Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd v RLA Polymers Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd v RLA Polymers Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 135

Citation: Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd v RLA Polymers Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 135
Appeal from: RLA Polymers Pty Ltd v Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 423
RLA Polymers Pty Ltd v Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 606
Parties: NEXUS ADHESIVES PTY LTD (ACN 121 120 036), JONATHAN CHARLES CLEWLOW, ISHU SOFAT and BRETT NIXON v RLA POLYMERS PTY LTD (ACN 004 709 915)
File number: VID 645 of 2011
Judges: NORTH, JACOBSON AND FOSTER JJ
Date of judgment: 19 September 2012
Catchwords:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – nature of appeal in Federal Court – need for demonstration of error

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – use of confidential information as a springboard –whether primary judge erred in finding information to be confidential – whether primary judge erred in finding misuse of confidential information – whether primary judge erred in calculating impact of the springboard advantage

COSTS – applicant successful on central issue – damages yet to be quantified – primary judge ordered respondents (appellants on appeal) to pay 75% of costs – no error in exercise of discretion to award costs

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 53(c)
Cases cited: RLA Polymers Pty Ltd v Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd (2011) 280 ALR 125 related
RLA Polymers Pty Ltd v Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 606 related
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Dart Industries Inc v David Bryar & Associates Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 389
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 210 CLR 181
Mifsud v Campbell (1991) 21 NSWLR 725
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588
United States Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 157
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531
Date of hearing: 21, 22 and 23 November 2011
Place: Sydney (via video link to Melbourne)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 129
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr T P Mitchell with Mr R E T Wodak
Solicitor for the Appellants: GPZ Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D M B Derham QC with Mr A D Nash
Counsel for the Respondent: Blake Dawson

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 645 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

NEXUS ADHESIVES PTY LTD (ACN 121 120 036)
First Appellant

JONATHAN CHARLES CLEWLOW
Second Appellant

ISHU SOFAT
Third Appellant

BRETT NIXON
Fourth Appellant

AND:

RLA POLYMERS PTY LTD (ACN 004 709 915)
Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, JACOBSON AND FOSTER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 SEPTEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO MELBOURNE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, brought proceedings against RLA Polymers Pty Ltd, the defendant, in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary dispute centred on the misuse of confidential information and trade secrets. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant improperly used confidential cost information, which led to the development of a competing product, Nexus 820. The defendant denied these allegations and appealed against the primary judge's decision.

The court had to decide several key legal issues. Firstly, whether the primary judge erred in finding the cost information to be confidential and whether it constituted a trade secret. Secondly, the court needed to determine if the primary judge correctly found that the defendant misused the plaintiff's confidential information. Thirdly, the court had to assess whether the primary judge erred in calculating the impact of the alleged springboard advantage.

The Full Court of the Federal Court found that the defendant's appeal failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the primary judge. The court emphasized that the appeal was by way of rehearing, requiring the demonstration of error. The Full Court noted that the primary judge's assessment of the evidence and his findings were consistent with well-established principles of appellate review. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the cost information was not pleaded as confidential and that the primary judge should have separately assessed damages under the Trade Practices Act and Fair Trading Acts. The Full Court held that the primary judge's approach to assessing the springboard advantage and his overall conclusions were sound and that there was no error in his Honour's exercise of discretion to award costs.

In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs of the appeal. The primary judge's findings and the resulting orders stood affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Once again, the appellants’ submissions miss the point and do not demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge.Issue 5: The evidence disclosed no use that advanced development. It was not open to assess damages based on actual development compared to an “expected” development time This issue raises challenges to his Honour’s approach to assessing the impact of the springboard advantage. In arriving at the five and a half month period of advantage which his Honour determined, his Honour reviewed the evidence tendered on behalf of each of the parties and ultimately found that, had Nexus not had its springboard advantage, it would have taken ten and a half months to develop Nexus 820. His Honour also held that, in fact, it took Nexus five months to develop Nexus 820. His Honour therefore deduced that the springboard advantage comprised five and a half months. In arriving at his ten and a half month development period, his Honour (at [165] (p 173)) said that he had not found the expert’s reports on either side compelled a particular period as the likely development time. He then explained why. The appellants complain that the CETEC report was admitted into evidence subject to objection but that his Honour never ruled on the objection in the first judgment. The appellants complain that they did not know what evidence they had to meet. This submission has no substance. The report was admitted into evidence and the appellants must be taken to have appreciated that, had they wished to do so, they would need to meet the evidence contained in that report. We find that the approach which his Honour took is consistent with the approach to the assessment of headstart damages explained by the NSW Court of Appeal in United States Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 157 at 233A–C. The Court’s decision was reversed on other grounds. The passages to which we have referred were referred to with apparent approval by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 210 CLR 181 at [50] (p 201).Issue 6: The Trade Practices Act and Fair Trading Act claims should have been dismissed (Ground 15) The primary judge held that an account of profits would adequately compensate RLA for (inter alia) damages for any contravention by the appellants of the Trade Practices Act or the State Fair Trading Acts. He made no separate assessment of damages under those statutes. Implicit in those remarks was the proposition that RLA had made good its claims pursuant to those statutes. The appellants complain that his Honour made no findings as to their liability under those statutes and that therefore RLA’s claims based upon them should have been dismissed. We do not agree. In effect, the contraventions of the Trade Practices Act and the cognate State legislation were subsumed into his Honour’s conclusions in respect of the claims for damages for breach of the duties of confidentiality and infringement of RLA’s trade secrets.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In a second judgment given on 2 June 2011 (RLA Polymers Pty Ltd v Nexus Adhesives Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 606) (the second judgment), the primary judge ordered that the appellants pay interest on the damages quantified by the Registrar. He also ordered that the appellants pay 75% of RLA’s costs of the proceedings at first instance.THE APPEAL AND THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN IT By their Notice of Appeal and in their submissions made to the Full Court (both written and oral), the appellants have mounted a detailed and lengthy attack on the findings of fact made by the primary judge. They also allege that his Honour made a number of errors of law. As a general observation, it must be said that the appellants have argued the appeal upon the basis that every important finding of fact made by the primary judge is susceptible to challenge and that this Court should, in effect, examine afresh any finding of fact which the appellant challenges. This approach pays insufficient regard to the well settled principles which govern the exercise of the Full Court’s appellate jurisdiction in a matter such as this. In Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424, the Full Court concluded that, in a matter such as the matter with which we are presently dealing, the appeal is by way of rehearing. At [21] (p 435), Allsop J (with whom Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreed) said that, notwithstanding that the appeal was by way of rehearing, there remained a need to show error on appeal. At [24]–[27] (pp 435–436), his Honour said:24 What is error in any given case depends, of course, not only on the evidence, but also on the nature of the findings or conclusions made by the primary judge. The demonstration of error may not be straight-forward where findings or conclusions involve elements of fact, degree, opinion or judgment or when the findings or conclusions in question can be seen as made with the advantage of hearing the evidence in its entirety, presented as it unfolded at the hearing with the opportunity over the course of the hearing and adjournments for reflection and mature contemporaneous consideration and assessment, in particular in a long and complex hearing [citations omitted]. 25 This is not to elevate ordinary factual findings to the protected position of those based on credit, but it is to make clear, first, the advantages of the trial judge and, secondly, the need for demonstration of error. The inability to identify error may arise in part from the unwillingness of the appeal court to be persuaded that it is in as good a position as the trial judge to deal with the issues, because of the kinds of considerations referred to at [24] above. Or, it may be that the nature of the issue is one such that (though not a discretion) there cannot be said to be truly one correct answer. In such cases the availability of a different view, indeed even perhaps the preference of the appeal court for a different view, may not be alone sufficient …26 Where parties do not finally record their bargain in a formal document but, perforce of circumstance, leave the state of their communings as a mixture of conversations (between different people), letters and drafts, the findings and conclusions of the trial judge as to what was agreed (in the sense of consensus) and whether or not such agreement was intended to be legally binding may well be ones reached with all the advantages referred to by, amongst others, Kirby J in Earthline, and perhaps with the advantage of seeing and assessing the witnesses. Such findings and conclusions are the very kind of assessments to which the words of Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45 (cited with approval by Heydon JA in Williams) are especially apposite:“The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge’s evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la [vérité] est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge’s overall evaluation.”27 However, as was made clear in Cabal, this Court is bound to deal with the appeal as directed by Warren v Coombes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [174] (p 175), his Honour determined that the springboard advantage comprised five and a half months. Ultimately, his Honour did not separately consider the claims under the Trade Practices Act and the State Fair Trading Acts. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL As mentioned at [16] above, we propose to adopt the structure chosen by the appellants in their written submissions as the basis for our consideration of the appeal. In doing so, we have also had regard to the way in which the appeal was addressed in oral argument. Issue 1: The cost information was not pleaded to be confidential (Ground 4(a)) In support of this ground, the appellants submitted that it was not open to the primary judge to make the finding which he made at [135] (pp 164–165) of the first judgment (which we have extracted at [55] above) because the cost of the polymers in PE 265 had not been pleaded as part of RLA’s confidential information. In support of this submission, the appellants focussed on the proposition at law which they had advanced to the primary judge that it was incumbent upon a claimant for relief for misuse of its confidential information to specify with great particularity the confidential information which it alleges has been misused and that, once so specified, it was not open to the Court to characterise the confidential information in some other way. At par 10 of the final iteration of its Statement of Claim, RLA provided particulars of its allegation that the product formulations and processes for manufacturing PE 265 and Roberts 656 were confidential and also were trade secrets. Included within subpar (a) of those particulars was the allegation that the product formulations and processes consist of detailed and technical information as to the quantities of raw materials, order of mixing, equipment settings (including timing, temperature and speed parameters) and other information relevant to the manufacture of the products. It was also alleged in that subparagraph of the particulars that the formulations and processes were arrived at after a lengthy period of technical development by RLA’s employees. His Honour (at [45] (pp 137–138)) rejected a similar argument advanced by the appellants to the effect that it was not open for his Honour to find that the type, relative proportions and number of polymers specified in the formulas for PE 265 and Roberts 656 constituted confidential information of RLA and a trade secret of RLA, given the width of the description of the confidential information given by RLA in its Statement of Claim. In making this complaint, the appellants misconstrued the substance of his Honour’s findings in relation to the third misuse of RLA’s confidential information. When proper regard is had to the findings which his Honour made at [133] (p 164), [134] (p 164) and the first part of [135] (p 164), the focus of his Honour’s attention was the provision by Nixon to Sofat of the precise quantities of the specific polymers in PE 265 which enabled Sofat then to calculate the precise dry weight of each of those ingredients. It was that information which, when coupled with publicly available costing information, allowed Sofat to cost Nexus 820 but also to compare that cost with the cost of PE 265 to RLA. This capacity to make that comparison by using the information which Nixon passed to Sofat was a misuse of important confidential information belonging to RLA.