the appellant in that letter. It cannot be argued, and indeed it was not, that the author of that letter was not aware of the provisions of the Act under which the Board proposed to act. That she chose for whatever reason not to address the particular issue counsel has referred to, or seek more time for the appellant to be heard, is not a complaint which can be laid at the door of the Board. The opportunity was there. It is disingenuous of counsel to suggest that because the Board did not set out chapter and verse in its minutes why it considered that suspension was appropriate, and that the executive officer did not, in his letter, do the same, the appellant was not aware of what she was facing and why.
The specific allegations against the appellant related to the mishandling of dangerous drugs in circumstances where she was dealing with patients. There was information before the Board of which the appellant was then aware that she was by-passing proper procedures for the medication of those patients. Clearly the Board's primary obligation was to act to protect any patients the appellant may potentially come into contact with.
Counsel argued further that because the appellant had been suspended by her employer, the Board should not have suspended her from practice because she was not dealing with patients and hence the protection of the public was not needed. As counsel for the Board submitted, that was irrelevant. The fact that an employer may have suspended the appellant did not of itself mean that suspension would continue. A number of things could have happened which would have been entirely out of the Board's control. For example, the appellant's employer might have reinstated her or the appellant might have resigned and obtained alternative employment. The Board's responsibility was not just to the patients at the premises of the appellant's then employer, but also to potential patients anywhere.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the Board was put on notice of the potential effect of suspension on the appellant and yet determined on 6 May 2005 to suspend. It did not at that time give particulars of what it considered the public interest to be, knowing the appellant was suspended. I repeat my earlier comments. The public interest issue, in my view, was self-evident, arising from the nature of the allegations.
Counsel referred further to the decision of Blow J in Bryan's case. He said at [23]:
"In my view, the Board should have given each appellant an opportunity to be heard, personally or by counsel, prior to deciding whether or not to suspend her. It is true that s67(3) provides that, 'If the Board decides to suspend a nurse's right of practice or authorisation it may afford that nurse an opportunity to be heard but is not required to do so'. … However, in my view, although s67(3) gives the Board discretion to depart from the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness, it would normally be unjust for it to do so. There was certainly no reason for the Board to have acted without warning in this case, especially since the appellants had not been informed as to the nature of the alleged or suspected conduct that was under investigation, had been allowed to practice for months without any suggestion that they might be suspended from practice, had not made any submission or representation to the Board as to the subject matter of the investigation, and had apparently not been involved in the decision to refuse access to the Board's investigator."
The circumstances there being described by his Honour were very different from those of the appellant. In that case the appellants were given no opportunity to be heard. In this case, the appellant was.
All of the above was by way of general submissions without any direct reference to the specific grounds of appeal. Counsel then went on to make specific reference to those.
First ground of appeal
This ground cannot be sustained. The decision complained of was that of the Board made on 6 May 2005. By its letter of 12 April, the Board provided to the appellant a notice of the complaint which set out the matters of specific complaint. It also set out what it proposed to do. She was given an opportunity to be heard about these matters. She appointed a representative of the ANF who inspected the Board's file and wrote to the Board. She did not seek to meet with the Board to provide further information. She did not ask for more time to consider the matter or make other submissions beyond what was in the letter from the ANF. The Board at all times had the power to suspend pending the finalisation of the investigation into the complaint.
This ground must fail.
Second ground of appeal
The Board had specific power under the Act to suspend a nurse at any stage of an investigation and was not required to complete an investigation before exercising that power. That was conceded by counsel for the appellant. I repeat the matters set out in respect of the first ground. There was nothing in the steps taken by the Board which would support the contention that it erred in doing exactly what it was legally authorised to do. This ground must fail.
Third ground of appeal
The Board was not required to conduct a hearing. This is precisely the type of situation which, in my respectful view, Mason J had in mind when he dealt with the issue of natural justice in Kiao v West. He recognised that in determining the extent to which the principles were applicable, a court had to have regard to the legislative framework being considered. In this case that framework allowed a form of summary procedure without any formal hearing because there may be circumstances where the priority is to protect patients and there may be no time for a hearing.
I repeat the comments already made in respect of the earlier grounds. There was no formal hearing, but the appellant was given an opportunity to be heard.
This ground must fail.
Fourth ground of appeal
This has effectively already been dealt with. The appellant was given an opportunity to be heard in April. She knew the penalty being proposed. It cannot be a matter of complaint against the Board that neither she nor her representative made submissions specifically about penalty nor sought time to do so.
This ground must also fail.
Supplementary ground of appeal
Counsel argued that the Board acted beyond its powers in the decision that it made on 6 May 2005 to suspend because it purported to suspend indefinitely when it could only do so for up to 12 months. The minutes of the meeting of the Board on 6 May 2005 did not make reference to the period for which any suspension would take effect. The notice of suspension dated 12 May 2005 did so and advised that the suspension would take effect from the date of service of the notice.
The argument from counsel is that the minute of the Board's decision did not reflect the 12 month limitation and hence its suspension of the appellant was beyond power.
The Board's power to suspend was specifically constrained by the opening words of the Act, s67. That is, they could not suspend indefinitely or for longer than 12 months. It is clear the Board was mindful of this because the minutes of the meeting of 8 April refer to the intention to suspend for up to 12 months. The letter of 12 April says the same. The suspension itself did not take effect until service of the notice, despite the decision of the Board on 6 May. The notice clearly contained the limitation.
Again, the wording of the minutes may have been inelegant. However, there can be no suggestion that in reality the Board, in serving the notice, purported to suspend the appellant for more than 12 months or indefinitely. Had their notice of suspension said that, I might have had some sympathy with this ground.
This ground must also fail.
The appeal is, in the circumstances, dismissed and the determination of the Board as to the appellant's suspension of 6 May 2005 is affirmed.
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