FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MZWDL v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1153MZWDL AND MZWDQ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 360 OF 2006
NORTH J
8 AUGUST 2006
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 360 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MZWDL
First AppellantMZWDQ
Second AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 AUGUST 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1)the appeal is dismissed; and
(2)the appellants are to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 360 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MZWDL
First AppellantMZWDQ
Second AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
8 AUGUST 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an appeal against a judgment of Federal Magistrate McInnis, delivered on 21 March 2006. His Honour dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 15 January 2004. That decision affirmed the decision of the delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, not to grant protection visas to the appellants. The appellants are husband and wife. The primary claim was made by the husband, so that the wife's appeal depends on the success of the husband's appeal. Consequently, I will refer to the husband as the appellant in this judgment.
BACKGROUND
The appellant's visa application briefly outlines the essence of his claim, which was elaborated upon in his evidence before the tribunal. The tribunal noted certain differences between the claims made in the appellant's visa application, and his oral evidence before the tribunal. However, those differences do not assume significance in this appeal. The claims made by the appellant are set out in the decision of the tribunal in detail. It is therefore only necessary for me to summarise the substance of those claims.
The appellant claimed that he was a businessman; a shopkeeper in Gujarat, India, and that he was a Muslim. He described how people from the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) demanded protection money from him to protect him and his business. In relation to this extortion, he stated that:
… VHP group is supported by Gujarat Government. Its [sic] is the political party against the Muslims in entire Gujrat state. …
He explained that on one occasion, people from the VHP came and demanded a very large amount of money, which he could not afford to pay. Previously, he had made the requested payments. On this occasion, following his refusal, the VHP threatened to kill him and his family if the amount was not paid.…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read MZWDL v Minister for Immigration and and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2006] FCA 1153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the appellant's claims of persecution due to his Muslim identity were valid under the Refugees Convention. This involved examining the specific incidents of alleged persecution and the broader context of religious conflict in Gujarat, India. The court needed to determine if the appellant's experiences were due to his religion or if they were isolated incidents of extortion and violence that could happen to anyone in a similar socio-economic position, irrespective of religion.
The court found that while the appellant did experience extortion and violence, these incidents were not related to his religious identity but rather his status as a business owner in a region prone to such activities. The court also noted that while there had been significant violence between Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat, particularly in 2002, this did not necessarily mean that the appellant would face persecution upon his return to Gujarat. The court concluded that the appellant's fear of future persecution was not well-founded, as he could potentially relocate within Gujarat to an area less affected by communal violence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) the appeal is dismissed; and
(2) the appellants are to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NORTH J
Having made the findings that each of the claimed incidents of persecution was not related to a reason provided for in the Refugees Convention, the tribunal moved to consider whether the general situation in Gujarat for Muslims did engage the Refugees Convention. That is, would the appellant suffer persecution for the reason that he was Muslim. The tribunal stated at 18-19:Notwithstanding my conclusion that matters associated with the extortion demands and having witnessed a crime do not engage the provisions of the Refugee Convention, the applicant is a Muslim from a state where there has been over the last two years, including time when the applicant was still there, terrible violence between Hindus and Muslims in which Muslims have been most of the victims. Independent information confirms that they was large scale retaliatory action taken against Muslims in many parts of Gujarat after the burning of the train at Godhra in February 2002. I accept that the troubles are not over and that the situation remains volatile. Such conflict would not only be manifested in acts of extreme violence and information I have read indicates that there has also been suspicion, harassment, abuse and intimidation between followers of the two religions. The applicant has submitted that the BJP government of Gujarat has been complicit in aspects of the mistreatment of Muslims and independent information suggests that there were occasions when this was so. It has pointed also to concerns that the issues of concern to Hindus have been given greater attention that those where Muslims have been affected.That some people in a country have suffered or suffer persecution and that an applicant claims to have suffered as these people have, or to be in similar circumstances as those who have suffered and so be at risk of similar treatment, does not, of itself, establish that an applicant’s claimed fear is well-founded within the meaning of the Refugees Convention. The Tribunal is obliged to consider the totality of the evidence about the particular circumstances of the applicant against information about conditions in the country in reaching its conclusions about what has happened to the applicant in the past, what might follow on the applicant’s return to their country and how these facts relate to the definition of a refugee in the Refugees Convention. I have had regard to the evidence which indicates that the applicant has not experienced persecution on account of his religion in the past even though he lived in a Hindu area. As well, I have had in mind the number of Muslims in Gujarat (some 4 million in a population of some 50 million), the numbers of people who have been killed or displaced in the violence and the information I have read which indicates that most of these have occurred in eruptions of violence in a limited number of particular localities. It has been at these times when state protection has been found to be less than adequate. I note that the applicant has stated that he lives in a Hindu area and consider that he could choose to move to live in a different area of the city. While I can understand the applicant’s wish to leave his country, I have come to the view that the chance of the applicant coming to serious harm, of a kind which could constitute persecution, as a consequence of communal trouble in the reasonably foreseeable future on account of his religion is remote.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL