FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NBDY v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 145
MIGRATION – appeal – decision to cancel visa for incorrect information given in visa application and for providing bogus documents in support of visa application – whether Tribunal reached the required standard of satisfaction for cancellation of visa – whether Tribunal had regard to prescribed circumstances – no jurisdictional error established
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to rely on additional grounds of appeal refused
Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 359A
Migration Regulations 1994 reg 2.41Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, art 1C(5)
H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43 referred to
JasbeerSingh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1011 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 referred to
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 ALJR 1009, 215 ALR 162 referred to
Sathiyanathan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 210 referred to
Tarasovski v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR 570 referred toNBDY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS & ANOR
NSD 1784 OF 2004NBDZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS & ANOR
NSD 1785 OF 2004BRANSON AND STONE JJ
13 OCTOBER 2006
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1784 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:
NBDY
APPELLANTAND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTAND
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENTCOURT:
BRANSON AND STONE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 OCTOBER 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1785 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:
NBDZ
APPELLANTAND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTAND:
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENTCOURT:
BRANSON AND STONE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 OCTOBER 2006
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1784 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:
NBDY
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTAND
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENTNSD 1785 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
NBDZ
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTAND:
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
COURT:
BRANSON AND STONE JJ
DATE:
13 OCTOBER 2006
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The appellants, a father…
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- Case
- [2006] FCAFC 145
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had properly exercised its jurisdiction and whether it had considered the prescribed circumstances required by the Migration Act. Additionally, the appellants sought to rely on s 359A of the Act, which mandates that the Tribunal provide specific information to the applicant and allow them to comment on it. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision could be set aside due to non-compliance with these obligations.
In its reasoning, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly followed the statutory process for cancelling visas and had appropriately considered the prescribed circumstances. The court rejected the appellants' claims that the Tribunal had failed to provide the required particulars under s 359A, as the information had already been disclosed to them in the delegate's record of decision. Consequently, the court found no jurisdictional error and dismissed the appeal. The appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
This decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with statutory processes in visa cancellation cases and highlights the court's scrutiny of procedural fairness as mandated by legislative requirements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON AND STONE JJ
As the respondent pointed out there is no evidence to show that the grant of Refugee and Humanitarian visas to the appellants involved recognising them as refugees within the meaning of the Convention. Moreover it must be remembered that the present proceedings concern a decision to cancel the appellants’ visas because such recognition as they acquired was based, at least in part, on incorrect information and bogus documents. It would be a very strange result, and at odds with the structure and intention of both the Migration Act and the Refugees Convention if in mounting this challenge the appellants could rely on their recognition as refugees procured by such means. In our view there is insufficient merit in the appellants’ submissions to justify the Court exercising its discretion to allow the appellants to rely on this ground of appeal.Obligations arising under s 359A of the Migration Act As an additional ground of appeal, the appellants also sought to rely on s 359A of the Act which provides that the Tribunal must give the applicant particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review and must give the applicant the opportunity to comment on this information. The appellants identified the information that allegedly attracted the obligation as being information concerning a re-assessment of the appellants’ claims conducted after they had been granted their visas. The Court was referred to those parts of the Tribunal’s decisions in which it addressed the present circumstances of the appellants as required under paragraph (e) of the ‘prescribed circumstances’. The Tribunal noted that the appellants’ claims had been re-assessed after the grant of the visa and that it had been concluded that the appellants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In the case of each appellant, the Tribunal expressly noted this information in setting out the matters it had taken into account in reaching its conclusions. Counsel for the appellants submitted therefore that particulars of this information should have been provided to the appellants in writing as required by s 359A. Counsel for the Minister pointed out that the information about the reassessment of their claims and the adverse conclusion had previously been disclosed to the appellants in the delegate’s record of decision in their case. In so far as notions of fairness are relevant to the question of leave, counsel sought to rely upon this. The Court is aware that, following the High Court’s decision in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Indigenous Affairs (2005) 79 ALJR 1009, 215 ALR 162, there must be strict compliance with the procedures imposed by s 359A. Consequently, if certain information was the whole or a part of a Tribunal’s reasons for affirming a decision to reject an application for a protection visa, failure to comply with these procedures will warrant setting aside the Tribunal’s decision even if there has been no substantive denial of procedural fairness.