Ortiz v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ORTIZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2014] FCCA 2994
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Partner (temporary) (Class UK) Visa.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s.61C(3)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr.13.10(a), 16.01

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.17A

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.353, 359(1), 414A, 474(2), 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl.820.221

Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1028
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] 228 CLR 470
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZABJ v Minister for Immigration (No.2) [2007] FMCA 1062
SZAYG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 90
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609
Applicant: SANTIAGO ORTIZ
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: BRG 829 of 2012
Judgment of: Judge Howard
Hearing date: 22 October 2014
Date of Last Submission: 22 October 2014
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 23 December 2014

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr McGlade
Solicitors for the First and Second Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. That the amended application filed on 7 November 2013 be dismissed pursuant to Rule 13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001.

  2. That the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs on a standard basis (including any reserved costs).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 829 of 2012

SANTIAGO ORTIZ

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant applied to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for a Partner (temporary) (Class UK) Visa on 9 November 2006.

  2. On 30 March 2009 the Delegate decided to refuse to grant the Visa to the applicant.

  3. The applicant sought a review of that decision and the Migration Review Tribunal, on 25 October 2010, affirmed the Delegate’s decision.

  4. The applicant then sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.  On 9 June 2011 a Federal Magistrate dismissed the application for a review.

  5. The applicant appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.  On 22 December 2011 that appeal to the Federal Court of Australia was allowed and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia was set aside.  The original decision of the Migration Review Tribunal was quashed and the matter was sent back to the Tribunal for determination according to law. 

  6. At the time the applicant had applied for the Visa he was the de facto partner of Ms Heidi Andrews.  Ms Andrews was an Australian citizen.  Ms Andrews was the applicant’s “sponsoring spouse”.

  7. Before the Delegate had made a decision in relation to the applicant’s Visa application – the de facto relationship between he…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCCA 2994
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Judge Howard considered an application by Mr. Ortiz against the Minister for Immigration. The applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal, alleging errors of law in the Tribunal's process and reasoning. The core of the dispute revolved around the Tribunal's consideration of a Family Court order concerning the applicant's parental responsibility for his child, Santina, and the timing of the Tribunal's decision.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the Tribunal erred in law by considering a Family Court judgment that was under appeal, and whether the Tribunal unreasonably delayed its decision by requesting further particulars when it allegedly possessed sufficient information. The applicant contended that the Family Court judgment, being under appeal, should not have been taken into account, and that the Tribunal's delay in making a decision after the Family Court's order was resolved the paternity issue caused injustice.

Judge Howard dismissed the applicant's grounds for review. Regarding the first ground, the Court held that the Tribunal was obliged to consider the operative Family Court order, even if it was under appeal, as it was binding until varied by a competent court and was relevant to the criteria under cl.820.221(3)(b)(ii) of the Regulations. On the second ground, the Court found no unreasonable delay by the Tribunal and agreed with the submissions of the respondent that the Tribunal was entitled to seek further information under s.359(1) of the Migration Act. The Court reiterated that its role was not to re-hear the facts but to review the Tribunal's decision for jurisdictional error, ensuring it acted within its legal framework.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the applicant had failed to demonstrate jurisdictional error. The operative Family Court order meant the applicant did not meet the exception in cl.820.211(3)(b)(ii) of the Regulations at the time of the Tribunal's decision, thus the Tribunal was not bound to make a favourable decision. The application was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, I note the Court’s power contained in r.16.01 of the Federal Circuit Rules 2001 where it is stated:-“The Court may, at any stage in a proceeding on the application of a party, give any judgment or make any order even if the claim was not made in an originating process.” The matter can also be dismissed pursuant to s.17A of the Federal Circuit of Australia Act 1999. If I am wrong in relation to the dismissal of the application as outlined above in these Reasons for Judgment – then, I have reached the conclusion that even having regard to the substantive application and the merits of the substantive application – that the application should be dismissed. The reasons that I have come to that conclusion are as follows. In essence, it is incumbent upon an application in cases such as the present to show to the Court that the decision made by the Tribunal was flawed through jurisdictional error – note s.474(2) and s.476 of the Migration Act (supra). Also note the decision of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at paragraph 87. In the Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 the High Court referred to a passage in an earlier High Court decision entitled Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 – where the concept of jurisdictional error by a Tribunal was explained:-“When a Tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the Tribunal which reflects it.” In a decision of the Federal Court of Australia (a decision of Allsop J – as His Honour then was) entitled SZAYG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 90 His Honour specifically stated the role of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia when revealing a decision of the Tribunal. His Honour stated:-“The Migration Act and the Judiciary Act provide for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. That judicial review is the application that was brought to the Federal Magistrates Court. It is important to understand that that application is not simply a rehearing of what was before the Tribunal. It is not hearing afresh the evidence to decide whether or not a visa should be given. It is a review by the Court of the decision of the Tribunal in order to ascertain whether the Tribunal has acted lawfully. That is sometimes expressed in the legal expression to ascertain whether the Tribunal has committed any jurisdictional error. That is a legal term of some complexity. However, at the risk of over-simplification, it basically means that the Court's job is to ascertain whether the Tribunal in doing its task, obeyed the legal framework within which it is supposed to work. For instance, it must approach the matter in a fair and unbiased way; it must assess the applicant's claims by reference to the appropriate principles in the Act; it must ask itself the correct questions as to its task; and it must proceed giving the applicant procedural fairness, by, for instance, giving the applicant a hearing before it makes a decision. Also, it must deal with the matter before it in a way that cannot be described as irrational or capricious. Within that kind of framework, how the Tribunal assesses the facts is largely a matter for the Tribunal. It is simply not the job of the Federal Magistrates Court and it is not this Court's job under the relevant statutes to re-find the factual matters afresh. It is important to understand that difference in function between the Tribunal and the Courts.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground two stated in the applicant’s amended application filed 7 November 2013 states:-“2. The Tribunal Member erred in law in taking into consideration the judgment of the Family Court knowing that it is under appeal.Particularsa. The Family Court Judgment came out in April 2013 more than 2 months from the date of the acceptance of the judgment of Federal Court by Logan J by the Tribunal.b. The Applicant replied to the Tribunal when asked that the judgment of the Family Court had been unfavourable to the Applicant in that he has no parental responsibility, the Applicant indicated that the judgment is now under appeal and there should not be consider in making the decision.” I have come to the conclusion that the applicant is simply wrong in relation to this ground of review. The Tribunal had before it an order of the Family Court of Australia. The Tribunal had to have regard to that order – even though the applicant had appealed the order. The order was highly relevant having regard to cl.820.221(3)(b)(ii) of the Regulations. Of course, the order of the Family Court of Australia was binding until some further order by a Court of competent jurisdiction varying that order. The applicant must fail on ground two. In relation to ground three for review contained in the amended application filed 7 November 2013 states as follows:-“3. The Tribunal erred in law in delaying making the decision by asking the Applicant for more particulars and information to assist the Tribunal when the Tribunal knew or ought to have known that it has sufficient information before it to make a decision and failed to do so.Particulars:a. The only criterion that prevented the Applicant from being eligible to obtain the resident visa at the first application was the issue of his paternity of the child Santina. Once the issue had been resolved by the Court order, the Tribunal was bound to make a decision based upon the information already before it, a decision that would have been favourable to the Applicant. By not making the decision at that time the Tribunal has caused injustice to the Applicant.” In so far as this ground relates to a contention by the applicant that the Tribunal unreasonably delayed the making of the decision following the decision of Logan J – I have already come to the conclusion that there was no unreasonable delay and my Reasons for Judgment in that regard have already been included above. I agree with the submissions made by the first respondent in the outline of submissions filed 8 October 2014 in relation to ground three. For the reasons stated above ground three should be dismissed. Ground four of the amended application filed on 7 November 2013 states:-“4. The Tribunal is duty bound to make a favourable decision if the information before it was sufficient to make the decision. It appears that the Tribunal had unduly delayed and pre-empting a negative decision of the Family Court.” The date of the Tribunal’s decision was 23 August 2012. As at that date the Family Court order of April 2012 was operative. By reason of the operation of the said Family Court order the applicant did not fall within the exception contained in cl.820.211(3)(b)(ii) of the Regulations. Therefore, at the time of the making of the decision (23 August 2012) the Tribunal was not “duty bound to make a favourable decision”. That contention by the applicant is clearly wrong. I note s.359(1) of the Migration Act (supra). That section states:-“359. Tribunal may seek information(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.”