Neetmanski and Child Support Registrar and Neetmanska (SSAT Appeal)
[2009] FMCAfam 200
•26 March 2009
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| NEETMANSKI & CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR and NEETMANSKA | [2009] FMCAfam 200 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Application to set aside notices under ss.72A and 72B, Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 and refund of moneys recovered under Notices – whether applicant entitled to credit for non-Agency payments – whether action to enforce arrears barred under Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) – whether action to enforce arrears prohibited under Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) – whether child support legislation constitutionally invalid. |
| Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) ss.30, 70, 72A, 72B Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) ss.31, 77, 78, 79 Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) ss.9, 9A, 204 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss.11(1), 14, 18, 63 Constitution ss.51(xxii), (xxix), (xxxi), (xxxvii), (xxxix), 53, 54, 55, 109, 122 |
| Luton v Lessels, (2002) 210 CLR 333 Torrens Aloha Pty Ltd v Citibank NA, (1997) 144 ALR 89 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155 W v Child Support Registrar, [2006] FamCA 598 Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth, (1993) 176 CLR 555 Western Australia v Commonwealth, (1995) 183 CLR 373 De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640 Horta v Commonwealth, (1994) 181 CLR 183 at 195 |
| Applicant: | MR NEETMANSKI |
| First Respondent: | CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY |
| Second Respondent: | MS NEETMANSKA |
| File Number: | PAM 4408 OF 2005 |
| Judgment of: | Halligan FM |
| Hearing dates: | 25 September 2008, 3 March 2009 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 3 March 2009 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 26 March 2009 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Father In Person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr Markus |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Attorney Generals Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Second Respondent: | No Appearance |
| Solicitors for the Second Respondent: | No Appearance |
ORDERS
The applicant’s amended application filed on 26 April 2006 is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Neetmanski & Child Support Registrar and Neetmanska is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
PAM 4408 OF 2005
| MR NEETMANSKI |
Applicant
And
| CHILD SUPPORT AGENCY |
Respondent
| MS NEETMANSKA |
2nd Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In 2003 and 2004, the first respondent (the Registrar) issued notices under the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (the Registration and Collection Act) requiring two insurance companies to pay money to it. The money was in satisfaction of claimed arrears under child support assessments issued by the Registrar against the applicant and in favour of the second respondent under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) (the Assessment Act). The Notices required payment to the Registrar of money to which the applicant was otherwise entitled.
The applicant, who conducted these proceedings without legal representation, contends that there are and at relevant times have not been arrears of child support properly owing by or recoverable from him. The first respondent maintains that the moneys were owing and were recoverable by the means used. The second respondent has not participated in the proceedings.
The applicant instituted these proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia in July 2005 to seek redress. The proceedings were transferred to this court the following month.
The applicant’s claims are set out in an amended application filed on 26 April 2006. Some of the orders sought in the amended application were summarily dismissed by Donald FM on 15 June 2007. I will refer later to the matters dealt with by his Honour, as the Registrar submits that some of the bases on which the applicant presses the remaining orders have been dealt with by the summary dismissal orders.
As best I understand the remaining orders set out in his amended application, the applicant seeks-
a)That three statutory notices dated 21 October 2003, 4 November 2004 and 20 November 2004, issued by the respondent under ss.72A and 72B of the Registration and Collection Act (the statutory Notices) to the third party insurance companies effectively attaching or garnisheeing moneys otherwise due by those third parties to the applicant, be set aside;
b)That the respondent repay to the applicant sums paid to it under the Notices, said to be $9003.76, $1335.50 and $7740 respectively, together with unspecified interest on those sums;
c)That the respondent be restrained from issuing further statutory Notices of the kind sought to be set aside in relation to amounts of child support said by the respondent to be owing by the applicant;
d)That the respondent pay to the applicant damages for “proven negligence, breaches of duty of care and established improper conduct in the management of this particular case aimed at construing, contemplating and carrying out this CS fraud”.
As best I can understand the applicant’s case as pressed in his submissions before me, he seeks to have the statutory Notices set aside on the grounds that-
a)He voluntarily paid the mother sums of money by way of child support, and that as there was a private collection arrangement in place, the Registrar was not entitled to register the child support assessments under the Registration and Collection Act, or should not have done so;
b)Sums he said he voluntarily paid to the mother for child support should have been, but were not, credited against his child support liability;
c)He had ceased to be a resident of Australia for the purposes of the Assessment Act at the time the assessments were registered for collection under the Registration and Collection Act, that this should have been treated by the Registrar as a terminating event in relation to the child support assessments, and they should not have been registered;
d)The statutory Notices, being issued in relation to moneys payable to the applicant under a policy of insurance, were not subject to attachment by virtue of provisions of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) (the Life Insurance Act);
e)Even if the applicant was liable for child support, recovery of arrears under the statutory Notices was statute barred as the limitation period under the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) (the NSW Limitation Act) had expired; and
f)On various grounds, the child support legislative scheme is constitutionally invalid.
As best I can understand the applicant’s case, he seeks to restrain the respondent from issuing any further statutory Notices on the preceding bases.
As best I can understand the applicant’s case, he seeks damages on the bases of negligence, breach of duty of care, fraud, malfeasance and misfeasance.
The applicant gave notice of the constitutional matters he raised to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories in accordance with s.78B, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). None sought to participate in these proceedings.
The applicant conceded that if the court found against him on his various challenges to the statutory Notices and the debts they sought to recover, then his claim for damages must fail, and there would be no basis on which he could press for the costs order sought in his amended application.
I will not pause to consider the appropriateness of the forms of relief the applicant seeks, despite some concerns in my mind on that point. Rather, I propose to deal with the substance of the applicant’s complaints, because ultimately the view I take of their merit renders moot the appropriate form of any remedy that might flow from his success on any of them.
The evidence
The applicant and his wife came to Australia from Macedonia with their two eldest children in December 1986. A third child was born in Australia in December 1993. The applicant and his wife subsequently separated, the evidence not establishing when.
The Registrar issued a child support assessment under the Assessment Act against the applicant in favour of the second respondent with effect from 22 June 2000. Moneys payable under the assessment were payable by the applicant to the second respondent (ss.31, 77, 78 and 79, Assessment Act).
The applicant said that between May and July 2000, he paid between $4,000 and $5,000 from his credit card for the purchase of whitegoods and furniture for the benefit of the children. On 10 July 2000, the second respondent signed a receipt for $2,000 for lump sum child support.
On 20 December 2000, the applicant left Australia and travelled to Macedonia. By then he said he had given the second respondent a total of $20,310, and had paid a further $1,233 for various child-related expenses, mostly medical expenses.
From early 2001 until 20 April 2003, the applicant said he paid the second respondent $5,805 for child support and $560 for medical expenses. Between April and November 2003 he said he paid between $7,000 and $9,000 to the children by bank transfer. He said he did this because of concerns the second respondent may gamble money meant for the children.
The administrative assessment of child support against the applicant was a “registrable maintenance liability” under the Registration and Collection Act. On the second applicant’s request, the assessment was registered by the Registrar in the Child Support Register under the Registration and Collection Act with effect from 1 June 2001. The effect of registration was to make amounts payable under the child support assessment debts due to the Commonwealth by the payer “in accordance with the particulars of the liability entered in the Register” (s.30, Registration and Collection Act).
When it advised the applicant on 15 June 2001 of registration of his child support liability, the Child Support Agency (the CSA) advised the applicant inter alia-
“If you have made any payments directly to (the second respondent) from ( 1 June 2001), you can apply to claim credit for the payment.”
The letter further advised the applicant how he could claim credit for payments direct to the second respondent, and otherwise advised him that child support was now payable to the CSA at the monthly rate of $386.75. The letter advised how he could dispute the Registrar’s decision, and enclosed a copy of the child support assessment for the period 1 June 2001 to 21 September 2001.
The applicant objected to the Registrar’s actions in writing on 5 July 2001. The basis of his objection was that he had made payments direct to the second respondent for child support, and would continue to do so voluntarily “on a basis of my good will and my children’s real needs, and if my financial situation permits so”.
The CSA requested evidence from the applicant of the voluntary payments he said he had made. In subsequent correspondence to the applicant the CSA stated that the applicant had not provided any such evidence.
The applicant subsequently sought a change in his child support on the basis of voluntary payments he said he had made, was asked by the CSA to produce evidence of the payments, and again the CSA’s position is that he produced none. By that, I take it to mean no evidence of payments after child support became payable to the CSA.
The only clear and unambiguous evidence of voluntary payments of child support by the applicant directly to the second respondent is a receipt signed by the second respondent dated 10 July 2000, acknowledging the receipt of $2,000 as child support for two of the parties’ children. This was well before registration of the child support liability under the Registration and Collection Act.
There followed further correspondence between the applicant and the CSA, in which the applicant continued to press his arguments about voluntary payments and other issues, to no avail. The applicant also sought to raise suggested legal impediments to recovery of child support from him while he was in Macedonia, based on the Child Support (Assessment) (Overseas Related Maintenance Obligations) Regulations 2000. The Registrar’s officer responded and gave reasons why the applicant’s arguments were not found to be persuasive.
On 21 October 2003, a delegate of the Registrar issued a notice under s.72A of the Registration and Collection Act to Asteron Life Ltd, requiring it to pay to the Registrar moneys to which the applicant was otherwise entitled up to the sum of $9003.76, being the amount said to be owing then by the applicant to the Registrar.
On 4 November 2004, a delegate of the Registrar issued a notice under s.72A of the Registration and Collection Act to Promina Life Ltd to pay to the Registrar moneys to which the applicant was otherwise entitled up to the sum of $8,162.86, being the amount said to be owing then by the applicant to the Registrar.
On 30 November 2004, a delegate of the Registrar issued a notice under s.72B of the Registration and Collection Act to Asteron Life Ltd to pay to the Registrar from moneys to which the applicant was otherwise entitled the sum of $860 per month.
These are the notices the applicant seeks to have set aside, and the sums he seeks to have refunded to him with interest.
Issues determined on the summary dismissal application
As mentioned, some of the orders sought by the applicant in his amended application were summarily dismissed. The Registrar has submitted that some of the bases for the remaining orders as pressed by the applicant are not open to him as they have been determined against him by the summary dismissal decision.
There were two main issues dealt with on the summary dismissal application and on which various orders sought by the applicant were summarily dismissed. Those matters were-
a)The applicant’s argument that it was not open to the Registrar to register the child support assessment under the Registration and Collection on the ground that there was an agreement for voluntary payments between the applicant and the second respondent by which the second respondent opted not to have the liability enforced under the child support legislation; and
b)The applicant’s argument that he ceased to be a resident of Australia for the purposes of the Assessment Act that this was a terminating event in relation to his child support liability, and hence there were no recoverable child support arrears.
The decision by Donald FM not only determined those parts of the amended application he dismissed. It also determined the issues on which he dismissed them. It is not open to the applicant to raise those same issues again. As both the above issues have already been decided against the applicant by Donald FM, I will not further consider arguments advanced by the applicant based on them.
Issues for determination
I will set out the issues raised by the applicant, as I understand the case he sought to present, and deal with each in turn.
There was an agreement for private collection between the applicant and the second respondent precluding registration
This issue has been definitively determined by Donald FM in these proceedings against the applicant, and I will not further consider it.
The Registrar should have given credit for voluntary payments
The applicant sought unsuccessfully to have the Registrar give him credit for voluntary payments he made to the second respondent.
Credit for direct payments of this nature is governed by s.70, Registration and Collection Act, which permits credit to be given for direct payments by the payer to the payee that are intended by both the payer and the payee to be paid in complete or partial satisfaction of an amount payable under a registered liability.
There is no evidence that the payments the applicant refers to were ever intended by the second respondent to be credited against a registered liability. The receipt the second respondent signed in mid 2000 for $2,000 was before the liability had been registered. It is thus outside the scope of s.70, and could not be credited by the Registrar against moneys owing by the applicant under the Registration and Collection Act. Further, the applicant’s own evidence suggests at least some of the payments he seeks credit for, namely those he said he made directly to the children, were not made with the second respondent’s agreement, much less with her agreement that they be credited against the registered liability.
He has thus failed to establish that there were grounds on which credit could be given for these payments under s.70. The Registrar could not otherwise give credit for payments by the applicant direct to the second respondent.
I note that the applicant had remedies under the Registration and Collection Act and under the Assessment Act that he could have exercised if he was dissatisfied with the Registrar’s decision not to give him credit for these payments, or on any other matter. I also note that one of those remedies, under Division 4, Part 7, Assessment Act, did not depend on the applicant being able to show that the mother agreed to the voluntary payments being in satisfaction of a registered liability. The applicant failed to avail himself of any of these remedies.
A terminating event occurred as the applicant was not resident in Australia
This issue has also been definitively determined by Donald FM in these proceedings against the applicant, and I will not further consider it.
The statutory Notices were issued contrary to the Life Insurance Act
The applicant contended that the Registrar’s action in issuing the statutory Notices was contrary to the Life Insurance Act. He referred to ss.3(1), 9, 9A and 204(1) and (2) of that Act as supporting his contention.
I infer that the applicant’s case is that the sums attached by the statutory Notices were payable to him under one or more “life policies” as defined in ss.9 and 9A.
Section 204 of the Life Insurance Act provides-
“1) The rights and interests of a person under:
(a) a life policy effected on his or her life; or
(b) a life policy effected on the life of the person’s spouse or de facto partner;
are not liable to be applied or made available by any judgment, order or process of a court in discharge of a debt owed by the person.
(2) Subsection (1) applies:
(a) regardless of when a policy was issued; and
(b) in the case of a policy referred to in paragraph (1)(a)–whether or not the policy is owned by the person.
(3) This section has effect subject to the Bankruptcy Act 1966.”
The section was in the same terms at the time each of the statutory Notices was issued.
For s.204 to apply to the statutory Notices, they must be a “judgment, order or process of a court”, and they clearly were not. The Registrar is not a court. Nor does the Registrar exercise judicial power when exercising a power under the child support legislation (Luton v Lessels, (2002) 210 CLR 333). Thus, s.204 does not apply to Notices issued under ss.72A and 72B of the Registration and Collection Act.
Recovery of arrears of child support were statute barred when the statutory Notices issued
The applicant contended that the NSW Limitation Act applied to the alleged debts sought to be enforced by the statutory Notices, that the relevant limitation period was two years, and that the Notices were statute barred. The applicant thus appears to be relying on s.18 of the NSW Limitation Act, which applies to an action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or a sum by way of penalty or forfeiture, recoverable by virtue of an enactment.
It was submitted on behalf of the Registrar that s.18 was not applicable as the statutory Notices did not involve the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture. It was the Registrar’s case that if the NSW Limitation Act applied, the relevant section was s.14, fixing a 6 year limitation period which had not expired when the statutory Notices issued. It was further submitted on behalf of the Registrar that the NSW Limitation Act did not apply in any event because the Act applied to limit the institution of court proceedings to enforce a cause of action, relying on Torrens Aloha Pty Ltd v Citibank NA, (1997) 144 ALR 89 (Torrens Aloha), and the issuing of the statutory Notices did not involve the institution of court proceedings.
The NSW Limitation Act limits an “action”. “Action” is defined in the NSW Limitation Act (s.11(1)) as including “any proceeding in a court”. This definition is inclusive, not exhaustive. However, I do not accept that “action” as used in the Act apples to everything a person may do in relation to a cause of action. In my view, the use of the term “plaintiff” in ss.14 and 18, which is defined in s.11 as “a person bringing an action” (emphasis supplied), not a person taking an action, suggests “action” means proceedings in a court or tribunal.
This is consistent with what was said in Torrens Aloha by Sackville J (at 98), with whom Foster and Lehane JJ agreed, that s.14(1) of the NSW Limitation was “a procedural provision dealing with the maintenance or commencement of proceedings”.
The issue of the statutory Notices under ss.72A and 72B of the Registration and Collection Act did not involve the taking of curial proceedings. As already mentioned, the Registrar’s actions under the child support legislation are not judicial (Luton v Lessels, above), and there appears no basis for contending that the NSW Limitation Act applied to limit the period in which the Registrar could issue the statutory Notices.
However, this only deals with the “procedural” provisions of the NSW Limitation Act. That Act also provides in s.63 for the extinguishment of a cause of action on the expiry of the relevant limitation period. While I raised this provision during submissions, neither the applicant nor the Registrar addressed it. As the applicant is unrepresented, and clearly seeks to rely on the NSW Limitation Act, it is appropriate that I give some consideration to s.63, albeit I have not had the benefit of argument about it.
Under s.63, a cause of action to recover any debt, damages or other property is, on the expiry of the relevant limitation period fixed by the Act, extinguished. As Sackville J said in Torrens Aloha (above, at 98), this section extinguishes rights, is substantive in character, does not run in tandem with s.14, and needs to be considered separately.
If the NSW Limitation Act applies to a cause of action arising under the Registration and Collection Act, s.63 extinguishes the cause of action under that Act on the expiry of the relevant limitation period. In relation to moneys due and payable under the Registration and Collection Act, it may be argued that application of s.63 would extinguish the cause of action for the debt on the expiry of the relevant limitation period, and that the Registrar would then have no right to issue a statutory Notice seeking to recover the debt. Does the NSW Limitation Act apply to a cause of action under the Registration and Collection Act?
In my view, this question may be quickly answered by reference to s.109 of the Constitution. If the NSW Limitation Act is inconsistent with the Registration and Collection Act, it is, by virtue of s.109, invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. In my view, a State act that purports to extinguish a cause of action created by a valid Commonwealth enactment is directly inconsistent with it, and to the extent of the inconsistency, it is invalid. Thus, the NSW Limitation Act cannot extinguish a cause of action for debt arising under the Registration and Collection Act.
I am therefore satisfied that none of the provisions of the NSW Limitation Act applied or apply to debts owed by the applicant under the Registration and Collection Act or to the statutory Notices issued, and that may in future be issued, by the Registrar in relation to such debts. The applicant thus fails on this issue.
The constitutional issues
As best I can understand the applicant’s case, the constitutional issues he seeks to raise are those referred to in his Notice of Constitutional Matter under s.78B of the Judiciary Act filed on 6 July 2006. In that Notice he contends that the Assessment Act and the Registration and Collection Act, and certain provisions of the Child Support (Assessment) (Overseas-related Maintenance Obligations) Regulations 2000 and the Child Support (Registration and Collection) (Overseas-related Maintenance Obligations) Regulations 2000, are constitutionally invalid.
The applicant contended that the Assessment Act is against the Constitution, including Magna Carta, as it lacks the basic legal principles of natural justice and due process.
I am unable to discern the basis on which the applicant contends concepts of “natural justice and due process” are constitutionally guaranteed in relation to administrative actions of the Registrar. Of course, his contention is that the Registrar’s actions are judicial, but in that he is mistaken. As mentioned, the Registrar is not a court and does not exercise judicial power (Luton v Lessels, above). Therefore, the submission on behalf of the Registrar that Chapter III of the Constitution does not contain a right of due process, and nor does it include a constitutional guarantee of procedural fairness in all cases, is not apposite, as Chapter III deals with the judicature. There is no merit in this contention by the applicant.
The applicant contended that the Assessment Act provides for the acquisition of property on terms that are other than just, and hence is invalid under s.51(xxxi) of the Constitution.
Again, there is no merit in this contention. I accept the submission on behalf of the Registrar. The challenged legislation is supported by the legislative power conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament by placita (xxii) (marriage power), (xxxvii) (State reference power) and (xxxix) (incidental power) of s.51, and by s.122 (Luton v Lessels, above, at [6] per Gleeson CJ). Section 51(xxxi) does not apply to a law where the acquisition of property is “a necessary or characteristic feature of the means which the law selects to achieve its objective and the means selected are appropriate and adapted to achieving an objective within power, not solely or chiefly the acquisition of property” (Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155 at 180-181, per Brennan J). The High Court considered the character of the Assessment Act and the Registration and Collection Act in Luton v Lessels (above, at [6], [14] – [16], and [177]), and what the High Court said in my view is inconsistent with the applicant’s contention.
The applicant contended that the Assessment Act impermissibly reposes judicial powers in the Registrar, and is thus constitutionally invalid. This argument has been found to have no merit (Luton v Lessels, above; W v Child Support Registrar, [2006] FamCA 598). The High Court in Luton v Lessels specifically referred to the Registrar’s powers of statutory garnishment under the Registration and Collection Act and held them not to involve the exercise of judicial power.
The applicant contended that various sections of the Assessment Act are contrary to various sections of the Constitution. He contended that the challenged provisions appropriate revenue otherwise than for the purposes of s.53, appropriate revenue otherwise than for the purposes of the ordinary annual services of the Government and/or deals as well with other matters contrary to s.54, and are a law imposing taxation which deals with other matters contrary to s.55.
I accept the submission on behalf of the Registrar that ss.53 and 54 of the Constitution are procedural provisions governing the intra-mural activities of the Parliament with which the courts do not interfere, and hence they do not give rise to issues that are justiciable by the courts (Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth, (1993) 176 CLR 555 at 578, Western Australia v Commonwealth, (1995) 183 CLR 373 at 482). As to the point in relation to s.55, the High Court held in Luton v Lessels (above) that the Assessment Act is not a law imposing taxation.
It seems that the applicant’s constitutional challenges to the Registration and Collection Act relate to his contention that it provides for the acquisition of property on other than just terms, contrary to s.51(xxxi) of the Constitution, and it impermissibly confers judicial power on the Registrar. Both these issues have been considered in relation to the Assessment Act, and for the same reasons, I am not satisfied there is any merit in the contentions in relation to the Registration and Collection Act.
The applicant’s challenge to the validity of the two regulations is based on an assertion that certain provisions in them are outside the external affairs power, s.51(xxix). The basis for this contention is unclear. In his s.78B Notice, the applicant seems to argue this is because Australia is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Recovery of Maintenance Abroad (UNCRAM). However, in an affidavit filed on
21 November 2005, he seems to contend that it is because the regulations are inconsistent with UNCRAM.
There is no substance in this contention, whatever the basis of it may be, and I accept the submissions on behalf of the Registrar. The regulations under challenge deal with moneys payable to or by persons outside Australia, and thus have the requisite characteristic to be amenable to the external affairs power, independently of any convention or treaty to which Australia may be a party (De L v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640 at 650). Exercise of the external affairs power is not conditional on Australia being a party to some convention or treaty covering the matters dealt with by the legislation. A commonwealth law, such as the regulations, otherwise within legislative power is not invalid because it is contrary to international law (Horta v Commonwealth, (1994) 181 CLR 183 at 195).
The claim for damages
As the applicant has failed to establish any basis for challenging the existence of the debt under the Registration and Collection Act or the validity of the statutory Notices, his action for damages must fail, as he himself conceded. The Registrar and its delegates and officers have not been shown to have acted other than in accordance with the duties cast on the Registrar under the child support legislation. Nor has it been demonstrated by the applicant that the Registrar, its delegates or officers exercised any power or discharged any duty under the child support legislation other than in accordance with the spirit and intent of that legislation. There was no negligence, there was no beach of a duty of care to the applicant (assuming one existed), there was no failure to perform duties or exercise powers that should have been performed or exercised under the child support legislation, and there was no performance of a duty or exercise of a power other than in accordance with the child support legislation.
Decision
For the foregoing reasons, the balance of the father's amended application fails and will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Halligan FM
Associate: Deanne Bush
Date: 26 March 2009
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