MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 879

Citation: MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 879
Appeal from: MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2013] FCCA 254
Parties: MZZAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 459 of 2013
Judge: DODDS-STREETON J
Date of judgment: 30 August 2013
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Tribunal found appellant had well-founded fear of persecution from the Taliban by reason of his father’s involvement with the Pakistani army – Tribunal found it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Lahore, Pakistan – appellant claimed Tribunal failed to consider his personal circumstances and the impact of relocation to Lahore – leave to raise new grounds of appeal refused because no reasonable prospect of success  
Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R and 91S
Refugees Convention (the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967)
Cases cited: Franco Buitrago v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1525
Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426
MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 634; [2007] HCA 40
Date of hearing: 13 August 2013
Date of last submissions: 13 August 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 82
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr BD Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 459 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MZZAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DODDS-STREETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2013

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship”.

2.Leave to raise grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal is refused.

3.Leave to raise the new grounds of appeal stated in oral submissions is refused.

4.The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 459 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MZZAD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DODDS-STREETON J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2013

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. By notice of appeal dated 6 June 2013 the appellant appeals…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 879
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, appealed against a decision of the Tribunal not to grant him a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal erred in its consideration of his evidence and his documents, particularly his identity card and domicile certificate. The appellant contended that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his personal circumstances and the impact of relocating to Lahore, Pakistan. The Federal Circuit Court was asked to determine whether the appellant's grounds for appeal had a reasonable prospect of success.

The court needed to decide whether the Tribunal correctly applied the law in determining the appellant's eligibility for a protection visa. This involved examining whether the Tribunal properly considered the appellant's evidence, including his documents, and whether it correctly applied the criteria for protection as a refugee and complementary protection. The court also needed to assess whether the Tribunal appropriately considered the appellant's fear of persecution and the reasonableness of relocating to Lahore.

The court found that the Tribunal correctly considered the appellant's evidence and documents. The Tribunal had a protocol for assessing the authenticity of documents and had applied this protocol in its assessment. The Tribunal also properly considered the appellant's fear of persecution and had found that it was reasonable for him to relocate to Lahore. The court held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the Tribunal's decision was flawed or that there was a reasonable prospect of success for his appeal.

The court dismissed the appeal and refused leave to raise the grounds of appeal. The name of the first respondent was amended to "Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship". The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship”.

2. Leave to raise grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal is refused.

3. Leave to raise the new grounds of appeal stated in oral submissions is refused.

4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal asked the appellant if he wanted the facts he had already raised to be considered in relation to complementary protection as well as protection as a refugee. The appellant confirmed that he wished to rely on the same facts. The Tribunal explained that there was a similar relocation test in relation to complementary protection. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On 24 July 2012, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the first respondent, by his delegate, not to grant the appellant a protection visa. On 23 August 2012, the appellant applied to the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, now Federal Circuit Court of Australia, (referred to throughout these reasons as the Federal Circuit Court) for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. On 10 September 2012, the first respondent filed a response and on 1 October 2012 the applicant filed an affidavit. The appellant appeared before the Federal Circuit Court on 20 March 2013 and was not legally represented. On 16 May 2013, Judge Burchardt dismissed the application. In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal discussed the relevant legislative framework of the appellant’s claim to a protection visa, including the criteria for protection as a refugee as defined in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention (the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967) and the complementary protection criterion. The Tribunal found that the appellant was a citizen of Pakistan and that his place of domicile to which he would return if required to do so would be Khadi, North Wairistan Agency. The Tribunal noted that the appellant’s Domicile Certificate showed his place of residence was Khadi. The Tribunal stated:119.The Tribunal gives no weight to the Domicile Certificate, as documents such as this are readily available fraudulently in Pakistan (see the country information recited by the delegate IRB Response to Information Request 18 June 2004).120.In relation to the Pakistan National Identity Card, this does support the claim that the applicant’s permanent address is in [North Wairistan Agency], although it is curious to note that it was issued in August 2002, at a time when the applicant claims that he was living in Khadi, and notes his ‘present address’ as Peshawar.121.On balance, the Tribunal accepts the applicant’s claim that his place of domicile and return, if required to do so, would be Khadi, [North Wairistan Agency]. The Tribunal accepted that:(a)The appellant’s father is a former Pakistani army officer and Malik who supports the government of Pakistan and that, accordingly, the appellant may be perceived as being opposed to extremist groups in North Wairistan Agency.(b)The appellant “genuinely” fears being killed if he were to return to Pakistan which is a form of “serious harm”.(c)Tribal elders, such as Maliks and their family members, and tribal militia, who oppose extremists groups, may be targeted and killed.(d)Pakistani authorities are unable to control that threat and appear “selectively” to condone such targeting.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent submitted that (having found that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to his village in the reasonably foreseeable future) the Tribunal determined whether the appellant could be relocated to another area in Pakistan where he would not face Convention-related persecution. Having identified Lahore as such a place, the Tribunal considered whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate there. It found that it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable.CONSIDERATIONNew matters raised by the appellant in oral submissions In my opinion, to the extent to which the appellant raised complaints which were not included in the notice of appeal, they were unfounded. As the first respondent submitted, there was no basis for the assertion that the Tribunal erred in concluding that victims of a recent attack in Lahore were targeted because they were police. The Tribunal clearly distinguished between the characteristics of victims of attack mentioned in country information and the particular profile of the appellant. Further, the Tribunal considered, although it rejected, the appellant’s claim that his tribal characteristics (his facial features and identity) would lead to various agencies tracking him in Lahore. The Tribunal also considered the appellant’s ID card in relation to his claimed fear of harm at the hands of the police and made findings which were open on the evidence before it. Ground 1The decision of the Tribunal was made in breach of essential pre condition to the exercise of the power conferred by sections 414 & 415 of the Migration Act, because the tribunal failed to determine whether the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution as required by s36(2) & 91R(1) of the Act and sub clause 866.211 of part 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994.PARTICULARSa.The tribunal imposed an impermissible burden of proof on the Applicant by misunderstanding the procedure in how id cards are obtained and by discounting the documents provided, especially given the tribunal has a protocol in assessing whether documents are genuine or fraudulent and by not addressing the issue of tribal Pashtuns and the risk they face. By ground 1, the appellant alleges that the Tribunal erred by failing to determine whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution and in particular, under ground 1(a), that the Tribunal imposed “an impermissible burden of proof” by “misunderstanding the procedure in how ID cards are obtained and by discounting the documents provided” and “by not addressing the issue of tribal Pashtuns and the risks they face”. Ground 1 was not directly raised below, although it was to some extent obliquely adumbrated in the appellant’s submissions that the Tribunal should have examined his documents more closely if it doubted his veracity. In my opinion, to the extent that leave is now required, it is not expedient in the interests of justice to grant it. Not only did the appellant fail adequately to explain why the relevant ground was not raised below, but more importantly, it has no reasonable prospects of success.