MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 100

Appeal from: MZAEU v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2612
File number: VID 652 of 2015
Judges: NORTH, RANGIAH AND MOSHINSKY JJ
Date of judgment: 5 August 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for protection visa – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal failed to consider claim that it would be unreasonable to relocate because of lack of traditional support mechanisms – whether reasonable apprehension of bias
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 414(1)
Cases cited:

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283

Ebner v Official Trusteein Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70

Livesy v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518

MZZIG v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1236

MZZQV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 533

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425

Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568

Date of hearing: 20 May 2016
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DM Robinson
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms CL Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 652 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MZAEU

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, RANGIAH AND MOSHINSKY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived on Christmas Island on 7 January 2012.  He is of the Shia Muslim faith and of Pashtun ethnicity.  He applied for a Protection (Class XA) Visa on the ground that, if he were returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed by the Taliban, like Sunni extremist groups and other Sunnis because his ethnic group have refused to assist the Taliban and are in conflict with Sunnis in his area of the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court of Australia addressed an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant, who had arrived on Christmas Island on 7 January 2012, had applied for a protection visa which was ultimately refused by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Tribunal had reviewed the decision and affirmed the Minister's refusal, concluding that the appellant could reasonably relocate to Karachi within Pakistan. The appellant then sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court, which was dismissed. This appeal followed, focusing on whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error and whether there was an apprehension of bias.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had overlooked critical aspects of the appellant's claims, specifically the lack of traditional support mechanisms in Karachi that would impact his ability to relocate, and whether there was an apprehension of bias due to the same Tribunal member hearing the case on two occasions. The court examined if the Tribunal's decision failed to consider the broader implications of the appellant's claims regarding the practicability of relocation within Pakistan. Additionally, the court assessed the appellant's argument that the Tribunal member's prior decision indicated prejudgment, thereby raising concerns about bias.

The court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the appellant's arguments about the lack of traditional support mechanisms, as reflected in their reasons. The court concluded that the Tribunal's analysis was sufficient and did not constitute a jurisdictional error. Regarding the apprehension of bias, the court observed that the appellant did not object to the same Tribunal member presiding over the case on both occasions and found no evidence of prejudgment in the Tribunal's reasons. Thus, the court upheld the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss the appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision reinforces the importance of the Tribunal comprehensively considering all aspects of a protection visa application and the threshold for establishing apprehension of bias in administrative law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It follows from the above that we would dismiss the appeal.Background facts As noted above, the appellant arrived on Christmas Island on 7 January 2012. He subsequently applied for a protection visa. By letter dated 9 August 2012, he was notified of a decision by a delegate of the Minister that his application for a protection visa had been refused. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. On 14 February 2013, the Tribunal made the First Tribunal Decision, by which it affirmed the decision of the delegate. The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s grounds of his protection visa claims (at [22]). The Tribunal found that the appellant was a credible witness (at [63]) and that there was a real chance the appellant would suffer serious harm “for the essential and significant reason of his religion and adverse opinions imputed to him” by the Taliban, like Sunni extremist groups and other Sunnis, who would wish to harm him (at [67]). The Tribunal then turned to the issue of whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate in Pakistan to a region where, objectively, there was no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution (at [68]). The Tribunal considered whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Karachi. The Tribunal concluded that in all of the circumstances, the appellant “can reasonably be expected to relocate to Karachi where there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution and where he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for any convention reason” (at [81]). The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the First Tribunal Decision. On 6 September 2013, the First Federal Circuit Court Decision was handed down: MZZIG v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 1236. The Federal Circuit Court judge said (at [16]) that counsel for the applicant in the proceeding (that is, the appellant before this Court) submitted, in the judge’s view correctly, that the Tribunal had focused its consideration of the question of relocation and its practicability wholly on the claims advanced by the applicant as to specific harm, namely his ethnicity, his religion and imputed political opinion. The judge said (at [27]-[29]):27… While no reasonable criticism can be made of the Tribunal for dealing with the matter in the way in which the applicant himself advanced his case, and no criticism has been or could be advanced of the way that the Tribunal dealt with those matters, the difficulty with the Tribunal’s decision is that it ignores the fact that the issue of relocation depends upon whether it is reasonable and practicable to relocate. 28While, of course, it is for the applicant to make his or her case, the fact is that relocation is not merely a subset of the grounds of persecution or of significant harm, referred to in the Convention and in the Complementary protection criterion. It concerns whether or not it is reasonable and practicable for the applicant to relocate. The applicant’s materials … had squarely raised the issue of endemic violence in Karachi and the inevitable associated risks. Although not clearly pressed at the hearing, it was an issue that should have been addressed. 29Put again shortly, the fact is that the applicant’s submission that the relocation principle is not limited to the Convention or the Complementary protection criterion in the sense that it involves broader considerations than mere persecution per se is, in my view, plainly correct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application (the Second Federal Circuit Court Decision). The appellant appeals from that decision. The appellant contends that the Federal Circuit Court erred in its consideration of the two grounds set out above. In our view, no error has been shown in the Second Federal Circuit Court Decision. In summary, our reasons are as follows:(a)In relation to the first ground raised before the Federal Circuit Court, the appellant’s argument before the Tribunal (that it would be unreasonable for him to relocate within Pakistan because of a lack of traditional support mechanisms in the area of prospective relocation) focused on the difficulty of obtaining employment without such mechanisms, but was not limited to this aspect. The Tribunal’s reasons reflected the emphasis in the appellant’s argument. The Tribunal adequately dealt with the matters raised by the appellant in relation to the lack of traditional support mechanisms.(b)In relation to the second ground, the appellant’s argument on appeal relied on both the fact that the same Tribunal member heard the matter on both occasions, and on certain aspects of the Second Tribunal Decision which were said to show prejudgment in relation to the relocation issue. The appellant (who was represented) did not object to the same member hearing the matter. Further, it is difficult to make out a case of apprehended bias, on the basis of prejudgment, by reference to the reasons of the decision-maker as distinct from statements or conduct of the decision-maker before the decision is made. In any event, a proper consideration of the Second Tribunal Decision does not indicate prejudgment. It follows from the above that we would dismiss the appeal.Background facts As noted above, the appellant arrived on Christmas Island on 7 January 2012. He subsequently applied for a protection visa. By letter dated 9 August 2012, he was notified of a decision by a delegate of the Minister that his application for a protection visa had been refused. The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. On 14 February 2013, the Tribunal made the First Tribunal Decision, by which it affirmed the decision of the delegate. The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s grounds of his protection visa claims (at [22]). The Tribunal found that the appellant was a credible witness (at [63]) and that there was a real chance the appellant would suffer serious harm “for the essential and significant reason of his religion and adverse opinions imputed to him” by the Taliban, like Sunni extremist groups and other Sunnis, who would wish to harm him (at [67]). The Tribunal then turned to the issue of whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate in Pakistan to a region where, objectively, there was no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution (at [68]). The Tribunal considered whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to Karachi. The Tribunal concluded that in all of the circumstances, the appellant “can reasonably be expected to relocate to Karachi where there is no appreciable risk of the occurrence of the feared persecution and where he does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for any convention reason” (at [81]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established