FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 879
Citation: MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 879 Appeal from: MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2013] FCCA 254 Parties: MZZAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: VID 459 of 2013 Judge: DODDS-STREETON J Date of judgment: 30 August 2013 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Tribunal found appellant had well-founded fear of persecution from the Taliban by reason of his father’s involvement with the Pakistani army – Tribunal found it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Lahore, Pakistan – appellant claimed Tribunal failed to consider his personal circumstances and the impact of relocation to Lahore – leave to raise new grounds of appeal refused because no reasonable prospect of success Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 36, 91R and 91S
Refugees Convention (the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967)Cases cited: Franco Buitrago v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1525
Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426
MZYXS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 614
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 237 ALR 634; [2007] HCA 40Date of hearing: 13 August 2013 Date of last submissions: 13 August 2013 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 82 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr BD Kaplan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 459 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MZZAD
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DODDS-STREETON J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2013
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship”.
2.Leave to raise grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal is refused.
3.Leave to raise the new grounds of appeal stated in oral submissions is refused.
4.The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 459 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: MZZAD
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DODDS-STREETON J
DATE:
30 AUGUST 2013
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
By notice of appeal dated 6 June 2013 the appellant appeals…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read MZZAD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 879
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to decide whether the Tribunal correctly applied the law in determining the appellant's eligibility for a protection visa. This involved examining whether the Tribunal properly considered the appellant's evidence, including his documents, and whether it correctly applied the criteria for protection as a refugee and complementary protection. The court also needed to assess whether the Tribunal appropriately considered the appellant's fear of persecution and the reasonableness of relocating to Lahore.
The court found that the Tribunal correctly considered the appellant's evidence and documents. The Tribunal had a protocol for assessing the authenticity of documents and had applied this protocol in its assessment. The Tribunal also properly considered the appellant's fear of persecution and had found that it was reasonable for him to relocate to Lahore. The court held that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that the Tribunal's decision was flawed or that there was a reasonable prospect of success for his appeal.
The court dismissed the appeal and refused leave to raise the grounds of appeal. The name of the first respondent was amended to "Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship". The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship”.
2. Leave to raise grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal is refused.
3. Leave to raise the new grounds of appeal stated in oral submissions is refused.
4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first respondent submitted that (having found that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to his village in the reasonably foreseeable future) the Tribunal determined whether the appellant could be relocated to another area in Pakistan where he would not face Convention-related persecution. Having identified Lahore as such a place, the Tribunal considered whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate there. It found that it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable.CONSIDERATIONNew matters raised by the appellant in oral submissions In my opinion, to the extent to which the appellant raised complaints which were not included in the notice of appeal, they were unfounded. As the first respondent submitted, there was no basis for the assertion that the Tribunal erred in concluding that victims of a recent attack in Lahore were targeted because they were police. The Tribunal clearly distinguished between the characteristics of victims of attack mentioned in country information and the particular profile of the appellant. Further, the Tribunal considered, although it rejected, the appellant’s claim that his tribal characteristics (his facial features and identity) would lead to various agencies tracking him in Lahore. The Tribunal also considered the appellant’s ID card in relation to his claimed fear of harm at the hands of the police and made findings which were open on the evidence before it. Ground 1The decision of the Tribunal was made in breach of essential pre condition to the exercise of the power conferred by sections 414 & 415 of the Migration Act, because the tribunal failed to determine whether the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution as required by s36(2) & 91R(1) of the Act and sub clause 866.211 of part 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994.PARTICULARSa.The tribunal imposed an impermissible burden of proof on the Applicant by misunderstanding the procedure in how id cards are obtained and by discounting the documents provided, especially given the tribunal has a protocol in assessing whether documents are genuine or fraudulent and by not addressing the issue of tribal Pashtuns and the risk they face. By ground 1, the appellant alleges that the Tribunal erred by failing to determine whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution and in particular, under ground 1(a), that the Tribunal imposed “an impermissible burden of proof” by “misunderstanding the procedure in how ID cards are obtained and by discounting the documents provided” and “by not addressing the issue of tribal Pashtuns and the risks they face”. Ground 1 was not directly raised below, although it was to some extent obliquely adumbrated in the appellant’s submissions that the Tribunal should have examined his documents more closely if it doubted his veracity. In my opinion, to the extent that leave is now required, it is not expedient in the interests of justice to grant it. Not only did the appellant fail adequately to explain why the relevant ground was not raised below, but more importantly, it has no reasonable prospects of success.