Navarac Pty Ltd v Moondancer Holdings Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   NAVARAC PTY LTD -v- MOONDANCER HOLDINGS PTY LTD [2009] WASCA 95

CORAM:   PULLIN JA

MILLER JA
NEWNES JA

HEARD:   13 MAY 2009

DELIVERED          :   29 MAY 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACV 25 of 2009

BETWEEN:   NAVARAC PTY LTD (ACN 071 456 212)

Appellant

AND

MOONDANCER HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 126 519 908)
First Respondent

REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :TEMPLEMAN J

Citation  :NAVARAC PTY LTD -v- MOONDANCER HOLDINGS PTY LTD [2009] WASC 68

File No  :CIV 1262 of 2009

Catchwords:

Real property - Torrens system - Caveat - Removal of caveat - Significance of balance of convenience - Unit trust - Unit holder lodging caveat - Trustee of unit trust exercising power of sale - Whether caveat should be removed

Legislation:

Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 138(2)

Result:

Appeal allowed subject to a condition

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr G R Donaldson SC & Ms C H Thompson

First Respondent           :     Mr N C Dillon

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Fairweather & Lemonis

First Respondent           :     Metaxas & Hager

Second Respondent      :     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Binningup Nominees Pty Ltd v Brogue Tableau Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 14

Custom Credit Corporation v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42

Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Interview Holdings Pty Ltd v Registrar of Titles [2008] WASC 144

Lewenberg v Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd [1981] VR 344

  1. PULLIN JA: The appellant (Navarac) appeals against the judgment of Justice Templeman. His Honour dismissed Navarac's originating summons, seeking an order pursuant to s 138(2) of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), directing the first respondent (Moondancer) to remove a caveat it had lodged over certain properties of which Navarac was the registered proprietor.

  2. The facts set out below are drawn from Templeman J's reasons for decision or from affidavits filed in the proceedings.  Where a fact asserted is in dispute, I will indicate this.  Navarac is the trustee of the Car Child Unit Trust (Car Child Trust).  Two directors of Navarac are Maddeleine Caratti and Aaron Caratti.  Two units have issued.  One unit has been held since the settlement of the Car Child Trust by Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd, as trustee for the JMC Child Trust (JMC Trust).  The JMC Trust is a trust for the children of John Michael Caratti, who is Maddeleine Caratti's son.  When the Car Child Trust was established, the other unit holder was Tosman Pty Ltd (Tosman).  Tosman was the trustee of the ABC Child Trust (ABC Trust).  The beneficiaries of the ABC Trust are the children of Allen Bruce Caratti, who is John Caratti's brother.  Moondancer claims to be the successor in title to Tosman's unit in the Car Child Trust.  Allen Caratti,…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 95
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Navarac Pty Ltd sought the removal of a caveat lodged by Moondancer Holdings Pty Ltd over a parcel of land in Western Australia. The dispute involved the balance of convenience in the removal of a caveat lodged by a unit holder under a unit trust against the trustee's exercise of a power of sale. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether the caveat should be removed, considering the balance of convenience in light of the unit holder's claim to an interest in the property. The court needed to determine if the caveator had demonstrated an arguable case for a caveatable interest and whether maintaining the status quo until the trial would be more convenient.

The court examined the principles laid down in Custom Credit Corporation v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd, where it was held that a caveator must establish that their claim raises a serious question to be tried and demonstrate that maintaining the status quo is more convenient until the trial. The court noted that while the balance of convenience is typically not decisive when a caveator claims a fee simple or leasehold estate, it may become crucial in cases involving security interests or competing claims. In this case, the court acknowledged the complexity introduced by the unit trust structure and the competing interests of the unit holder and the trustee. The court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour maintaining the status quo, given the trustee's valid exercise of the power of sale and the potential detriment to third parties if the caveat were to remain. The appeal was allowed subject to a condition.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed subject to a condition

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The section confers a statutory discretion on the court. In Custom Credit Corporation v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42, 48, Owen J (Malcolm CJ and Walsh J agreeing) referred to and quoted Lord Diplock's judgment in Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 to the effect that the caveator:[M]ust first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it, his claim for an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried and having done so, he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party (337). Owen J stated that the pronouncement in the Eng Mee Yong case was clearly correct, insofar as it dealt with the onus of demonstrating the existence of a caveatable interest, but that the reference to the balance of convenience required further comment. As to this, after some discussion, Owen J at 50, concluded that the balance of convenience was a factor to be considered in an application under s 138, but that the interlocutory removal of a caveat where an arguable case as to the existence of a caveatable interest has been demonstrated 'will be unusual'. It is true that experience shows that parties are most commonly in dispute about the existence of a caveatable interest. Balance of convenience issues are usually of little or no significance where the caveator claims an estate in fee simple or a leasehold estate. In those fairly common cases, it is 'unusual', as Owen J states, that once an arguable case is made out by the caveator that there is such a caveatable interest, that balance of convenience issues will result in removal. However, if for example the interest claimed by the caveator is a security interest or an interest in competition with another claimant against the registered proprietor, then balance of convenience issues may become decisive. Owen J, at 49 in Custom Credit, gave an example where he referred to Lewenberg v Direct Acceptance Corporation Ltd [1981] VR 344. In that case, the contest was between a registered mortgagee and the holder of an unregistered mortgage. The unregistered mortgagee had lodged a caveat. The registered mortgagee was being prevented by the caveat from passing title under a power of sale which appeared to have been validly exercised. There, the validity of the interest which both contestants had in the land was not in dispute and therefore the holder of the registered mortgage had an unquestionably superior interest in the land. As Owen J said 'but the case was, and could only have been, about the balance of convenience' (49). The Custom Credit case is significantly different from this case, because in Custom Credit the respondent had proceedings on foot seeking to have the appellant's mortgage set aside, to the extent that it contained a charge over the land in question. If the proceedings to set aside the mortgage succeeded, then the respondent would have had an unencumbered interest in the land.