Nguyen v Minister for Immigration
[2010] FMCA 726
•24 September 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| NGUYEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2010] FMCA 726 |
| MIGRATION – Section 363 power to summon a person is discretionary – whether decision attached to the letter is part of the s.66 notification? – where relationship with nominating spouse had ceased but the applicant had suffered domestic violence – whether failure to consider integer of claim or merely a piece of evidence – application seeks a review of the merits – not available. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.65(1), 66, 359A, 360, 363, 474 Migration Regulations 1994, cl.801.221(1), subclass 801, 820 |
| Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 Chan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs 134 FCR 308 Chen Xin He v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] FCA 1682 (Federal Court of Australia, RD Nicholson J, 23 November 1995, unreported) Lee vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 Muliyana v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 24 NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) (2005) 144 FCR 1 NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 SHUB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 137 FCR 43 Sie Sok v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 238 CLR 251 SZINP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1747 Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 |
| Applicant: | VAN NGOC NGUYEN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | MLG 1566 of 2009 |
| Judgment of: | Turner FM |
| Hearing dates: | 2 July and 16 August 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 August 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 24 September 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Fernandez |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Nathan Dorevitch Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms Latif |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application filed 4 December 2009 and the amended application filed 26 March 2010 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 1566 of 2009
| VAN NGOC NGUYEN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) on 11 November 2009. That decision affirmed a decision of a delegate to the Minister to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Residence)(Class BS) subclass 801 (Spouse) visa.
The applicant is a citizen of Germany. At the time of his application he and his two children from a former marriage were in Australia. Departmental records show that he and his former spouse travelled to Australia together on 10 January 2001; they left Australia together on
7 March 2001, and returned together on 13 February 2003, despite claiming to have divorced on 6 February 2001 (Court Book (“CB”)
283.9).
The applicant left Australia on 19 March 2003 and returned on
5 July 2003. He was granted a subclass 820 visa on 15 May 2004 on the basis of the marriage to his sponsor (Ms Xuan Linh Le). He left Australia again on 18 August 2007 and returned on 1 September 2007 as the holder of a subclass 820 visa (CB 284 [1]).
The Court was advised that the parties separated around September 2007 and in December 2008 the spouse informed the Department of Immigration that she was withdrawing her sponsorship (Transcript (“T”) 2 July 2010 p.3, l.9). In January or March 2009, the applicant made a claim of domestic violence to the Department (Ibid p.3, l.19).
On 28 September 2009 the Tribunal sent the applicant a letter pursuant to s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 (the “Act”) inviting him to comment on information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review: [s.359A(1)(a)] (CB 272).
The applicant’s migration agent responded by letter dated 19 October 2009 and requested that:
“the appeal be decided based on the information already on file without a further need for personal attendance by him” (the applicant).
By s.360 of the Act the Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments. That requirement does not apply where the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it. That consent was given by the applicant’s migration agent (CB 275). A hearing was not held and the Tribunal proceeded to make a decision pursuant to s.360(2)(b) of the Act (CB 283 [8]).
By s.65(1) of the Act, in order to succeed in an application for a visa, an applicant must satisfy all of the criteria for the grant of a visa.
At the time the application for a visa was lodged, Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa contained subclass 801 (spouse), and other classes that are not relevant to this application (CB 286 [6]). At the time of decision, cl.801.221(1) of the Migration Regulations1994 (the “Regulations”) required the visa applicant to satisfy the requirements of sub –cls.2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 8 (CB 243 [1] and 286 [9]).
Sub clause 801.221(2) required, amongst other things, that the visa applicant is the spouse of, and continues to be nominated by, the nominating spouse, as follows:
(2)“An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:
(a)the applicant is the holder of a Subclass 820 visa; and
(b)the applicant continues to be nominated for the grant of the Subclass 801 visa by the nominating spouse; and
(c)the applicant is the spouse of the nominating spouse; and
(d)subject to subclauses (6A) and (7), at least 2 years have passed since the application was made”.
At the hearing before the Court on 2 July 2010 Mr Fernandez put the following submissions for the applicant.
Mr Fernandez submitted that there was no spousal relationship between the parties when the Tribunal made its decision on 11 November 2009.
Mr Fernandez referred to the decision in Muliyana v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 24 as authority for the proposition that the Tribunal:
“doesn’t have to go into the question of spousal relationship before you decide the question of domestic violence”.
Mr Fernandez referred to the head note that:
“there is no requirement that the domestic violence occur before the spousal relationship ceased”.
He referred to para.34 to support that head note.
Mr Fernandez submits that Muliyana means that the Tribunal did not:
“have to look at an existing spousal relationship to trigger domestic violence. You can look at domestic violence independently, without looking at the spousal relationship”
(T 2 July 2010 p.6, l.12).
Mr Fernandez referred to grounds one and two of the amended application, which he says is supported by Muliyana.
Mr Fernandez then complains that the Tribunal brushed aside documentary evidence about the child of the applicant and sponsor, and relied on the non response to the s.359A letter to decide that the applicant may not be the father of the sponsor’s child (CB 290 [53]).
The Court notes the applicant’s statutory declaration (CB 213) where he states that:
“I was surprised to learn that my said (sic “that my wife said”) that the child was not mine”.
Also the sponsor advised the delegate at interview that the applicant may not be the child’s father (CB 290 [53]).
Domestic Violence
Mr Fernandez submits as to domestic violence that there is evidence of that violence (CB 213 – 227) but the s.359A letter contained no reference to it (CB 272)
The Court finds that the information relating to domestic violence was given in writing by the applicant during the process that led to the decision that is under review and therefore covered by the exemption in s.359A(4)(ba) of the Act (T 2 July 2010 p.19, l.25).
Mr Fernandez continued that s.360 of the Act requires the Tribunal to invite the applicant to appear to give evidence and present arguments. However s.360(2)(b) provides that that does not apply where, as here, the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it (CB 275).
Mr Fernandez referred to the decision in Sie Sok v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 238 CLR 251 at [31] where reference is made to the obligations under s.360 of the Act to invite the applicant to appear. For the reasons given above that obligation did not obtain here.
Mr Fernandez contended that the Tribunal should have summoned the doctor to give evidence. However s.363 of the Act is discretionary. The Tribunal did not err in failing to summon the doctor.
Mr Fernandez sought to amend the application by referring to s.66(2) of the Act, and submitting that the letter indicating that the visa was refused (CB 231) did not give written reasons why the criterion was not satisfied on the provision prevented to grant of the visa.
Mr Fernandez referred to the decision in Chan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs 134 FCR 308 where Justice Gray stated at [53]:
“that the obligation (under s.66 of the Act) is discharged when all the requirements of s.66(2) have been met”.
The Court notes the content of s.66(4) that:
“Failure to give notification of a decision does not affect the validity of the decision”.
The Court notes also that the decision was attached to the letter and together set out the detail required (CB 233 – 246). The decision formed part of the notification.
A breach of s.66 of the Act has not been established.
After Mr Fernandez put his submissions, Ms Latif, for the first respondent sought an adjournment to respond to new issues that had not been raised in the material filed, and which caught the first respondent by surprise.
After hearing submissions the Court decided that they were new issues and allowed the amendments sought by the applicant, and ordered that
(1)The first respondent file written submissions in reply on or
before 16 July 2010.(2)The matter is adjourned until 13 August 2010 for the applicant to respond to those submissions
(3)That the costs of adjourning and of the new submissions be reserved.
Submissions for the first respondent 16 August 2010
The first respondents Further Contentions of Fact and Law filed
16 July 2010 identify correctly the issues in contention being:
a)“Whether the Tribunal’s findings as to the existence of a spousal relationship at CB 288-290 [41]-[56] reveals of jurisdictional error? The applicant relies on Muliyana v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 170 (“Muliyana”)
b)Whether the Tribunal’s treatment of the paternity of the sponsor’s child at CB 290 [53] reveals of error?
c)Whether the Tribunal’s procedure breached s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”)?
d)Whether the Tribunal’s procedure breached s 360 of the Act? The applicant relies upon Sie Sok v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 238 CLR 257 in this connection.
e)Whether the fact that the Tribunal did not use its power pursuant to s 363 (3)(a) of the Act reveals of jurisdictional error?
f)Whether the delegate’s notification of decision complied with
s 66(2)(c) of the Act?”Ms Latif appeared for the first respondent and relied on the first respondents Contentions of Fact and Law.
Ms Latif contends as follows as to the Tribunal’s consideration of whether there was a spousal relationship at the time of decision:
(7)To be eligible for the grant of a Partner (Residence)(Class BS) visa, the applicant must satisfy the time of application criteria, relevantly clause 801.221 of Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”).
(8)Clause 801.221(2) is reproduced at CB 243 and requires the applicant to:
(a)…
(b)Continue to be nominated by his or her nominating spouse;
(c)Be the spouse of the nominating spouse;
(d)…
(9)The applicant will be taken to meet the requirements of sub-cl 801.221(2) in circumstances where, the applicant would meet the requirements of subclause (2) except that the relationship between the applicant and the nominating spouse has ceased and the applicant has suffered domestic violence committed by the nominating spouse: cl 801.221(6)(b) and (c)(B). (CB243)
(10)In the present case, the applicant failed to make a claim of domestic violence that complied with cl 801.221(6). The first respondent refers to and repeats its contentions of fact and law dated 15 April 2010 at paragraphs [9]-[15], [35]-[37] in this connection, (In particular as to the applicant not filing two statutory declarations).
(11)The applicant submits Muliyana is authority for the proposition that a claim of domestic violence may be considered independently of the existence of a spousal relationship: T 2 July 2010 p.6 line 10-15(enclosed). The first respondent submits this is incorrect: a mandatory criterion for eligibility for the visa is the existence of a spousal relationship between the applicant and the nominating spouse.
The Court accepts those submissions.
(12)Muliyana is authority for the limited proposition that the phrase “domestic violence” in clause 100.221(4)(c) of Sch 2 of the Regulations does not require the domestic violence to occur before the spousal relationship ceased. In Muliyana, it was accepted that the parties were in a spousal relationship that had ceased and it was accepted that the visa applicant had made a valid claim of domestic violence: Muliyana at [22].
Here the Tribunal found that the applicant does not meet
sub-cl.801.221(2)(c) as he was not the spouse of the nominating spouse (CB 290 [55]).
(13)“The present application may be distinguished because in the present case:
(a)The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant and the nominating spouse were in a spousal relationship” CB 290 [55]-[56]”.
That finding of fact was open to the Tribunal and is not amenable to review; and
(b)“The applicant failed to make a claim of domestic violence that could be considered pursuant to cl 801.221(6) and compare Muliyana at [15]”.
(14)In oral submissions the applicant submitted the visa criteria in cl 100.221(4)(c) could not be distinguished from the visa criteria relevant to the present application. The first respondent submits this is not the case. The applicant in Muliyana made an offshore application for a Partner (Migrant)(Class BC)(subclass 100) visa: Muliyana at [10]. Sub-cl 100.221(4)(c) contains a temporal clause not found in 801.221(6). Sub-cl 100.221(4)(c) states “after the applicant first entered Australia” –there is no such language in 801.221(6).
Mr Fernandez submitted in relation to those contentions that “the Tribunal erred jurisdictionally by going into a spousal relationship that admittedly had come to a close” (T 16 August 2010 p.4, l.2).
Mr Fernandez contends that the Tribunal erred by examining whether there was a spousal relationship at the time of decision. The Court rejects those submissions and accepts the submissions for the first respondent.
Ms Latif contends as follows in relation to the Tribunal finding that the child is not the child of the marriage:
(1)In oral submissions, the applicant contended the Tribunal did not consider the material at CB 86, 87, 91 and 92-95. The first respondent makes the following submissions in response:
(a)Firstly, to demonstrate jurisdictional error, the material must be a claim or an integer of a claim as opposed to a piece of evidence. The first respondent submits the photographs, birth certificate and statutory declaration amount to evidence and any failure to consider them cannot form a basis for prerogative relief: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24.
(b)Secondly, the Tribunal did have regard to the material. The Tribunal referred to the photographs at CB 284 [19], 289 [50], the birth certificate at CB 290 [53] and the statutory declaration at CB 285 [22]. The Court should be slow to infer the Tribunal has not dealt with a claim where the Tribunal has referred to it in its reasons for decision: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ.
(c)Thirdly, a different finding on the child’s paternity would not have been dispositive of the review: compare NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2005) 144 FCR 1 at [63] per Black CJ, French and Selway JJ. The applicant before the delegate, the Tribunal and the Court conceded the parties were not in a spousal relationship at the time of application. Accordingly, the only way the applicant could satisfy
cl 801.221(2) was by satisfying cl 801.221(6). The applicant could not satisfy cl 801.221(6) because his material was deficient: refer paragraph [10].(10)In the present case, the applicant failed to make a claim of domestic violence that complied with cl 801.221(6). The first respondent refers to and repeats its contentions of fact and law dated 15 April 2010 at paragraphs [9]-[15], [35]-[37] in this connection. (Re: not filing two statutory declarations).
Mr Fernandez submitted in relation to those contentions that the Tribunal was incorrect to rely on the non response to the s.359A letter to find that the child was not a child of the marriage.
However, the Tribunal considered the evidence relating to the parentage of the child in para.53 (CB 290). On the basis of the evidence, and especially the failure of the applicant to respond to the s.359A letter, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the child is a child of the marital relationship of the parties (CB 290 [53]).
That finding was open to the Tribunal on the material before it and is not amenable to review.
In NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10, the Full Court of the Federal Court decided at [10] as follows:
“In their written submissions, the appellants took exception to a number of findings of the Tribunal. In many cases, those exceptions were purely on the basis that the appellants disagree with the findings. In effect, the appellants sought to have the Court take a different view of various issues of fact from that taken by the Tribunal. To engage in fact-finding about the merits of the appellants’ case is no part of the function of the Court, whether at first instance or on appeal, in dealing with an application for relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act. As Stone J said, Plaintiff S157 establishes that it is necessary for the appellants to show jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, if they are to succeed. Whatever be the boundaries of jurisdictional error, they do not comprehend errors of fact as to merits of the case put to the Tribunal.”
As stated in Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at [7]:
“A decision-maker does not have to have rebutting evidence available before he or she can lawfully hold that a particular factual assertion by an applicant is not made out.”
Chen Xin He v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1995] FCA 1682 (Federal Court of Australia, RD Nicholson J, 23 November 1995, unreported) at [24]:
“It is not the case, as the submissions for the applicant appear to assume, that the evidence of the applicant should have been believed by the Tribunal unless specifically disproved by the objective evidence before the Tribunal. Rather it was for the Tribunal to decide what facts it found on a consideration of all the evidence, subjective and objective. This required the Tribunal not only to consider inconsistencies but also to determine what evidence it found credible.”
As stated in Tefonu Pty Limited v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 per Beazley J at [54]:
“The weight which is to be given to a relevant factor is a matter for the Tribunal, unless it can be said that the Tribunal’s decision is manifestly unreasonable. (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anor. v. Peko-Wallsend Limited and Ors (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41; Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223 at 230, 233-234).”
The decision must be so unreasonable “that no reasonable body could have come to it”: Ibid at [41].
The Court does not make that finding in this case.
As stated by the Federal Court of Australia in Lee vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27]:
“The Tribunal is entitled to accept or reject or give such weight to the evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate in all the circumstances.”
The Court refers to the decision of Collier J in SZINP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1747 at [26] as follows:
“Decisions of the Tribunal are privative clause decisions and as such are not open to review on the facts: S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. As is clear from such cases as Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 and NAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 76 errors of fact do not give rise to jurisdictional errors.”
A wrong finding of fact is not jurisdictional error. Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 per Brennan J
“Wednesbury unreasonableness leaves the merits of a decision or action unaffected unless the decision or action is such as to amount to an abuse of power: Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment”: Attorney General for the State of NSW v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35.
The Court refers to the following passages in Attorney General for the State of NSW v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35:
“The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.
The consequence is that the scope of judicial review must be defined not in terms of the protection of individual interests but in terms of the extent of power and the legality of its exercise. In Australia, the modern development and expansion of the law of judicial review of administrative action have been achieved by an increasingly sophisticated exposition of implied limitations on the extent or the exercise of statutory power, but those limitations are not calculated to secure judicial scrutiny of the merits of a particular case.
There is one limitation, “Wednesbury unreasonableness” (the nomenclature comes from Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation), which may appear to open the gate to judicial review of the merits of a decision or action taken within power. Properly applied, Wednesbury unreasonableness leaves the merits of a decision or action unaffected unless the decision or action is such as to amount to an abuse of power: Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment. Acting on the implied intention of the legislature that a power be exercised reasonably, the court holds invalid a purported exercise of the power which is so unreasonable that no reasonable repository of the power could have taken the impugned decision or action. The limitation is extremely confined.”
The Court does not find the decision to be so unreasonable that no repository of the power could have taken it.
As stated by Collier J in SZINP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1747 at [29]:
“if the Tribunal made an error of fact, it is not a jurisdictional error if there is some evidence upon which the finding of fact could be made: Epenisa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 80 at [36], Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510.”
The issue the applicant seeks to agitate is no more than an impermissible attack on the factual finding of the Tribunal. The challenge is no more than an invitation to review the merits. The authorities make clear that the making of findings of fact is uniquely a matter for the decision-maker. In SHUB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 137 FCR 43, the Full Court (at [12] quoted a passage from the decision of Selway J at first instance, where his honour had said:
“16 I have considered all of the matters put to me. The relevant principle is clear. Notwithstanding whatever concerns I may have about the reasoning of the Tribunal is analysing the factual material before it, the assessments of the material was a matter for the Tribunal, not for this Court. The appellant asked the Court to undertake a review on the merits of the decision of the Tribunal. The Court has no jurisdiction to do so. As it was put by Justice Kenny in a similar context in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 at [146]:
“A tribunal such as the RRT does not commit an error of law merely because it adopts unsound or questionable reasoning. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [(1999 197 CLR 611]…at paras 40, 44-45 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 138 per Gummow J and cf para 159 per Hayne; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356 per Mason CJ with Brennan J at 365, Deane J at 369 and Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 387 agreed; Road Corporation v Dacakis [1995] 2 VR 508 at 517-520; Minister for Immigration and Affairs v Epeabaka (1999) 160 ALR 543 (FC)…agree with the remarks of Katz J in [Zuway v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 160 ALR 391 at 399] that a search by the Court for objective cogency in the reasons of the RRT creates a real risk that the Court will substitute its own view of the merits of the case for that of the Tribunal.”
The applicant has not established an error of law in the Tribunal finding that the child is not a child of the marital relationship of the parties.
The Court has already dealt with the complaint about the content of the s.359A letter and refers to its conclusions thereon. A breach of s.359A of the Act has not been established.
Further, a breach of s.360 of the Act has not been established (supra).
A breach of s.363(3)(a) of the Act has not been established (supra).
A breach of s.66(2)(c) of the Act has not been established; and in any event Mr Fernandez withdrew that claim (T 16 August 2010, p.18, l.27).
The Court finds that the Tribunal was required to consider the question of a spousal relationship at the time of decision [sub-cl.801.221(2)]. Apart from demonstrating an ongoing spousal relationship the only other way to satisfy sub-cl.801.221(2) of the Regulations is to show domestic violence by the sponsoring partner.
The Tribunal found that the applicant’s material was deficient. It has not been shown that that finding was in error.
The applicant has not established any error of law by the Tribunal.
The Court finds that the Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision that has not been infected with jurisdictional error. In such circumstances, and pursuant to s.474 of the Act, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to interfere.
The application and amended application are dismissed.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Turner FM
Date: 24 September 2010
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