FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
The Ngalakan People v Northern Territory of Australia [2001] FCA 654
ABORIGINES AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDERS – Native Title – recognition by Common Law and Native Title Act 1993 – rights of exclusive possession to land that is part of proclaimed township – whether Native Title continues on Crown Land proclaimed as township but largely undeveloped
NATIVE TITLE – roads – extinguishment by “dedication” of roads – statutory gazettal of roads
NATIVE TITLE- Claimant Groups – “adoption” and “incorporation” into Claimant Groups
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
Native Title Act 1993
Northern Territory Crown Lands Consolidation Act (1882)
Minerals Acquisition Ordinance 1953
Petroleum Act 1984
Territory Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act (NT)Mabo v The State of Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 followed
Ward v State of Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 followed
Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 followed
Wandarang, Alawa, Marra and Ngalakan Peoples v Northern Territory of Australia [2000] FCA 923 applied
Re: Waanyi People’s Application (1995) 129 ALR 118 cited
Permanent Trustee Company of New South Wales Ltd v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1960) 105 CLR 401 considered
Attorney-General for the Northern Territory of Australia v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1989) 23 FCR 536 considered
Attorney-General for the Northern Territory of Australia v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (3 August 1988, unreported) cited
Bass Coast Shire Council v King [1997] 2 VR 5 followed
Fourmile v Selpam Pty Ltd (1997) 80 FCR 151 followed
The Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v The State of Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 considered
Yarmirr v Northern Territory of Australia (1998) 82 FCR 533 followed
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 referred to
Hayes v Northern Territory of Australia [1999] FCA 1248 followedTHE NGALAKAN PEOPLE v THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
NO DG 6003 OF 1996
O’LOUGHLIN J
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN ROPER BAR AND ADELAIDE)
5 JUNE 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
DG 6003 OF 1996
BETWEEN:
THE NGALAKAN PEOPLE
ApplicantsAND:
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
RespondentJUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2001
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE (HEARD IN ROPER BAR AND ADELAIDE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Further consideration of these proceedings is adjourned sine die.
2.Each party is at liberty, if so advised, to file and serve, within twenty-eight days of this date, written submissions with respect to the determination that should be the subject of the orders of the Court.
3.After the expiration of twenty-eight days from the date hereof, either party is at liberty, upon giving seven days notice to the other, to set these proceedings down for further consideration.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
DG 6003 OF 1996
BETWEEN:
THE NGALAKAN PEOPLE
ApplicantsAND:
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
O’LOUGHLIN J
DATE:
5 JUNE 2001
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 654
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the principles of native title and the concept of extinguishment by State action. It concluded that the creation of the gazetted roads did indeed extinguish any native title rights that existed over the parcels of land represented by those roads. This extinguishment likely occurred on 17 March 1887 when the relevant notice appeared in the South Australian Government Gazette, but it was certainly effective from the time of the first land grant on 24 August 1889. The Court considered the traditional laws and customs of the Ngalakan People, including the concepts of adoption and incorporation, and found that these practices were integral to their community. The Court also rejected the Northern Territory's argument that incorporation was not a well-established tradition, noting that cultures and native title rights evolve over time.
In light of the findings, the Court adjourned the proceedings sine die and allowed both parties to submit written submissions within 28 days. The parties were also given the liberty to set the proceedings down for further consideration after this period, upon providing seven days' notice to the other party.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Further consideration of these proceedings is adjourned sine die.
2. Each party is at liberty, if so advised, to file and serve, within twenty-eight days of this date, written submissions with respect to the determination that should be the subject of the orders of the Court.
3. After the expiration of twenty-eight days from the date hereof, either party is at liberty, upon giving seven days notice to the other, to set these proceedings down for further consideration.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The creation of the gazetted roads was therefore, in my opinion, inconsistent with and extinguished any native title that was previously subsisting over the parcels of land that were represented by those roads. That extinguishment probably occurred as early as 17 March 1887 when the relevant notice appeared in the South Australian Government Gazette but certainly it occurred as and from the time of the first land grant on 24 August 1889.ADOPTION AND INCORPORATION To the members of the Aboriginal community who were the claimants in this litigation, biological descent is important, but a person can also achieve a classification through social recognition. This is most often achieved through adoption, but it can also occur through incorporation. Adoption is the term that is used when someone has been “grown up” by a member of a group. In a case such as that, the adult who is doing “the growing up” is regarded as a social parent. Just as a person who has been formally adopted can enjoy, in western society, the same rights of inheritance and maintenance as a natural born child, so also can a person who has been accepted into a group by adoption, claim membership of that group and trace his or her membership back through the adopting family. Incorporation is a much broader concept and could occur, for example, where a person who, although not “grown up’ by a member of the group, has nevertheless come to be regarded as a member of the group. This could occur as a result of ceremonial involvements or residence or skin affiliation. Tex Camfoo, for example, was adopted by Power Jack (Magurnba) who was a Mingirringgi for the area that includes the claim area. Through that affiliation, Tex has come to be regarded as a senior Mingirringgi for the country. Another example is Peter Woods who was born on the eastern Arnhem Land coast. As a child, he was brought to Roper Bar where his father died when Peter was still young. However, he was of the correct semi-moiety to be Mingirringgi. That did not mean, however, that Peter thereby abandoned his connections with the country of his birth in Arnhem Land. That connection still remains and is still maintained by Peter. Dawson Daniels is an example of an “outsider” who became a Junggayi. He lived at Ngukurr but regularly visited Roper Bar where he formed a close association with members of the Ponto family as he grew up. There came a time when the number of Junggayi fell away and Dawson and his brothers were invited to fill the gap. Thus, through this concept of incorporation, they became Junggayi for the area of which the claim area is part. The Territory did not dispute the availability of the concept of adoption but it had reservations about “incorporation”. It did not dispute that there could be circumstances where a person might be incorporated into a group that is associated with country otherwise than by the principles of descent. Examples that the Territory recognised were matters such as long residence in an area or superior knowledge of ceremony. However, so it was claimed, such cases are exceptions to the general rule of inheritance through biological or adoptive descent. The Territory claimed that the evidence did not support a conclusion that incorporation is a long established tradition. Rather, said the Territory, it appears to be a relatively recent mechanism whereby males are “recruited” through ceremony in order to make viable otherwise rapidly diminishing groups. Assuming that the evidence supports the Territory’s submission that incorporation is relatively new – and I am by no means satisfied that it does – the evidence of Professor Morphy and Mr Stead suggested that incorporation, like adoption, is, nevertheless, part of the system of traditional laws and customs. I do not consider that the recency of the practice is a matter of concern. There is ample authority to the effect that native title rights and interests are not “frozen in time”; they, like all cultures, are continually evolving. There was uncontradicted evidence from Peter Woods and Dawson Daniels that they had been incorporated as Mingirringgi and Junggayi respectively and that their incorporation was in accordance with the customs and traditions of the community.