NAQV v Minister for Immigration

Case

[2004] FMCA 535

7 September 2004


FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAQV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION [2004] FMCA 535
MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether jurisdictional error in Tribunal not taking into account untranslated documents. 

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26
Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 52
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407
NANM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 32
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] 198 ALR 59

Applicant: NAQV
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
File No: SZ1883 of 2003
Delivered on: 7 September 2004
Delivered at: Sydney
Hearing date: 3 May 2004
Judgment of: Barnes FM

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Nil
Solicitors for the Applicant: Nil
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R. Bromwich
Solicitors for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. That the application is dismissed. 

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SZ1883 of 2003

NAQV

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) handed down on 30 April 2003 affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa. 

  2. The applicant, who is a citizen of Ukraine, arrive in Australia on 28 April 2001 and lodged an application for a protection visa on 10 May 2001.  The application was refused on 19 April 2002 and the applicant sought review by the Tribunal.  The applicant gave oral evidence to the Tribunal at hearings on 22 November 2002 and 7 March 2003 and his migration agent provided further information to the Tribunal. 

  3. The applicant claimed to fear persecution by reason of his political opinion as a member of the Ukrainian popular movement (Rukh). The Tribunal reasons for decision record that he claimed before the Tribunal that he had supported Rukh in its fight against the administration of the Ukrainian President Kuchma, that the President had created an atmosphere of political intolerance in the Ukraine and persecuted his political opponents. The applicant claimed he was politically active in Rukh from 1989 to 1992 but did not participate in its activities between 1992 and January 2001. He claimed he became politically active again in 2001 when Rukh joined the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action and that at the end of January 2001 he supported students in a tent camp they had established in Kiev. He claimed that on 1 March 2001 when police broke up the camp, he was arrested, charged and fined and that when he returned to his home he was taken to the police station, threatened and asked to work as a spy. He also claimed he participated in a tent camp in Lviv on 4 March 2001 and when he returned home was taken to the police station and told he could be charged under the Criminal Code if he did not work as a secret agent. He travelled to Germany and returned to the Ukraine on 12 March 2001 and participated in a further demonstration in Lviv. He claimed that on 16 March 2001 when he returned home he was arrested by SBU officers who threatened to detain his wife and child if he did not co-operate with them and that he went into hiding and departed Ukraine on 25 April 2001.

  4. In a decision handed down on 30 April 2003 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.  It did not find the applicant to be a credible or truthful witness as his claims were not supported by the independent information before the Tribunal and there were inconsistencies in his story.  It was prepared to accept that the applicant was an ordinary member of Rukh, but did not accept that he became politically active when Rukh joined the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action or that he was detained and threatened that criminal charges would be laid against him if he did not act as a spy for the Security Service of Ukraine (the SBU).  The Tribunal had regard to independent country information about the situation in Ukraine as well as an absence of any report to indicate that President Kuchma used the SBU to detain, threaten or prevent ordinary members of opposition parties from participating in anti-Kuchma demonstrations.  Given such information it did not accept that the applicant was detained or threatened by the SBU in March 2001. 

  5. The Tribunal then described inconsistencies and changes in the applicant’s story.  It noted that the applicant had changed his account.  He had initially claimed in connection with his protection visa application that he was persecuted for being a member of Rukh, that he had been warned that he would be detained if he continued his support for Rukh, that he was detained on a number of occasions and was warned by the police after his return from the trip to Germany that he would be detained if he participated in any more demonstrations.  However in the hearing he claimed that as a result of his participation in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action he was threatened that criminal charges would be laid against him if he did not act as a spy for the SBU.  The Tribunal also described inconsistencies between the applicant’s story at the first Tribunal hearing and the story in his adviser’s written submission relating to issues such as the source of his visas to Germany and Lithuania, what the police asked him or did to him and when he went into hiding.  Such inconsistencies were, according to the Tribunal, put to the applicant for comment during the hearing.  The Tribunal considered but rejected the applicant’s explanations that his English was not good and then that the agent had ‘scrambled’ his story.  It noted that the agent was a registered migration agent who spoke Ukrainian.  It found that the inconsistencies indicated that the applicant was not a truthful witness and that he had fabricated his claims that he participated in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action and was detained and threatened by SBU officers. 

  6. It also had regard to the fact that a certificate as to membership of the Rukh provided no details of the applicant’s political involvement in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action, as the Tribunal found would have been expected had it occurred.  The Tribunal also referred to the fact that the applicant had not sought protection in Germany during his visit in 2001 and to the fact that the applicant had provided three different reasons for not seeking such protection.  It found that his failure to seek protection in Germany, his failure to travel to Lithuania on the Lithuanian visa which he held and his delay in leaving Ukraine further indicated that he was not truthful and that he had fabricated his claims.  The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was of any interest to the authorities in Ukraine. 

  7. In conclusion the Tribunal found that, taking into account all the evidence, including the fact that it did not accept that the applicant participated in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action or that he was detained and threatened that criminal charges would be laid against him if he did not act as a spy for SBU, the independent evidence that the post-independence period in Ukraine had seen the emergence of a multi-party system reflecting a broad range of political viewpoints and that since the applicant had left Ukraine Rukh had successfully increased its representation in the Parliament belonging to a block which won the largest number of seats in the 2002 elections, and the fact that there was no evidence to suggest that ordinary members of Rukh are harassed or threatened by the authorities, the Tribunal was unable to be satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would be persecuted for his political opinion, or for any other reason, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. 

  8. The applicant sought review of the Tribunal decision in an application filed on 23 May 2003. In that application it was claimed that the Tribunal was not very well informed about life in the Ukraine and had refused to accepted information which the applicant provided at interview. It was also claimed that the Tribunal was not aware of the facts that not every right officially provided for in the Constitution of Ukraine could be exercised by ordinary Ukrainian citizens (especially a member of the opposition party). In an accompanying affidavit the applicant repeated his claims to fear persecution. The applicant filed written submissions on 28 January 2004 which repeated the claims made in the application with the addition that it was contended that under s416 of the Migration Act 1958 the Tribunal had to accept all new information which the applicant provided. 

  9. In oral submissions the applicant complained that the Tribunal had refused to accept untranslated documents in Ukrainian which he had sought to submit during the hearing.  He also stated that in the first Tribunal hearing a Russian interpreter was provided who could not understand a lot of what the applicant was saying.  The applicant took issue with the accuracy of independent information relied on by the Tribunal as to the number of people arrested in anti-Kuchma demonstrations and the consequences which such people faced.  He also took issue with the factual findings of the Tribunal and provided a further explanation of his claims.  He suggested that the Tribunal misunderstood his claim to have been detained in Kiev on 1 March 2001 and detained on another occasion by the SBU in his home town on 6th and then again on 16 March 2001.  He claimed that material before the Tribunal consisting of a letter from the Rukh confirmed that he was an active party participant in Ukraine. 

  10. He claimed that the main error made by the Tribunal was that it did not make use of all the materials about the political situation in the Ukraine, in particular the documents that were in Ukrainian without English translations which he had tried to give to the Tribunal.  The applicant contended that these documents painted a rather different picture of the situation in the Ukraine and that the Tribunal erred in not taking into account this material but in basing its decision on material from Ukrainian official sources.  He said that he did not have the financial means to translate such documents and expected that the Tribunal would translate this material and consider all sources not only those in the English language. 

  11. Section 416 of the Migration Act 1958 is not of assistance to the applicant.  That section deals with the Tribunal obligations in relation to applications for review where there have been prior applications by the same applicant.  There was no suggestion that this applicant has made more than one application for review of the decision to refuse to grant him a protection visa. 

  12. The applicant’s claims do raise for consideration the issue of whether there is a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal in declining to accept material in a foreign language. I have considered whether the Tribunal has such an obligation, either under the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 or as part of its obligations to accord procedural fairness to an applicant. Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act deals with the conduct of reviews by the Tribunal. In light of my conclusions below in relation to natural justice it is not necessary in this instance for me to determine the precise scope of s422B.

  13. Section 423 provides that an applicant for review may give the Registrar of the Tribunal certain documents (a statutory declaration and written arguments) and s441F describes the method of giving such documents to the Tribunal. No reference is made to the language in which documents are to be provided. The applicant’s written submissions were provided in English by his migration agent. Section 423 does not oblige the Tribunal to accept or to take into account materials about the situation in the applicant’s country of origin in a language other than English. Section 424 of the Act provides that the Tribunal may seek additional information. In this instance the Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 15 May 2002 to acknowledge receipt of his application. In that letter it stated “If you have any new documents or written evidence, you should send them to the Tribunal at the earliest possible point in the review process. Any documents that are not in English are to be translated into English by an accredited translator.” Such specification is consistent with s424B(1) which provides that if a person is invited under s424 to give additional information the invitation is to specify the way in which the additional information or the comments may be given: ‘being the way the Tribunal considers is appropriate in the circumstances’. These provisions do not oblige the Tribunal to accept material in a language other than English. The Tribunal has the power to specify the way in which information is provided being a way it considers is appropriate in the circumstances. In the letter of 15 May 2002 it specified that documents not in English were to be translated into English by an accredited interpreter. There was no breach of the provisions of the Migration Act in such a requirement.

  14. Nor am I persuaded on the material before me that there was a lack of procedural fairness in the imposition of this requirement in the letter of 15 May 2002 or in the conduct of the review in this particular case. 

  15. It is the case that in the context of s425 the obligation of the Tribunal to invite the applicant to a hearing carries with it an obligation to provide adequate interpretation services (see Appellant P119/2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 230 at [16] – [18]) as considerations of procedural fairness dictate that an applicant with an insufficient understanding of English should be permitted to use an interpreter at a hearing. The Tribunal obligation under s425 of the Migration Act is to invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In this case the Tribunal conducted two hearings and it is apparent from the only material before the Court as to the conduct of the hearing (that being the Tribunal reasons for decision) that the applicant was given the requisite opportunity to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of an interpreter.

  16. The applicant contended in oral submissions that the interpreter at the first hearing, on 22 November 2002, was a Russian interpreter who could not understand a lot of what he was saying. The factual basis for such a claim is not established. There is no transcript of either hearing before the Court. No particular instances of mistranslation were cited by the applicant. Insofar as his complaint is that the interpreter was Russian rather than Ukranian no breach of s425 or lack of procedural fairness is established. Russian was the language required by him in the Response to Hearing form completed on 18 October 2002. Russian was listed as the applicant’s first language on his protection visa application. No complaint appears to have been made to the Tribunal about the interpreter in the written submission from his migration agent dated 28 November 2002 and a Russian interpreter was also provided for the second hearing on 7 March 2003. There is nothing in the Tribunal reasons for decision to suggest that the applicant raised an issue about the first interpreter in the second hearing although the Tribunal did put to the applicant inconsistencies between his evidence at the first hearing and claims in his submission from his adviser. The Tribunal met its obligation under s425 to give the applicant a meaningful opportunity to attend a hearing.

  17. The only information before the Court as to the conduct of the hearing indicates that the Tribunal also met the procedural fairness obligations to inform the applicant of critical issues and to give him an opportunity to comment.  In particular the Tribunal reasons for decision indicate that the Tribunal put to the applicant the substance of independent information on which it relied (particularly in the hearing on 7 March 2003) and that the applicant had the opportunity to comment on such information. 

  18. The scope and content of any natural justice requirements must be considered in the particular factual circumstances of the case (NAFF of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 52). In this case the applicant claims that in the hearing the Tribunal refused to accept untranslated documents about the situation in Ukraine. In the absence of a transcript there is no evidence to establish that this did occur or, if it did, the circumstances in which it occurred. Assuming however that the Tribunal did refuse to consider untranslated documents about the situation in the Ukraine, no lack of procedural fairness or failure to comply with s.425 is established. The applicant had the assistance of a migration agent both in connection with his protection visa application and before the Tribunal. The Departmental delegate had raised with the applicant its view of independent information about the situation in Ukraine in a letter. The Departmental decision addressed this issue. The Tribunal letter of 15 May 2002 advised the applicant of the need to provide written evidence as soon as possible and for documents to be translated into English. The Tribunal letter of 15 October 2002 inviting the applicant to the first hearing also advised that any documents or written arguments should be in English or translated by a qualified translator. The applicant did provide a translation of the certificate about his Rukh membership. At no stage in his written submissions did his adviser suggest that the applicant had documents or evidence of relevance which the Tribunal should take into account despite the absence of a translation. Nor is there anything in the material before the court to suggest that the Tribunal undertook to make further inquiries or that this was a case in which it was appropriate for it to do so.

  19. I recognise that translation costs may be inhibiting for an applicant who wishes to provide evidence to the Tribunal. However of itself this does not establish jurisdictional error. It may well be that in a particular case the Tribunal could be obliged to ensure that untranslated material which was critical to a particular applicant’s case, particularly if such material was personal to an applicant, was taken into account. However I am not satisfied that this is such a case or that there is a general obligation on the Tribunal to accept and translate untranslated country information. I have borne in mind that its statutory objective is to provide a mechanism of review that is ‘fair, just, economical, informal and quick’ (s.420(1) Migration Act). No failure to comply with the Migration Act or lack of procedural fairness or other error constituting jurisdictional error is established in relation to the Tribunal treatment of independent information or its refusal to accept untranslated documents in Ukrainian.

  20. Nor do the general contentions that the Tribunal was not very well informed about life in the Ukraine or not aware of the facts in the Ukraine establish a jurisdictional error.  Such claims seek merits review which is not available in this Court (MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259). It is for the applicant to establish his case. Here the applicant had a proper opportunity to present his claims and address Tribunal concerns.

  1. The applicant took issue with the Tribunal conclusions in light of the written confirmation from Rukh that he was an active party participant in the Ukraine.  However the Tribunal accepted that the applicant was a member of Rukh.  Its conclusions are not inconsistent with what is stated in the letter from Rukh dated 3 November 2002 which the applicant provided to the Tribunal together with an English translation.  That letter signed by the head of the Boryslav Rukh Territorial Political Party, certified that the applicant was a member of the Rukh and that:

    “He has been a member of the party since 1989 taking an active part in creation of the organisational structure of the Popular Movement of Ukraine, the only political force that stood against the Communist power.  He was the head of the party cell at his workplace.  Together with the members of his party’s cell he took part in all events conducted by the Rukh Party, ie, rallies, actions of protest, manifestations that accompanied the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian State.  He took an active part in the first democratic elections in Boryslav and was elected a member of the Boryslav town council of the first democratic convocation.  He and other deputies and Rukh party activists took a trip to Kiev to support passing the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine.  He was one of the first to set up a private small-size enterprise BKTs contact Kontakt and acted as its managing director.  Due to constant checks and depression by law enforcement bodies this company has virtually stopped its operation.” 

  2. The Tribunal specifically addressed this letter which was submitted after the first hearing.  It recognised that the letter certified that the applicant was a member of Rukh and provided details of his political activities in setting up a party cell in his workplace, taking part in events leading to the break-up of the Soviet Union and his election to the Boryslav town council.  However the Tribunal also correctly stated that it provided no details of the applicant’s claimed political involvement in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action.  It found that if in fact the applicant had become active when Rukh joined the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action this would have been recorded in the letter provided by the party.  Such a finding was open to the Tribunal on the material before it.  The applicant’s explanation that Rukh would not state in a certificate that he or anyone else had engaged in action against the present President of the Ukraine does not establish a jurisdictional error.  Moreover, the Tribunal gave a number of reasons for not accepting his claim to be a participant in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action, not only the absence of any reference to such political involvement in the certificate from Rukh.  Even if the Tribunal reasoning about the certificate was less than satisfactory, faulty logic in fact finding does not constitute jurisdictional error (NANM of 2002 v MIMIA [2003] FCAFC 32 and Re MIMA; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] 198 ALR 59 at 77 and 89 – 90). The Tribunal conclusions were open to it on the material before it. The applicant takes issue with the Tribunal fact finding but this does not establish jurisdictional error.

  3. The applicant’s contention that the independent information in relation to the number of people arrested in demonstrations against President Kuchma and the consequences that they faced was incorrect does not establish jurisdictional error.  Findings of fact are a matter for the Tribunal.  There is no suggestion that there was other material before the Tribunal to the contrary and, in any event the weight to be given to particular information is a matter for the Tribunal.  In so far as this claim relates to the applicant’s claim the Tribunal failed to take into account untranslated Ukrainian material it is dealt with above. 

  4. The applicant also contended that the Tribunal confused the episodes or occasions on which he was detained.  He explained that some explanation for the discrepancies and inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal in his claims was that the written form of claims which he submitted had contained some errors which were made by the person who translated his claims into English for the purpose of submitting the documentation to the Tribunal.  He had relied on the person who did the translating for him. 

  5. The applicant contended that any inconsistencies in his claims were the responsibility of the person who translated his written submission.  He referred specifically to a mistake about the time he arrived in Australia in the written submission from his migration agent.  This states that he went into hiding on 19 March 2001 and left Kiev on 25 March 2001 whereas at the hearing he claimed that he left Ukraine for Australia on 25 April 2001.  The Tribunal put such inconsistencies to the applicant.  It considered but rejected his explanations, first that his English was not good and then that his agent (a registered migration agent who speaks Ukrainian) ‘scrambled’ his story.  It is apparent from the Tribunal reasons for decision that the Tribunal correctly understood and reached its decision taking into account his departure from the Ukraine in April 2001.  The relevance of his actual departure date in the Tribunal reasons for decision was that it was apparent that the applicant had remained in the Ukraine for a month after obtaining his visitor visa for Australia.  There is no error in that regard. 

  6. Any mistakes attributable to the applicant’s own interpreter or migration agent are not matters which give rise to a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.  As the applicant conceded, the Tribunal member asked him if the information he provided was correct and he confirmed that it was.  No jurisdictional error is apparent in the Tribunal consideration of these claims.  In any event the applicant has not established the factual basis for his claim of mistranslation by his own agent. 

  7. The applicant claimed in the written submission from his migration agent that he went to Kiev in February 2001 and was arrested on 1 March 2001 when the police surrounded the tent camp, that he was beaten and taken to the police station, charged and fined and then released and that on 6 March 2001 he was taken from his home to the branch of the LVIV regional headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Boryslav, questioned and that a police officer explained that he could be charged as an organiser of mass disorder and sentenced unless he provided information to the police and became a Kuchma supporter.  This submission also claimed that on 16 March 2001 he was taken by SBU officers from his home, beaten and that his co-operation was demanded.  

  8. The applicant contended that the Tribunal did not understand that these were very different episodes, that on 1 March 2001 being a demonstration against President Kuchma whereas on 6th and 16 March 2001 he was detained by the SBU in his home town (not in Kiev).  The contention appears to be that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that there were two aspects to his claim, relating to the consequences of demonstration against President Kuchma and the separate issue of the consequences of the detention and threat by the SBU.  The part of the Tribunal reasons for decision with which the applicant takes issue is its consideration of the inconsistencies between the claims made by the applicant in his initial application (which was based on membership of Rukh and which made no mention of involvement of the SBU or of a claim that he was threatened that criminal charges would be laid against him if he did not act as a spy for the SBU) and the later claims made at the hearing to the effect that as a result of his participation in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action he was threatened that criminal charges would be laid against him if he did not act as a spy for the SBU.  The Tribunal reasons for decision record that at the start of the second hearing the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims and put to him that he was claiming “that because he had participated in protests against President Kuchma he had been detained by the SBU, asked to act as a spy and threatened that if he did not co-operate with them criminal charges would be laid against him” and that the applicant agreed with the Tribunal’s summary.  This summary is consistent with the Tribunal description of what occurred in the first hearing.  There is no transcript before the Court or other material to suggest that these claims were not made by the applicant in the first hearing as recorded by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal went on to describe other inconsistencies between the applicant’s story as told at the first hearing and the story in his adviser’s subsequent submissions.  It was on the basis of those inconsistencies that the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a truthful witness and had fabricated his claims that he participated in the ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ action and that he was detained and threatened by SBU officers. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was of any interest to the authorities in Ukraine and also had regard to independent information about the position of ordinary members of Rukh.  These findings addressed all aspects of his claims.  It is notable that the consideration of inconsistencies (which dealt with claims made at the hearing and not those made in the adviser’s letter) followed a discrete conclusion by the Tribunal that it did not accept that the applicant was detained or threatened by the SBU in March 2001 based on independent information about the situation in the Ukraine and the absence of any information before the Tribunal that the President used the SBU to detain, threaten or prevent ordinary members of opposition parties from participating in anti-Kuchma demonstrations.  The Tribunal also considered and rejected his claim of involvement in ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’, on the basis of credibility findings as well as other factors.  The complaint made by the applicant does not establish that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s claims or failed to consider all the integers of his claims in a manner constituting jurisdictional error (see Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 and Htun v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244). The Tribunal considered and made findings in relation to both his claims that he participated in anti-Kuchma activities and also that he was detained by the SBU.

  9. On the evidence before the Court the applicant has not established that the Tribunal finding that the applicant made different claims in his initial application and at the hearing was not open to the Tribunal on the material before it as claimed.  The factual basis for the applicant’s claim is not established.  No misunderstanding as to the substance of the applicant’s claims in the sense considered by the High Court in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26 has been established.

  10. Finally the applicant contended that the Tribunal member had told him that she would not consider the case because there were errors in it.  Not only is there no factual basis for such a claim but it is contrary to the consideration of the applicant’s claims apparent in the Tribunal reasons for decision.  The Tribunal gave consideration to the applicant’s claims.  The applicant failed largely because the Tribunal did not accept the credibility of his claims.  Credibility is a matter for the Tribunal par excellence (MIMA, Re; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407). The Tribunal findings were open to it on the material before it. No jurisdictional error is established. Accordingly the application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Barnes FM

Associate: 

Date:  7 September 2004

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