| CITATION: | Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner Colin McCallum [2011] QCAT 739 |
| PARTIES: | Officer TXS |
| v | |
| Acting Deputy Commissioner Colin McCallum |
| APPLICATION NUMBER: | OCR184-10 |
| MATTER TYPE: | Occupational regulation matters |
| HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
| DECISION OF: | Ms Margaret McLennan |
| DELIVERED ON: | 25 March 2011 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
ORDERS MADE: | Matter 1: the decision is confirmed; Matter 2: the decision is confirmed; |
| CATCHWORDS : | Police Discipline - nature of QCAT review – misconduct – police officer – domestic violence order made against police officer – off duty conduct - dismissal - suspended dismissal considered. Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 Ss 219G, 219H, 219L Compton v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Henry v Ryan [1963] Tas SR 90 page 91 |
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
| Decision on the papers. |
REASONS FOR DECISION
This is an application to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“the tribunal”) to review a decision made on 13 July 2010 by Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart (“the respondent”). It was in relation to a disciplinary hearing which commenced 16 June 2010 and concluded on 13 July 2010.
In a Notice of Formal Finding – Misconduct dated 13 July 2010 the respondent delivered his findings and reasons. He found the following disciplinary charges of misconduct against Officer TXS (“the applicant”) were substantiated:
“Matter 1
That on the 16th day of April 2010 at Brisbane you did not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer in that you:
a)Entered the premises of CYF without her permission or authority.
[Section 1.4 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (‘PSAA’), section 9(1)(f) Police Service (Discipline) Regulations 1990 (‘PS(D)R’)]
Further and better particulars:
Investigations have identified that you were previously in a de facto relationship with CYF and resided at her premises at […]. It is alleged that on 16 April 2010 at approximately 9.30 pm, whilst off duty, and without any authority or permission, you:
§ Attended the premises at […]; and
§ Entered by opening the electric garage door with the remote control you were in possession thereof.
Matter 2
That on the 16th day of April 2010 at Brisbane you did not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer in that you:
a)Assaulted [CYF].
[Section 1.4 of the PSAA, section 9(1)(f) PS(D)R]
Further and better particulars:
Investigations have identified that you were previously in a de facto relationship with CYF and resided at her premises at […]. It is alleged that on 16 April 2010 at approximately 9.30 pm, whilst off duty, you:
§ Wrestled with and scratched the neck of [CYF] several times;
§ Punched [CYF] in the face with a closed fist, causing her lower teeth to pierce the inside of her lip; and
§ Wrestled with then grabbed the neck of [CYF] and choked her with your right hand.
Matter 3
That on the 16th day of April 2010 at Brisbane you did not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer in that you:
a)Assaulted [HZM].
[Section 1.4 PSAA, section 9(1)(f) PS(D)R]
Further and better particulars:
Investigations have identified that you were previously in a de facto relationship with [CYF] and resided at her premises at […]. It is alleged that on 16 April 2010 at approximately 9.30 pm, whilst off duty, you:
§ Grabbed hold of [HZM] causing her shirt to rip;
§ Head butted [HZM] on two occasions; and
§ Attempted to punch [HZM].
Matter 4
That on the 16th day of April 2010 at Brisbane you did not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer in that you:
a)Damaged the property of [CYF].
[Section 1.4 of the PSAA, section 9(1)(f) PS(D)R]
Further and better particulars:
Investigations have identified that you were previously in a de facto relationship with [CYF] and resided at her premises at […]. It is alleged that on 16 April 2010 at approximately 9.30 pm, whilst off duty, you:
§ With your hand punched five holes in a wall within the premises;
§ With your foot kicked out causing damage to the wall within the premises;
§ Smashed a bottle of perfume and two ceramic bowls by throwing them onto the ground; and
§ Damaged the remote control for the garage door by throwing it onto the ground.”
The respondent, as a result of the disciplinary hearing, having found the charges to be substantiated and having regard to the purpose of discipline, the maintenance of public confidence in police officers and the Queensland Police Service (“QPS”), the maintenance of proper standards of conduct for police officers and general deterrence principles, ordered that the applicant be dismissed from the QPS pursuant to section 5 and sections 10(a) and 10(f) of the PS(D)R. The sanction was to take effect at 4pm 13 July 2010.
At the disciplinary hearing on both days the applicant was represented by her barrister, Mr T Schmidt. He also prepared the written submissions on her behalf received in the tribunal on 8 September 2010.
Jurisdiction
The tribunal’s review jurisdiction is contained in sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (“QCAT Act”). The enabling Act referred to in section 17 of the QCAT Act is, in this matter, the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 in particular section 219G and section 219H which set out the process relating to reviewable decisions. In particular subsection 219H(1) provides that a review of a reviewable decision is by way of rehearing on the evidence (original evidence) given in the proceeding before the original decision-maker.
This matter has been dealt with on the papers pursuant to subsection 32(2) of the QCAT Act.
The evidence before this tribunal consists of the material originally placed before the respondent and the additional written submissions to the tribunal. The tribunal is mindful that the review involves a fresh hearing and that subsection 20(1) of the QCAT Act provides:
“the purpose of the review of a reviewable decision is to produce the correct and preferable decision.”
It is accepted that the principle stated in Aldrich v Ross[1](“Aldrich”) by Thomas JA (as he then was) continues to apply in the new statutory regime contained in the QCAT Act. He stated:
“... I consider that the Misconduct Tribunal is required to make its own decision on the available evidence rather than merely to determine the correctness of the original decision in the limited manner permitted by an appeal in the strict sense against the exercise of a discretion. . . .
It would be appropriate for the Misconduct Tribunal in making up its own mind to give considerable weight to the view of the original decision-maker who might be thought to have particular expertise in the managerial requirements of the police force.” [2][1] [2000] 2 Qd R 235.
[2] Aldrich at 257
The tribunal will make its own decision on the evidence before it with due respect to the original decision-maker.
Applicant’s submissions
[10]The applicant admitted all charges against her.[3] The written submission at the disciplinary hearing noted that all charges arose from an incident that occurred at the premises of CYF on 16 April 2010 at about 9.30pm and that the applicant was off-duty at the time.[4]
[3] Volume 1 Material Provided Pursuant to s.21(2) of the QCAT Act (“Volume 1”) Submissions page 22.
[4] Ibid.
Matter 1
[11] The written submissions provided background to the charge.[5] It stated that the applicant and CYF had been in a long term de facto relationship which had ended and the applicant was in the process of moving out of the former shared residence. The applicant had departed the residence on 13 April 2010 taking only a few items with her and arrangements were made for the remainder of the property to be left there until she found alternative accommodation. It is stated that an agreement was reached for the applicant to attend the premises and retrieve her property and so the applicant was allowed to retain her front door keys and a remote control button for the garage door which would give her access to the garage and the connected premises.
[5] Outline of Submissions for the Applicant [undated] received in the tribunal 8 September 2010 pages 3-4.
[12] The submission is that the applicant had permission to enter the premises pursuant to the agreement with CYF and the applicant’s common law rights to enter the premises. The applicant admits the charge on the basis that she should have departed the premises when it was clear that CYF did not wish her to be present instead of remaining and causing the ensuing altercation.
Matter 2
[13] It is submitted that the applicant was there to retrieve property but believed that the separation was a trial period and there was hope of reconciliation. Instead, when confronted by the presence of another person at the premises, the applicant, who had been on medication though not on that occasion nor for several days beforehand, suffered “an extreme amount of grief”.[6] The applicant acknowledged that she reacted “extremely badly”[7] when confronted with the presence of the other person with CYF and described her behaviour as a “result of a sudden and unexpected breakdown which occurred while she was emotionally vulnerable . . .”[8]
[6]Ibid page 4 paragraph 11.
[7]Ibid paragraph 13.
[8]Ibid paragraph 14.
[14] The submission states that the applicant’s actions were completely out of character for her and occurred solely as a result of the domestic situation she found herself in. The extent of her grief was evident from the injuries she inflicted upon herself while at the scene and “…she is deeply ashamed and embarrassed by her behaviour on this occasion. She deeply regrets the physical and emotional abuse she inflicted and the pain CYF had to endure as a consequence.” The applicant has sought medical assistance in relation to her behaviour which included self harming.[9]
[9]Ibid page 5 paragraph 15.
[15] It was stated that the enforceable civil agreement the applicant entered with CYF whilst at court has been honoured and that the applicant and CYF remain friends and are in contact.[10] The applicant has sought assistance from her doctor and a psychologist to address her behaviour.[11]
[10]Ibid paragraph 18.
[11]Ibid paragraph 20.
Matter 3
[16] In relation to this matter, the submission is that the applicant has little recall of this assault. She remembers CYF trying to restrain her and she has since apologised for headbutting and assaulting HZM.[12]
[12]Ibid paragraph 16.
[17] It was submitted that in the police initiated domestic violence protection order the applicant attended court and immediately consented to the order against her. In attending court and consenting to the order, the applicant had found it to be “extremely humiliating and embarrassing”[13] but believed that it would be a first step in making amends. At court, the basis of the enforceable civil agreement with CYF was for the applicant to pay for the damage to the premises as well as contributing half the costs to the replacement of the locks at the premises.[14]
[13]Ibid paragraph 17.
[14]Ibid page 6 paragraph 18.
Matter 4
[18] The applicant had expressed remorse and entered into a restitution process by means of the civil agreement with CYF as well as seeking to rectify her own behaviour.
Discussion
[19] The issue before the tribunal is the sanction of dismissal and its severity.
[20] The applicant whose date of birth is 24 November 1968[15] was sworn into the QPS on 29 January 2002.[16]
[15] Volume 1 Domestic Violence Application Information Sheet page 38.
[16] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010: the respondent provides the dates as 9 July 2001 page 5 of 18. The difference is explained by the recruit training period.
[21] In relation to Matters 2, 3 and 4 the applicant exhibited extreme behavioural responses in an unprovoked situation but one that the applicant had manufactured by entering the property without permission. These matters involved serious and unprovoked assaults upon CYF and HZM and wilful damage to CYF’s property. On 16 April 2010 police were required to attend the residence and were subsequently obliged to apply to court for a protection order against the applicant.
[22] In addition to the assaults and damage to property, the applicant used self harm in an attempt to show she had been assaulted by CYF or HZM. While criminal complaints were originally made by both CYF and HZM with respect to Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm[17] and Wilful Damage[18] they withdrew these complaints and were satisfied that the matters would be dealt with by means of a domestic violence order and the QPS internal disciplinary process.
[17] Section 339 Criminal Code 1899.
[18] Section 469 Criminal Code 1899.
[23] CYF’s Statement of Witness dated 17 April 2010 describes a vicious and calculated assault on her in her own home. The assault included: punching CYF in the face with a closed fist, causing her teeth to split her lip;[19] tackling her to the ground and choking her; threats to poison her dogs; ripping HZM’s shirt; headbutting her twice and scratching her neck.
[19] Volume 1 Part B Statement of Witness CYF page 18 paragraph 12.
[24] In the period from Tuesday 13 April 2010 to Friday 16 April 2010 there had been threatening and abusive phone calls from the applicant to CYF which behaviour escalated into actual violence on 16 April 2010.[20] These harassing phone calls continued even after the police arrived on 16 April 2010.[21]
[20] Volume 1 Protection Order Application Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 Basis of Application page 34.
[21] Volume 1 Transcript of Interview with Senior Sergeant Darrin Ferguson page 59.
[25] The intensity and violence of the assault was corroborated as was the intent behind it. The neighbouring off duty police officer had managed briefly to distract the applicant and remove her from CYF’s property but she returned to the property to continue the assault.[22]
[22] Volume 1 Transcript of Interview with Senior Sergeant Darrin Ferguson page 51.
[26] The Protection Order which was uncontested was made in the Magistrates Court on 21 April 2010.[23]
[23] Volume 1 page 47.
[27] I have referred elsewhere[24] to a conflict between the not uncommon duties of police officers being called upon to handle community domestic violence issues and a police officer being the subject of a domestic violence order, in this case, an uncontested order. I note that the respondent refers to the applicant’s duties: “As an experienced watchhouse and previously general duties officer I am confident you …would have on many occasions been exposed to situations requiring you to render assistance to victims at similar types of incidents.”[25]
[24] DA v Deputy Commissioner Stewart [2011] QCAT 102, p 7-8.
[25] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 6 of 18.
[28] The applicant initiated violent assaults causing injury upon two persons, caused wilful damage to property and made threats which were apparently intended to intimidate. The entry to the property was without permission.[26]
[26] Volume 1 Part B Statement of Witness CYF page 17 paragraph 5.
[29] It is incompatible with the public duties of a police officer that she, even as an off duty officer, can cause such a level of domestic violence. It is irreconcilable that a police officer, a senior constable, can both be the subject of a domestic violence order yet at the same time, attend to victims of domestic violence in other contexts that do not involve her own personal circumstances.
[30] It has been stated:
“Domestic violence is an insidious, prevalent and serious problem in our society. . . . It is not solely a domestic issue; it is a crime against the State warranting salutary punishment.”[27]
[27] R v Fairbrother; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2005] QCA 105 per McMurdo P at paragraph 23
[31] The tribunal notes the reference the respondent made to all members of the police being public officials as defined in the Public Service Ethics Act 1994 and who are employed at public expense for the benefit of the community.[28] As such, police officers must demonstrate the highest standard of conduct in order to maintain the confidence of the community.
[28] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 4 of 18.
[32] The QPS Code of Conduct (“Code”) states:[29]
“7. Determination of Conduct
Determining whether a member's conduct, whether on or off duty, is right and proper in terms of this code requires examination of:
• the nature of the conduct exhibited; and
• the context in which the conduct takes place.”[29] QPS Code of Conduct 6 October 2006 section 17.1.
[33] In this case, the nature of the conduct displayed involved sustained and violent assault on CYF and HZM, members of the public, as well as enraged damage to CYF’s property. The context was in an off duty capacity and involved a recently failed personal relationship. While the tribunal accepts that the applicant was distressed by the relationship breakdown, it does not accept that the applicant should evade strong censure for her actions albeit while off duty.
[34] In relation to the duty concerning misconduct or breaches of discipline, subsection 7.2(1) of the PSAA provides a broad definition of conduct:
“conduct means conduct of an officer, wherever and whenever occurring, whether the officer whose conduct is in question is on or off duty at the time the conduct occurs.”
[35] The principles outlined in Orme v Atkinson[30] (“Orme”) are of assistance in assessing an officer’s private, off duty conduct and conduct that may be found to be misconduct for the purposes of discipline.[31] There Member Mr McCarthy stated in relation to off duty behaviour:
[30] Misconduct Tribunal No.TA 2 of 1999 Orme v Atkinson before Member Mr McCarthy.
[31] Ibid page 11.
“There needs to be some nexus or some factor which raises the conduct to another level or ‘puts it over the line’ so far as the reasonable expectations of the public are concerned. . .
It seems to me therefore that a line must be drawn in respect of a police officer’s private or off duty conduct and that a police officer’s conduct may ultimately be found to be misconduct for the purposes of discipline if:a.it is of such a nature as to erode public confidence in the Police Service; or
b.it may be regarded as ‘morally or socially blameworthy in a policeman qua policemen’ (Smith v Cullinan[32] ); or
c.it affects the police officer’s ‘fitness to discharge his duties as a police officer’ (Henry v Ryan[33]);
d.it ‘clearly affects the status and authority of the police officer in the discharge of his public duties’ (Henry v Ryan). ”[34]
[32] Misconduct Tribunal No. TA4 of 1996 Smith v Cullinan before Dr Forbes.
[33] Henry v Ryan [1953] Tas SR 90 page 91 per Burbury CJ (“Henry”).
[34] Orme pages 10 and 11.
[36] The violence in the applicant’s case creates the nexus which takes the conduct beyond the realm of the merely private and encroaches on the applicant’s public status as a police officer. Her authority has been eroded because the violent behaviours she demonstrated were directly contradictory of the professionalism and integrity in personal behaviour that must be apparent in a police officer.
[37] Section 1.4 of the PSAA defines misconduct as:
“conduct that—
(a)is disgraceful, improper or unbecoming an officer; or
(b)shows unfitness to be or continue as an officer; or
(c)does not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer.”
[38] It has been observed that:
“The purpose of misconduct and discipline proceedings within the Police force has been identified in a number of decisions including Hardcastle v Commissioner of Police[35] , Police Service Board v Morris[36] and Re Bowen[37]. The protection of the public, the maintenance of public confidence in the Service and the maintenance of integrity in the performance of police duties are the primary purposes of such proceedings.” [38]
[35] (1984) 53 ALR 593.
[36] (1984) 53 ALR 593, (1985) 156 CLR 397, 411.
[37] [1996] 2 Qd R 8.
[38] Aldrich page 19 paragraph 42.
[39] The tribunal considers that such serious conduct as displayed by the applicant where fellow police officers have been obliged to apply for a protection order to restrain her violent conduct amounts to misconduct. She has not met the standard of conduct that is reasonably expected by the community.
[40] The tribunal considers that:
“Misconduct in his private life by a person discharging public or professional duties may be destructive of his authority and influence and thus unfit him to continue in his office or profession.”[39]
[39] Henry per Burbury CJ at 91.
[41] The tribunal considers that in this instance, the applicant’s misconduct does impact on her status as a police officer and her role in the community.[40]
[40] See also R v Teachers Appeal Board ex parte Bilney [1984] 35 SASR 492 Mohr J at 496- 497.
Mitigating factors
[42] The applicant submitted that mentally she had been affected by the break up of her relationship with CYF and that she had been placed on medication which she had not taken for several days before the assaults.
[43] The tribunal has noted the remorse shown by the applicant; her acknowledgement of the embarrassment she caused the QPS[41] and her attempt at restitution. The applicant did not contest the court order, co-operated with the disciplinary process and pleaded guilty to the charges. Also noted is the psychological counselling she undertook. The respondent considered these affected mitigation but did not excuse the conduct.[42]
[41] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing 6 June 2010 page 15 of 16.
[42] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 6 of 18.
[44] There were favourable referees’ letters of which three were from her personal friends and one from her general practitioner. Two police references were from her immediate supervisor and the second was from the officer-in-charge at the watchhouse. Both references spoke well of her general conscientiousness and ability in her duties in the watchhouse.
[45] The references from the applicant’s friends saw her behaviour on 16 April 2010 as uncharacteristic.
[46] The submission filed on behalf of the applicant referred to the case of Compton v Deputy Commissioner Ian Stewart Queensland Police Service (“Compton”)[43] where the presiding member in that matter set aside the sanction of dismissal against an officer who had been sanctioned for his off duty behaviour. Mitigating factors considered included no accident or damage to person or property; the stress of a recently failed relationship and “an excellent service record.”[44]
[43] [2010] QCAT 384.
[44] Ibid page 9.
[47] Distinguishable from Compton in the present case are the following factors: the service record was not good, with a previous dismissal recorded; there was a violent and sustained assault and there was considerable ensuing damage to person and property.
[48] In McKenzie v Acting Assistant Commissioner Tony Wright Queensland Police Service[45] an off duty Sergeant was found to have used inappropriate force causing injury and amounting to misconduct against a member of the community with whom he had an intimate relationship. In that case there was a history of good service over 18 years. The force used was found to be excessive and warranted demotion. Distinguishable in this case is the degree of enraged and sustained violence against two persons with the aggravation of willful property damage as well as a record of service that included a previous dismissal.
[45] [2011] QCAT 20.
Suspended dismissal
[49] The tribunal considered the question of suspended dismissal[46]. Section 7.4(3) of the PSAA sets out the range of disciplinary possibilities. The Crime and Misconduct Act in sections 219L(1)(c), 219L(2) and 219L(3) allow for suspended dismissal and, subject to a 12 month conditional period which if breached leads to immediate reimposition of the sanction, provides an opportunity for the applicant to rehabilitate herself within the QPS and demonstrate that the conduct was “one off”.
[46] Pursuant to PS(D)R section 10(f) and section 5.
[50] The respondent had the power to suspend pursuant to regulation 12 of the PS(D)R. He referred to the applicant’s service record where as a result of the applicant’s conduct in November 2003, the sanction of dismissal was imposed in August 2006, suspended for the 12 month period.[47] The circumstances were different to the present case albeit serious enough to attract the ultimate sanction.
[47] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 5 of 18 and page 9 application to the tribunal.
[51] In the present case, the respondent considered that there was a degree of calculation in the applicant’s behaviour on 16 April 2010;[48] the conduct and resultant actions were “by no means minor in nature”;[49] involved “an uncontrolled rage of violence”[50] and would have been frightening to those concerned.[51] The respondent referred to the applicant’s “escalating violence” and stated that “Your actions depict a person who either by her very poor judgement and inability to control her actions and emotions has the ability to be extremely violent.”[52]
[48] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 10 of 18 line 300.
[49] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 11 line 309.
[50] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 11 line 311.
[51] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 11 line 313.
[52] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 11 lines 316- 318.
[52] The tribunal in reaching its independent decision is advised to “give considerable weight” to the respondent’s considerations in his original decision because the respondent has the expertise in the management of the QPS.[53] The respondent in referring to the 2006 sanction and the present case was unable to be satisfied that the applicant would not resort to such levels of misconduct in the future thereby bringing the QPS into unwarranted disrepute.[54]
[53] Aldrich at 257.
[54] Volume 1 Transcript of Disciplinary Hearing (Resumption) 13 July 2010 page 16.
[53] The applicant’s case is one in which is appropriate for the tribunal to give that weight to the respondent’s considerations. The level of violence demonstrated in this case is serious and incompatible with the standard of conduct expected by the community in a police officer and does not warrant a suspended dismissal.
Sanction
[54] In this case, the tribunal having reviewed the material according to the principles outlined in Aldrich, agrees with the respondent original decision-maker.
[55] The tribunal, for the reasons given in this decision and pursuant to section 24(1)(a) of the QCAT Act in relation to matters 1, 2, 3 and 4 confirms the decision under review. That is, the decision of the respondent to dismiss the applicant from the QPS is confirmed.
- AGLC
- Officer TXS v Acting Deputy Commissioner Colin McCallum [2011] QCAT 739
- Case
- [2011] QCAT 739
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the disciplinary action taken was proportionate to the misconduct, whether the process was fair, and whether the decision was within the bounds of rationality. The appellant argued that the disciplinary action, which included dismissal, was excessive given the nature of the misconduct and their otherwise unblemished career. They further contended that the process was unfair due to procedural errors and that the decision was irrational given the mitigating circumstances.
The court found that the disciplinary action was proportionate and that the process followed was fair. The tribunal considered the nature of the misconduct, the context of the domestic violence order, and the appellant's conduct since the incident. The tribunal emphasised the importance of maintaining high standards within the police force and found that the dismissal was a necessary measure to uphold public confidence in law enforcement. The court also noted that the decision-making process adhered to the relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks, thus dismissing the appellant's procedural fairness argument. Finally, the tribunal concluded that the decision was rational and within the range of acceptable outcomes given the circumstances.
The orders of the tribunal were confirmed, with the dismissal upheld as appropriate and proportionate given the nature of the misconduct and its implications for the integrity of the police force. The tribunal found no grounds to interfere with the disciplinary action taken by the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
Matter 1: the decision is confirmed;
Matter 2: the decision is confirmed;
Matter 3: the decision is confirmed;
Matter 4: the decision is confirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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