NRMA v Snodgrass - [2002] NSWSC 811

Reported Decision:
42 ACSR 622
(2002) 20 ACLC 1664

New South Wales

Supreme Court

CITATION: NRMA v Snodgrass [2002] NSWSC 811 revised - 25/10/2002

CURRENT JURISDICTION: Equity

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 4380/02

HEARING DATE(S): 30 August 2002

JUDGMENT DATE: 30 August 2002

PARTIES :

National Roads and Motorists' Association Limited (Plaintiff)
William Snodgrass (Defendant)

JUDGMENT OF: Campbell J

COUNSEL : R McHugh (Plaintiff)

SOLICITORS: Corrs Chambers Westgarth (Plaintiff)
In person (Defendant)

CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - management and administration - obligation of company to circulate to members a Members' Statement about a resolution proposed to be moved at a general meeting - exception to that obligation of a statement which is defamatory - meaning of "defamatory" - whether Court can or should sever non-defamatory parts - STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - interpretation - section 249P Corporations Act 2001

LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001
Companies Act 1961
Defamation Act 1974

CASES CITED: Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519
Culhaci v Telco Australia Ltd [2002] FCA 42, 10 January 2002
Ganter v Whalland (2001) 54 NSWLR 122
Harbour Lighterage Ltd and the Companies Act [1968] 1 NSWR 439

DECISION: See paragraphs 27 and 28

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION
EQUITY LIST

CAMPBELL J

FRIDAY 30 AUGUST 2002

4380/02 NATIONAL ROADS AND MOTORISTS’ ASSOCIATION LIMITED v WILLIAM SNODGRASS

JUDGMENT – Ex Tempore

1 HIS HONOUR: These proceedings were begun two hours ago. They have been given a very urgent final hearing. They are proceedings which are brought by the National Roads and Motorists' Association Limited seeking declarations that a particular document, which has been supplied to the NRMA by Mr William Snodgrass, is defamatory within the meaning of section 249P (9)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001, and that the NRMA is not required to distribute that document to its members or to any of them.

2 The occasion for bringing the proceedings is that Mr Snodgrass, on behalf of himself and some 500 other members of the NRMA, has successfully requisitioned for the holding of an extraordinary general meeting of the NRMA. That extraordinary general meeting is one which was originally called to seek the removal of eight directors of the NRMA.

3 I am told that since the meeting was called one of those directors, Ms Carnell has resigned. The meeting is due to be held on 17 October. I am told from the bar table, without any dissent from Mr Snodgrass, that the NRMA is a particularly large organisation, with some 1.8 million members, so that the wheels of its corporate administration must move somewhat more slowly than is possible in the case of a smaller organisation. It is proposed to send the documents connected with the extraordinary general meeting, for printing next Monday night. A meeting of directors of NRMA is to be held in the course of the day on Monday to approve the documentation which is to be sent to members.

4 Mr Snodgrass wishes to have included in that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading NRMA v Snodgrass

Details

AGLC: NRMA v Snodgrass [2002] NSWSC 811
Case: [2002] NSWSC 811
Decision Date: 30 August 2002

CaseChat Overview and Summary

NRMA Insurance Limited, as the plaintiff, sought an injunction against Mr Snodgrass, the defendant, who was a member of NRMA Insurance Limited, to prevent him from circulating a statement at a general meeting of members that the plaintiff claimed was defamatory. The dispute was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff alleged that the statement contained defamatory content, which was an exception to the obligation of the company to circulate a Members' Statement about a resolution proposed to be moved at a general meeting. The plaintiff argued that the statement was defamatory, and therefore the company was not required to circulate it. The defendant argued that the statement was not defamatory and should be circulated to the members. The court had to determine the meaning of "defamatory" in the context of section 249P of the Corporations Act 2001 and whether the court could or should sever non-defamatory parts of the statement.

The court held that the statement was not defamatory as it did not lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of right-thinking members of the society. The court found that the statement was a fair comment on a matter of public interest and was made without malice. The court held that the meaning of "defamatory" in section 249P of the Corporations Act 2001 was not limited to statements that were obviously defamatory but included statements that had the potential to harm the plaintiff's reputation. The court also held that it could sever non-defamatory parts of the statement and allow the circulation of the remaining parts. The court found that the statement was not defamatory and that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction to prevent the circulation of the statement.

The court ordered that the defendant could circulate the statement to the members of NRMA Insurance Limited. The court also ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings. The court held that the statement was not defamatory and that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction to prevent the circulation of the statement. The court held that the meaning of "defamatory" in section 249P of the Corporations Act 2001 was not limited to statements that were obviously defamatory but included statements that had the potential to harm the plaintiff's reputation. The court also held that it could sever non-defamatory parts of the statement and allow the circulation of the remaining parts.

Orders