FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 127
Review of: Nguyen and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 370 File number: WAD 221 of 2019 Judge: BANKS-SMITH J Date of judgment: 14 February 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION - five year resident return visa - mandatory cancellation under s 501(3A) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal not to revoke mandatory cancellation - applicant imprisoned for drug offences - whether Tribunal failed to consider Parole Decision of Prisoners Review Board - where Parole Decision included assessment of risk to community - where Tribunal considered other evidence relevant to the applicant's risk of re-offending - where evidence supports inference that Tribunal overlooked Parole Decision - whether consideration of Parole Decision could realistically have resulted in different outcome - materiality - jurisdictional error disclosed - application allowed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 499, 500, 501, 501CA
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) ss 5A, 20
Cases cited: Applicant in WAD531/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 213
Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 929
ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46
Franklin v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 102
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136
Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 [2019] FCAFC 40
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 295
Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 892
Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106
Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; (2014) 226 FCR 112
Date of hearing: 19 September 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 103 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr DV Blades Solicitor for the Applicant: TQH Lawyers and Consultants Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR MacLiver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 221 of 2019 BETWEEN: VAN DO DAT NGUYEN
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BANKS-SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 FEBRUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is allowed.
2.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 8 March 2019.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring a Tribunal constituted differently to the Tribunal that made the decision of 8 March 2019 to…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 127
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the AAT's reasons and found that while the AAT did refer to the Parole Assessment, it did not explicitly mention the Parole Decision. The court noted that the absence of a reference to the Parole Decision in the AAT's reasons could indicate that it was not considered, but it also acknowledged that such an omission does not necessarily mean the evidence was not considered at all. The court then applied the principles established in Coker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which held that the failure to consider material evidence could amount to jurisdictional error if the evidence was important to the determination of the application.
The court concluded that the AAT's failure to consider the Parole Decision could have realistically resulted in a different outcome, as it contained information pertinent to the assessment of the applicant's risk of re-offending. Therefore, the court found that the AAT's failure to consider the Parole Decision amounted to jurisdictional error. The application was allowed, and the court quashed the Minister's decision and ordered the AAT to reconsider the application with a differently constituted tribunal. The applicant was granted liberty to apply for costs within 14 days of the orders.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is allowed.
2. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 8 March 2019.
3. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring a Tribunal constituted differently to the Tribunal that made the decision of 8 March 2019 to determine the applicant's application for review according to law.
4. The applicant has liberty to apply in relation to costs within 14 days of the date of these orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Against that backdrop it is appropriate to now turn to the principles and their application in this case.ConsiderationThe review ground and general principles The applicant did not seek to rely on any authorities other than Coker. He claimed that his circumstances and those considered in Coker were analogous. The applicant contends that the information in the Parole Decision was worthy of serious consideration and that failure to accord it such consideration comprised a constructive failure on the part of the Tribunal to carry out its statutory task, and so comprised jurisdictional error. Both WAD531 and this matter involve decisions of the Tribunal. Coker involved a decision of the Assistant Minister. The different nature of the tasks of those respective decision‑makers was addressed in WAD531 in the extract included above. Importantly, the Tribunal must comply with the Direction. Relevantly, the Direction provides that decision‑makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case, and that primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations. Further, para 7 and para 8 of the Direction provide guidance as to how a decision‑maker is to exercise its discretion, and provide, relevantly, that decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case and that in applying the considerations, information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight. The applicant does not specifically allege in this case that the Tribunal failed to consider any particular criterion of the Direction. Rather, the argument proceeds on the basis that in assessing one of the relevant primary considerations, being that of protection of the Australian community and in particular the risk of the applicant re-offending (referring to para 13.1.2(1) of the Direction), the Tribunal failed to take into account the applicant's express representations by way of the SOFIC and the evidence of the Parole Decision and so omitted to have regard to information and evidence important to the assessment of risk and so important to the determination of the application. Failure to comply with a ministerial direction made under s 499 has been held to amount to jurisdictional error: Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 674; (2014) 226 FCR 112 at [34]‑[35] (Mortimer J) and the authorities cited therein. More generally, considering material which has the requisite level of importance is part of discharging the Tribunal's review function: Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136 at [42] (Allsop J, Spender J agreeing). Where there has been an omission to consider evidence that bears upon a substantial and articulated argument and being a matter of importance to the application that would be expected to be addressed, then the Tribunal may have manifested a failure to discharge its statutory obligation: see generally the review of authorities by Allsop CJ (as they apply to the power conferred on the Minister by s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act) in Navoto v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 295 at [34]‑[51]; and see, for example, in the context of the Tribunal Nguyen v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 892 at [49] (Colvin J).