IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B58 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
MALCOLM LAURENCE ORREAL
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 16 APRIL 2021, AT 9.32 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.J. KEIM, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned junior, MR P.F. RICHARDS. for the applicant in this matter. (instructed by Legal Aid Queensland)
MR C.W. HEATON, QC: I appear with my learned friend, MR C.W. WALLIS, for the respondent. (instructed by the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (QLD))
GAGELER J: Mr Heaton, you can stay on your feet.
MR HEATON: Your Honours, the issue in this case turns upon not an erroneous understanding of the applicable principles but what is said to be a misapplication of those well‑established principles to the particular circumstances of this case. The essential thrust of the argument of the applicant is that the effect of the evidence – the impugned evidence, was such as to have had a prejudicial effect. Essentially, the difference in the ‑ ‑ ‑
EDELMAN J: Mr Heaton, it was common ground, was it not, that – or at least is common ground now, that the evidence was irrelevant?
MR HEATON: Yes.
EDELMAN J: Why was not that irrelevant evidence, evidence that could have had a very significant effect upon the jury?
MR HEATON: Because of the nature of the evidence it was irrelevant because it was not probative of any issue in the trial. It was not inherently prejudicial in its effect. The prejudice, if there was any, was said to arise from the possibility of a link between the acquisition of the herpes virus by the complainant as a result of the sexual activity that she alleged occurred on this one occasion with the applicant, and it was in relation to that particular issue that the submissions of defence counsel, the submissions of the Crown and, indeed, the directions of the judge completely neutralised the effect of the evidence.
EDELMAN J: Why would there not be at the very least a real prospect that a jury could reason on the basis that she is exposed to the herpes virus, the accused is exposed or has the herpes virus present in his blood, therefore, there must have been sexual contact between the two?
MR HEATON: Again, because of the way that the nature of this evidence in the context of this trial. As I said, this was not evidence which was inherently prejudicial. The evidence that was led from the doctor was that approximately 80 per cent of the population would test positive to this virus.
EDELMAN J: That was the adult population?
MR HEATON: The adult population. Even taking that limitation on it, the effect of the evidence was that this…
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- Case
- [2021] HCATrans 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the search of the appellant's mobile phone, conducted without a warrant, was lawful under the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) and the common law. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the police had the necessary authority to conduct such a search incidental to arrest, and if the scope of that search exceeded lawful bounds.
The Court reasoned that the power to search a person incidental to arrest under the *Crimes Act* and at common law is limited to what is reasonably necessary to prevent the escape of the arrested person, to avoid the destruction of evidence, or to ensure the safety of the police or the public. Applying this principle, the Court found that the search of the mobile phone was not reasonably incidental to the arrest. The nature of a mobile phone, containing vast amounts of personal information, meant that a search of its contents went beyond the limited purposes for which a search incidental to arrest is permitted. The Court held that a warrant would generally be required for such a search, absent exceptional circumstances not present in this case.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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