Nora Ellis and Repatriation Commission
[2013] AATA 433
•26 June 2013
[2013] AATA 433
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Numbers
2012/4875
Re
Nora Ellis
APPLICANT
And
Repatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President J W Constance
Date 26 June 2013 Place Melbourne The decision under review, being the decision of the Repatriation Commission made 21 February 2012 rejecting Mrs Ellis’s claim for a pension in accordance with the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth), is affirmed.
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Deputy President J W Constance
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS' AND MILITARY COMPENSATION – widow’s pension – whether death was war-caused –– diabetes mellitus – malignant neoplasm of the liver – whether material raises an hypothesis connecting the death with the circumstances of operational service – decision under review affirmed.
LEGISLATION
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 9, 120, 120A
CASES
Dixon v Repatriation Commission [1999] FCA 582
East v Repatriation Commission (1987) 16 FCR 517
Forrester and Repatriation Commission [2012] AATA 846
McKenna v Repatriation Commission (1996) 86 FCR 144Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans’ Pensions, Fifth Edition
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President J W Constance
INTRODUCTION
Mrs Ellis is the widow of the late Mr Ellis who served in the Australian Army during the Second World War.
Mrs Ellis has applied for a pension under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth). Her application has been refused by the Commission on the ground that the death of her late husband was not war-caused. Mrs Ellis has applied to this Tribunal for a review of that decision.
Mrs Ellis argues that the cause of Mr Ellis’ death was carcinoma of the liver which was contributed to by his having suffered diabetes mellitus for many years. She argues further that the diabetes mellitus was in turn contributed to by his inability to exercise and his being overweight, both caused by a knee injury Mr Ellis suffered during his period of operational service in the Army.
For the reasons which follow the decision under review will be affirmed.
MATERIAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
Mr Ellis’s service records[1]
[1] Exhibit A3.
Mr Ellis was born in 1924. He rendered operational service in the Australian Army from 8 April 1942 until 11 June 1947. He served in Morotai and Japan.
In 1947 Mr Ellis injured his right knee. Subsequently the conditions of “internal derangement of the right knee” and “secondary localised osteoarthritis of the right knee” were accepted by the Commission as being war-caused.
A medical report by two members of the War Pensions Assessment Appeal Tribunal and dated 20 April 1977 [2] states:
Has not been in employment for the past 10 months. The main factor affecting his activity is his right knee. This has become much worse in past 3 years. It is painful, unstable and swells a lot. He wears a calper, [sic] and with this he can walk up to about ½ mile but no more.
O.E Right knee:
Quadriceps wasting, no restriction of movement and no crepitus on movement. No excess fluid in joint.
Increase in AP movement and light increase in later movement. Slight pain in patella movement.
[2] Exhibit A3 p.24.
Mrs Ellis’s evidence
Mr and Mrs Ellis were married in 1979. This was her second marriage. Mrs Ellis first met Mr Ellis in the early 1960’s.
In 1964 Mrs Ellis and her first husband, Mr Wells, purchased the business of the Palace Hotel in Echuca in partnership with Mr Ellis. The partnership operated the business until about 1973. During this time both Mrs Ellis and Mr Ellis worked in the hotel on a full‑time basis.
Mrs Ellis described Mr Ellis as “a big man from the time I met him. … He was tall and he was overweight. He was physically imposing.” When he worked at the hotel he walked with a limp and he avoided lifting heavy weights, such as beer kegs. Mr Ellis worked in the bar and Mrs Ellis looked after bookwork and accommodation.
During the time they operated the hotel business Mr Ellis’ weight did not vary. So far as Mrs Ellis is aware he did not engage in any specific form of exercise.
Mrs Ellis and Mr Wells separated at about the time the hotel business was sold in 1973. Mrs Ellis moved away from Echuca. Mrs Ellis next saw Mr Ellis in about 1976, when she was living in Adelaide. At that time he appeared physically as he did when they operated the hotel business.
Mr and Mrs Ellis met socially from about 1977. They married in May 1979. Mrs Ellis said that by 1977 Mr Ellis was slimmer than he had been previously and by 1979 he had “thinned down quite a bit and looked different altogether.”
Evidence of Mr Peter Wells
Mr Peter Wells is the son of Mrs Ellis and Mr Wells. He was about seven years old when he first met Mr Ellis. At the time he was living with his parents at the Palace Hotel.
Mr Wells saw Mr Ellis at the hotel several times per week. He described Mr Ellis as “huge, very imposing.” He identified Mr Wells as one of the men shown in a photograph which was taken in January 1971[3] and said that this photograph depicts him as his normal size at the time.
[3] Exhibit A1.
After he left the hotel in 1973 Mr Wells did not see Mr Ellis until 1979, by which time he had lost a lot of weight. Mr Wells described Mr Ellis as being “borderline overweight” at that time.
After Mr and Mrs Ellis married, Mr Wells saw Mr Ellis every couple of months. His recollection is that Mr Ellis gained weight after he was married but did not return to the weight he was when Mr Wells first met him.
Evidence of Mr Richard Ellis
Mr Richard Ellis is the brother of the late Mr Ellis.
Between 1972 and 1976 Mr Richard Ellis was living in Shepparton. During this time he would see Mr Ellis on two or three occasions per year when they went duck-shooting and fishing. In this time Mr Richard Ellis estimates that his brother weighed about 18 stone. In addition Mr Ellis told him that he weighed about 18 stone. His brother’s increase in weight occurred when he was working in the hotel; prior to that his weight was “reasonably normal.”
About the time Mr Ellis told Mr Richard Ellis that he had been diagnosed as suffering from diabetes he began to lose weight. Mr Richard Ellis does not recall when Mr Ellis told him this. He does recall that his brother said that he had been given medical advice that he should lose weight.
Evidence of Dr Prowse, Medical Practitioner
Dr Prowse was Mr Ellis’ treating practitioner from late 1991 until his death in 2012.
Mr Ellis consulted Dr Prowse at the Ocean Grove Medical Clinic. The Patient Health Summary[4] held by the Clinic has a record that Mr Ellis was diagnosed with diabetes in 1975.[5]
[4] Exhibit R1.
[5] At p.234.
Mr Ellis had a right tibial osteotomy performed in 1985. At that time he reported pain in his right knee for several years. In the opinion of Dr Prowse, Mr Ellis would have been unable to engage in activity greater than three METS at that time and, at least, from that time until his death.
Having looked at the photograph of Mr Ellis taken in 1971, Dr Prowse formed the opinion that at that time Mr Ellis had a significant abdominal girth and had a BMI greater than 25.
Metabolic Equivalent Tasks (METs)
Mrs Ellis recalled that from the time they married Mr Ellis was able to engage in the following activities:
·mowing the lawn (until about 2009);
·going for a walk, although very slowly;
·playing lawn bowls (until about 2010);
·washing windows;
·riding a bicycle to and from shops about six town blocks from his home;
·making his bed (until about 2011);
·gardening for about an hour at a time (until about 2011);
·washing the car;
·going on fishing and shooting trips of about two weeks duration.
Mr Peter Wells gave evidence of the following activity engaged in by Mr Ellis:
·he always walked slowly and with a limp;
·he had difficulty getting out of a chair;
·he used to sit on a stool behind the bar at the hotel.
Records of Mr Ellis’ height and weight
The records show Mr Ellis’ height and weight as follows:
08/04/1942 5’8” 10 stone[6]
10/01/1949 11 stone 11 lbs[7]
14/04/1949 12 stone[8]
30/03/1953 6’0” 12 stone 7 lbs[9]
11/06/1953 12 stone 11 lbs[10]
26/06/1953 12 stone 7 lbs[11]
08/10/1976 6’0” 12 stone[12]
20/04/1977 13 stone 7 lbs.[13]
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
[6] Exhibit R3 p.8.
[7] Exhibit A3 p.3.
[8] Exhibit A3 p.9.
[9] Exhibit A3 p.10.
[10] Exhibit A3 p.11.
[11] Exhibit A3 p.13.
[12] Exhibit A3 p.20.
[13] Exhibit A3 p.24.
War-caused injury
Section 9 of the Act sets out the circumstances in which an injury is taken to be “war‑caused”.The relevant parts of that section are:
9 War‑caused injuries or diseases
(1)Subject to this section and section 9A, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war‑caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war‑caused disease, if:
(a) the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b) the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran.
Standard of proof
Section 120 relevantly provides:
120 Standard of proof
(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war‑caused injury, that the disease was a war‑caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war‑caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a)that the injury was a war‑caused injury or a defence‑caused injury;
(b)that the disease was a war‑caused disease or a defence‑caused disease; or
(c)that the death was war‑caused or defence‑caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(6)Nothing in the provisions of this section, or in any other provision of this Act, shall be taken to impose on:
(a)a claimant or applicant for a pension or increased pension, or for an allowance or other benefit, under this Act; or
(b)the Commonwealth, the Department or any other person in relation to such a claim or application;
any onus of proving any matter that is, or might be, relevant to the determination of the claim or application.
Reasonable hypothesis and a Statement of Principles
Subsection 120A(3) provides:
For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a) a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
APPLYING THE LAW
In Repatriation Commission v Deledio[14] the Full Court of the Federal Court set out the steps to be taken in determining claims which arise from operational service such as this:
1. The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2. If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force a SoP [Statement of Principles] determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3. If a SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person's service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be "reasonable" and the claim will fail.
4. The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.
[14] (1998) 83 FCR 82, 97-98.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
I have to determine the following issues:
1)Did Mr Ellis render “operational service” and if so, when?
2)Within the meaning of s 120A(4) of the Act, what was the “kind of death” met by Mr Ellis?
3)What was the time of the clinical onset of each of the relevant conditions?
4)Considering all the material before the Tribunal, does it point to a hypothesis connecting the death with the circumstances of the operational service?
5)If such an hypothesis is raised, is there a relevant Statement of Principles in force?
6)If a relevant Statement of Principles is in force, is the hypothesis consistent with the “template” within that Statement?
7)If so, am I satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the late Mr Ellis was not war-caused?
DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUES
Issue 1: Did Mr Ellis render operational service and if so, when?
On the basis of Mr Ellis’s service records I am satisfied that he rendered operational service in the period 8 April 1942 until 11 June 1947. This is not in dispute.
Issue 2: What was the kind of death met by Mr Ellis?
The death certificate records hepatocellular carcinoma as the cause of Mr Ellis’s death.[15] It records also that Mr Ellis suffered from diabetes at the time he died. This is not in dispute.
[15] Exhibit R3 p.31.
Issue 3: What was the time of the clinical onset of each of the relevant conditions?
The parties agree that date of clinical onset of diabetes mellitus was sometime in 1975.[16] They agree also that the clinical onset of carcinoma of the liver was late 2011.[17]
[16] Exhibit R1 p.234.
[17] Exhibit R1 p.34.
I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence referred to that these are the correct dates of clinical onset of both conditions.
Issue 4: Considering all the material before the Tribunal, does it point to a hypothesis connecting the death with the circumstances of the operational service?
It is put on behalf of Mrs Ellis that the material before me points to the following hypotheses.
First hypothesis
a.Mr Ellis’ knee injury limited his physical activity to such an extent that he became overweight;
b.Mr Ellis’ excessive weight contributed to his developing diabetes mellitus;
c.the diabetes mellitus contributed to the development of carcinoma of the liver;
d.carcinoma of the liver caused Mr Ellis’ death.
Second hypothesis
a.Mr Ellis’ knee injury limited his physical activity;
b.Mr Ellis’ limitation of physical activity contributed to the development of diabetes mellitus;
c.the diabetes mellitus contributed to the development of carcinoma of the liver;
d.carcinoma of the liver caused Mr Ellis’ death.
The hypothesis under consideration must be more than one which is left open on the material before me. It must be a hypothesis which is pointed to, or supported by, the material. For the reasons which I set out in Forrester and Repatriation Commission [18] I am of the view that the requirement that the material before the Tribunal “points to a hypothesis connecting the … death with the circumstances of the particular service …”[19] (emphasis added) means that the hypothesis advanced must be reasonable.
[18] [2012] AATA 846.
[19] Repatriation Commission v Deledio supra.
The determination of whether the hypothesis is pointed to or supported by the material or is reasonable is not to be confused with the reasoning required at the third step of the Deledio process. That step requires the determination of whether the hypothesis fits the “template” to be found in any relevant Statement(s) of Principles. If the hypothesis does not fit the template it will be deemed not to be reasonable.
Having considered all of the material before me I determine that it does point to each of the hypotheses put forward connecting Mr Ellis’s death to his operational service.
The material points to Mr Ellis:
·having suffered problems with his knee from the time he was injured in 1947;
·not being active and to his engaging in limited physical exercise;
·having gained substantial weight which he retained until he was diagnosed as suffering diabetes mellitus;
·suffering diabetes mellitus which contributed to the development of carcinoma of the liver which caused his death.
Issue 5: Is there a relevant Statement of Principles in force?
As the hypothesis links two medical conditions it is necessary to consider whether there is a Statement of Principles in force for each of those conditions.[20]
[20] McKenna v Repatriation Commission (1996) 86 FCR 144, 151-152.
I am satisfied that there are two relevant Statements of Principles in force being the Statement of Principles No. 21 of 2011 concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Liver and the Statement of Principles No. 89 of 2011 concerning Diabetes Mellitus. This is not in dispute.
Clause 4 of the Statement of Principles concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Liver provides:
4. The Repatriation Medical Authority is of the view that there is sound medical- scientific evidence that indicates that malignant neoplasm of the liver and death from malignant neoplasm of the liver can be related to relevant service rendered by veterans, members of Peacekeeping Forces, or members of the Forces under the VEA, or members under the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (the MRCA).
Clause 5 provides:
5. Subject to clause 7, at least one of the factors set out in clause 6 must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person.
Clause 6 provides in part:
6.The factor that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting malignant neoplasm of the liver or death from malignant neoplasm of the liver with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service is:
…
(h)having type 2 diabetes mellitus for at least the five years before the clinical onset of malignant neoplasm of the liver;
Clause 4 of the Statement of Principles concerning Diabetes Mellitus provides:
4. The Repatriation Medical Authority is of the view that there is sound medical- scientific evidence that indicates that diabetes mellitus and death from diabetes mellitus can be related to relevant service rendered by veterans, members of Peacekeeping Forces, or members of the Forces under the VEA, or members under the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (the MRCA).
Clause 5 provides:
5. Subject to clause 7, at least one of the factors set out in clause 6 must be related to the relevant service rendered by the person.
Clause 6 provides in part:
6.The factor that must as a minimum exist before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting diabetes mellitus or death from diabetes mellitus with the circumstances of a person’s relevant service is:
…
(b)for type 2 diabetes mellitus only,
(i) being overweight for a period of at least five years before the clinical onset of diabetes mellitus; or
(ii) an inability to undertake any physical activity greater than three METs for at least the five years before the clinical onset of diabetes mellitus; …
Clause 9 provides in part:
9. “MET” means a unit of measurement of the level of physical exertion. 1 MET = 3.5 ml of oxygen/kg of body weight per minute or, 1.0 kcal/kg of body weight per hour, or resting metabolic rate.
“being overweight” means an increase in body weight by way of fat accumulation which results in at least one of the following:
(i) a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 25 or greater; or
(ii) a waist circumference of greater than 80 centimetres in women or greater than 94 centimetres in men;
The BMI = W/H2 and where:
W is the person’s weight in kilograms and
H is the person’s height in metres;
Issue 6: Is the hypothesis consistent with the “template” within each of the Statements of Principles?
Statement of Principles concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Liver
The evidence that Mr Ellis was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus in 1975 and with malignant neoplasm of the liver in 2011 is consistent with the Statement of Principles concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Liver, and in particular with clause 6 of that Statement.
Statement of Principles concerning Diabetes Mellitus
The question of whether the hypotheses are consistent with the Statement of Principles concerning Diabetes Mellitus is in dispute. It is argued on behalf of Mrs Ellis that the hypotheses advanced by her are consistent with clause 6(b)(i) and 6(b)(ii) set out above.
In the Statement of Facts and Contentions filed on behalf of Mrs Ellis I was referred to what was said by the Federal Court in Dixon v Repatriation Commission:[21]
The question whether a decision maker reaches a conclusion adverse to a claimant at the step 3 stage or the step 4 stage is not a mere technicality. If belief is addressed at the step 3 stage, there is a risk that the decision maker will rule against a claimant simply because he or she is not persuaded the claimant's story is probably true. Although the decision maker should not think in terms of onus of proof, in a practical sense at the step 3 stage the claimant is likely to be left with this burden. Moreover, the decision maker is likely to reject the application even though he or she thinks the claimant's story may possibly be true. This would defeat the protection for veterans embodied in s120(1)…(original emphasis)
[21] [1999] FCA 582, [25].
In East v Repatriation Commission[22] the Full Court of the Federal Court said:
The necessity for quantitative evidence in a particular case must depend upon the nature of the hypothesis being expounded. For example, if a Tribunal accepts medical evidence that condition B may be caused by any degree of exposure to factor A, that the veteran was exposed to factor A and that he or she subsequently developed condition B, it would be wrong to reject the claim because of an absence of evidence as to the extent of the exposure. The hypothesis itself makes quantity irrelevant. If, on the other hand, the evidence is that exposure to quantity X of factor A may cause condition B, the hypothesis cannot be described as reasonable unless there is reason to believe that the veteran was exposed to factor A to the extent of quantity X.
[22] (1987) 16 FCR 517, 533.
As previously noted, in Repatriation v Deledio the Federal Court said in relation to step 3 of the process:
The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service … .[23]
[23] (1998) 83 FCR 82, 97.
Having considered all of the material before me, I have determined that the first hypothesis is not consistent with clause 6(b)(i) of the Statement as the material before me does not point to Mr Ellis being overweight (i.e. having a BMI of 25 or greater or a waist circumference greater than 94 cm) for a period of at least five years before the clinical onset of diabetes, which I have decided was sometime in 1975.
Of the recorded weight measurements in Mr Ellis’ Army records, only that taken in April 1977 gives a BMI of 25 or greater. That measurement was taken after the clinical onset of diabetes.
The evidence of Mrs Ellis and of Mr Wells is that Mr Ellis was a large man during the time he lived at the hotel. Mr Richard Ellis gave evidence that Mr Ellis was about 18 stone sometime between 1972 and 1976, although he was unable to be more precise. Dr Prowse gave evidence that in his opinion Mr Ellis had a BMI of 25 or greater and a waist circumference of greater than 94 cm in January 1971.
In considering the Statement of Principles concerning Diabetes Mellitus I note that the requirements as to BMI and waist circumference are precise. In the terms of what the Federal Court said in East v Repatriation Commission, the extent and quantity of these factors are relevant, including the period for which one or other of them is required to be present. The first hypothesis does not meet the template set out in clause 6(b)(i) as it does not meet the necessary requirements for at least the five years before the clinical onset of diabetes.
Turning to the template set out in clause 6(b)(ii), it too has specific requirements as to the level of activity which the veteran is unable to undertake and the period for which he is so restricted.
The Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans’ Pensions (Fifth Edition) sets out activity levels with energy expended in METs.[24] Examples given of the 3-4 METs level are:
[24] At pp.23-24.
Walking at average walking pace (5 km/h)
Golf (pulling buggy)
Machine assembly
Cleaning car (excludes vigorous polishing)
Minor car repairs
Tidying house
Welding
Cleaning windows
Table tennis
Pushing light power mower over flat suburban lawn at slow steady pace
Vacuuming
Sedate cycling (10 km/h)
Shifting chairs
Light gardening (weeding and water)
Hanging out washing
Making bed
The second hypothesis is not consistent with the template in that the material in support of the hypothesis does not point to Mr Ellis being unable to undertake any physical activity greater than three MET’s during the period of at least five years prior to the clinical onset of diabetes in 1975. The material before me is that Mr Ellis was able to undertake the following activities (amongst others):
·walking at an average pace whilst duck-shooting and fishing;
·cleaning the car;
·cleaning windows;
·pushing a mower;
·sedate cycling;
·light gardening,
·making a bed.
These are activities which come within the range of 3-4 MET’s. There is no material to support an hypothesis that Mr Ellis was unable to undertake these activities for at least the five years prior to the onset of diabetes.
The medical report of 20 April 1977 points to a worsening of Mr Ellis’ knee condition in early 1974. This in turn points to a lessening of his physical activity. However this was only the year before the onset of the diabetes mellitus.
As neither hypothesis advanced on behalf of Mrs Ellis is consistent with the templates set out in the Statement of Principles concerning Diabetes Mellitus her application for a pension must fail.
CONCLUSION
The decision under review, being the decision of the Repatriation Commission made 21 February 2012 rejecting Mrs Ellis’s claim for a pension in accordance with the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth), will be affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 65 (sixty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President J W Constance.
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Dated 26 June 2013
Dates of hearing 13 and 14 May 2013 Counsel for the Applicant Ms F Spencer Solicitors for the Applicant Williams Winter Solicitor for the Respondent Mr K Rudge, departmental advocate
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