N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCAFC 94

N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 403

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)

The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

The transitional arrangements are as follows:

  • All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
  • All Full Court judgments delivered between 1 January 2002 to 30 April 2002 have been assigned parallel medium neutral citations in both the FCA and FCAFC series. 
  • All Full Court judgments delivered from 1 May 2002 will contain the FCAFC medium neutral citation only.

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 403

IMMIGRATION – Decision of Refugee Review Tribunal refusing protection visa – decision of primary judge affirming decision of Tribunal – appellant citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity and adherent to Al-Haqq – appellant’s wife converted to Al-Haqq from Islam - whether in assessing degree of risk that appellant would face persecution in the future the Tribunal had regard to the degree of probability that past events had occurred as claimed – where Tribunal did not accept that past events had occurred as claimed because it was unpersuaded or unable to reach a state of positive belief - where Tribunal did not find that appellant was an untruthful witness whose evidence was to be rejected.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Extension of time for appeal – where period of delay in filing the notice of appeal approximately two months – whether special circumstances exist- where appellant does not understand English, is not familiar with the Australian legal system and has been interned in a detention centre without legal representation – whether real issue to be considered in the appeal.

Migration Act1958 (Cth) s 476
Federal Court Rules Or 52 r 15(1) and (2)

Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 referred to
Hughes v National Trustees Executor and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd [1978] VR 257 cited
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 cited
Burns v Grigg [1967] VR 871 cited
Kalaba v The Queen (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Finn J, 13 September 1996

cited

Howard v Australian Electoral Commission [2000] FCA 1767 cited
W105/99A vMinister For Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1786 cited
Yusuf v Minister For Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 180 ALR 1 followed
Kalala v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1594 cited
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 followed
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 followed
Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449 referred to

N1202/01A v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N1202 OF 2001

LEE, MOORE AND MADGWICK JJ
8 APRIL…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 403
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court is N1202/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which concerns the appeal against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) regarding the applicants' refugee status. The applicants, N1202/01A and his wife, sought refugee status in Australia based on claims of persecution due to the husband's Kurdish ethnicity, religious affiliations, and other activities. The primary judge had to decide whether the RRT correctly assessed the applicants' claims and whether the court should grant the appeal.

The primary legal issues were whether the RRT correctly interpreted and applied the law in assessing the applicants' claims, particularly in relation to the husband's fear of being considered guilty of proselytising due to his wife's alleged conversion to his religion, Al-Haqq. The applicants argued that the RRT made an error in relying on evidence concerning the consequences of conversion from Islam to Catholicism to assess their situation, rather than evidence specific to conversion to Al-Haqq. Additionally, the applicants claimed that the RRT failed to properly consider all relevant evidence regarding the husband's role as the agent of his wife's apostasy and whether this would result in a well-founded fear of persecution.

The court found that the RRT had not erred in relying on analogous evidence concerning conversion from Islam to Catholicism, as it was reasonable for the RRT to consider such evidence when specific evidence on Al-Haqq was unavailable. However, the court held that the RRT did err in not properly applying the law in assessing the husband's fear of being considered an agent of his wife's apostasy. The court concluded that the RRT failed to consider all relevant evidence and did not adequately speculate on the potential future persecution based on the husband's role in his wife's conversion.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge set aside the RRT's decision and remitted the matter to the RRT for redetermination, with the respondent to pay the applicants' costs. The respondent was also ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders appealed from be set aside and in lieu thereof the following orders be made:

“(a) The application for review be granted.

(b) The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made 9 March 2001 be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination.

(c) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.”

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The foregoing submissions demonstrate that there is a real issue to be considered in the appeal and sufficient reason to allow the appeal to proceed. We are satisfied that, in all the circumstances leave should be granted for the notice of appeal in this matter to be filed out of time and for the appeal to be treated as instituted by the notice of appeal filed and served.Background and the learned primary judge’s decision. The learned primary judge set out in her reasons, in a summary form, the Tribunal's description of the appellant's claims (and those of his family) and the relevant evidence as well as the Tribunal's consideration and analysis of the claims and evidence. It is convenient simply to repeat her Honour's summary:“The applicants’ claims before the Tribunal were based on matters including the husband’s Kurdish ethnicity, his membership of the minority religious group “Al Haqq” or “Al Hagh” (also known as ‘Yarasan’), his membership of a student association, his participation in a political demonstration and the fact that he has applied for refugee status in Australia. In relation to those matters, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The applicants have not sought to review any of those findings in this Court. Accordingly, there is no need to set out the Tribunal’s reasons in relation to those claims.The husband and wife also claimed that they each had a well-founded fear of persecution because of the wife’s conversion from Islam to Al Haqq. It was claimed that the husband would be presumed guilty of the offence of proselytising and the wife would be presumed guilty of apostasy. With some reservations the Tribunal accepted that the husband was a follower of the Al-Haqq religion. In relation to the wife’s alleged conversion to that religion, the Tribunal stated:‘The Tribunal has considered [the husband’s] claim that he will face serious problems and punishment in Iran for reasons of his wife’s conversion to his religious faith…There are difficulties in the accounts given of the wife’s conversion. It has been claimed that she converted to Al-Haqq prior to her wedding and in the ignorance of this by her parents. The Applicant husband claimed that her parents did not know that he was a member of this group even though he has also submitted that the Al-Haqq, and therefore he, himself do not ‘dissimulate’. The Applicant husband was a Kurd from Ilam who had, he had claimed, already lost one job because he was identified as a member of Al-Haqq. He has claimed that he was sacked again in 1998, the year of his marriage, for the same reason. He claimed he was at that time detained for three weeks. That employment was with the Sea Transport Organisation in Khoramshar, that is in the town where his in-laws lived. The Tribunal does not accept that the wife’s parents would make no enquiries of their prospective son-in-law’s credentials and that they would be unable to find out, what he has claimed others had found out, that he was a member of Al-Haqq. That is, it is difficult to accept the issues raised in this paragraph did not result in his parents-in-law at least knowing that he was a member of Al-Haqq.The Tribunal also has taken into account that they lived together for two years before departing for Australia with no obvious negative consequence for either of them because of the marriage. Whether both or either of them was a devout follower of Al-Haqq, they apparently managed to persuade her large family and others around them that they were not religiously unusual or that their religious situation was no problem. That is, the alleged conversion did not apparently result in any change of behaviour on the part of the Applicant wife which raised suspicions. She did not exhibit zeal for a new religion nor seek to convert others. There appears to have been no public dimension to conversion. She told the Tribunal that she did not participate in Al‑Haqq rituals of groups, except for attending some singing and social occasions. This raises the issue as to whether the mere undergoing of an initiation ritual into Al-Haqq could be described as ‘conversion’.’The Tribunal then considered the contents of letters sent by the husband’s family suggesting that they had been questioned by the authorities in relation to the wife’s conversion and stated that it did not find these compelling. It then stated‘The Tribunal has also taken into account that according to the Applicant husband it was his mother-in-law who told the authorities of her daughter’s conversion to Al-Haqq even though he previously had stated that his in-laws did not know this. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has been given a genuine account of the Applicant wife’s religious position’.It is not clear whether the above passages amount to a finding that the wife did not convert to Al-Haqq or that the husband was not involved in persuading her to convert. The Tribunal clearly stated that, in its view, the story of the wife’s conversion was not ‘genuine’. However, it did not elaborate on the nature of its concerns. In any event, as the Tribunal then considered the position of the wife should she have converted, this uncertainty is not important. It is useful to set out the Tribunal’s reasoning on this issue:‘However, [the Tribunal] also has considered the situation should she have converted. While apostasy is punishable by death, there are very few recent accounts of any such punishment being meted out. Because of the dearth of information on conversion to Al-Haqq, the Tribunal has looked at sources describing the treatment of Muslims converting to Christianity, a topic on which there is a considerable amount of information. The Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999 notes that there are restrictions on freedom of religion in Iran and that conversion from Islam is proscribed. However, that does not mean that conversion is, ipso facto, treated in this way. As information from the Reasearch [sic] Directorate, Immigration and Refguee [sic] Board of Canada makes clear, the situation is not as stark as the law implies.“A professor of sociology at California State University who specializes in third world development, social change, democratization in the Middle East and Iran, stated in a 29 October 1999 telephone interview that…it is possible for Muslims to attended [sic] Catholic services and said that if a ‘simple person’ wanted to convert, ‘that’s not a problem’. He claimed that he has heard of many cases of ordinary people converting from Islam to Christianity…and that the government does not need to know if this does occur.” REFINFO Version 96.0 (November/novembre 2000, IRN33082.E)The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant wife is not claiming conversion to one of the registered faiths in Iran but to a small officially unrecognised minority. However, it does believe there is some correspondence between them. It is not the case the [sic] all apostates are harshly treated. The Tribunal is satisfied that the circumstances in this case will not provoke harsh reaction. The Applicant wife has not openly offended against Islam. She has, she has claimed, quietly undergone a ritual of conversion to her husband’s religion. Members of Al-Haqq consider themselves to be a branch of Muslims and the family travelled to Australia with Islamic material, a compass and a cassette of Koranic readings. The Tribunal is satisfied that her husband has not been persecuted for his membership of the Al-Haqq group. It is satisfied that she too will not be persecuted for her quiet adoption of her husband’s religious identity. It is not satisfied that the claims made in the letter about relatives’ anger, official searches and interrogations and maltreatment of their close relatives are true.’The Tribunal’s treatment of the husband’s claim that he would be considered guilty of the offence of ‘proselytising’ because of his wife’s conversion to his religion is less clear and is the basis of one of the grounds of review raised by the applicants. It is discussed later in these reasons at [8]–[11].” (emphasis in original)The issues before the learned primary judge and her consideration of them

Decision

Reasons for decision

LEE, MOORE AND MADGWICK JJ
Issues
1. Did the Tribunal err in its consideration of the consequences of conversion from Islam to Al Haqq?
2. Did the Tribunal err in its interpretation and application of the law relating to the process of defining "refugee"?
3. Did the Tribunal err in its consideration of the evidence relating to the husband's role as the agent of his wife's apostasy from Islam to Al Haqq?

Held
1. The Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the consequences of conversion from Islam to Al Haqq. However, the court found that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the consequences of conversion from Islam to Al Haqq and relied on analogous situations, such as conversion to Catholicism, which was not entirely relevant.
2. The Tribunal erred in its interpretation and application of the law relating to the process of defining "refugee". The Tribunal failed to properly apply the law by not speculating on whether the letters from the appellant's family evidenced past events that could form a basis for a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.
3. The Tribunal erred in its consideration of the evidence relating to the husband's role as the agent of his wife's apostasy from Islam to Al Haqq. The Tribunal failed to consider all relevant evidence concerning the husband's role as the agent of his wife's apostasy and whether this would provide a basis for a well-founded fear of persecution in the future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LEE, MOORE AND MADGWICK JJ

It should be noted that her Honour did refer to one matter raised on behalf of the appellant in the appeal, namely the Tribunal's reliance on evidence concerning the consequences of conversion from Islam and to Catholicism. Her Honour said:“The applicants challenged the Tribunal’s reliance on evidence concerning the consequences of conversion from Islam to Catholicism. Mr Jones submitted that Catholicism is an official religion in Iran and therefore this material was not relevant in considering conversion to an unofficial religion. I do not agree with this submission. Obviously it would have been better to have evidence concerning the consequences of conversion to the Al-Haqq group. As the Tribunal was not able to obtain such information it was entirely reasonable for it to consider analogous situations. If the applicants’ challenge has any force it is in relation to the weight to be attached to such evidence. That decision, however, is a matter for the Tribunal and cannot be disturbed by this Court.”Issues raised on the appeal and their consideration During the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant, appearing pro bono publico, formulated the points sought to be raised in various ways and at various times during the hearing and subsequently in written submissions. In the original draft notice of appeal filed on 16 August 2001 the following ground appeared:“[1] the Court below erred in not finding that the Tribunal had used an irrelevant consideration when the Tribunal used the example of conversion from Islam to Christianity in Iran to analyse the likely fate of those who convert from Islam to Al Haque.” The submissions made on behalf of the appellant during the hearing of the appeal exposed a number of further issues which were reflected in amendments later proposed to the draft notice of appeal as follows:“2. The Tribunal erred in law in making an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law in not properly applying the law relating to process of defining "refugee".ParticularsThe Tribunal referred to letters from the appellant's family having been put in evidence, but the Tribunal rejected the letters without performing any speculation as to whether those letters evidenced past events which might in turn be a basis for a well founded fear of persecution in the future by (a) the Iranian State, or (b) the Iranian community (with the State failing to provide protection).3. The Tribunal erred in law in making an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law in not properly applying the law relating to the process of defining "refugee".ParticularsThe Tribunal referred in its reasons to the position of the appellant as a member of the Al-Haqq, and also to the position of the wife of the appellant as both a member and convert to Al-Haqq from Islam. The Tribunal noted the appellant's claim as to his fear in respect of being the agent of his wife's apostasy from Islam to Al-Haqq, but the Tribunal performed no speculation, and failed consider all the relevant evidence as to the position of the appellant as such agent of the wife's apostasy, and whether being such agent would provide the basis of a well founded fear of persecution in the future by (a) the Iranian State, or (b) the Iranian community (with the State failing to provide protection)”