Nugawela v Medical Board of Australia (WA Branch)
[2024] WASCA 101
•26 AUGUST 2024
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: NUGAWELA -v- MEDICAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA (WA BRANCH) [2024] WASCA 101
CORAM: BUSS P
MITCHELL JA
HEARD: 23 AUGUST 2024
DELIVERED : 23 AUGUST 2024
PUBLISHED : 26 AUGUST 2024
FILE NO/S: CACV 9 of 2024
BETWEEN: PATRICK ALLAN NUGAWELA
Appellant
AND
MEDICAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA (WA BRANCH)
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: LEMONIS J
Citation: NUGAWELA -v- MEDICAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA (WA BRANCH) [No 2] [2024] WASC 15
File Number : GDA 11 of 2022
Catchwords:
Appeal - Practice and procedure - Application for an extension of time to comply with a springing order after appeal has been dismissed - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 58
Commonwealth Constitution, s 76, s 109
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (WA) Act 2010 (WA), s 4
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, s 5, s 196
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 11, s 105
Result:
Application for an extension of time dismissed
Appeal remains dismissed pursuant to springing order
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | H M Cormann |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Clayton Utz |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
A v C [No 2] [2015] WASCA 199
Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216
Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161 [2024] WASCA 87
Nugawela v Medical Board of WA [2024] WASC 100
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361
R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141
REASONS OF THE COURT:
At the hearing on 23 August 2024 of the appellant's application for an extension of time in which to comply with a springing order, we ordered that the application be dismissed and that the appeal remains dismissed pursuant to the springing order. We said that we would publish our reasons for making those orders later. These are our reasons for making those orders.
Background
On 16 June 2020, the respondent commenced proceedings VR 53/2020 in the State Administrative Tribunal against the appellant. The proceedings referred an allegation that the appellant, who was then a medical practitioner, had engaged in professional misconduct as defined in s 5 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (National Law). The National Law was applied in Western Australia by s 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (WA) Act 2010 (WA).[1]
[1] See now, the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Application Act 2024 (WA).
The respondent's statement of facts, issues and contentions relevantly alleged that the appellant had engaged in professional misconduct in the following ways:[2]
(a)failing to appropriately store and manage clinical records at the Property, and then failing to arrange for their transfer in the lead up to, and after, his eviction on 21 June 2018,
(b)failing to appropriately store and manage Schedule 4 and Schedule 8 medications at the Property, including failing to make provision for them in the lead up to, and after, his eviction on 21 June 2018,
(c)acting in breach of the Code, and in breach of the Medicines and Poisons Regulations 2016 (WA) and relevant Department of Health requirements, and
(d)failing to provide information, including practice information to AHPRA, and failed to comply with s 131 of the National Law.
[2] Nugawela v Medical Board of Australia (WA Branch) [No 2] [2024] WASC 15 (primary decision) [54].
At a mediation conducted at the Tribunal on 8 September 2022, the appellant and the respondent's counsel signed consent orders putting forward an agreed resolution of the matter. The consent orders were presented to a member of the Tribunal (who was also the mediating member) outside the mediation. The member made orders in terms of the consent orders, reflecting the Tribunal's satisfaction that proper cause existed for disciplinary action against the appellant. Under those orders, the Tribunal found in substance that, by engaging in the conduct referred to at [3] above, the appellant had behaved in a way that constituted professional misconduct as defined in s 5 of the National Law. Consistently with the consent orders, the Tribunal reprimanded the appellant and imposed supervised practice and other conditions on the appellant's registration as a medical practitioner, with a review period of 6 months.
In the primary proceedings, the appellant sought to appeal to the General Division of this court against the orders made by the Tribunal on 8 September 2022. Such an appeal is provided for by s 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). The appellant sought to appeal on five grounds, headed:
1.'Denial of Procedural Fairness'.
2.'Ineffective Legal Representation'.
3.'Unconscionable Agreement'.
4.'Deprivation of Vocational Livelihood'.
5.'Interaction with Federal Law'.
On 25 January 2024, the primary judge granted the appellant leave to appeal on ground 1, refused leave to appeal on the other grounds and dismissed the appeal. His Honour published written reasons for making those orders.
Primary judge's approach
The primary decision deals with a wide variety of complaints made by the appellant in the primary proceedings in a way which is not easy to summarise. Without attempting to deal with all of those matters, we note below the findings made by the primary judge which were central to his Honour's conclusion that none of the grounds of appeal to the General Division were established.
Making of the Tribunal's orders
The primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal member made an independent decision to make the orders set out in the consent orders and this accorded with the requirements of the National Law.[3] The primary judge was satisfied that the orders constitute decisions made under s 196(1)(b)(i), s 196(1)(b)(ii), s 196(2)(a), s 196(2)(b) and s 196(3) of the National Law.[4]
Nature of the appeal to the General Division
[3] Primary decision [71].
[4] Primary decision [73].
The primary judge found that an appeal from a decision of the non-judicial member of the Tribunal lay to the General Division under s 105(3) of the SAT Act.[5]
[5] Primary decision [80].
His Honour rejected the submission that s 105(13) of the SAT Act applied on the basis that the Tribunal's decision had the effect of depriving the appellant of his capacity to lawfully pursue a vocation. In doing so, his Honour rejected the appellant's submission that the orders had that effect on the basis that it was not reasonably possible for him to obtain a suitable supervisor and thus the orders have the effect of depriving him of his vocation. Referring to the decision of this court in Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board,[6] the primary judge held that s 105(13) is concerned with the legal, as distinct from the practical, effect of the decision. The appellant's claim was found to concern the practical effect rather than the legal effect of the orders and, in any event, the evidence before the primary judge did not sustain the proposition that the orders had prevented the appellant from practising as a medical practitioner. Therefore, the primary judge concluded that the appeal to the General Division could only be brought on a question of law.[7]
Ground 1: denial of procedural fairness
[6] Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361 [48].
[7] Primary decision [81] - [86].
The primary judge identified the question of law raised by the first ground of appeal to the General Division as being whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the Tribunal proceedings. The appellant alleged that the mediator commenced with an apparent acceptance of a conduct‑finding instead of dealing with the issues in dispute on the alleged charges. The appellant alleged that his signature on the consent orders was obtained by duress.[8] The primary judge rejected these contentions, essentially on the basis that they were unsupported by evidence.[9] The primary judge granted leave to appeal on this ground, although his Honour found that it was not made out. Leave to appeal was granted on the basis that, in considering the grounds, it was necessary to first determine the jurisdictional basis upon which the Tribunal member made the orders.[10]
Ground 2: ineffective legal representation
[8] Primary decision [107] - [109].
[9] Primary decision [115].
[10] Primary decision [125].
The second ground of appeal to the General Division contended that pro bono legal representation which the Tribunal had arranged for the appellant at the mediation was ineffective.[11] The primary judge found that it was not necessary to determine whether incompetent legal representation provides an arguable basis to set aside orders made by an administrative body.[12] The primary judge found that there was no evidence that the appellant was incompetently represented, or that any such incompetence brought about an unfairness to the appellant in the making of the orders.[13]
Ground 3: unconscionable agreement
[11] Primary decision [126] - [127].
[12] Primary decision [128] - [130].
[13] Primary decision [131] - [135].
The appellant's third ground of appeal to the General Division contended that the 'purported agreement reached was unconscionable'. The appellant pointed to a combination of the terms of the orders, their effect and the conduct of the mediation as giving rise to the asserted unconscionability.[14] The primary judge characterised this complaint as being that the Tribunal's orders, their effect and the conduct of the mediation, taken as a whole, reflected a substantial deviation from the standards of fairness which ought to have been afforded to the appellant at the mediation.[15]
[14] Primary decision [136] - [137].
[15] Primary decision [139].
The primary judge rejected this ground on the basis that it was unsupported by evidence of the factual assertions made in the ground. Most importantly, there was no evidence as to the appellant's state of mind when he signed the orders. So, there was no evidence as to how any such alleged unfairness affected his thinking when signing the consent orders. There was also no evidence as to the legal advice the appellant received in relation to the consent orders and their implementation, or as to the legal advice he received throughout the course of the mediation.[16] The primary judge also rejected the appellant's contention that the ultimate disposition of the matter, constituted by a reprimand and conditions of supervision, education and notification with a six month review period, was disproportionate to the underlying agreed factual basis for the orders.[17]
Ground 4: deprivation of vocational livelihood
[16] Primary decision [140].
[17] Primary decision [141] - [147].
The primary judge characterised the appellant's fourth ground of appeal to the General Division as complaining that the supervision conditions were substantially unnecessary and unworkable at the time they were made.[18]
[18] Primary decision [153] - [155].
The primary judge found that there was no evidence to support such a conclusion. The appellant's affidavit asserted the conditions were unworkable for a general practitioner in sole practice and alluded to the cost of the supervision being prohibitive. However, the appellant's affidavit did not identify any steps he had taken to find a suitable supervisor. There was also no evidence as to the financial viability of the appellant's practice, such as to give weight to the proposition that the cost of supervision was prohibitive. The appellant's signature to the consent orders conveyed an acceptance that the conditions were at least capable of being achieved.[19]
Ground 5: interaction with federal law
[19] Primary decision [157] - [159].
The appellant's fifth ground of appeal to the General Division arose out of the fact that he was declared bankrupt on 21 February 2017 and, as a result, his property (including clinical records and medications) then vested in his trustee in bankruptcy under s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The appellant contended that the National Law was inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and therefore inoperative by force of s 109 of the Commonwealth Constitution. He also contended that the respondent's allegations required the Tribunal to rule on the appellant's rights to property vested in his bankruptcy trustee, which was outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The appellant therefore contended that the Tribunal proceedings concerned a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of s 76(i) of the Constitution and arising under laws made by the Commonwealth Parliament within the meaning of s 76(ii) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appellant contended that the Tribunal should not have proceeded to dispose of the proceedings, as it did not have jurisdiction to do so.[20]
[20] Primary decision [169].
The primary judge recognised that the Tribunal is not a court and does not have jurisdiction with respect to any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, or arising under laws made by the Commonwealth Parliament.[21]
[21] Primary decision [167].
His Honour applied the decision of the High Court in Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn,[22] which held that for a constitutional claim or defence to give rise to a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation:
it is enough that the claim or defence be genuinely in controversy and that it give rise to an issue capable of judicial determination. That is to say, it is enough that the claim or defence be genuinely raised and not incapable on its face of legal argument.
[22] Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216 [35].
The primary judge noted that the appellant simply asserted in very broad terms that there was an inconsistency between the operation of the Bankruptcy Act and the National Law. The appellant had not pointed to any provisions of the Bankruptcy Act which expressly or by implication were inconsistent with the provisions of the National Law. The Bankruptcy Act did not prevent the appellant from working as a medical practitioner. The primary judge held that a claim raised in such a broad and imprecise manner was incapable on its face of legal argument and did not give rise to a matter described in s 76(i) of the Constitution.
The primary judge closely examined the issues raised in the Tribunal proceedings and held that they did not require any determination as to the appellant's rights to the clinical records or medicines which the appellant was alleged to have stored inappropriately. As the Tribunal proceedings did not raise any controversy that required a determination of the appellant's rights in respect of the medical records or the medicines, they did not concern a matter arising under the Bankruptcy Act for the purposes of s 76(ii) of the Constitution.[23]
[23] Primary decision [174] - [200].
The appeal to this court
On 15 February 2024, the appellant commenced an appeal to this court against the primary judge's orders dismissing his appeal to the General Division and ordering him to pay the respondent's costs of that appeal. Curiously, he did not appeal against the order refusing leave to appeal in relation to grounds 2 - 5 of his appeal to the General Division. The right to appeal to this court against the primary judge's orders is conferred by s 58(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA).
An appellant's case was due to be filed on 21 March 2024.[24] On 28 March 2024, the time for filing an appellant's case was extended to 5.00 pm on 19 April 2024 by consent order.
[24] Rule 31B(2)(b)(i) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) (Rules).
On 23 April 2024, the associate to the Court of Appeal registrar sent a letter to the appellant by email regarding his failure to file and serve his appellant's case by 5.00 pm on 19 April 2024. On 24 April 2024, the appellant contacted the Court of Appeal office by email. He stated that he had tested positive for COVID-19 and was quite unwell. He attached a document purporting to be a text message confirmation of his positive COVID-19 test. The appellant also requested a further extension of time to file and serve his appellant's case.
On 22 May 2024 the appellant lodged a document purporting to be an appellant's case with the Court of Appeal office. That document was not accepted for filing because it did not comply with the Rules. In particular, there were 13 grounds running over 35 pages. Those grounds did not comply with r 32(4)(b) of the Rules, which requires that the document state the grounds and concise particulars of them succinctly in numbered paragraphs. The submissions did not comply with r 32(5)(b) of the Rules, which requires that for each ground of appeal the document must contain the appellant's written submissions expressed to carry the substance of them clearly and as succinctly as possible.
On 24 May 2024, Mitchell JA and Vaughan JA heard the registrar's notice to attend for the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file and serve an appellant's case. Prior to the hearing that morning, the appellant sent an email to the court attaching his affidavit sworn on 23 May 2024 in which he deposed to having certain medical conditions including COVID-19 and shingles.
At the hearing, the court noted that the fact that the appellant was able to prepare a document of the length and complexity of that lodged on 22 May 2024 demonstrated that his medical conditions did not incapacitate him from preparing an appellant's case. The court was prepared to give the appellant the further extension of four weeks which he sought to file an appellant's case. However, the court concluded that this extension to 21 June 2024 should be subject to a springing order. The court relevantly ordered that:
1.The time for the appellant to file and serve an appellant's case which complies with the [Rules] is extended to 4 pm on 21 June 2024; and the appellant is to file and serve the appellant's case by that time.
2. If the appellant does not comply with order 1:
(a) The appeal is dismissed.
(b) The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, including any reserved costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
The appellant lodged a document with the registry on 20 June 2024, but it was not accepted for filing as his appellant's case as it did not comply with the Rules. As no appellant's case which complied with the Rules was filed by 4.00 pm on 21 June 2024, the appeal was dismissed by operation of the springing order. On 24 June 2024, the registrar wrote to the appellant advising him that the appeal had been dismissed and enclosing a certificate of conclusion of civil appeal. The registrar's letter advised the appellant:
However, if you consider that you are entitled to an extension of time to comply with the order for the filing of the appellant's case made on 24 May 2024, you may file and serve an application (Form 9) seeking an extension of time together with a supporting affidavit which has attached to it a minute of proposed appellant's case which complies with the [Rules].
The current application
By application in an appeal filed on 22 July 2024, the appellant seeks an extension of time in which to file his appellant's case. That application is supported by the appellant's affidavit sworn on 12 July 2024, which annexes a minute of his proposed appellant's case.
The proposed appellant's case contains five proposed grounds of appeal which, shorn of particulars, are shortly stated:
1. The learned judge erred in law in acting wholly outside jurisdiction in determining that the [Tribunal] was not required to determine the status/ownership of the appellant's medical practice property vested in the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), so misconstruing the appellant's constitutional 'section 109 defence.'
2.The learned judge erred in fact and law by failing to determine and to exercise jurisdiction vested under the Australian Constitution, the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to establish the validity of a 'matter' raised by the appellant as a constitutional defence.
3.The learned judge erred in law finding that the 'Consent Orders' dated 8 September 2022 stood as lawful 'Findings' and 'Orders' of the Tribunal and giving rise to errors on the face of the record.
4.The Honourable Judge erred in upholding professional misconduct findings and ancillary orders made by the Ordinary Member as Final Orders of the Tribunal.
5.The learned judge fell into jurisdictional error in law by a denial of procedural fairness to the appellant and errors in fact and law.
However, the particulars to these grounds are long and discursive, often containing statements which are in the nature of submissions with footnoted references to evidence and authorities in a way not provided for by the Rules. On other occasions, the particulars assert myriad errors by the primary judge. The length of the grounds and particulars in combination is 8 pages. While this is a marked improvement on the 35 pages in the document lodged on 22 May 2024, it remains difficult to characterise the particulars to the appellant's proposed grounds as 'concise' within the meaning of r 32(4)(b) of the Rules.
General principles
The principles governing the determination of an application to extend time for compliance with a springing order were summarised by this court in A v C [No 2],[25] in the following terms:
[25] A v C [No 2] [2015] WASCA 199 [2] - [4].
It has often been pointed out that the failure by a party to comply with a springing order is an egregious breach. A springing order is intended to be the last opportunity afforded to the party to put its case in order. The proper administration of justice, and the quality of justice for the other party, generally requires that it be just that, its last opportunity …
There is, however, a discretion to extend the time for compliance with a springing order and while no hard and fast rules can be laid down as to the matters to which the Court should have regard in the exercise of that discretion, the Court will normally have regard to at least the following matters:
(1)the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made;
(2)the reason for non-compliance with the springing order;
(3)the prejudice to the defaulting party if the time were not extended; and
(4)the prejudice to the other party if the time were extended.
It will also normally be a relevant consideration whether or not the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case on the merits, there being no point in resuscitating a case that is devoid of merit. However, the fact that a party has an apparently meritorious case cannot be permitted effectively to insulate it from the consequences of a failure to comply with a peremptory order of the Court[.] (citations omitted)
Disposition
There are some factors in this case which tend to count in favour of the grant of an extension of time. While justifying the making of the springing order, the appellant's delay in filing an appellant's case was not egregious. He attempted to comply with the springing order by filing a document on 20 June 2024. There is no particular prejudice to the respondent, a professional regulatory authority, if an extension of time is granted. If the appeal had merit, there would be at least some prospect of the appellant being prejudiced if an extension is not granted and the appeal remains dismissed. The record of this court indicates that breach of the conditions imposed by the Tribunal's orders has been relied on by the respondent in suspending the appellant's registration as a medical practitioner.[26] Without making any determination as to the impact of allowing the appeal on that suspension, if the Tribunal's orders were now to be set aside then that may impact on the way the appellant's registration is dealt with in the future.
[26] See Nugawela v Medical Board of WA [2024] WASC 100.
Against that, the document which the appellant now proposes to file still does not comply with r 32 of the Rules and the history of this matter gives us no confidence that the appellant has the capacity to remedy the defects in the immediate future.
If there was merit in the appellant's appeal, then it might be appropriate to grant the self-represented appellant some indulgences in relation to compliance with the Rules and to grant an extension of time. However, for the following reasons, none of the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal, so far as they can be discerned, are reasonably arguable. This is a case where there is no utility in resuscitating an appeal that is devoid of merit.
Proposed grounds 1 and 2 to this court seek to raise the issue of whether the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the proceedings against the appellant on the basis that they concerned a matter described in s 76(i) and/or s 76(ii) of the Constitution. This court recently considered the relevant principles to be applied in determining a jurisdictional challenge of this kind in Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161.[27]
[27] Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161 [2024] WASCA 87.
In this court, the appellant's grounds, particulars and submissions do not identify any particular provision(s) of the National Law which might be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act. Nor do they contain any coherent explanation as to how an inconsistency for the purposes of s 109 of the Constitution might arise. The primary judge was correct to conclude that the appellant's alleged 'defence' to the proceedings based on s 109 of the Constitution was not only unmeritorious but was also incapable on its face of legal argument. The appellant's argument in this court that the matter before the Tribunal arose under s 109 of the Constitution or involved the interpretation of that section has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.
Further, the primary judge's analysis of the matter before the Tribunal demonstrated that the Tribunal proceedings did not concern any right or duty owing its existence to federal law or depending on federal law for its enforcement.[28] The resolution of the disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal did not turn on proprietary rights in the relevant clinical records and medications. It is not reasonably arguable that the Tribunal was purporting to exercise jurisdiction in a matter arising under the Bankruptcy Act.
[28] R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141, 154.
The appellant's jurisdictional arguments may also raise a question as to whether the Tribunal was exercising judicial power in the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Unless the Tribunal was exercising judicial power, there could be no infringement of the implied Constitutional prohibition against State Parliaments conferring judicial power with respect to any of the matters identified in s 75 or s 76 of the Constitution on a body other than a court of the State.[29] As this question was not debated before us and was not addressed by the primary judge, it is unnecessary and inappropriate for this court to resolve that issue.
[29] See Hanssen [50], [112] - [114].
Proposed grounds 3 and 4 to this court seek to challenge the primary judge's conclusion that a single non-judicial member of the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make the primary orders on being presented with the signed consent orders of the parties following the mediation. There is no merit to those proposed grounds. For the reasons explained by the primary judge,[30] the requirement in s 11(4) of the SAT Act for a matter to be determined by a Tribunal constituted by three persons with certain qualifications is qualified by s 11(5) of the SAT Act. Section 11(5) provides that s 11(4) does not apply relevantly to a hearing where the Tribunal makes a decision other than a final decision, or a final decision with the consent of the parties. As the order in this case was made by consent, the single member had jurisdiction to make the order irrespective of whether or not it constituted a final decision. The appellant's proposed grounds, particulars and submissions provide no reason to doubt the primary judge's conclusion that facts agreed in the annexure to the consent order provided a basis for the member to be satisfied that the orders should be made under the National Law and that the member in this case made an independent decision to make those orders.
[30] Primary decision [38] - [48].
The particulars and supporting submissions for ground 5 are very difficult to follow. The ground asserts various alleged errors, many of which appear to reflect error by the Tribunal which were not the subject of the grounds of appeal to the General Division. Nothing in ground 5 and its particulars and supporting submissions appears to us to provide any reason for doubting the correctness of the primary judge's decision.
In our view, the primary judge was clearly correct to dismiss the appellant's appeal to the General Division for the reasons which his Honour gave.
In the circumstances, as the respondent submits, there is no reasonable basis upon which to conclude that any further extension of time would result in the production of an appellant's case that contains reasonably arguable grounds for impugning the primary decision and is compliant with the Rules.
Having regard to all of the above matters, we were not satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to grant the appellant an extension of time to comply with the springing order.
Orders
For the above reasons, at the conclusion of the hearing on 23 August 2024 we made the following orders:
1.The appellant's application in an appeal filed on 22 July 2024 is dismissed.
2.The appeal remains dismissed pursuant to order 2(a) of the orders made by this court on 24 May 2024.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
KP
Associate to the Hon Justice Mitchell
26 AUGUST 2024
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