FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Nunis v Oak Capital Group Wholesale Fund Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 127
File number(s): PEG 52 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON Date of judgment: 20 February 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – costs sought against solicitor – relevant considerations. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 191
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30, 40, 41
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), r 22.06
Cases cited: Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178
Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 456
Mitry Lawyers v Barnden [2014] FCA 918
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge (2003) 133 FCR 487
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 48 Date of hearing: 26 September 2023 Place: Perth Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Langdon Solicitor for the Applicant: TGC Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Wallwork Solicitor for the Respondent: Summer Lawyers ORDERS
PEG 52 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: RALPH MARCEL NUNIS
Applicant
AND: OAK CAPITAL WHOLESALE FUND PTY LTD ACN 622 106 692
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CAMERON
DATE OF ORDER:
20 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to amend the orders made on 17 July 2023 be refused.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Cameron
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Mr Nunis, brought this proceeding on 6 April 2023 seeking an order that a bankruptcy notice addressed to him and issued on 10 March 2023 (Bankruptcy Notice) be set aside. The respondent, Oak Capital Group Wholesale Fund Pty Ltd (Oak Capital), opposed that application on various grounds. Over the course of the next four months the matter was listed no fewer than five times only to be adjourned to a later date. On 17 July 2023 a registrar dismissed Mr Nunis’s application and ordered him to pay Oak Capital’s costs. The registrar also granted the parties liberty to apply to amend the costs order.
Exercising that liberty, by letter dated 1 August 2023 Oak Capital applied to the Court for an amendment to the 17 July 2023 costs order to the effect that the solicitors acting for Mr Nunis, Timohir Galic and his firm TGC Lawyers, be made jointly and severally liable for payment of Oak Capital’s costs of the proceeding. These reasons concern that application.
APPLICATION FOR COSTS
Oak Capital sought amendment of the costs order by:
1deleting ‘The…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 127
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined Mr Galic's conduct through the lens of established legal principles. The analysis included whether Mr Galic's actions involved unreasonable conduct, which is required to invoke the jurisdiction to make a costs order against a lawyer. The court noted that Mr Galic had provided an explanation for his failure to manage the case adequately, attributing it to a combination of personal pressures and a breakdown in systems rather than deliberate misconduct. Additionally, Mr Galic had taken steps to address the concerns raised by the registrar. The court concluded that the evidence did not meet the threshold for unreasonable conduct as articulated in Mitry Lawyers v Barnden, which requires a deliberate or conscious decision unrelated to the prospects of success. Given these findings, the court ruled that Oak Capital had not demonstrated that Mr Galic's conduct warranted a personal costs order.
The court's decision was grounded in the statutory requirements of the Court's Statute and the overarching principles of civil practice and procedure. The court emphasized that while the duty to facilitate the just resolution of disputes must be upheld, unreasonable conduct must be established for a costs order to be made against a legal representative. The court refused Oak Capital's application to amend the orders made on 17 July 2023, as it found no basis for such a personal costs order against Mr Galic. The final orders of the court upheld the initial decision not to impose personal costs on Mr Galic, reflecting the court's balanced approach to the application of legal principles in the context of costs allocation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In his affidavit of 22 September 2023 Mr Galic deposed to the pressing need for him to travel when he did and to the work-related pressure which planning for his absence caused as he is a sole practitioner. He also deposed that his practice followed him to Europe where he had had to do more work than he had anticipated, which at times caused him great tiredness. Mr Galic deposed to the various steps he had taken while overseas to manage this matter and also to engage the assistance of other practitioners once it became apparent to him that Mr Scovell “would not be appearing”. He further deposed that he had intended to inform the Court that no legal practitioner would be appearing for Mr Nunis on 10 July 2023 but overlooked that step when briefing Mr Nunis on what to do when at Court and had not advised Oak Capital’s solicitors as he questioned the utility of doing so because he doubted that consent to an adjournment would be forthcoming. He expressed regret for not having advised the Court and his opponents and concluded:I have consistently directed my client towards early resolution of this matter instead of prolonged litigation.I have never sought to abuse the processes of the Court intentionally, by design or otherwise. CONSIDERATIONRelevant principles Section 191 of the Court’s Statute requires parties to proceedings in the Court to conduct their proceedings consistently with the overarching purpose of the Court’s civil practice and procedure provisions, namely the facilitation of the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. Further s.191(2) requires legal practitioners acting for parties before the Court to take account of the duty s.191(1) imposes on them and to assist them to comply with it. When awarding costs in a proceeding the Court is to take into account any failure by a party or their legal representative to comply with those duties: s.191(4). Those considerations are the statutory background against which the present application that Mr Galic and his firm pay Oak Capital's costs of the proceeding are to be determined. More generally the discretion to order that costs be paid by a party’s legal representatives is to be exercised judicially and in accordance with general legal principles relating to the law of costs: Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192. Whether any such costs should be awarded on the indemnity basis, as Oak Capital sought, is a matter for separate consideration and depends on Oak Capital persuading the Court to amend the orders of 17 July 2023. As Lee J recorded in Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 456 at [26], the principles guiding the exercise of the discretion to order costs against a party’s legal representative were collated by Wigney J in Mitry Lawyers v Barnden [2014] FCA 918 at [42] in the following terms:1.Instituting or maintaining a proceeding on behalf of a client which has no, or substantially no, prospect of success will not, without more, invoke the jurisdiction to make a costs order against a lawyer.2. Something which involves “unreasonable conduct” is required.3.What constitutes unreasonable conduct will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. 4. The element of acting unreasonably involves some deliberate or conscious decision taken by reference to circumstances unrelated to the prospects of success, with either a recognition that there is no chance of success, or an intention to use the proceeding for an ulterior purpose, or to abuse the processes of the court, or with a disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of success. 5.The circumstances must involve or result in a serious dereliction of duty owed to the court, or serious misconduct in promoting the course of, and the proper administration of, justice.6. An ulterior purpose or an abuse of process cannot be assumed simply because the case is hopeless.7.The reason that the mere pursuit of an unmeritorious case is not so sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction to make a costs order against a lawyer is that a party is entitled to have a practitioner act for him or her in an unmeritorious case. The court is concerned to avoid the risks of a practice developing whereby lawyers endeavour to browbeat their opponents into abandoning clients, or particular issues or arguments, for fear of personal costs orders being made against them