CITATION: NSW CRIME COMMISSION v MACRIS [2002] NSWSC 3 FILE NUMBER(S): SC S11317 of 2000 HEARING DATE(S): 15 November 2001 JUDGMENT DATE: 9 January 2002 PARTIES :
Plaintiff: New South Wales Crime Commission
Defendant: John MACRISJUDGMENT OF: Hulme J at 1
COUNSEL : Plaintiff: S McNaughton
Defendant: C Stein SC, G JonesSOLICITORS: Plaintiff: JM Giorgiutti, NSW Crime Commission
Defendant: GallowaysDECISION: See paragraph 20
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY
COMMON LAW DIVISIONNo: 11317 of 2000
Wednesday, 9 January 2002HULME J
NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION v John MACRISJudgment
On 29 May 2000, a number of orders were made in these proceedings. They included an order:-
- “Pursuant to section 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 that no person is to dispose of, or attempt to dispose of, or otherwise deal with or attempt to otherwise deal with any interest in property (within the meaning of “interest in property” as defined in section 7 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990) of John Macris, including the interest in property in the property described in Part One of the Schedule hereto.”
2 Part One of the schedule included reference to 2 parcels of real estate, motor vehicles, funds held in a nominated bank account and some cash.
3 On 19 March 2001, I made orders in accordance with a form of “Consent Orders” signed by the solicitors for the parties. Those orders included:-
- “5. Pursuant to section 10(5)(b) of the (Criminal Assets Recovery) Act the restraining order make provision for meeting the reasonable legal expenses of the Defendant agreed at $40,000 out of the property specified in Schedule hereto such sum to be paid to Brett Galloway, Solicitor.
6. Subject of order 5, pursuant to section 22 of the Act the interests of the Defendant in the property specified in the Schedule hereto be forfeited to, and vest in, the Crown (‘the assets forfeiture order”)
8 Execution of the assets forfeiture order be stayed until 21 May 2001.
9 Leave be granted to the Defendant pursuant to sections 25(4) and 26(4) of the Act to make applications pursuant to sections 25 and 26 of the Act in respect of the interests in property of the Defendant specified in the Schedule hereto within six (6) months of the date of this order.”
4 The schedule to those orders was in identical terms to the schedule to the orders of 29 May 2000. The orders were entered on 20 March 2001.
5 On 21 September 2001, there was filed on behalf of the Defendant a Notice of Motion which sought, inter alia, an order that the orders made on 19 March be set aside and orders under section 25 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act and 26 of the Proceeds of Assessment Act (sic) that certain property in a schedule (which was not attached) be excluded from any Assets Forfeiture Order and/or any Proceeds Assessment Order. Amended Notices of Motion were subsequently filed,…
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- Case
- [2002] NSWSC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the orders should be set aside because the condition that the defendant's property should be used to cover his legal expenses had not been met. The court reasoned that the orders were not merely interlocutory but had practical effects and could not be set aside lightly. However, since the condition of paying the defendant's legal expenses had not been satisfied within a reasonable time, the orders were set aside. The court also noted that the orders could be reinstated if the condition was met, and the defendant could apply for his legal costs separately.
The court granted the defendant's application to set aside the orders made on 19 March 2001 and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs. The operation of the orders to be made was stayed until 4 February 2002 to allow the parties to consider further applications. The court also granted the defendant liberty to apply and allowed any further applications to be dealt with by another judge.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case began with restraining orders made on 29 May 2000, preventing John Macris from dealing with certain specified property. On 19 March 2001, consent orders were entered, which included provisions for the payment of legal expenses and the forfeiture of Macris's interests in the specified property to the Crown. On 21 September 2001, Macris filed a Notice of Motion seeking to set aside these orders or, alternatively, a declaration regarding the effect of the forfeiture. The matter was heard on 15 November 2001, and judgment was delivered on 9 January 2002.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the orders made on 19 March 2001 should be set aside.
2. Whether the Court has the power to set aside the orders despite them having been entered.
3. Whether the setting aside of the orders should lead to the reinstatement of the restraining order made on 29 May 2000.
Held
1. The court held that the orders made on 19 March 2001 should be set aside.
2. The court held that it has the power to set aside the orders despite them having been entered.
3. The court held that the setting aside of the orders should not lead to the reinstatement of the restraining order made on 29 May 2000.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court concluded that the orders made on 19 March 2001 should be set aside because the condition or terms to which the vesting and forfeiture order was subject had not been complied with. The court found that the terms of order 5, which made provision for the payment of legal expenses, left a lot to be desired in its drafting, but it was clear that property referred to in the schedule was to be a source of $40,000 to be paid to the defendant's solicitor for legal expenses. However, the defendant had not received the agreed legal expenses, and it was clear that a reasonable time had expired by the time the matter came before the court. The court found that the condition or terms to which the vesting and forfeiture order was subject had not been complied with, and therefore, the order should be set aside. The court also concluded that it has the power to set aside the orders despite them having been entered. The court relied on the remarks of Sheller J in Logwon Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council and the passages from earlier authority which his Honour quoted. The court also noted that the orders should be set aside because of the usual principles as to the consequences of non-compliance with a condition in a contract. The court further concluded that the setting aside of the orders should not lead to the reinstatement of the restraining order made on 29 May 2000. The court noted that it may well be that on the making of the orders on 19 March, the restraining order made on 29 May 2000 came to an end, and the setting aside of the orders made in March may not operate to resuscitate the restraining order. The court held that the restraining order made on 29 May 2000 came to an end, and the setting aside of the orders made in March did not operate to resuscitate the restraining order.