Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 127

Review of: Nguyen and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 370
File number: WAD 221 of 2019
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 14 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION - five year resident return visa - mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to revoke mandatory cancellation - applicant imprisoned for drug offences - whether Tribunal failed to consider Parole Decision of Prisoners Review Board - where Parole Decision included assessment of risk to community - where Tribunal considered other evidence relevant to the applicant's risk of re-offending - where evidence supports inference that Tribunal overlooked Parole Decision - whether consideration of Parole Decision could realistically have resulted in different outcome - materiality - jurisdictional error disclosed - application allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 499, 500, 501, 501CA

Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) ss 5A, 20

Cases cited:

Applicant in WAD531/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 213

Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 929

ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46

Franklin v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 102

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 [2019] FCAFC 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16

Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 295

Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 892

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106

Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; (2014) 226 FCR 112

Date of hearing: 19 September 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 103
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr DV Blades
Solicitor for the Applicant: TQH Lawyers and Consultants
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 221 of 2019
BETWEEN:

VAN DO DAT NGUYEN

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is allowed.

2.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 8 March 2019.

3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring a Tribunal constituted differently to the Tribunal that made the decision of 8 March 2019 to…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a non-citizen who had been imprisoned for drug offences, challenged the Minister for Home Affairs' decision to deny a visa application and to order the applicant's removal from Australia. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had previously dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Minister's decision. The central issue in this case was whether the AAT had committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the Parole Decision of the Prisoners Review Board when assessing the risk of re-offending. The Parole Decision included an assessment of the applicant's risk to the community, which the applicant argued should have been considered by the AAT.

The court examined the AAT's reasons and found that while the AAT did refer to the Parole Assessment, it did not explicitly mention the Parole Decision. The court noted that the absence of a reference to the Parole Decision in the AAT's reasons could indicate that it was not considered, but it also acknowledged that such an omission does not necessarily mean the evidence was not considered at all. The court then applied the principles established in Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which held that the failure to consider material evidence could amount to jurisdictional error if the evidence was important to the determination of the application.

The court concluded that the AAT's failure to consider the Parole Decision could have realistically resulted in a different outcome, as it contained information pertinent to the assessment of the applicant's risk of re-offending. Therefore, the court found that the AAT's failure to consider the Parole Decision amounted to jurisdictional error. The application was allowed, and the court quashed the Minister's decision and ordered the AAT to reconsider the application with a differently constituted tribunal. The applicant was granted liberty to apply for costs within 14 days of the orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is allowed.

2. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 8 March 2019.

3. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring a Tribunal constituted differently to the Tribunal that made the decision of 8 March 2019 to determine the applicant's application for review according to law.

4. The applicant has liberty to apply in relation to costs within 14 days of the date of these orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister denies that the Tribunal committed the error as alleged. The Minister's case proceeds on the basis that the Tribunal did consider that the applicant was released on parole and that it considered the Parole Decision. The Minister submits further that even if the alleged error is found to have occurred then it was not material as any regard paid to the Parole Decision could not realistically have resulted in the Tribunal making a different decision. Accordingly, the Minister argues, such failure did not comprise jurisdictional error having regard to the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421.Background to conviction and parole The applicant was arrested on 14 June 2016 on four drug charges and was held in custody. He pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of 188.3 grams of MDMA and possession of $75,000 suspected of being unlawfully obtained. He pleaded not guilty to the other charges which were listed for trial, but on the day before the trial was due to commence the State filed a notice of discontinuance of those charges. The applicant was sentenced for the two charges to which he pleaded guilty on 8 March 2018 (and at his request he was also sentenced on that date on a third charge of possessing heroin). The applicant was sentenced by the District Court to a term of imprisonment of 3 years and 9 months, backdated to the date on which he had been taken into custody, being 14 June 2016, and with a direction that he be considered for parole at the half way point of his sentence (13 June 2018). The applicant was released on parole on 13 June 2018 and taken into immigration detention.Parole materials before the Tribunal The Tribunal listed in its reasons the documents that were before it. Those documents included a supplementary bundle comprising a Parole Review Report dated 27 April 2018 (upon which nothing appears to turn), a Parole Assessment which is undated but refers to an interview date of 3 April 2018 and presumably was produced in late April 2018 (Parole Assessment), a Board Decision Slip with a stated date of 28 May 2018 (Decision Slip) and the Parole Decision. Presumably the documents were provided by way of a supplementary bundle because they were received by the Minister's solicitor's office only sometime after January 2019 and apparently did not form part of the materials before the delegate.Parole Assessment The Parole Assessment is on Department of Justice, Corrective Services letterhead. It appears that it has been provided only in part in the application book, and as the signatory page is not included the position of the author is unknown. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Parole Assessment was prepared by an authorised officer from the Department. It was prepared following an interview of 3 April 2018. It refers to an alert dated 26 April 2018 which recorded that the applicant had received a formal notification of cancellation of his visa pursuant to s 501 of the Migration Act. Therefore, the risk of deportation was known at the time of its preparation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, the first matter to resolve is whether the Tribunal did or did not have regard to the Parole Decision.Alleged failure to have regard to the applicant's submission and the Parole Decision There is no doubt that the Tribunal had regard to the SOFIC. The Tribunal ascribed to it the reference Exhibit A1 and then referred to it in its reasons on some four occasions. The Tribunal does not, however, refer to paras 15 or 54 of the SOFIC or their content. The only reference to para 53 is in that part of the reasons that address the submission of the lawyers for the applicant that the risk of re-offending is very low. However, the extent of its reference to para 53 is limited as follows:Thirdly, Counsel submitted that the Applicant's conduct whilst in custody had been 'exemplary' (refer paragraph 53 of Exhibit A1). There is no reference in the reasons to the fact that the applicant was granted parole. The Tribunal refers only to the Parole Assessment. The contention advanced by the applicant is that the Court should conclude from the absence of any express reference to the Parole Decision in the Tribunal's reasons that the Tribunal did not consider it. The obligation of the Tribunal is to provide written reasons that include its findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which the findings were made: s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth); and s 500(6G) of the Migration Act. There are a number of reasons why the Tribunal might fail to refer to a matter in its reasons. Such failure may reflect that the matter was not considered by the Tribunal to be material. It may provide a basis for inferring that it was not considered at all: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431 at [62] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ); and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 at [34] (Katzmann, Griffiths and Wigney JJ). The position was summarised in ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46 at [13]‑[14] (Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ) as follows:[13]The absence of an express reference to evidence in a tribunal's reasons does not necessarily mean that the evidence (or an issue raised by it) was not considered by that tribunal. That is especially so when regard is had to the content of the obligation to give reasons, which, here, included referring to the findings on any 'material questions of fact' and setting out the evidence on which the findings are based. There was no obligation on the Tribunal to refer in its reasons to every piece of evidence presented to it.[14]Further, there is a distinction between an omission indicating that a tribunal did not consider evidence (or an issue raised by it) to be material to an applicant's claims, and an omission indicating that a tribunal failed to consider a matter that is material: including one that is an essential integer to an applicant's claim or that would be dispositive of the review.(footnotes omitted)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Against that backdrop it is appropriate to now turn to the principles and their application in this case.ConsiderationThe review ground and general principles The applicant did not seek to rely on any authorities other than Coker. He claimed that his circumstances and those considered in Coker were analogous. The applicant contends that the information in the Parole Decision was worthy of serious consideration and that failure to accord it such consideration comprised a constructive failure on the part of the Tribunal to carry out its statutory task, and so comprised jurisdictional error. Both WAD531 and this matter involve decisions of the Tribunal. Coker involved a decision of the Assistant Minister. The different nature of the tasks of those respective decision‑makers was addressed in WAD531 in the extract included above. Importantly, the Tribunal must comply with the Direction. Relevantly, the Direction provides that decision‑makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case, and that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations. Further, para 7 and para 8 of the Direction provide guidance as to how a decision‑maker is to exercise its discretion, and provide, relevantly, that decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case and that in applying the considerations, information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight. The applicant does not specifically allege in this case that the Tribunal failed to consider any particular criterion of the Direction. Rather, the argument proceeds on the basis that in assessing one of the relevant primary considerations, being that of protection of the Australian community and in particular the risk of the applicant re-offending (referring to para 13.1.2(1) of the Direction), the Tribunal failed to take into account the applicant's express representations by way of the SOFIC and the evidence of the Parole Decision and so omitted to have regard to information and evidence important to the assessment of risk and so important to the determination of the application. Failure to comply with a ministerial direction made under s 499 has been held to amount to jurisdictional error: Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; (2014) 226 FCR 112 at [34]‑[35] (Mortimer J) and the authorities cited therein. More generally, considering material which has the requisite level of importance is part of discharging the Tribunal's review function: Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136 at [42] (Allsop J, Spender J agreeing). Where there has been an omission to consider evidence that bears upon a substantial and articulated argument and being a matter of importance to the application that would be expected to be addressed, then the Tribunal may have manifested a failure to discharge its statutory obligation: see generally the review of authorities by Allsop CJ (as they apply to the power conferred on the Minister by s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act) in Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 295 at [34]‑[51]; and see, for example, in the context of the Tribunal Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 892 at [49] (Colvin J).