NACQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NACQ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
& Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 355

APPLICANT NACQ OF 2001 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 367 OF 2002

DRUMMOND, NORTH & DOWSETT JJ
15 NOVEMBER 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 367 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NACQ OF 2001
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND, NORTH & DOWSETT JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

15 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 367 OF 2002

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NACQ OF 2001
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DRUMMOND, NORTH & DOWSETT JJ

DATE:

15 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Beaumont J (the primary judge) made on 11 April 2002.  His Honour dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 11 October 2001.  By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (the Minister), not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Palestine who was born on 9 January 1977.  Until arriving in Australia, he lived in the West Bank city of Janin.  From 1997 to 2000, the appellant worked as a wholesaler of fruit and vegetables in Janin.

  3. Before the delegate and the Tribunal, the appellant claimed that he feared persecution from Israeli spies if he was forced to return to Palestine.  The circumstances leading up to his departure from Palestine were set out in a written statement attached to his application for a protection visa.  In summary, the circumstances were as follows.

  4. In April 2000, the appellant was involved in a violent incident with Mr Sati Al-Sharqawi, who beat the appellant after the appellant refused to become an informer for the Israeli intelligence.  The appellant’s statement then recorded the following: 

    “I went back home and some marks of a fight were still apparent on my body.  My family insisted on knowing what happened.  When I told them, my father said words to the effect that:

    ‘Sati did this because your brother Ahmed was involved in arresting Sati’s group of Israeli agents and he interrogated them.  They were: Salim Abu Fahd, Mehdi Al-Darbi and Tayseer Jaradat, who was known as the joker.  They confessed that it was Sati who heads the group.  Sati became wanted by Palestinians.  He fled from Genin…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 355
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court is an appeal by the appellant, a Palestinian citizen, against the decision of the primary judge who dismissed an application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa. The appellant argued that he feared persecution from Israeli spies if he was forced to return to Palestine. The primary judge found that the Tribunal did not consider the particular social group ground in its decision, and that this was an error on the part of the Tribunal. The Minister, represented by the respondent, accepted that the Tribunal's statement was likely an error of expression, but contended that the Tribunal, in fact, considered the claim of persecution for reasons of membership of the particular social group.

The court had to decide whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the Tribunal did not consider the particular social group ground in its decision. The court found that the Tribunal's statement that no claim had been made on the particular social group ground was curious in the light of the express reference to that ground in the written submissions of the appellant's migration agent. However, the court agreed with the respondent that, despite the erroneous statement, the Tribunal, in fact, considered the claim of persecution for reasons of membership of the particular social group, namely, the appellant's family.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal. The court found that the Tribunal had considered the particular social group ground in its decision and that the primary judge was incorrect in finding otherwise. The court also found that the appellant's fear of persecution from Israeli spies was not well-founded and that the Tribunal's decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant was correct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of Beaumont J (the primary judge) made on 11 April 2002. His Honour dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 11 October 2001. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (the Minister), not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Palestine who was born on 9 January 1977. Until arriving in Australia, he lived in the West Bank city of Janin. From 1997 to 2000, the appellant worked as a wholesaler of fruit and vegetables in Janin. Before the delegate and the Tribunal, the appellant claimed that he feared persecution from Israeli spies if he was forced to return to Palestine. The circumstances leading up to his departure from Palestine were set out in a written statement attached to his application for a protection visa. In summary, the circumstances were as follows. In April 2000, the appellant was involved in a violent incident with Mr Sati Al-Sharqawi, who beat the appellant after the appellant refused to become an informer for the Israeli intelligence. The appellant’s statement then recorded the following: “I went back home and some marks of a fight were still apparent on my body. My family insisted on knowing what happened. When I told them, my father said words to the effect that:‘Sati did this because your brother Ahmed was involved in arresting Sati’s group of Israeli agents and he interrogated them. They were: Salim Abu Fahd, Mehdi Al-Darbi and Tayseer Jaradat, who was known as the joker. They confessed that it was Sati who heads the group. Sati became wanted by Palestinians. He fled from Genin to live in Israel and his house was burnt by angry Palestinians.’ I then realised that the real reason behind my problem was that I and all members of my family had always supported the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority. My brother was one of the leaders of a group of National Committee which was established during the first uprising (INTIFADA) of the Palestinians against Israel. I was also an out spoken [sic] person on the rights of our people to have their own independent state and that there is no room among the Palestinian people for traitors. Those persons should be arrested, taken to court and punished.”[emphasis added] In June 2000, the appellant again met with Mr Al-Sharqawi. However, this time, the appellant beat Mr Al-Sharqawi. In July 2000, the appellant’s car was burned outside his house. Graffiti was inscribed on the car “Today is your car and tomorrow is you”. The incident was reported to the Palestinian police. The Palestinian police told the appellant that, because Mr Sharqawi did not live in Janin, he was under the Israeli security and could not be arrested by them. They told the appellant that the Palestinian Authority wanted Mr Sharqawi and that he should advise the police if he saw Mr Sharqawi in Janin.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 11 October 2001, the Tribunal determined to affirm the decision of the delegate to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal set out the background of the appellant’s application, and the statutory provisions which govern it. It then discussed some of the legal principles relevant to its consideration of the case. In this discussion, the Tribunal made several references which bear on the issues argued on the appeal. Having referred to the definition of a refugee in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugees Convention) the Tribunal then said: “… 91S of the [Migration] Act now qualify some aspects of Article 1A(2) for the purposes of the application of the Act and the regulations to a particular person.” Section 91S of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) concerns the Convention ground of persecution for reason of a particular social group. It provides as follows:“For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:(a)disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; and(b)disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:(i)the first person has ever experienced; or(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.” The Tribunal then addressed what it called the four key elements of the Convention definition. The third element was the necessary nexus between then harm feared and a Convention ground. On this subject the Tribunal said:“Third, the persecution which the applicant fears must be for one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Convention definition – race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The phrase ‘for reasons of’ serves to identify the motivation for the infliction of the persecution. The persecution feared need not be solely attributable to a Convention reason. However, persecution for multiple motivations will not satisfy the relevant test unless a Convention reason or reasons constitute at least the essential and significant motivation for the persecution feared: s.91R(1)(a) of the Act.” The Tribunal then referred to the claims and evidence relied upon by the appellant. The written statement made by the appellant was set out in full. Then, under the separate heading “Written submissions to the Tribunal”, there was a reference to the fact that the appellant’s advisers had filed written submissions of fact and law on 27 July 2001. Part of these submissions is extracted in par 12 of these reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant obtained leave, without opposition by the respondent, at the hearing of the appeal, to amend the notice of appeal by adding par 3A which is reflected in issue (b) above. The respondent made written and oral submissions in response to the above issues stated by the appellant, even if the notice of appeal did not reflect those issues precisely. It is convenient to deal with the appeal by reference to the issues thus agreed by the parties.CONSIDERATIONParticular social group – Issue (a) The first two grounds of appeal raise the question whether the primary judge erred in holding that the Tribunal did address the particular social group ground. It is convenient to deal with this question at the outset. Mr Karp who appeared as counsel for the appellant, relied centrally on the following sentence in the Tribunal’s decision:“The applicant made no claim of fearing persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group.”It was contended that this statement was wrong because the appellant and his adviser had raised the particular social group ground. In particular, the appellant’s statement included:“I then realised that the real reason behind my problem was that I and all members of my family had always supported the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority.”And the adviser had included in the written submission in reference to this very part of the appellant’s statement:“It also discloses … [the appellant’s] membership of a particular social group, one constituted by his membership of a family closely aligned to the PLO, through the activities in particular of … [the appellant’s] brother, ….” Mr Karp also contended that the Tribunal’s finding “Sati is seeking to harm the applicant because he is seeking revenge or retribution against the applicant’s brother for arresting his friends” would have supported the particular social group claim if the Tribunal had considered that ground in relation to the particular finding. The fact that the Tribunal confirmed the refusal of the protection visa, while at the same time making a finding which was consistent with success on that ground, showed, it was argued, that the Tribunal did not consider the ground. The Tribunal’s statement that no claim had been made on the particular social group ground is curious in the light of the express reference to that ground in the written submissions of the appellant’s migration agent. We have struggled to see an explanation for the apparent error in the context of the proceeding before the Tribunal as a whole. However, there does not seem to be an explanation. Mr Lloyd, who appeared as counsel for the Minister, did not seek to explain the statement. He was content to accept that it was probably an error of expression on the part of the Tribunal. The critical factor, he contended, was that, despite the erroneous statement, the Tribunal, in fact, considered the claim of persecution for reasons of membership of the particular social group, namely, the appellant’s family. We agree with this contention.