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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M91 of 1993 B e t w e e n -
NINTENDO COMPANY LTD
Appellant
and
CENTRONICS SYSTEMS PTY LTD,
MAURICE LATIN, TIBERIO SALICE
and FABRIZIO LATIN
Respondents
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
| Nintendo(2) | 77 | 6/10/93 |
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1993, AT 10.02 AM
(Continued from 5/10/93)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Macaw.
| MR MACAW: | I was taking the Court last evening to |
paragraph 9 of our outline, and I would like to
take the Court briefly to Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill
Book Co, (1983) FSR 545. It is a copyright case and deals with the question of knowledge in a
provision similar to that of sections 37 and 38 of
our Copyright Act, that is to say knowledge of the
subsistence and infringement of copyright. What it and other like cases stand for is the proposition
that being put on notice of the relevant facts and
in some circumstances having a reasonable time for
inquiry will constitute knowledge for that purpose.
In Sillitoe's case, as the Court will see from
the headnote, literary copyright was involved in
0 level literature studies. The Court will see from point (iv) at the foot of page 545 one thing
that was contended by the defendants was:
having obtained counsel's opinion, they did
not have the knowledge required by section 5 -
counsel having advised that there was no
infringement. At the foot of page 555, the point
that is reminiscent of the way the respondents here
wish to conduct the case:
Mr Jeffs's final point was that there
cannot be "knowledge" on the part of the
defendants if it takes a law suit to determine
whether or not there is an infringement.
Here, he said, the defendants had seen an
Advice of counsel concerning the plaintiffs' claim and in the Advice those claims were
rejected. The defendants had gone ahead in reliance on the Advice. This argument means,
as I understand, that a defendant who does not
dispute the facts can nevertheless rely on having no "knowledge" within section 5(2) if he accepts and acts on legal advice, whether the advice turns out to be right or wrong.
And, in the middle of that page, 556, there is
reference made to the New South Wales decisions of
Albert v Hoffnung and RCA Corporation v Custom
Cleared Sales. In that latter case:
The judgment of the court includes these
words:
"In other words, the true position is
that the court is not concerned with the
knowledge of a reasonable man but is concernedwith reasonable inferences to be drawn from a
| Nintendo(2) | 78 | 6/20/93 |
concrete situation as disclosed in the
evidence as it affects the particular person
whose knowledge is in issue."
It follows that one must consider the
concrete situation disclosed by the evidence
in this case…
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- AGLC
- Nintendo Company Ltd v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd [1993] HCATrans 291
- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 291
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was to determine the meaning of "knowledge" as it pertains to copyright infringement under sections 37 and 38 of the Copyright Act, and the related concept of what a party "ought reasonably to have known." Specifically, the court had to consider whether relying on legal advice that denied infringement, despite being put on notice of a claim, could negate the knowledge requirement.
The court considered various authorities, including *Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co* and New South Wales decisions such as *Albert v Hoffnung* and *RCA Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales*. The reasoning emphasised that "knowledge" is not solely about a reasonable person's general understanding, but rather about the inferences that can be drawn from the concrete factual situation as it affects the particular person whose knowledge is in question. This includes express knowledge or knowledge that the defendants must have had, or ought reasonably to have had, given the circumstances and the passage of a reasonable time after notice of a claim. The court noted that the statutory language in sections 37 and 38 uses "knowledge," while section 19(3) also incorporates the concept of "ought reasonably to have known."
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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