Nguyen-Kieu and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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Nguyen-Kieu and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2021] AATA 61 (28 January 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2019/1721

Re:Chinh Nguyen-Kieu

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk
Dr Peter Fricker

Date:28 January 2021

Place:Canberra

The Reviewable Decision is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal finds that, as at 25 September 2018 and presently, the Applicant’s accepted condition is ongoing and the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to sections 16, 19 and 29 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

………………..……………………
Senior Member Linda Kirk
Dr Peter Fricker

Catchwords

COMPENSATION – Worker’s Compensation – Commonwealth employee – whether liability should be accepted under sections 16, 19 and 29 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – chronic rotator cuff impingement with wear of the bursal surface of the postero-superior rotator cuff - whether the Applicant suffers from an injury – whether an injury other than a disease – whether an ailment – aggravation of an ailment – causation – whether contributed to, to a significant degree, by employment – reviewable decision set aside

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Australian Workplace Safety Standards Act 2005 (Cth)
Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘SRC Act’)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation and other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Cth)

Cases

Comcare v Power (2015) 238 FCR 187

Comcare v Reardon [2015] FCA 1166

Comcare v Sahu-Kahn (2007) 156 FCR 536

Reardon and Comcare [2015] AATA 360

Su v Comcare [2011] AATA 934

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Linda Kirk
Dr Peter Fricker

28 January 2021

  1. Ms Chinh Nguyen-Kieu (‘the Applicant’) was born in 1959.  She commenced permanent full-time employment as a mail officer with Australia Post at the Canberra Mail Centre in 1989.

  2. On 21 April 2016, a claim for rehabilitation compensation was lodged by the Applicant for ‘an injured right shoulder’ (‘the claimed condition’) with a date of injury being 17 March 2016.[1]

    [1] T6, 17-18.

  3. On 26 May 2016, Comcare (‘the Respondent’) issued a Determination accepting liability pursuant to section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (‘SRC Act’) for ‘aggravation to pre-existing right shoulder tendinosis resulting in subacromial/ subdeltoid bursitis’, with a date of injury of 17 March 2016.[2]

    [2] T15, 28.

  4. On 2 June 2016, the Respondent issued a Determination accepting medical treatment pursuant to section 16 of the SRC Act.[3]  On 5 June 2017, the Respondent issued a Determination approving a rehabilitation program.[4]

    [3] T17, 35-19.

    [4] T22, 44-49.

  5. On 17 July 2018, at the request of the Respondent, the Applicant was assessed by Dr Anthony Smith, Orthopaedic Surgeon, who subsequently produced a report dated 24 July 2018.[5]

    [5] T31, 60-69.

  6. On 1 August 2018, the Respondent issued a fair opportunity letter which foreshadowed the Respondent issuing a Determination no longer accepting liability for the condition.[6]

    [6] T31, 60-69.

  7. On 27 August 2018, the Respondent issued a Determination accepting a rehabilitation program.[7]

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by the Applicant, Ms. Nguyen-Kieu, against the Australian Postal Corporation (the Respondent) regarding a claim for compensation under the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (SRC Act). The Applicant claimed to have suffered a chronic rotator cuff impingement with wear of the bursal surface of the postero-superior rotator cuff due to her employment. The core dispute revolved around whether the Applicant's condition constituted an "injury" as defined by the SRC Act, and consequently, whether the Respondent was liable to pay compensation. The decision was made by Linda Kirk SM.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the Applicant suffered an "injury" as defined in section 5A of the SRC Act. This required determining if her condition was an "injury (other than a disease)" under subsection 5A(1)(b), or a "disease" under subsection 5A(1)(a) and section 5B(1). Further, the Tribunal had to consider if the condition was an "ailment" or an "aggravation" as defined by section 4, and crucially, whether it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the Applicant's employment with Australia Post, as stipulated by section 5B(3). If these conditions were met, the Tribunal then had to determine if the Respondent was liable to pay compensation under sections 14, 16, 19, and 29 of the SRC Act.

The Tribunal reasoned that while medical evidence indicated the Applicant suffered from age-related degeneration in her shoulder, and not an acute injury like a rotator cuff tear, her repetitive and physically demanding work duties, including prolonged overhead reaching and lifting, contributed to her condition. The Tribunal applied the principles of the SRC Act, focusing on the definition of "injury" and the requirement for employment to contribute significantly to the ailment. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant's employment had significantly contributed to her condition, thus meeting the criteria for a compensable injury.

Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the reviewable decision. It found that the Applicant had suffered an "injury" within the meaning of section 14 of the SRC Act and that the Respondent was liable to pay compensation for this injury under sections 16, 19, and 29 of the SRC Act. The Tribunal further found that the Applicant's accepted condition was ongoing and that the Respondent remained liable to pay compensation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The issues for determination are as follows:(1)Did the Applicant suffer an ‘injury’ as defined in section 5A of the SRC Act, and specifically, is the claimed condition:(i)‘an injury (other than a disease)’ as defined in subsection 5A(1)(b) of the Act; or(ii)a ‘disease’ as defined in subsection 5A(1)(a) and section 5B(1) of the Act, specifically are the conditions:(i)an ‘ailment’ or ‘aggravation’ as defined by section 4 of the Act?(ii)contributed to by the Applicant’s ‘employment’ with Australia Post as required by section 5B of the Act? and(iii)was this employment contribution ‘significant’ as defined by subsection 5B(3) of the Act?(2)Is the Respondent liable to pay compensation for the Applicant’s ‘injury’ pursuant to sections 14, 16, 19 and 29 of the SRC Act?EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNALApplicant’s employment with Australia Post The Applicant filed a statement dated 10 July 2019 in support of her application.[11] In relation to her employment and work duties she wrote: [11] Exhibit A1.… 2. I have been employed by Australia Post in the mail sorting area on a permanent full-time basis for approximately 30 years. 3. My duties require me to use various machines as well as hand sorting to sort mail. These have been my duties since commencing at Australia Post. I have also had other duties in my time at Australia Post.4. In previous years, mail sorting duties were more physical in nature, requiring us to also handle parcels up to 16 kilograms. 5. I had not had any pain of stiffness in my shoulder prior to 17 March 2016. Description of Duties 6. My duties are repetitive in nature, and often require me to lift, reach, and perform overhead work, for extended periods of time. 7. Each morning, I would be required to work at the barcode machine, which would continually operate. There were usually four people working at this machine. 8. The barcode machine would continuously fill with letters which we would frequently reach up above shoulder and remove. 9. The team of four people would work quickly and repetitively to prevent the machine from overfilling with letters. 10. To work at the barcode machine, I would be doing work frequently above my shoulder level for approximately three hours every day. 11. I would manually sort small and large letters for approximately two hours each day following my return from my lunch break. Sorting large letter can involve lifting of up to 16 kilograms. 12. Later in the afternoons, I would operate the MARS machine. 13. Operating the MARS machine involves repetitively reaching forwards to place letters on the table to be fed into the machine, and then reaching to remove the letters from the stackers. 14. The MARS machine would be operated for two to three hours per day. 15. During Sunday operations, extra machine work is required, totalling six to seven hours a day. 16. I would repeat this sequence of duties each day. The Applicant told the Tribunal that prior to her injury she worked full-time five days a week from 10:39am to 6:30pm, including breaks. She also worked every second Sunday from 6am to 1:45pm. She worked overtime about once a week. Her work duties involved sorting parcels and running the Mail and Round Sorter (MARS) machine and the Barcode Sorter (BCS) machine. She was always busy and worked at a fast pace on both machines. She worked on the BCS machine until lunchtime for three to four hours and the MARS machine in the afternoon, three to four times a week. On Sundays she would work the entire shift on one or other of the machines. Her duties included carrying boxes between five and eight kilograms in weight a distance of less than one metre.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal is satisfied, for the reasons outlined above, that the Applicant suffered an ‘injury’ within the meaning of section 14 of the SRC Act. The Respondent is therefore liable to pay compensation to the Applicant for the injury under sections 16, 19 and 29 of the SRC Act.DECISION The Reviewable Decision is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal finds that, as at 25 September 2018 and presently, the Applicant’s accepted condition is ongoing and the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to sections 16, 19 and 29 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the Applicant’s pre-disposition to the condition, the available medical evidence, including from Dr Damiani, indicates that the Applicant suffers from degeneration affecting her right shoulder, which is typical for someone of her age. The available evidence also indicates that the applicant has not suffered from an injury simpliciter affecting her right shoulder whilst at work, such as a rotator cuff tear, which would likely produce immediate and ongoing pain.[110] [110] Respondent’s SFIC at 9.CONSIDERATION AND REASONS The Tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions, the evidence of the witnesses at the hearing, and all the documentary material before it. The Tribunal is satisfied that the parties had an adequate opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s role on review is established by section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the AAT Act’) which provides that the Tribunal ‘may exercise all the powers and discretions that are conferred by any relevant enactment on the person who made the decision’. As Woodwood J explained in McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 at 357 (‘McDonald’), the Tribunal is effectively required by section 43 of the AAT Act to put itself in the position of the decision-maker and, based on the material before it, make its own decision. 
 As Katzmann J explained in Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502 (‘Power’), to speak in terms of a party bearing an onus of proof (whether legal or evidential) in proceedings before the Tribunal is apt to mislead. After referring to McDonald and noting that it was common ground that the Act did not provide for an evidential onus, Her Honour stated at [63]:Here, as Comcare acknowledged in argument, the decision the Tribunal was reviewing was whether or not to terminate Ms Power’s compensation entitlements arising from the compensable injury in light of changed circumstances. It was not reviewing a decision based on fresh evidence as to whether compensation should ever have been awarded. In a case such as this, as Woodward J explained in McDonald at 359, having considered all the available evidence, if the Tribunal was left in a state of indecision, it should have been resolved in the claimant’s favour. Her Honour later observed at [70]:Nonetheless, I accept that it is reasonable to say, as a practical matter, that Comcare would have to persuade the Tribunal of the circumstances which justify a finding that compensation payments should no longer be made. The statement the Tribunal made in the present case that Comcare did not discharge its onus should be taken to mean that the Tribunal was not persuaded that Ms Power was no longer suffering from the effects of the compensable injury. Accordingly, although there is no legal or evidentiary onus, ‘as a practical matter’ the Respondent must persuade the Tribunal of the circumstances that justify a finding that there is no liability for the claimed condition. Medical experts