SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
National Australia Bank Limited v Troiani and Anor
[2002] QCA 196PARTIES:
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
ACN 004 044 937
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
SANTE TROIANI
(first defendant/appellant)
RITA CESARINA TROIANI
(second defendant/appellant)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 3447 of 2001
SC No 7759 of 2000DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
6 June 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 April 2002
JUDGES:
McPherson JA, Fryberg and Helman JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; McPherson JA and Fryberg J concurring as to the orders made, Helman J dissenting.ORDER:
1. Appeal allowed. Judgment for the plaintiff varied by reducing amount to $3, 451, 599.24.
2. The appellants pay half the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.
CATCHWORDS:
CORPORATIONS – Receivers, Managers and Controllers – Appointment – By creditor – Whether agent for creditor
PROCEDURE – Supreme Court procedure – Queensland – Practice under Rules of Court – Summary judgment – Whether inappropriate exercise of discretion – Whether respondents had delayed in bringing the application for summary judgment
REAL PROPERTY – Valuation of Land – Methods of Valuation – Expert Opinion – Qualifications of Expert – Owner – Reliance on limited sales data
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 85
Corporations Law (Cth), s 420A
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 292, r 766(1)(c)
Miles v Bull [1969] 1 QB 258, considered
Talbot-Butt v National Australia Bank [2001] QSC 249, referred toCOUNSEL:
The appellants appeared on their own behalf.
D J S Jackson QC, with I Perkins, for the respondent.SOLICITORS:
The appellants appeared on their own behalf.
Mallesons Stephen Jaques for the respondent.
McPHERSON JA: I have read and agree with the reasons of Fryberg J. The appeal must be allowed to the extent stated in those reasons. The appellants should pay half of the respondent’s costs of appeal to be assessed.
FRYBERG J: The appellants were the first two defendants in an action brought by the plaintiff (“the bank”) to enforce a guarantee of the indebtedness of a company called Wide Bay Brickworks Pty Ltd (“the company”). The first defendant was the managing director and major shareholder (over 60 per cent) of the company. Default judgment was entered against the third, fourth and fifth defendants and on 22 March last year, subsequent to the delivery of pleadings and particulars, the Chief Justice gave judgment against the appellants summarily for $5,333,452.24 with costs to be assessed on an indemnity basis. The appellants now challenge both the judgment and its amount. They were represented by senior counsel before the Chief Justice, but were unrepresented in this division.
The company carried on business as a brick and tile maker at Bundaberg. It employed more than 140 people. In 1993, it received an Ethnic Business Award in a national competition. Shortly thereafter, the bank invited it to become a customer. After discussions, the bank provided the company with…
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the authority of the bank to appoint a receiver and manager through its agent, and assessed whether the appointment was valid and a proper exercise of the bank’s rights. It also considered whether the defendants had unreasonably delayed in bringing their application for summary judgment, and if the court had exercised its discretion inappropriately in granting the summary judgment. The court found that the bank's agent did have the authority to act on its behalf, and the appointment was valid. The court further ruled that the defendants had indeed delayed unreasonably in bringing their application, but this did not affect the appropriateness of the court's exercise of discretion in granting summary judgment.
The appeal by the defendants was allowed in part, leading to a variation of the judgment amount. The judgment was reduced to $3,451,599.24. The court ordered the appellants to pay half of the respondent's costs of the appeal, with the amount to be assessed. This outcome represented a significant reduction from the original judgment, reflecting the court’s considerations regarding the valuation of the property and the experts’ opinions presented during the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed. Judgment for the plaintiff varied by reducing amount to $3, 451, 599.24.
2. The appellants pay half the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the court as an appeal against a decision made in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The initial proceedings involved an application for summary judgment by the bank against the respondents. The respondents opposed the application, arguing various grounds, including the invalidity of the receivers' appointment and issues with the valuation of the properties. The trial judge found in favour of the bank and granted summary judgment. The respondents then appealed to the court, challenging the trial judge's decision. The appeal was heard, and the court considered the arguments presented by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the bank's agent had the authority to appoint receivers and managers over the properties.
2. Whether the trial judge's decision to grant summary judgment was an inappropriate exercise of discretion.
3. Whether the respondents delayed in bringing the application for summary judgment.
4. Whether the valuation of the properties, based on limited sales data and the qualifications of the expert, was reliable and appropriate.
Held
1. The court held that the bank's agent did not have the authority to appoint receivers and managers over the properties.
2. The court held that the trial judge's decision to grant summary judgment was an appropriate exercise of discretion.
3. The court held that the respondents did not delay in bringing the application for summary judgment.
4. The court held that the valuation of the properties, based on limited sales data and the qualifications of the expert, was reliable and appropriate.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal began by examining the authority of the bank's agent to appoint receivers and managers. It was established that the agent, as an employee of the bank, did not possess the necessary power to make such appointments, as this authority is typically reserved for the court itself or a person expressly authorised by statute. The court thus concluded that the agent's appointment was invalid, leading to the first holding.
Regarding the exercise of discretion in granting summary judgment, the court found that the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion. The undisputed facts presented a clear case for the bank's claim, and the procedural rules permitted the granting of summary judgment under these circumstances. The court did not find any abuse of discretion by the trial judge, leading to the second holding.
The issue of delay in bringing the application for summary judgment was considered next. The court assessed the timing and circumstances of the application and found no evidence of unreasonable delay by the respondents. The application was brought within a reasonable timeframe, and the court rejected the argument of delay, leading to the third holding.
Finally, the court evaluated the reliability and appropriateness of the property valuation. The expert's qualifications were deemed sufficient, and the limited sales data, while not extensive, provided a reasonable basis for the valuation in the given circumstances. The court accepted the valuation as reliable and appropriate, leading to the fourth holding. This decision, therefore, affirmed the importance of considering both the qualifications of the expert and the context of the data in real property valuation.