Nicholas Kermode and Repatriation Commission

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[2015] AATA 234

Division Veterans' Appeals Division

File Number

2013/2193

Re

Nicholas Kermode

APPLICANT

And

Repatriation Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member N A Manetta

Date 17 April 2015
Place Adelaide

The Tribunal answers the preliminary question as follows:

The Tribunal has no power under s 20 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 to backdate to 1996 or to 2002 any pension to which Mr Kermode is found to be entitled under the Act as a result of his 2012 claim. Under s 20, any pension to which Mr Kermode is found to be entitled as a result of his 2012 claim may not commence earlier than three months before that claim was received at an office of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

........................................................................

Senior Member N A Manetta

CATCHWORDS

VETERANS' ENTITLEMENTS - Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 – preliminary question concerning date of payment of benefit - previous claims - no power to backdate pension to date of earlier finally determined claim

LEGISLATION

Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986, ss 14(1), (3), (5), (6) and (7), 20(1), 119(1)(f) and (g)

CASES

Ryde v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1281; 85 ALD 586

Ryde v Repatriation Commission [2005] FCAFC 108; 143 FCR 293

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member N A Manetta

17 April 2015

  1. Mr Nicholas Kermode has applied to the Tribunal for a review of a decision of the respondent Repatriation Commission dated 15 May 2012, affirmed by the Veterans’ Review Board on 21 February 2013.  The Commission refused Mr Kermode’s claim dated 7 May 2012 for a pension under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (the VE Act). The medical condition on which Mr Kermode bases his claim for a pension is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

  2. Mr Kermode has made three claims for a pension in respect of this condition:  the first in 1996, the second in 2002, and the third, as I have noted, in May 2012.  I note that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction arises from the application he has made in respect of the rejection of the third claim.  There is no outstanding application to the Tribunal in respect of either of the other unsuccessful claims.

    PRELIMINARY QUESTION

  3. A Deputy President has listed a question for decision by the Tribunal by way of preliminary hearing. The question asks what the “date of effect” of any decision favourable to Mr Kermode should be. This expression refers to the power of the Commission under s 20(1) of the VE Act to specify the date on which its determination will operate. This commencement date may be up to three months before the date on which “the claim” was received in an office of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, but no earlier. The question effectively asks whether, on the assumption Mr Kermode succeeds in his application for review and is found to be eligible to receive a benefit under the VE Act in respect of his 2012 claim,[1] payment of the benefit may be backdated under s 20 to 1996 or 2002 (that is,…

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Details
Case
[2015] AATA 234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nicholas Kermode and the Repatriation Commission involved a dispute regarding the date from which a pension should be backdated to a veteran under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (VE Act). The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had the authority to backdate a pension to the date of earlier claims that had been finally determined, specifically to either 1996 or 2002, for a pension stemming from a 2012 claim. Mr Kermode, the veteran, had made three separate claims for a pension related to his service in the Royal Australian Navy and subsequent PTSD, with the first two claims being rejected and the third claim being successful.

The court had to determine whether the statutory provisions of the VE Act permitted the backdating of pensions to the dates of earlier claims, despite those claims having been finally determined. The relevant sections of the VE Act, particularly sections 14 and 20, were scrutinized to understand the legislative intent concerning the backdating of pensions. The court considered the reasoning in Ryde v Commonwealth of Australia, where similar issues were addressed, and concluded that the legislative framework did not allow for the backdating of pensions to the dates of earlier claims that were not successful.

The court found that despite the assumptions favoring Mr Kermode regarding his PTSD and the eligibility for a pension, the statutory provisions and the precedent set in Ryde precluded the Tribunal from backdating the pension to the earlier claim dates. The court emphasized that the decisions in Ryde and subsequent appeals established a clear legal precedent that the Act did not intend to allow for such backdating. Therefore, the court held that the Tribunal did not have the power to backdate the pension to either 1996 or 2002, aligning with the statutory interpretation and the precedent set by the higher courts.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

I have decided that the Tribunal has no power under s 20 of the VE Act to backdate to either 1996 or 2002 any pension to which Mr Kermode is ultimately found to be entitled as a result of his 2012 claim. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF THE HEARING I now set out briefly the relevant factual background, including the course of the hearing before me, and then my reasons for this conclusion.Service Mr Kermode gave evidence that he was serving with the Royal Australian Navy on HMAS Melbourne when it collided with HMAS Voyager in 1964. He also gave evidence that he later saw between 21 and 28 days’ active service in Vietnam. Mr Kermode maintains that he developed PTSD as a result of the collision in 1964 and that the condition was aggravated by his service in Vietnam.Claims and the statutory regime under the VE Act Mr Kermode first made a claim for a benefit under the VE Act in respect of PTSD in 1996. This claim was rejected by the Repatriation Commission. Mr Kermode took the matter no further. He made a second claim in respect of PTSD in 2002. This claim was rejected by the Commission, and his further appeal to the Veterans’ Review Board was unsuccessful. He lodged an application for review with this Tribunal. He retained solicitors (Tindall Gask Bentley) and counsel (Mr Hemsley). He gave evidence, led by Mr Cameron, that he was advised by Mr Hemsley on the day of the hearing to discontinue the proceedings. The discontinuance led to a formal dismissal of his application for review under s 42A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, 1975. No action was taken in respect of the dismissal. Both these claims are “finally determined” for the purposes of s 14 of the VE Act. As I have noted, it is Mr Kermode’s third claim, lodged in 2012, that has led to the present application to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction arises in respect of this claim. For present purposes, the main relevant statutory provisions in the VE Act are sub-sections 14(1), (3), (5), (6) and (7), and sub-section 20(1), which I now set out:-“14 Claim for pension(1) Subject to subsection (2), a veteran, or a dependant of a deceased veteran other than a reinstated pensioner, may make a claim for a pension in accordance with subsection (3).Note 1: Some dependants do not have to make a claim (see section 13A). Note 2: If it is uncertain whether a person is a dependant and as a result a pension is not payable to the person under section 13A, the person may make a claim for the pension under section 14. The Commission will determine whether the person is entitled to be granted a pension (see subsection 19(3)). …. (3)A claim for a pension: (a) shall be in writing and in accordance with a form approved by the Commission; (b) shall be accompanied by such evidence available to the claimant as the claimant considers may be relevant to the claim; and (c) is to be lodged at an office of the Department in Australia in accordance with section 5T and is taken to have been made on a day determined under that section. .... (5)Where: (a) a veteran has made a claim for a pension under this section in respect of incapacity from a particular injury or disease; and (b) the claim has not been finally determined; the veteran is not empowered to make another claim for a pension under this section in respect of incapacity from that injury or disease. (6)Where: (a) a person has made a claim for a pension under this section in respect of the death of a veteran; and (b) the claim has not been finally determined; the person is not empowered to make another claim for a pension under this section in respect of the death of that veteran. (7)For the purposes of this section, a claim is finally determined when either: (a) a decision that has been made in respect of the claim is not subject to any form of appeal or review; or (b) a decision that has been made in respect of the claim was subject to some form of appeal or review, but the period within which such an appeal or review could be instituted has ended without an appeal or review having been instituted.” “20 Dates of effect that may be specified in respect of grant of claim for pension(1) Where a claim in accordance with section 14 for a pension is granted (other than a claim to which subsection (2A) applies), the Commission may, subject to this Act, specify as a date that a determination under subsection 19(3) takes effect in respect of the claim, a date not earlier than 3 months before the date on which the claim for a pension, in accordance with a form approved for the purposes of paragraph 14(3)(a) was received at an office of the Department in Australia.….”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I received written submissions and heard oral argument in respect of the question. Mr Cameron appeared for Mr Kermode at the hearing (although Mr Miller was retained after the hearing in circumstances I shall describe); Mr Crowe appeared for the respondent. CONCLUSION I have decided that the Tribunal has no power under s 20 of the VE Act to backdate to either 1996 or 2002 any pension to which Mr Kermode is ultimately found to be entitled as a result of his 2012 claim. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF THE HEARING I now set out briefly the relevant factual background, including the course of the hearing before me, and then my reasons for this conclusion.Service Mr Kermode gave evidence that he was serving with the Royal Australian Navy on HMAS Melbourne when it collided with HMAS Voyager in 1964. He also gave evidence that he later saw between 21 and 28 days’ active service in Vietnam. Mr Kermode maintains that he developed PTSD as a result of the collision in 1964 and that the condition was aggravated by his service in Vietnam.Claims and the statutory regime under the VE Act Mr Kermode first made a claim for a benefit under the VE Act in respect of PTSD in 1996. This claim was rejected by the Repatriation Commission. Mr Kermode took the matter no further. He made a second claim in respect of PTSD in 2002. This claim was rejected by the Commission, and his further appeal to the Veterans’ Review Board was unsuccessful. He lodged an application for review with this Tribunal. He retained solicitors (Tindall Gask Bentley) and counsel (Mr Hemsley). He gave evidence, led by Mr Cameron, that he was advised by Mr Hemsley on the day of the hearing to discontinue the proceedings. The discontinuance led to a formal dismissal of his application for review under s 42A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, 1975. No action was taken in respect of the dismissal. Both these claims are “finally determined” for the purposes of s 14 of the VE Act. As I have noted, it is Mr Kermode’s third claim, lodged in 2012, that has led to the present application to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction arises in respect of this claim. For present purposes, the main relevant statutory provisions in the VE Act are sub-sections 14(1), (3), (5), (6) and (7), and sub-section 20(1), which I now set out:-“14 Claim for pension(1) Subject to subsection (2), a veteran, or a dependant of a deceased veteran other than a reinstated pensioner, may make a claim for a pension in accordance with subsection (3).Note 1: Some dependants do not have to make a claim (see section 13A). Note 2: If it is uncertain whether a person is a dependant and as a result a pension is not payable to the person under section 13A, the person may make a claim for the pension under section 14. The Commission will determine whether the person is entitled to be granted a pension (see subsection 19(3)). …. (3)A claim for a pension: (a) shall be in writing and in accordance with a form approved by the Commission; (b) shall be accompanied by such evidence available to the claimant as the claimant considers may be relevant to the claim; and (c) is to be lodged at an office of the Department in Australia in accordance with section 5T and is taken to have been made on a day determined under that section. .... (5)Where: (a) a veteran has made a claim for a pension under this section in respect of incapacity from a particular injury or disease; and (b) the claim has not been finally determined; the veteran is not empowered to make another claim for a pension under this section in respect of incapacity from that injury or disease. (6)Where: (a) a person has made a claim for a pension under this section in respect of the death of a veteran; and (b) the claim has not been finally determined; the person is not empowered to make another claim for a pension under this section in respect of the death of that veteran. (7)For the purposes of this section, a claim is finally determined when either: (a) a decision that has been made in respect of the claim is not subject to any form of appeal or review; or (b) a decision that has been made in respect of the claim was subject to some form of appeal or review, but the period within which such an appeal or review could be instituted has ended without an appeal or review having been instituted.” “20 Dates of effect that may be specified in respect of grant of claim for pension(1) Where a claim in accordance with section 14 for a pension is granted (other than a claim to which subsection (2A) applies), the Commission may, subject to this Act, specify as a date that a determination under subsection 19(3) takes effect in respect of the claim, a date not earlier than 3 months before the date on which the claim for a pension, in accordance with a form approved for the purposes of paragraph 14(3)(a) was received at an office of the Department in Australia.….”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

After reviewing Ryde’s case, I have concluded that the preliminary question must inevitably be answered against Mr Kermode despite assumptions in his favour that he suffers from PTSD, that he is eligible to receive a pension under the VE Act, and also that the earlier decisions of the Commission and the Board, to which I have referred, were erroneous. I have made these assumptions for the purposes of deciding the preliminary question. I have gone so far as to assume that the earlier decisions were erroneous on the material before the decision-maker and not merely erroneous given a subsequent and superior understanding of Mr Kermode’s circumstances. I have also assumed that all three claims are relevantly identical. In other words, I have made assumptions as favourable to Mr Kermode as I can. In my opinion, however, notwithstanding any favourable assumptions that may be made, his Honour Justice Sackville’s decision in Ryde and the decision of the Full Court on appeal preclude the Tribunal from backdating to 1996 or 2002 any pension to which Mr Kermode may be entitled as a result of his 2012 claim. Consideration of Ryde’s case In Ryde’s case, the issue of backdating squarely arose. It arose in the context of an application for a widow’s pension, but that fact is immaterial to the reasoning. Three claims had been made by Ms Ryde, only the third of which was successful. His Honour Justice Sackville decided that the Act did not allow for backdating of her pension entitlement to either of the earlier unsuccessful claims. I acknowledge that Ms Ryde’s first and second claims were not in substance the same as her third claim. Mr Miller sought to distinguish Mr Kermode’s circumstances on the basis that in Ryde’s case “it was never demonstrated that either of the earlier applications had been decided wrongly”.[3] He submitted that as Mr Kermode had made earlier claims based on PTSD which had been wrongly rejected, any pension entitlement arising under the third claim could be backdated. Mr Miller’s submission draws a distinction between cases where there is a substantial identity in the grounds of claim for a pension entitlement and those where there is no such identity. [3] Applicant’s supplementary submissions at [3]. I accept that where a subsequent claim is successful but is based on grounds not raised in an earlier claim, it is hard to see why backdating to an earlier claim date would have been intended under the VE Act. I accept also that Sackville J expressly acknowledged that he thought there was “very considerable force”[4] in the Commission’s submission that Ms Ryde’s third claim was not in substance the same as either of the two earlier claims she had made. [4] See 85 ALD 586 at paragraph [42]. Importantly, however, his Honour did not decide the case simply on this basis. Referring to the same distinction Mr Miller submits should be drawn, his Honour said (at 85 ALD 586, [43]):“43 This analysis suggests that the approach contended for by the applicant would lead to difficulties in practice. When is a particular claim in substance the same as an earlier, rejected claim? If the claimant relies on fresh evidence, or advances a new theory as to the relationship between the veteran’s war service and his or her death, does that amount to a new claim? Does it depend on the nature of the fresh evidence, or on the extent to which the new theory is linked to previous arguments put on behalf of the claimant?”