NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 117

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249
File number(s): NSD 1859 of 2016
Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 17 February 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (FMCA) – whether FCMA erred in dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal – whether extension of time and leave to appeal is warranted in circumstances where the applicant was awaiting the outcome of a decision on his request for Ministerial intervention.

Held: application dismissed with costs.

Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 r 35.14
Cases cited:

BTM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 888

Décor Corporation Pty Limited v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293

MZZYC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1426

NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249

SZASP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 771

Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42

Date of hearing: 16 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 18
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms E Warner Knight of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1859 of 2016
BETWEEN:

NAPF

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 FEBRUARY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed. 

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. The applicant applies for an extension of time and leave to appeal under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 from a judgment of Judge Cameron, dated 15 February 2008.  At that time, Judge Cameron was a Federal Magistrate. 

  2. In an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 25 October 2016, the only explanation for the delay in challenging Judge Cameron’s decision was “because my application was pending before the Ministerial intervention (sic)” and that the applicant was uninformed about the Ministerial decision during the week commencing 19 October 2016. 

    Judge Cameron’s decision

  3. In the light of its brevity it is convenient to set out the decision in NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249 in its entirety:

    1The applicant seeks review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) signed on 12 December 2007.

    2The applicant has claimed to fear persecution…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an applicant, NAPF, who is seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (FMCA). The applicant argues that the FMCA erred in dismissing their application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal. NAPF contends that they delayed challenging the FMCA's decision because they were awaiting the outcome of a decision on their request for Ministerial intervention.

The primary legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the applicant had provided an acceptable explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing the proceedings and whether the proposed grounds of appeal were strong enough to warrant an extension of time and leave to appeal. The court needed to consider the principles guiding the consideration of an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, which include the need for an acceptable explanation for the delay and the strength of the proposed grounds of appeal.

In reaching its decision, the court considered the circumstances of the case, including the fact that the applicant had known about the hearing date since 2 November 2016 but had left it too late to apply for an adjournment. The court noted that the applicant's only explanation for the delay was that they were awaiting the outcome of a decision on their request for Ministerial intervention. The court found that this explanation was inadequate, particularly given the unusually long delay of almost nine years. The court also noted that seeking Ministerial intervention was not consistent with an intention to pursue appeal rights and contest the correctness of the FMCA's decision.

The court held that the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing the proceeding. The court inferred from the fact that the applicant sought Ministerial intervention on three separate occasions during the nine-year period since the FMCA's judgment that the applicant had elected to take a course of action inconsistent with an intention to pursue their appeal rights. This was sufficient to dispose of the application. The court also found that the proposed grounds of appeal were not strong enough to warrant an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (FMCA) regarding the applicant's claim for a protection visa. The applicant, who had applied for a protection visa on 2 August 2001, had his application refused by the Minister's delegate on 23 November 2001. The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed this decision on 11 April 2003. The applicant's subsequent applications for judicial review of this decision were dismissed by various courts, including the Federal Court of Australia on 6 October 2005 and the High Court on 4 July 2005. The applicant made another application for review by the Tribunal on 13 November 2007, which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 12 December 2007 on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction as it had already discharged its function. The applicant commenced proceedings seeking judicial review of this decision on 8 January 2008.

The applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of Judge Cameron from the FMCA, which was dismissed on 15 February 2008. The applicant cited his financial difficulties and his pending request for Ministerial intervention as reasons for the delay in lodging the appeal. Despite being informed of the hearing date on 2 November 2016, the applicant did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the almost nine-year delay in lodging the appeal.

The case began with the applicant's application for a protection visa on 2 August 2001, which was refused by the Minister's delegate on 23 November 2001. The applicant's appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal was affirmed on 11 April 2003. Subsequent applications for judicial review were dismissed by various courts, culminating in the dismissal of the applicant's application to the FMCA on 15 February 2008. The applicant then sought an extension of time and leave to appeal this decision, which was dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 25 October 2016. The applicant's explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal was based on pending requests for Ministerial intervention, which the court found to be inadequate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 25 October 2016, the only explanation for the delay in challenging Judge Cameron’s decision was “because my application was pending before the Ministerial intervention (sic)” and that the applicant was uninformed about the Ministerial decision during the week commencing 19 October 2016. Judge Cameron’s decision In the light of its brevity it is convenient to set out the decision in NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249 in its entirety:1The applicant seeks review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) signed on 12 December 2007.2The applicant has claimed to fear persecution in Bangladesh. The basis of that fear is set out in paragraph 3 of the judgment of Barnes FM in NAPF v Minister for Immigration [2004] FMCA 399. In para.3 her Honour says this:The applicant claimed to fear persecution by reason of his political opinion or membership of a particular social group in Bangladesh arising from a claim to have been involved in the founding and activities of the Sirajdikhan Humanitarian Organisation. This was described by the applicant as a secular humanitarian organisation founded in January 1990 which comprised nine friends who were committed to social activities and wanted to improve the situation in their village. He claimed that their goal was to encourage women to cast votes properly, and to stop child marriages and polygamy.”3The Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's application for review.4The matter is before the Court today on the applicant's application that the respondents show cause why relief should not be granted to the applicant.5 In the application the following grounds are pleaded:(1) The tribunal failed to act according to migration law and regulation.(2) The tribunal did not apply the correct laws when consider this matter.(3) The tribunal misinterpreted the migration laws.(4)The tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the migration act.6Today the applicant also submitted that he had been denied an opportunity to appear before the Tribunal and so alleges breaches of the natural justice provisions in Pt.4 Div.7 of the Migration Act 1958 (“Act”). The first respondent submits that the applicant has no arguable case and, in any event, has brought an application which is an abuse of process.7At a hearing to determine whether an order to show cause should be made, the order will not be made and instead the proceedings will be dismissed pursuant to r 44.12 of the Rules of Court if the applicant does not have an arguable case against the respondents. The authorities show that such a dismissal will not be ordered except where the lack of the cause of action is clearly demonstrated or the claim is groundless or there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome. Under the Rules of Court the proceedings may also be dismissed if they have no reasonable prospect of success, are frivolous or vexatious or are an abuse of process.8From the documents which are in evidence in these proceedings the following chronology of the applicant's pursuit of a protection visa emerges:a) On 2 August 2001 the applicant applied for a protection visa;b)On 23 November 2001 the Minister's delegate refused that application;c)On 11 April 2003 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate;d)On 19 March 2004 Barnes FM dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision;e)On 1 July 2004 Madgwick J dismissed the applicant's appeal from the decision of Barnes FM;f)A subsequent application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was deemed to have been abandoned on 4 July 2005;g)On 6 October 2005 Scarlett FM dismissed a further application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision of 11 April 2003;h)On 27 March 2007 Moore J dismissed the applicant's appeal from the decision of Scarlett FM;i)On 13 November 2007 the applicant made a further application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision;j)On 12 December 2007 the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain that application for review; andk)On 8 January 2008 the applicant commenced these proceedings seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision signed on 12 December 2007.9The basis of the Tribunal's decision that it had no jurisdiction was that it had already discharged its function. In relation to the Tribunal's conclusion that it was functus officio, it is important to keep in mind that the delegate's decision was dated 23 November 2001 and that the Tribunal made its original decision in respect of that decision of the delegate on 11 April 2003. There has been no further decision by a ministerial delegate.10That being so, the Tribunal discharged its function when it made its decision of 11 April 2003. Having done so, it does not have jurisdiction to entertain a further application for review of a delegate's decision. The authorities make that clear and have done so for many years: Jayasinghe v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 76 FCR 301; Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 109 FCR 18; SZEBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 456, and SZDMO v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 989.11Today the applicant also says that the circumstances in Bangladesh have changed. But any change in circumstances asserted by the applicant does not give the Tribunal renewed power to review the original decision of the delegate.12In SZASP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 771 Moore J said at [4]:It is necessary to first say something about the applicant's attempt to seek a second review of the delegate's decision in the Tribunal. The Tribunal's conclusion that it no longer had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, having already discharged its functions under the Act to review the delegate's decision, was correct … The Tribunal was also correct in finding that changed circumstances did not provide any legal basis for undertaking a second review.13As to the allegations made today arising out of the fact that the Tribunal did not invite the applicant to appear before it before making its decision of 12 December 2007, the natural justice hearing rule requirements codified in the Act by virtue of s 422B of the Act are predicated on the Tribunal having jurisdiction to entertain the application which is before it. I have already found that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction because it was functus officio. That being so, there was no call for the Tribunal to invite the applicant to appear before it and no jurisdictional error is demonstrated because it did not do so.14For all these reasons, it is clear to me that the Tribunal made no jurisdictional error in its finding that it was functus officio or because it did not invite the applicant to attend before it to give evidence and present arguments. Consequently, the application is not arguable.15However, regardless of whether the applicant's case is an arguable one or not, there remains the first respondent's submission that the application is an abuse of process. In this regard, I refer again to Moore J's decision in SZASP's case. As the passage already quoted demonstrates, one of the applicants in those proceedings, which involved several applicants, had sought a second Tribunal review in respect of a decision of the Minister's delegate. That is to say, the circumstances in that case were relevantly identical to the circumstances in this case. His Honour found at [22] that such circumstances amounted to an abuse of process.16In my view, the applicant does not have an arguable case for the relief claimed and the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, although the respondent expressly only seeks dismissal pursuant to r.44.12, because he has also raised the issue of the proceedings being an abuse of process, which I find them to be, the application will be dismissed pursuant to r.13.10.The draft notice of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister opposed an adjournment. I refused the applicant’s adjournment application and said that I would give reasons later. Those reasons relate to the fact that, as the applicant acknowledged, he had known since directions were made on 2 November 2016 that the hearing would proceed at this time. I accept that he has financial difficulties but he has left it too late to apply for an adjournment. The promised financial support referred to in his written submissions lacks particulars and adequate detail. I was unpersuaded that it was in the interests of justice to adjourn the matter, particularly against the background of the fact that the applicant was seeking an extension of time in respect of a decision dated as long ago as 15 February 2008. Consideration and determination The relevant principles guiding the Court’s consideration of an application for extension of time and leave to appeal are well settled. The applicant needs to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay in commencing the proceedings. The strength of the proposed grounds of appeal is another relevant matter, not only in relation to the application for an extension of time, but also in connection with a related application for leave to appeal (see Décor Corporation Pty Limited v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 and BTM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 888 at [19]). As to the first of those matters, the delay in seeking leave to appeal is almost nine years, which is an unusually long period of time. The only explanation offered by the applicant was that he was awaiting the outcome of a decision on his request for Ministerial intervention. In his affidavit dated 25 October 2016 in support of his extension of time, the applicant said that his appeal was out of time because “my application was pending before the Minister”. He then stated that he would provide more details later. This explanation has been rejected in other cases, even where the delay is not as long as that here (see, for example, MZZYC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1426 at [4] per Davies J), however, each case will necessarily turn on its own facts. In other cases, the decision to seek Ministerial intervention has been regarded as not being consistent with an intention to pursue appeal rights and contest the correctness of the decision of the FCCA (see Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42, and M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293 at [24]). In his affidavit, the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the very lengthy delay here. Given his status as a litigant in person, I asked him to elaborate upon his affidavit. Through his interpreter, he said that he had sought Ministerial intervention three times and had hoped to get a positive decision from those requests. In the light of the above, I do not accept that the applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing this proceeding. It may be inferred from the fact that he sought Ministerial intervention on three separate occasions during the nine year period since Judge Cameron published his judgment that the applicant elected to take a cause of action which is inconsistent with an intention to pursue his appeal rights. That is sufficient to dispose of his application but, for completeness, I will now address the issue of the strength of the proposed grounds of appeal.