Ogawa v Parker

Case [2008] FCA 388


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ogawa v Parker [2008] FCA 388

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether Court is satisfied that party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding – where no reasonable prospect of establishing jurisdiction of Court to hear proceeding – where no reasonable prospect of successfully demonstrating jurisdictional error or misfeasance in public office

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 351, 474, 476A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 31A, 51A
Constitution, para 75(v)

Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Migration Review Tribunal [2006] FCA 1694 cited
Day v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 cited
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex Parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441 applied
Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 applied
James v Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339 cited
RACZ v Home Office [1994] 2 AC 45 cited

MEGUMI OGAWA v NATALIE PARKER AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
QUD327 OF 2007

LOGAN J
10 MARCH 2008
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD327 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MEGUMI OGAWA
Applicant

AND:

NATALIE PARKER
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2008

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The substantive application originally filed in the Federal Magistrates Court and transmitted to this Court be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding, to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD327 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

MEGUMI OGAWA
Applicant

AND:

NATALIE PARKER
First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE:

10 MARCH 2008

PLACE:

BRISBANE

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. There is an old adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.  These proceedings indicate that it is not only that destination that is paved with good intentions, but also the pathway to a courthouse.  By that I mean, that when one reflects upon the history of this case, and in particular the observations that Cowdroy J made in his reasons for judgment in Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Migration Review Tribunal (2006) FCA 1694, one sees there particular sources of grievance that, at a humane level, one might see Ms Ogawa having in respect of the saga of her dealing with the immigration authorities of the Commonwealth.

  2. Those grievances, though, do not translate into actionable causes of action against either of the Respondents in this proceeding.  In between when this proceeding was first instituted in the Federal Magistrates Court in June last year and today, there have been many “good intentions”, in terms of adjournments granted for the purpose…

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AGLC
Ogawa v Parker [2008] FCA 388
Case
[2008] FCA 388
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ogawa v Parker involved a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Migration Act. The Applicant, Ogawa, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Respondent, Parker, concerning their visa status. The matter was initially heard by the Federal Magistrates Court but was transmitted to the Federal Court due to its jurisdiction over privative clause decisions under the Migration Act. The central legal issue was whether the Federal Court had the authority to review the decision made by Parker, considering the specific provisions of the Migration Act regarding the finality of decisions and the court's jurisdiction.

The Federal Court examined the statutory language of sections 474 and 476A of the Migration Act, which outline the finality of certain administrative decisions and the specific circumstances under which the Federal Court can exercise jurisdiction over such decisions. The Court determined that the decision in question was a privative clause decision, which means it was intended to be final and not subject to judicial review. The Court further found that the statutory provisions did not confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court to review such decisions. Consequently, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision made by Parker.

Given the Court's finding that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision, the substantive application filed by Ogawa was dismissed. Additionally, the Court ordered that Ogawa pay the Respondent's costs of and incidental to the proceeding, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the scope of judicial review in cases involving administrative decisions under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The substantive application originally filed in the Federal Magistrates Court and transmitted to this Court be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding, to be taxed, if not agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

LOGAN J
Section 474 of the Migration Act provides:Section 474 Decisions under Act are final(1) …(2) In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:(a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa);(c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument;(d)imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction;(e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration, demand or requirement;(f)retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article;(g)doing or refusing to do any other act or thing;(h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation;(i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j)a failure or refusal to make a decision.(4)…(7)To avoid doubt, the following decisions are privative clause decisions within the meaning of subsection 474(2):(a)a decision of the Minister not to exercise, or not to consider the exercise, of the Minister’s power under subsection 37A(2) or (3), section 48B, paragraph 72(1)(c), section 91F, 91L, 91Q, 195A, 197AB, 197AD, 351, 391, 417 or 454 or subsection 503A(3);(b)a decision of the Principal Member of the Migration Review Tribunal or of the Principal Member of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refer a matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;(c)a decision of the President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to accept, or not to accept, the referral of a decision under section 382 or 444;(d)a decision of the Minister under Division 13A of Part 2 to order that a thing is not to be condemned as forfeited. Section 476A of the Migration Act provides:Section 476A Limited jurisdiction of the Federal Court(1)Despite any other law, including section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 8 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if:(a)the Federal Magistrates Court transfers a proceeding pending in that court in relation to the decision to the Federal Court under section 39 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999; or(b)the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; or(c)the decision is a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause decision, made personally by the Minister under section 501, 501A, 501B or 501C; or(d)the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to the decision under subsection 44(3) or 45(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.Note: Only non‑privative clause decisions can be taken to the Federal Court under subsection 44(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (see section 483).(2)Where the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c), that jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LOGAN J

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