New South Wales Bar Association v Abdul-Karim (No 2)

[2003] NSWADT 144

CITATION:	New South Wales Bar Association v Abdul-Karim (No 2) [2003] NSWADT 144
DIVISION:	Legal Services Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Council of the New South Wales Bar Association RESPONDENT Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim
FILE NUMBER:	012029
HEARING DATES:	23/04/2003
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	04/23/2003
DATE OF DECISION:	06/17/2003
BEFORE:	West J QC - Judicial Member; Mattila J - Judicial Member; Costigan M - Member
APPLICATION:	Penalty - Costs
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Penalty and Costs
LEGISLATION CITED:	Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Legal Profession Act 1987
CASES CITED:	Law Society of NSW v Foreman [1994] NSWLR 408 New South Wales Bar Association v P (unreported, 19 March 1997) Englebrecht (1995) 5LPDR 1
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT P Mahony, barrister RESPONDENT In person
ORDERS:	1 That MICHAEL SAADEY ABDUL-KARIM undertake at the next available sessions, the course of studies offered by the NSW Bar Association Readers Course in Ethics, Practice and Procedure and Evidence, AND that he achieve a performance at examination or assessment (whichever being applicable to the students at the time) of pass; 2 That MICHAEL SAADEY ABDUL-KARIM pay the costs of the Association of these proceedings in the sum of $33,300.

1 On 27 March 2003 this Tribunal, differently constituted, decided that conduct of Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim (the Barrister), in the respects identified in that decision, constituted professional misconduct.

2 Thereafter the Tribunal attempted to sit on two occasions namely 10 April 2003 and 17 April 2003 to hear submissions of the parties as to the orders, if any, which should be made consequential upon the decision of 27 March 2003. On each of those two occasions, through no fault of the parties, the Tribunal was unable to constitute itself to hear the substantive matter however as it was sufficiently constituted to give directions, it did so.

3 It was not until 23 April 2003, after the President of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, Judge O’Connor, at the request of the presiding judicial member (Mr J. N. West QC), and with the consent of the parties ordered the reconstitution of this Tribunal pursuant to the power given him by s.79 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, that the hearing of the substantive proceedings could be completed.

4 The reconstitution substituted Dr Michael Costigan for Mr David Brehe.

5 On 23 April 2003 the Tribunal as presently constituted heard the submissions of the parties on the question of what orders, if any, should be made in these proceedings. We must record that in these circumstances the Tribunal has enjoyed the full cooperation of the parties.

Submissions

6 The Applicant, the Council of the NSW Bar Association (the Association), sought the following orders:

(i) That the practising certificate of Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim be cancelled;

(ii) That a practising certificate not be issued to Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim for a period being not less than 12 months from the date of cancellation of the practising certificate and the completion, to the satisfaction of the Bar Association, of each of the courses and examinations referred to in paragraph 3 herein, whichever shall be the later.

(iii) Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim undertake each of the courses and examinations referred to herein or in their absence such other similar courses as may from time to time be available and approved by the Bar Association;

I Equity course and examination conducted by the Law Extension Committee of the Legal Practitioners Admission Board.

II Professional Responsibility course and examination conducted by the College of Law.

III Bar Association examinations in Ethics, Practice and Procedure and Evidence

And obtain a pass mark in each examination to a level not less than 75%.

(iv) Michael Saadey Abdul-Karim pay the costs of the Bar Association.”

7 The essential reasons underlying this approach by the Association were identified as:

The Informant relies on the following matters in support of the orders sought:

(1) The circumstances giving rise to the complaint and the serious nature of the conduct found against the barrister:

(2) Previous adverse findings made in respect of the conduct of the barrister and, in particular:

(i) a private reprimand issued to the Barrister on 3 April 2000 in respect of a Bar Council complaint in respect of breaches of s.175 and s.177 LPA and Rule 80 of the New South Wales Barrister’s Rules.

(ii) An order made by this Tribunal on 13 September 2002 that the barrister be publicly reprimanded in proceedings no 002015 of 2000 filed in the Tribunal on 4 October 2000. The Tribunal held that the barrister had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct on six occasions, five of which involved contraventions of Rule 75 of the New South Wales Barristers Rules (acting inappropriately without a solicitor) and the sixth was in respect of his drafting of a Statement of Claim where the Tribunal held that this conduct fell short of the standard of competence and diligence a member of the public was entitled to expect of a reasonably competent legal practitioner.

(3) The Barrister’s denial of the complaints and the absence of remorse in respect of the conduct complained of.

(4) The need for the Tribunal to have regard to the protection of the public in arriving at an appropriate penalty in addition to the usual considerations of punishment and deterrence.

8 Each one of these elements in the Association’s submissions was expanded upon in writing and orally. We will deal with the submissions of each party under the respective topic headings.

Present Findings of Professional Misconduct

9 The Association focused upon paragraphs 101 and 102 of the Tribunal’s decision of 27 March 2003 (“the Findings”). The Association emphasised the significance of these findings in light of what were characterised as further examples of conduct of the kind described in the Findings at paragraphs 82 and 83. In particular it was submitted that the evidence demonstrated that in numerous respects the Barrister had given inadequate explanations for his conduct, or that, in the way he had answered questions put to him, he had, in some cases, inserted qualifications into his answers. It was in effect submitted that he was being disingenuous (our word) in his answers. This, it was submitted, flowed from the fact that at the date of his answers he had been in practice as a barrister for some ten years; that the precise use of the English language was a basic tool of his trade and that he accordingly must have appreciated that his qualification of his answers involved a lack of frankness. By way of example, we were taken to some exchanges on 5 November 2002 where the Barrister gave the following evidence:

Mahony: … namely – please let me finish the question. I will start it again. What I’m putting to you is in substance, exactly the same matter that was put to you on 2 August 1999 by Hamilton J, namely, that the interest that you completed, paragraph number 2 in the second caveat, was the very same subject matter as had been the subject of the first caveat matter, and that was acknowledge (sic) by you on that occasion as being correct?

The Witness: The same option, sir. It is the same option. I had nothing to do with the first caveat. Nothing.

Mahony: And the second caveat, which you did have everything to do with …

The Witness: No.

Mahony: … relied on this very same subject matter as had been placed in the first caveat?

The Witness: Look, what you got to understand, Mr Mahony, is that on 28 May 1998, Mr Ruckvina didn’t come to see me. He did not come to see me.

Mahony: Would you please answer my question?

The Witness: Well, I think I have answered your question. You have got to take my answer into consideration asking the question.

West: I think you should put the question again, Mr Mahony, and we will have Mr Abdul-Karim answer it.

Mahony: The interest that you placed at paragraph number 2 of the second caveat, was an interest which was exactly the same subject matter as had been the caveatable interest expressed in the first caveat?

The witness: Not in its entirety.

Mahony: That was a matter that was put to you by Hamilton J on 2 August 1999 and you agree that that was the case?

The Witness: No, I said – his Honour was strictly correct. Same option. It wasn’t a different option, a different date. It is the same option, yes.

Mahony: No. The transcript makes it quite clear, that the second caveat refers to exactly the same subject matter as the first, namely, whether you say it as grantee of an option, or whether you say in the nature of trust, the interest in each case is said to arise from the option document? That is what his Honour was putting to you and that is what you agreed with, was correct?

The Witness: He was strictly correct. His Honour was strictly correct.

Mahony: Why do you insist on the word “strictly”? Do you put some qualification on your agreeing with that proposition?

The Witness: Sir, I had given an advice at the request of my instructing solicitor on that issue because Mr Peter Ruckvina – we have seen him in conference, and he had made a number of – told us a story, in effect, what had happened, and to me, I had no doubt whatsoever that would constitute a trust.

10 While we have some sympathy for the submission which the Association put, we do not think that in the end, it is necessarily correct. This is because the essential issue which the Barrister was seeking to address in his answer concerned his belief that, based on evidence not yet procured but the essential substance of which he had been told, the full story had not been placed before and therefore not examined by Hamilton J. Reference to this issue is in paragraphs 59 to 65 in the Findings.

11 We do not think that anything further need be said about it.

12 The Association took us to other paragraphs in the evidence said to show that the Barrister had given evidence which displayed either an inadequate grasp of what he was doing; or which showed that his actions in drafting the caveat in the terms he did and in asserting the existence of an estate or interest in land under the option had to be contrary to his own appreciation of the decision of Hamilton J at the time.

13 Further the Association submitted that not only did the evidence show an inability to answer directly questions put to him but also an inability to accept what was plain and obvious. In this regard the Association took us to the Barrister’s evidence as to whether or not the description of the claimed interest in the land was misleading (TP 5.11.02 Page 19) and the Barrister’s refusal to accept that what he did was misleading.

14 This Tribunal has already dealt extensively with these matters in paragraphs 80 to 91 of the Findings.

15 The alleged lack of understanding of what he was doing, said to demonstrate a need for his re-education in the manner proposed by the Association, was said to be shown by passages in the evidence where the Barrister was cross examined about any relationship between an appeal against a Supreme Court judgment and the constitution of a “legitimate” caveatable interest (TP 5.11.02 Page 21).

16 Again, we doubt that a re-examination of this evidence really adds very much to our evaluation of the problem confronting us. We should say that, in any event, the evidence rather disclosed a debate about whether or not a stay had been or would have been inevitably sought and whether or not the Barrister had really considered the question at all. In the end the evidence which the Barrister gave before the Tribunal had an edge of argumentativeness about it.

17 We come to the position that the further examples of conduct and attitude of the Barrister to which we were taken, adds little if anything to the conclusions reached and expressed in the Findings, although they do rather serve to reinforce conclusion and concerns made in the Findings, especially the following:

90. The barrister’s failure to accede to the obvious strikes us as having more to do with an obstinate refusal to concede that his conduct may be described in unprepossessing terms – a situation to which his emotional involvement in his defence may have been a contributing factor.

102. Frankly, we think that the barrister’s conduct demonstrates an unusual and unhealthy closeness of identity with his client’s case and it may well be that in considering what orders should be made in these proceedings account will need to be taken of such aspects of the barrister’s behaviour as disclosed in the evidence before us.

18 As was said in the Findings, the Barrister’s manner of conduct of his own defence did not really assist his position. His conduct was remarked upon in the Findings and was the subject of comment during the hearing.

19 It was not however until the question of costs was debated before us, that any inkling of the Barrister’s position in defending himself was revealed.

20 The Barrister told us that he “cannot afford to have the luxury of someone appearing for me. I had no choice”. He said to us that, in the proceedings before Hamilton J (when Mr Bagley had moved to make him personally liable for the costs he had incurred in having to move to get rid of the caveat which the Barrister had drafted and which had been placed upon the title of the subject land) he had retained Counsel to appear for him. When, however, it came to the present proceedings he said “no one would touch me absent a substantial sum of money”.

21 The result is that in these proceedings the Barrister’s defence has been captive to the barrister’s personality, style and emotional disposition. It is necessary to appreciate that his emotional involvement and the presentation of the defence seems to us to contribute to his lapses into argumentativeness and unresponsiveness. With no one to filter out the effects of this behaviour, the impact upon presentation of his defence has not been to his advantage. We take this situation into account – but it is only one factor amongst many to be considered.

22 The Barrister submitted that we should have regard to the fact that, accepting as he did the finding of professional misconduct was one of the utmost seriousness, nevertheless he had found himself placed in the position at the Land Titles Office with Mr Ruckavina as the result of his extending a courtesy to a person who was unfamiliar with Sydney. He submitted that, as we understood him, he did not believe at the time that he had been acting recklessly or that he was being neglectful.

23 He emphasised that his position at the time of the events at the Land Titles Office was affected by his belief that the whole picture with respect to the interest of Pinebelt Pty Limited in the subject land had not been explored before Hamilton J – and thus he had the view the caveatable interest based on the existence of a trust was valid – even though the Court had not yet had a proper opportunity to pass upon that matter.

24 To a certain extent these submissions rather echoed some of the argument which took place at the hearing of the question of whether there was professional misconduct or not. To a large degree they were not to the point – a matter which we pointed out to the Barrister when asking for his help on the matters raised by the Association.

25 In the end, the Barrister emphasised that we should bear in mind that from the conduct complained of, he made no financial gain and that his conduct did not reflect upon his honesty or his good character. Indeed there is no question as to his honesty or good character.

Prior Adverse Findings

26 The Association placed before us information as to prior findings adverse to the Barrister. There are aspects of these prior matters which, perhaps not surprisingly, dovetail with the remarks made in the Findings at paragraph 102 namely:

102. Frankly, we think that the barrister’s conduct demonstrates an unusual and unhealthy closeness of identity with his client’s case and it may well be that in considering what orders should be made in these proceedings account will need to be taken of such aspects of the barrister’s behaviour as disclosed in the evidence before us.

27 With the above stated concern in mind, the prior adverse findings can be set out from the Association’s written submissions as follows:

“3.1 On 18 February 1999 the Bar Council resolved to initiate a complaint against the barrister arising from a wider complaint made in respect of his conduct by a Mr Costa Layous. The Bar Council complaint was made against him pursuant to s.135 LPA alleging breaches of ss.175 and 177 LPA and Rule 80 of the New South Wales Barristers’ Rules in respect of the barrister’s failure to comply with his obligations in respect of disclosure on the basis upon which he was charging Mr Layous fees for work he was carrying out on his behalf.

3.2 After investigation the barrister was invited to consent to a reprimand pursuant to s.155(3)(a) LPA and the barrister did so. He attended the chambers of the President of the Bar Association on 3 April 2000 and was privately reprimanded.

3.3 The complaint by Mr Layous was referred by the Bar Association to the Tribunal on the same day, that is 18 February 1999. An Information No 002015 of 2000 was filed in the Tribunal on 4 October 2000. The conduct described in the Information was inappropriately acting without a solicitor and giving further incompetent and/or inadequate advice on various occasions during 1995 and 1996.

3.4 The barrister was acting on behalf of Mr Layous in respect of a dispute concerning the siting of garbage disposal bins on the common property of the Strata Plan at premises where Mr Layous lived. Without the intervention of a solicitor, the barrister wrote various letters to the local Council, local estate agents and others as well as drafting a statement of claim which he sent to Mr Layous and was subsequently filed in the District Court by Mr Layous.

3.5 The hearing of the complaint commenced in the Tribunal on 29 August 2001. The barrister denied all of the particulars of complaint. On 22 February 2002 the Tribunal found that the barrister had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct on six occasions in respect of his handling of the dispute on behalf of Mr Layous

3.6 The Tribunal held that the contraventions of Rule 75 (acting inappropriately without a solicitor) were by no means flagrant and were borne (sic) of the genuine desire to assist Mr Layous. The Tribunal further found that in respect of his drafting of the Statement of Claim in the matter, his conduct fell short of the standard of competence and diligence a member of the public was entitled to expect of a reasonably competent legal practitioner and that the conduct also amounted to unsatisfactory professional misconduct.

3.7 On 23 April 2002 the Tribunal heard submissions on sentence. The Association submitted that the barrister should be publicly reprimanded pursuant to s.171C(1)(e) LPA and that pursuant to s.171C(1)(f) the barrister should be ordered to undertake and successfully complete the Bar Association courses and examinations in Ethics, Practice and Procedure and Evidence. It was submitted that that order was necessary as this matter had exposed the barrister’s misunderstanding of his role as counsel and his misunderstanding of the applicability of the relevant Bar Rules.

3.8 On 13 September 2002 the Tribunal ordered that the barrister be publicly reprimanded and that he pay compensation to Mr Layous together with the costs of the proceedings. No order was made for further legal education by the barrister on the basis that the Tribunal was satisfied that the content of the statement of claim referred to was not necessarily representative of his competence to draft pleadings. Further, the Bar Association could point to no course that would provide relevant education in pleading.”

28 It appears to us that the conduct earlier the subject of complaint and that which led to the present proceedings here a common element. The Barrister has allowed himself to be influenced into carrying out acts which he had no business to perform in circumstances where he paid no or no proper regard to this professional duty as a barrister. This position seems to flow from his failure to distinguish for himself his role and duty as a barrister and to separate out his identity from that of his client.

29 Indeed it appears to us that there is a realisation on the part of the Barrister of the essential truth of this position when in his submissions he emphasised that his actions had not been planned but rather had come about in circumstances which sprung from initial preparedness to extend a courtesy to his client. He said he had never had any intention to mislead anyone nor would he knowingly do so.

30 This Tribunal has already found that he did not intend to mislead in what he did.

Absence of Remorse

31 It was submitted by the Association that the Barrister has at no time shown any remorse and that the contents of his Reply are consistent with that. The Association also relied upon the exchanges between its counsel and the Barrister which are set out in paragraph 87 of the Findings and upon the contents of paragraph 90 of the Findings.

32 It was put by the Association that, while the Barrister demonstrated an obstinate refusal to recognise his conduct for what it was and had refused to make concessions and demonstrated a complete lack of remorse, nevertheless his emotional involvement in his defence had been found to be a contributing factor. However, it was submitted, his history nevertheless had to be taken into account. It should be recognised, so the submissions went, that there was a failure to take advantage of the traditions of the Bar in that there had been no seeking out of senior members to give advice or counsel the Barrister.

33 The Association referred to the decision of Kirby P (who dissented in the result) in Law Society of NSW v. Foreman [1994] 34 NSWLR 408 at 417, where his Honour referred to the need to consider the question of acknowledgment of wrong doing. Of course that was a case of thoroughly dishonest and discreditable conduct on the part of a solicitor. No question of dishonesty or intent to mislead or deceive any person is involved here.

34 For his part the Barrister said that he took the Findings with the utmost seriousness. He said to us that he apologised for his conduct. This was the first time at which the Barrister has expressed to the Tribunal such sentiments, although it should be noted that despite the terms of his Reply, the Barrister has not attempted to make good those propositions or to make submissions to the effect of them. That is also to his credit.

35 It seems to us that the apology made should be accepted. Certainly the Barrister’s demeanour in presenting his submissions on penalty has been one consistent with the realisation that a very serious event has occurred in his professional life.

36 We think that it is a case of “better late than never” and we do not doubt the Barrister’s sincerity in his declaration of apology and of recognition of the seriousness of his professional position.

Protection of the Public

37 The Association submitted that in seeking cancellation of the Barrister’s Practising Certificate for “a period of time”, it was not merely seeking punishment of the Barrister but protection of the public.

38 The power we are asked to exercise is that found in s.171C of the Legal Profession Act1987. Specifically, in s.171C(1)(b), the Tribunal in circumstances such as these is empowered to order that a legal practitioner’s Practising Certificate be cancelled. By s.171C(1)(C) this Tribunal is empowered to order that a practising certificate not be issued to the legal practitioner until the end of the period specified in the order.

39 The Association submits that practising certificates have been cancelled in cases where the conduct was not as serious as that found in this case. In aid of that submission reliance is placed on New South Wales Bar Association v. P (unreported, 19 March 1997) and the decision in the matter of Englebrecht (1995) 5 LPDR 1.

40 Turning first to the decision in P’s case, this was a case of serious unsatisfactory professional conduct and one “on the border” of professional misconduct. The actions and failures of the barrister in that case involved “an experienced junior counsel briefed on hearing did not attend when 2 appeals were called on for hearing before the Court of Criminal Appeal and that no explanation is proffered which is acceptable”. The Tribunal said that:

“The duty to attend when retained to do so and not leave the client unrepresented is one of the most basic duties of counsel. We do not think that a penalty which affords the barrister no interruption to his professional practice is appropriate.”

41 The practising certificate was then ordered to be cancelled for a period of three months.

42 In the case of Englebrecht a barrister was found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct when, with limited recollection of relevant matters and events, he set about addressing a Magistrate upon the extent of his client’s prior convictions. The essence of the vice in the conduct was a “degree of rashness or recklessness which does not become a barrister, having regard in particular to his duty to the court, not to mention his duty to his client”. The barrister was required to undertake the Bar reading course and the ethics exam and had his practising certificate suspended for three months.

43 The present proceedings do not involve professional misconduct before a Court. Rather peculiarly they have arisen from a failure on his part to observe proper standards of behaviour in the face of circumstantial pressure to act in what he misguidedly thought were his client’s interests.

44 We are satisfied that at the heart of the matter is the Barrister’s misunderstanding of his proper role in representing his clients. To an extent, this is recognised by the Barrister himself as has become apparent during his submissions as to the appropriate orders to be made.

45 He emphasised his background and his fluency in Arabic as specially equipping him to act for Arab speaking people especially those who do not have or are not fluent in English. This appreciation of his is at the same time both laudable and indicative of the need to ensure, as far as can reasonably be done, that the essential and underlying cause of the conduct which has brought him to the Tribunal, does not recur. The protection of the public is at the heart of this matter. It is with this matter firmly in mind that we turn to address the matters presented to us on the question of further legal education.

Educational Conditions

46 The Association concentrated its attention upon the orders sought in subparagraph (iii) as identified in paragraph 6 above. It submitted that such a spread of legal education is necessary to ensure that we could have confidence that similar conduct will not recur.

47 The Barrister approached this topic with candour. He said he did not think it demeaning for him to undertake it. He said while he has access to the books he would need to undertake the course in Equity proposed by the Association, he doubted that anything would really be gained by his doing so.

48 Essentially this was so, he said, because his practice, in the 5 years since the events with which we are concerned, has become almost exclusively criminal. He said to us that the Tribunal, “need not fear in any way a repetition of that nature” (ie of the subject conduct).

49 We are of the opinion that the conduct complained of does not reasonably require that the Barrister undertake the course in Equity. We see little point in requiring that he undertake the identified course at the College of Law. However, we are strongly of the opinion that he must undertake the NSW Bar Reading course in Ethics, Practice and Procedure and Evidence. In our opinion shortcomings in his grasp of the essentials of these subjects as taught and examined in the NSW Bar Reading Course lie at the heart of the conduct complained of – and, indeed at the heart of at least one aspect of the earlier conduct examined in the Layous matter.

50 While the Barrister suggested that his conduct did not demonstrate any deficiency in his grasp of the rules of evidence and hence he should not have to undertake such a course, we do not agree. His appreciation of the evidentiary burden his client faced in establishing the supposed trust and the appropriate manner of dealing with that position especially on appeal indicated to us that further instruction of the type proposed is warranted.

51 We have confidence that the need to be fully involved in these three (3) limbs of the NSW Bar Reading course and the requirement that he achieve whatever is the set pass mark, is the appropriate remedial order to be made.

52 We have given serious consideration to whether we should also order that his practising certificate be cancelled for the balance of its currency and a fresh certificate not issued for a time. We do not believe in any event that a period of cancellation for 12 months as sought would have been warranted. Had we, decided to order that the barrister be deprived of his practising certificate at all, we would have favoured a period of three months. However, on balance, and in the special circumstances of this case, we have decided not to so order. We accept that other minds might differ – but we nevertheless are of the opinion that in all of the circumstances the need to protect the public does not require such a cancellation. We bear in mind that it is now five years since the events complained of and that the Barrister has been in practice throughout that period and over all for nearly twelve years.

53 We are satisfied that the Barrister accepts the extreme seriousness of his position and that he is now contrite at his fate. The blow to a barrister’s professional standing from a finding of professional misconduct, without more, is not to be overlooked or underestimated. It is not something of which a barrister can be proud.

Costs

54 The Association seeks an order that the Barrister pay its costs of these proceedings. The Barrister opposes the awarding of the full award of the costs sought ($41,625.67) on the basis that, as he put it, there were four matters complained of and on those the Association lost two and won two. He therefore submits that the appropriate order is that each party bear its own costs.

55 The Association says that it would be prepared to accept a costs order in its favour amounting to 80% of the amount of $41,625.67 being the figure rounded to $33,300. The Barrister, in any event, accepts that the figure of $33,300 is a reasonable amount and does not take issue with it. Rather he submits that he cannot pay it without borrowing funds for the purpose and that his capacity to make such arrangements are doubtful.

56 We do not accept that these proceedings should be looked at as being four complaints – two of which were lost and two won by the Association. These are disciplinary proceedings, brought in the public interest in which the Association sought a finding of professional misconduct. It specified four grounds for such a determination and it succeeded in making out a case for such a determination by reason of two of those grounds. The proceedings have occupied two and one half days of hearing time on the substantive question and another day on the issue of consequential orders. The four grounds of the complaint were not presented in four discrete evidentiary components but the evidence of the whole of the conduct was presented as one cognate whole.

57 We do not believe it is appropriate to treat it as “two successes and two losses”. In our opinion, it is appropriate that the Barrister pay the costs of the Association at the agreed reasonable figure of $33,300.

58 Accordingly the Orders of this Tribunal are:

1. That MICHAEL SAADEY ABDUL-KARIM undertake at the next available sessions, the course of studies offered by the NSW Bar Association Readers Course in Ethics, Practice and Procedure and Evidence, AND that he achieve a performance at examination or assessment (whichever being applicable to the students at the time) of pass.

2. That MICHAEL SAADEY ABDUL-KARIM pay the costs of the Association of these proceedings in the sum of $33,300.