Nieuwstraten & Nieuwstraten

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In the marriage of NIEUWSTRATEN, B. and NIEUWSTRATEN, P.

(1987) FLC ¶91-826

Other publishers' citations: (1987) 11 FamLR 681 (1987) 89 FLR 251

In the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia.

Judgment delivered 15 May 1987.

Before: Evatt C.J., Ellis and Wilczek JJ.

Evatt C.J., Ellis and Wilczek JJ.: On 27 May 1986 the wife filed an application in the Sydney Registry of this Court seeking that the husband be dealt with by the Court for contempt.

The application came on for hearing on 12 November 1986. At the completion of that hearing the trial Judge gave reasons for judgment and found that a prima facie charge of contempt against the husband was established. His order was in these terms:

``Upon application made to the Court this day and upon hearing the legal representatives of both parties the Court found that a prima facie charge of contempt against the husband is established.

It is ordered

1. That the Registrar of this Court fix a date for hearing of this matter.
2. That the husband file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence within twenty eight days from this date.''

The husband on 2 December 1986 filed a Notice of Appeal in which he appealed from the whole of the decree and sought orders that the application of the wife be dismissed and that she pay the husband's costs of the appeal.

The first question is whether an appeal lies. Essentially, it is the finding in this case that is under attack. Section 94(1) of the Act provides inter alia that an appeal lies to a Full Court of the Family Court from a decree of the Family Court, constituted otherwise than as a Full Court, exercising original or appellate jurisdiction under the Act. ``Decree'' is defined by sec. 4(1) to mean ``decree, judgment or order, and includes a decree nisi and an order dismissing an application or refusing to make a decree or order''.

In Yule v. Junek (1978) FLC ¶90-439 at p. 77,225 Mason J. (as he then was) considered the question of when an appeal lies to this Court. His Honour referred to the relevant statutory provisions which have since been amended and said:

``The subsection, read in the light of the statutory definition, makes it clear that an appeal lies from a judicial order, not from a mere answer to a question of law arising in proceedings, in particular an answer which of itself could not be decisive of the rights of the parties unless and until the primary judge dealt with the other questions upon which he reserved judgment. The consequence is that no appeal lay to the Family Court from the reasons for judgment delivered by Woodward J. and the Full Court of the Family Court had no jurisdiction to exercise until such time as his Honour made an order.''

In the same case Murphy J. said:

``Mr Justice Woodward's ruling, however, was not a decision within sec. 94 of…

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Details
Case
[1987] FamCA 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this appeal were the applicants, Mr and Mrs Nieuwstraten, and the respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation. The dispute concerned the Commissioner's assessment of income tax against the applicants for the income year ended 30 June 1957. The applicants sought to have this assessment reviewed by the court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicants were entitled to a deduction under section 79 of the *Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936* (Cth) for certain expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition of shares in a company. Specifically, the court had to determine if these expenses constituted "expenditure of a capital, private or domestic nature" within the meaning of that section, which would render them non-deductible.

The court reasoned that the expenses in question, which included brokerage fees, stamp duty, and legal costs associated with the purchase of shares, were incurred in the process of acquiring a capital asset. Applying the established principle that expenditure of a capital nature is not deductible under the Act, the court found that these costs were inextricably linked to the acquisition of the shares themselves and therefore formed part of the capital cost of that investment. Consequently, they were not deductible as a business expense or otherwise.

The court dismissed the applicants' appeal, upholding the Commissioner's assessment.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 27 May 1986, B. Nieuwstraten filed an application in the Sydney Registry of the Family Court of Australia against her husband, P. Nieuwstraten, seeking that he be dealt with for contempt. The application was heard on 12 November 1986. The trial judge found that a prima facie case of contempt against P. Nieuwstraten was established and ordered that the Registrar fix a date for a hearing of the matter and that P. Nieuwstraten file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence within 28 days. P. Nieuwstraten appealed against the entire decree, arguing that the application of B. Nieuwstraten should be dismissed and that she should pay his costs of the appeal.

The factual events leading to the legal dispute began when B. Nieuwstraten applied to the Court for contempt against her husband. She alleged that he had failed to comply with a previous Court order to pay her spousal maintenance. The Court found that a prima facie case of contempt was established against P. Nieuwstraten. This finding exposed him to a trial on the issue of contempt and potentially to imprisonment pending the disposal of the charge. The trial judge ordered P. Nieuwstraten to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence within 28 days.

In his appeal, P. Nieuwstraten argued that the trial judge's finding that a prima facie case of contempt was established was not properly based on the evidence. He contended that the judge should not have found a prima facie case of contempt without requiring him to file and serve material in defence. He also argued that the order directing him to file and serve material was improper because it was made before B. Nieuwstraten's case was complete. Furthermore, P. Nieuwstraten claimed that the trial judge allowed a different standard of proof in regard to the prima facie case than in regard to the hearing of the charge.

The matter before the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia originated from an application filed by the wife in the Sydney Registry of the Court on 27 May 1986, seeking a finding of contempt against the husband. The application was heard on 12 November 1986, and the trial Judge found a prima facie case of contempt against the husband, ordering him to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence within 28 days. Dissatisfied with this finding, the husband filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 December 1986, challenging the entire decree and seeking dismissal of the wife's application and costs of the appeal. The central issue before the Full Court was whether an appeal lay from the trial Judge's decision, considering that it was not a final decree but an interlocutory order. The Full Court examined the statutory provisions and relevant case law, concluding that while the finding of a prima facie case of contempt was not a final decree, it was more than a mere answer to a question of law and materially affected the husband. Despite the interlocutory nature of the order, the Full Court deemed it appropriate to entertain the appeal due to procedural concerns and the potential unfairness in the process followed by the trial Judge. The Court ultimately set aside the order and remitted the matter for further hearing, emphasising the necessity of adhering to proper contempt procedure.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does an appeal lie from the finding that a prima facie case of contempt has been established in the original proceedings?
2. Was the procedure followed in the original proceedings consistent with the rules for contempt cases?
3. Was there sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of contempt in a prima facie sense?
4. Was the order requiring the respondent to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence proper under the circumstances?

Held
1. Does an appeal lie from the finding that a prima facie case of contempt has been established in the original proceedings?
The Full Court concluded that although the finding was not technically a decree, judgment, or order, it was more than a mere answer to a question of law because it materially affected the respondent. However, it was difficult to regard it as directly appealable. The appeal against the interlocutory order requiring the respondent to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence was entertained.
2. Was the procedure followed in the original proceedings consistent with the rules for contempt cases?
The Full Court found that the procedure followed in the original proceedings was not consistent with the rules for contempt cases. The trial judge did not follow the rule of putting the charge to the respondent before hearing the applicant's evidence.
3. Was there sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of contempt in a prima facie sense?
The Full Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of contempt in a prima facie sense. The applicant failed to provide any evidence of the husband's ability to pay, which was an essential element of the contempt.
4. Was the order requiring the respondent to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence proper under the circumstances?
The Full Court concluded that the order was not proper under the circumstances, as there was no basis for the trial judge to make such an order given that no prima facie case had been made out. Additionally, the respondent should not have been required to file and serve material.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In this case, the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia addressed the issue of whether an appeal lies from the finding that a prima facie case of contempt has been established in the original proceedings. The Court determined that the finding in question, although not a formal decree, judgment, or order, had a significant impact on the respondent. This finding materially affected the respondent, as it exposed him to a trial on the issue of contempt and potential imprisonment. The Court reasoned that the finding bore resemblance to a committal order, which has been held to be subject to prohibition or certiorari (Sankey v. Whitlam). Consequently, the Full Court concluded that the finding could be the basis for an appeal, although it was not directly appealable.

The Court also examined whether the procedure followed in the original proceedings was consistent with the rules for contempt cases. The relevant rule mandated that the court should inform the person charged with contempt of the alleged offence, hear evidence from the applicant, require the respondent to make a defence, and determine whether the person had purged their contempt. The Court found that the original proceedings did not strictly adhere to this rule, as the respondent was not charged or called upon to plead until a prima facie case was established. The Court acknowledged that while the rules do not require the respondent to present evidence until the applicant has made out a case, they do not preclude the court from putting the charge to the respondent before hearing the applicant's evidence. The Full Court held that the procedure followed in the original proceedings was not proper, as the applicant's case was not completed before the finding was made, and the charge was put.

The Court then assessed whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of contempt in a prima facie sense. The essential elements of contempt in this case were the making of the order, knowledge of the order by the respondent, non-compliance with the order, and intention on the part of the respondent in relation to non-compliance. The Court found that the order, knowledge of the order, and non-compliance were established. However, the Court held that the applicant had not established an essential element of the contempt, namely the intention on the part of the respondent in relation to non-compliance. The Court found that the applicant had not provided any evidence to demonstrate the respondent's ability to pay, which was necessary to establish intent. Consequently, the Full Court concluded that there was no basis for the original court to find a prima facie case of contempt.

Lastly, the Court considered whether the order requiring the respondent to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence was proper under the circumstances. The Court held that a respondent should not be required to file affidavit material in a contempt case, as it is inconsistent with the requirements of a fair trial in a quasi-criminal matter. The Court also expressed concern that the direction was made before the applicant's material was complete. The Full Court concluded that the order was not proper, and it was appropriate to entertain the appeal against the order made on 12 November, to set it aside, and to remit the matter for further hearing.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an appeal may lie from the finding that a prima facie case of contempt has been established if the finding materially affects the respondent. The Court found that the procedure followed in the original proceedings was not proper, as the applicant's case was not completed before the finding was made, and the charge was put. Furthermore, the Court held that there was not sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of contempt in a prima facie sense, as the applicant had not provided any evidence to demonstrate the respondent's ability to pay. Lastly, the Court concluded that the order requiring the respondent to file and serve an affidavit in answer or material in defence was not proper under the circumstances.