FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 117
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249 File number(s): NSD 1859 of 2016 Judge(s): GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 17 February 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (FMCA) – whether FCMA erred in dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal – whether extension of time and leave to appeal is warranted in circumstances where the applicant was awaiting the outcome of a decision on his request for Ministerial intervention.
Held: application dismissed with costs.
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 r 35.14 Cases cited: BTM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 888
Décor Corporation Pty Limited v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397
M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293
MZZYC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1426
NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249
SZASP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 771
Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42
Date of hearing: 16 February 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 18 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms E Warner Knight of Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1859 of 2016 BETWEEN: NAPF
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 FEBRUARY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
The applicant applies for an extension of time and leave to appeal under r 35.14 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 from a judgment of Judge Cameron, dated 15 February 2008. At that time, Judge Cameron was a Federal Magistrate.
In an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 25 October 2016, the only explanation for the delay in challenging Judge Cameron’s decision was “because my application was pending before the Ministerial intervention (sic)” and that the applicant was uninformed about the Ministerial decision during the week commencing 19 October 2016.
Judge Cameron’s decision
In the light of its brevity it is convenient to set out the decision in NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 249 in its entirety:
1The applicant seeks review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) signed on 12 December 2007.
2The applicant has claimed to fear persecution…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read NAPF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 117
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the applicant had provided an acceptable explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing the proceedings and whether the proposed grounds of appeal were strong enough to warrant an extension of time and leave to appeal. The court needed to consider the principles guiding the consideration of an application for extension of time and leave to appeal, which include the need for an acceptable explanation for the delay and the strength of the proposed grounds of appeal.
In reaching its decision, the court considered the circumstances of the case, including the fact that the applicant had known about the hearing date since 2 November 2016 but had left it too late to apply for an adjournment. The court noted that the applicant's only explanation for the delay was that they were awaiting the outcome of a decision on their request for Ministerial intervention. The court found that this explanation was inadequate, particularly given the unusually long delay of almost nine years. The court also noted that seeking Ministerial intervention was not consistent with an intention to pursue appeal rights and contest the correctness of the FMCA's decision.
The court held that the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing the proceeding. The court inferred from the fact that the applicant sought Ministerial intervention on three separate occasions during the nine-year period since the FMCA's judgment that the applicant had elected to take a course of action inconsistent with an intention to pursue their appeal rights. This was sufficient to dispose of the application. The court also found that the proposed grounds of appeal were not strong enough to warrant an extension of time and leave to appeal.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal the decision of Judge Cameron from the FMCA, which was dismissed on 15 February 2008. The applicant cited his financial difficulties and his pending request for Ministerial intervention as reasons for the delay in lodging the appeal. Despite being informed of the hearing date on 2 November 2016, the applicant did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the almost nine-year delay in lodging the appeal.
The case began with the applicant's application for a protection visa on 2 August 2001, which was refused by the Minister's delegate on 23 November 2001. The applicant's appeal to the Refugee Review Tribunal was affirmed on 11 April 2003. Subsequent applications for judicial review were dismissed by various courts, culminating in the dismissal of the applicant's application to the FMCA on 15 February 2008. The applicant then sought an extension of time and leave to appeal this decision, which was dismissed by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 25 October 2016. The applicant's explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal was based on pending requests for Ministerial intervention, which the court found to be inadequate.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister opposed an adjournment. I refused the applicant’s adjournment application and said that I would give reasons later. Those reasons relate to the fact that, as the applicant acknowledged, he had known since directions were made on 2 November 2016 that the hearing would proceed at this time. I accept that he has financial difficulties but he has left it too late to apply for an adjournment. The promised financial support referred to in his written submissions lacks particulars and adequate detail. I was unpersuaded that it was in the interests of justice to adjourn the matter, particularly against the background of the fact that the applicant was seeking an extension of time in respect of a decision dated as long ago as 15 February 2008. Consideration and determination The relevant principles guiding the Court’s consideration of an application for extension of time and leave to appeal are well settled. The applicant needs to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay in commencing the proceedings. The strength of the proposed grounds of appeal is another relevant matter, not only in relation to the application for an extension of time, but also in connection with a related application for leave to appeal (see Décor Corporation Pty Limited v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 and BTM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 888 at [19]). As to the first of those matters, the delay in seeking leave to appeal is almost nine years, which is an unusually long period of time. The only explanation offered by the applicant was that he was awaiting the outcome of a decision on his request for Ministerial intervention. In his affidavit dated 25 October 2016 in support of his extension of time, the applicant said that his appeal was out of time because “my application was pending before the Minister”. He then stated that he would provide more details later. This explanation has been rejected in other cases, even where the delay is not as long as that here (see, for example, MZZYC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1426 at [4] per Davies J), however, each case will necessarily turn on its own facts. In other cases, the decision to seek Ministerial intervention has been regarded as not being consistent with an intention to pursue appeal rights and contest the correctness of the decision of the FCCA (see Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42, and M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293 at [24]). In his affidavit, the applicant did not provide an adequate explanation for the very lengthy delay here. Given his status as a litigant in person, I asked him to elaborate upon his affidavit. Through his interpreter, he said that he had sought Ministerial intervention three times and had hoped to get a positive decision from those requests. In the light of the above, I do not accept that the applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay in bringing this proceeding. It may be inferred from the fact that he sought Ministerial intervention on three separate occasions during the nine year period since Judge Cameron published his judgment that the applicant elected to take a cause of action which is inconsistent with an intention to pursue his appeal rights. That is sufficient to dispose of his application but, for completeness, I will now address the issue of the strength of the proposed grounds of appeal.