CATCHWORDS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - whether applicant should be granted extension of time to institute appeal against decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal - relevant considerations - merit of claim - whether applicant is a person affected by a reviewable decision of the Tribunal.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Development Allowance Authority Act 1992 (Cth) s 93, s 119
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd
(1996) 139 ALR 663
Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Smithkline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250
ROSS SAMUEL NOLAN v DEVELOPMENT ALLOWANCE AUTHORITY
No VG 727 of 1996
GOLDBERG J
MELBOURNE
4 FEBRUARY 1997
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION No VG 727 of 1996
B E T W E E N:
ROSS SAMUEL NOLAN
Applicantand
DEVELOPMENT ALLOWANCE AUTHORITY
Respondent
Coram: GOLDBERG J
Place: MELBOURNE
Date: 4 FEBRUARY 1997
JUDGMENT
The matter before me comes by way of an application for extension of time to file or serve a notice of appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The matter comes before me pursuant to section 44(2)A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act which allows the institution of a notice of appeal out of time within such further time as the Court allows. The relevant chronology for the purposes of the application is that the application for extension of time was filed on 10 December 1996. It was supported by an affidavit sworn on 10 December 1996. The relevant factual situation which lies behind the application is as follows, and I summarise the facts briefly insofar as they are relevant for the purposes of this application.
There is a body known as the Development Allowance Authority ("the Authority") which is constituted under the Development Allowance Authority Act 1992 ("the Act"). It has a number of functions, in particular in relation to what I will call loosely infrastructure borrowings or bonds. In January 1996 the Authority decided to issue certain infrastructure borrowing certificates under Chapter 3 of the Act in relation to some proposed borrowings to fund the Melbourne City Link Project.
On 12 March 1996 the applicant Mr Ross Nolan, applied to the Authority to reconsider its decision to issue those certificates. On 11 April 1996 the Authority determined that the applicant was not a person who was affected by a reviewable decision and that the request for review did not fall within section 119(1) of the Act. On 12 April 1996 the Authority notified the applicant of its determination. The applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 19 May 1996 pursuant to section 120(1) of the Act to review the decision of the Authority.
There was a hearing before the Tribunal and on 13 November 1996 the Tribunal handed down its decision. The formal decision recorded was that "the applicant is not a person affected by a reviewable decision and consequently the Tribunal lacks…
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- AGLC
- Nolan, Ross Samuel v Development Allowance Authority [1997] FCA 86
- Case
- [1997] FCA 86
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Justice Goldberg reviewed the relevant legal principles and case law, including observations by Fitzgerald J in Lucic v Nolan, principles enunciated in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, and considerations of fairness and merit. The court also examined the merits of the potential appeal, focusing on whether Nolan could establish that he was a person affected by the reviewable decision. The court considered the statutory provisions of the Development Allowance Authority Act 1992 and the infrastructure borrowings provisions. Ultimately, the court concluded that Nolan's project was too remote and speculative to be considered a person affected by the decision, and the prospects of a successful appeal were highly unlikely. The court also considered the unsettling effect on other parties if the extension was granted.
Given the principles and considerations, the court found that the reasons provided by Nolan for the extension of time were misconceived and did not justify granting the extension. The court dismissed Nolan's application for an extension of time to file or serve a notice of appeal, and ordered that Nolan pay the respondent's costs of the application. The application was deemed to have failed, and the usual order applied that costs follow the event.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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