Noble v Murgha

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Noble v Murgha [2005] FCAFC 211

NATIVE TITLE – application for leave to appeal from primary judge’s decision under s 66B of Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) removing applicant in claimant application – whether removal authorised pursuant to s 251B – whether decision made by native title claim group in accordance with a “process of decision-making agreed to and adopted”

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), ss 61(1), 66B, 251B and 253

Combined Mandingalbay Yidinji-Gunggandji Claim v State of Queensland [2004] FCA 1703 referred to
Daniel v Western Australia (2002) 194 ALR 278 referred to

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE v LESLIE MURGHA AND STEWART HARRIS and STATE OF QUEENSLAND

QUD 96 OF 2005

NORTH, WEINBERG & GREENWOOD JJ
30 SEPTEMBER 2005
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 96 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE
APPLICANT

AND:

LESLIE MURGHA AND STEWART HARRIS
FIRST RESPONDENT

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH, WEINBERG & GREENWOOD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 SEPTEMBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal from the judgment of Dowsett J, given on 31 March 2005, be refused.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 96 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

FREDERICK CHARLES NOBLE
APPLICANT

AND:

LESLIE MURGHA AND STEWART HARRIS
FIRST RESPONDENT

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH, WEINBERG & GREENWOOD JJ

DATE:

30 SEPTEMBER 2005

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from what the applicant regards as an interlocutory judgment, given by Dowsett J on 31 March 2005. His Honour ordered, pursuant to s 66B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (“the Act”), that Mr Frederick (Ricko) Noble be removed from the three individuals who, together, made up the “applicant” in a native title claim. That claim is described as the Combined Gunggandji claim. The members of the native title claim group consist of three clans, each associated with one of the three individuals in question.

  2. Although the matter before this Court is, in form, an application for leave to appeal, the Court has heard full argument on the merits of the appeal.  Whether, in truth, his Honour’s judgment was interlocutory, or whether it was actually final in character, is by no means an easy question to resolve.  Fortunately, we are able to determine this application without any elaborate discussion of that question.

    THE RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE SCHEME

  3. In order to understand the issues raised, it is necessary to refer to several provisions of the Act.

  4. The starting point is the term “native title claim group”. Section 253 of the Act provides that, in relation to a claim in an application for a determination of native title made to this Court, the term means:

    “the native title claim group mentioned in relation to the application in the table in subsection 61(1)”.

  5. The table in s 61(1), to which…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 211
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Noble v Murgha involved an application for leave to appeal from a decision of Dowsett J, who had removed the applicant, Mr Noble, as an applicant in a native title determination application. The dispute centred on whether the removal was authorised under Section 251B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), and whether the decision was made by the native title claim group in accordance with an agreed-upon process of decision-making. The application for leave to appeal was based on the grounds that the removal decision was incorrect in fact and law, as the respondents did not have the authority to remove Mr Noble under Section 251B. Additionally, the applicant argued that the judge had failed to correctly apply Section 251B by not identifying the process of decision-making and not considering whether it had been agreed to and adopted by the native title claim group.

The court was required to determine if the removal of Mr Noble was authorised under Section 251B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), specifically whether the claim group had the authority to remove him and whether this was done in accordance with a process of decision-making that had been agreed to and adopted by the members of the claim group. The court also needed to consider whether the judge had correctly applied Section 251B in his decision.

The court found that the decision of Dowsett J was correct. The court noted that the claim group had referred the matter of Mr Noble's removal to the elders for their decision, as per the traditional law and custom. Although Mr Noble disputed the claim group's laws and customs, the court found that there was only one set of laws and customs within the claim group, and that the claim group had agreed to abide by the elders' decision. The court found that the elders had unanimously agreed to remove Mr Noble, and that the claim group had adopted that resolution. The court also noted that the decision of the judge was in accordance with Section 251B, as all requirements had been satisfied.

Accordingly, leave to appeal from the judgment of Dowsett J was refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal from the judgment of Dowsett J, given on 31 March 2005, be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was on the basis of this evidence that the application under s 66B came before the primary judge.THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION It must be said that his Honour’s reasons for decision were brief in the extreme. He noted that he had before him an application under s 66B to remove Mr Noble as an applicant in the native title determination application. He referred to the process by which the decision had been taken to remove Mr Noble by the members Combined Gunggandji claim group as being that set out in s 251B(a), though, as will be seen, he subsequently appeared to proceed instead under s 251B(b). His Honour referred specifically to the affidavits mentioned in [18] of these reasons for judgment. His Honour then outlined his conclusions. He said:“2 At a meeting of the claim group, the proposed removal of Mr Noble was considered. Allegedly in accordance with traditional law and custom, the claim group decided to refer the matter to the elders for their decision and to abide by that decision. Mr Noble disputes that the laws and customs of the claim group so provide. However the basis of his dispute seems to be that there are two claim groups with different laws and customs. Clearly enough, that is not possible, as Spender J found in Combined Mandingalbay Yidinji-Gunggandji Claim v State of Queensland [2004] FCA 1703. If there is no accepted law or custom within the claim group (because there are conflicting practices within that group), then par 251B(b) would apply. In effect the claim group agreed to refer the matter to the elders for decision and chose to abide by the resulting decision.3 It is asserted that the elders unanimously agreed that Mr Noble should be removed and advised the meeting of the claim group accordingly. The claim group then adopted that resolution. There is, however, a dispute as to the elders’ decision. Mr Garling, who is one of the elders, agrees that he concurred in the proposal to remove Mr Noble but says that his agreement was conditional upon his being appointed as an applicant. Other affidavits assert to the contrary. I am inclined to the view that Mr Garling’s evidence has, to some extent, been influenced by events which have occurred since the meeting, which events have caused him to be very concerned and excited about the matter. In any event I prefer the evidence of the other four deponents to that of Mr Garling on this score. There was probably room for misunderstanding as to what actually happened on the day in question.4 All of the requirements of s 66B have been satisfied. There will be an order in accordance with pars 4 and 5 of the notice of motion.” Apart from a short introductory paragraph, these passages are the entirety of his Honours reasons for judgment.THE DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY NOTICE OF APPEAL By a draft supplementary notice of appeal, Mr Noble seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of Dowsett J. The grounds in support of that application are as follows:“(c) The decision of the learned judge was wrong in fact and law, in that the First Respondents did not have grounds to satisfy Section 251B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), because:(i)the First Respondents were not authorised in accordance with a process of decision making which had been agreed to, and adopted, by the persons in the Native Title Claim Group.(d) The learned judge failed to correctly apply Section 251B in that he:(i)did not identify the process of decision making of the Native Title Claim Group;(ii)did not consider whether the process of decision making had been agreed to and adopted, by the persons in the Native Title Claim Group.”THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established