Mwangi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 500
•10 April 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Mwangi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 500
File number(s): ADG 155 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 10 April 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – student visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to properly apply cl 500.217 – whether Tribunal properly applied PIC 4020 – whether Tribunal failed to consider relevant information – whether Tribunal decision is unreasonable or illogical – whether Tribunal failed to conduct a review – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 360, 360A, 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 500.217 in Schedule 2 and PIC 4020 in Schedule 4
Cases cited: Arora v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 35
Batra v Minster of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 274
BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21
DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Rokovuki v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 282
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 850
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Trivedi v Minister for immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 71 Date of last submission/s: 18 September 2024 Date of hearing: 18 March 2025 Place: Adelaide Applicant: Self-represented Counsel for the First Respondent: Josephine Battiste Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 155 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ERIC MBUGUA MWANGI
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
10 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. As will be explained, for the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that the Tribunal decision contains a jurisdictional error (Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476). This Court cannot undertake a review of the merits of the decision under review.
For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Kenya who first arrived in Australian on a student visa in 2017 (Court Book (CB) 13).
On 4 July 2019, the applicant applied for a further Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (the visa) (CB 1-19). In that application, the applicant declared that he was financially supported by his uncle for the purpose of funding his stay in Australia (CB 8-9). He provided several documents in support of that application (CB 20-59), including a statement of account from First Community Bank in the name of his uncle (CB 44-46). The applicant’s uncle also provided a statutory declaration and a letter of support to verify the bank statement (CB 47-48).
On 12 August 2019, the Department wrote to the applicant to request more information about the relationship between he and his uncle, the source of his funds (CB 64-70). In reply, the applicant provided a letter and sponsorship consent form from his uncle, indicating that he was the uncle of the applicant and that he agreed to the bank authorities’ disclosure of his information to the Australian High Commission (CB 71-72).
On 4 September 2019, the Department invited the applicant to comment on adverse information received, namely, that on 26 August 2019, a departmental officer contacted the First Community Bank by email with a copy of the statement of account, and that an employee of the bank responded to say that the document was forged and had not been issued by the First Community Bank (CB 74-77).
On 26 September 2019, the applicant responded to the effect that his uncle had initially agreed to sponsor his study in Australia but, because of a dispute between the uncle and the applicant’s parents, withdrew that support without advising the applicant. The applicant says this is what caused him to provide the forged bank statement (CB 78-79).
On 15 October 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 107-111). The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy cl 500.217 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) because the applicant did not satisfy Public Interest Criterion (PIC) 4020(1).
Clause 500.217 provides as follows:
(1)The applicant satisfies public interest criteria 4001, 4002, 4003, 4004, 4010, 4013, 4014, 4020 and 4021.
(2)If the applicant has not turned 18, public interest criteria 4012A, 4017 and 4018 are satisfied in relation to the applicant.
(3)If the applicant had turned 18 at the time of application, the applicant satisfies public interest criterion 4019.
(4)The applicant (other than a Foreign Affairs student or a Defence Student) satisfies public interest criterion 4005.
(5)The applicant, being a Foreign Affairs student or a Defence Student, satisfies public interest criterion 4007.
The relevant part of PIC 4020 in Schedule 4 of the Regulations provides:
(1)There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5‑reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:
(a)the application for the visa; or
(b)a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made.
The delegate found that the applicant had provided a bogus document in support of his application and therefore could not meet PIC 4020(1) in order to satisfy cl 500.217 for the grant of the visa.
On 5 November 2019, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 112-113).
On 23 April 2021, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 11 May 2021 (CB 120-122).
On 4 May 2021, the applicant provided written submissions to the Tribunal (CB 131-133). He reiterated that his uncle had agreed to sponsor his study in Australia and was unaware of any issue with the financial statements, only becoming aware of this when he was contacted by the Department about it. He requested that the Tribunal disregard the issue because he was unaware it was a bogus document, it was out of his control, and it was caused by a breach of trust by his uncle (CB 132).
On 11 May 2021, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing (CB 226-228).
That same day, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 233-239).
On 28 May 2021, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail.
The Tribunal’s reasons began by identifying the visa under review, noting that the applicant had applied for the Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa on 4 July 2019 (at [1]-[2]). The Tribunal explained that a delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the applicant the visa because the delegate found that the applicant had provided a bogus document, or information that is false or misleading, in relation to the visa application (at [2]).
The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant appeared before it to give evidence and present arguments on 11 May 2021 (at [3]).
The Tribunal outlined that the issue before it was whether the applicant met PIC 4020 as required by cl 500.217 of the Regulations (at [5]). The Tribunal set out the relevant legislation in that regard and noted that the requirements of PIC 4020(1) and (2) can be waived if there are certain compelling or compassionate reasons to justify granting the visa (at [5]-[6]).
The Tribunal also outlined the relevant definitions under PIC 4020, namely, that (at [7]-[9]):
·‘bogus document’ is defined in s 5(1) of the Act;
·the bogus document need not be relevant to a criterion for the grant of a visa (Arora v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 35; Batra v Minster of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 274);
·the requirements of PIC 4020(1) apply whether or not the bogus document was provided by the applicant, and whether it was done knowingly or unwittingly; and
·the Tribunal is not required to find that the applicant was aware the information was purposely untrue, however an element of fraud or deception by some person is necessary to attract that provision (Trivedi v Minister for immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169) (Trivedi)).
Against this background, the Tribunal summarised the delegate’s findings, noting that the applicant had responded ‘yes’ in his declaration that he understood giving false or misleading information is a serious offence, and that the delegate had considered but found that there were not compelling or compassionate circumstances to justify the grant of the visa (at [10]-[14]).
The Tribunal considered all of the material before it, including the applicant’s written submissions and oral evidence given at the hearing (at [15]-[18]). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s submissions dated 4 May 2021, in which the applicant said he understood the seriousness of the events but asked the Tribunal to disregard the issue on the basis that he was unaware and it was out of his control, and that it had been caused due to a breach of trust by his uncle (at [15]). The Tribunal also considered the applicant’s statement at the hearing that he did not know the document was bogus but that he understood now, and that it was his responsibility to ensure the information was correct. He said that he hoped the Department would consider the matter more broadly and take note of his good record (at [17]).
Upon consideration of the applicant’s evidence, particularly with respect to the relationship between his uncle and his family, the Tribunal found that the applicant would have known that the information provided may have been bogus but provided it anyway in an attempt to be granted the visa (at [18]).
The Tribunal therefore found there was evidence before it that the applicant had given, or caused to be given, a bogus document as defined in s 5(1) and had provided information that is false or misleading in a material particular as defined in PIC 4020(5) (at [19]). The applicant therefore did not meet PIC 4020(1) for the grant of the visa (at [20]).
The Tribunal then considered whether there were any compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia, or whether there were any compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen, such that PIC 4020(1) and (2) should be waived (at [21]-[27]). In response, the applicant stated there was nothing he could think of except that his partner is here with him in Australia. He stated his partner was not an Australian citizen or permanent resident, but that she is here on a student visa and they had just had a child. The Tribunal noted that such a child would not be an Australian citizen or permanent resident, and that the applicant could return to his home country with his family (at [25]).
The Tribunal ultimately found that there were not any compassionate or compelling circumstances to justify waiving PIC 4020(1) and (2) for the grant of the visa (at [26]-[27]).
The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy PIC 4020 for the purposes of cl 500.217 and did not meet the criteria for any other subclass within the class of visa sought (at [28]-[29]).
Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (at [30]).
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 28 May 2021 contains four grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
1.The second respondent failed to properly apply cl 500.217 of the Migration Regulations 1994
2.The second respondent failed to take into meaningful considerations of the materials and evidence before it.
3.The second respondent’s decision is unreasonable or illogical.
4.The second respondent failed to conduct a review.
The applicant filed an affidavit with that judicial review application on 28 May 2021. That affidavit annexed a copy of the Tribunal’s decision.
The applicant appeared before the Court via telephone on 18 March 2025 without legal representation. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received copies of the Court Book and the Minister’s written submissions.
The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 28 May 2021 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 18 March 2025), a Court Book numbering 240 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 18 September 2024.
The applicant was not represented and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, Rokovuki v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 282 at [41]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter on 18 March 2025, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal’s decision and/or procedure.
In line with its usual approach, the Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal’s decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that, in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error included:
(a)where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));
(b)where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);
(c)where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);
(d)where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);
(e)where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and
(f)where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).
However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court what he said the Tribunal did wrong.
CONSIDERATION
As outlined above, the applicant advanced four grounds of review in these proceedings. Noting the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court endeavoured to interpret the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392). In these circumstances particularly, the Court gave the applicant an opportunity to say what was wrong with the Tribunal’s decision.
Against this background, the applicant told the Court he had intended to explain why he should be granted the visa but he now understood that this was beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. He said he did not otherwise wish to make any submissions. After hearing the Minister’s submissions, the applicant replied to the effect that he was not complicit in providing the document which was said to be fraudulent, and that all he did was use an agent to submit the document, although he accepted that he had signed the accompanying document. He otherwise said he relied on his earlier written statements which are contained in the Court Book.
Ground one: did the Tribunal fail to properly apply cl 500.217 of the Regulations?
The key issue for the Tribunal was whether the applicant satisfied the criteria in PIC 4020 in order to meet the requirements of cl 500.217. The Tribunal set out those requirements and the relevant definitions at [5]-[9] of its reasons, particularly with respect to the provision of a bogus document (see above at [9]-[10] of these reasons).
The Tribunal acknowledged the matters raised in the applicant’s written submissions, namely, that the applicant was not aware of any problem with the bank statement until it was brought to his attention by the Department, and that these circumstances arose because of a family misunderstanding. The Tribunal also had regard to the applicant’s oral evidence that he believed the bank statement to be true and correct when he submitted it alongside his visa application, but that he now understood it to be bogus.
The Tribunal concluded that there was evidence before it that the applicant had given or caused to be given to the Minister a bogus document as defined by s 5(1) of the Act, namely, a document the Tribunal reasonably suspected to be a document that is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so, and also provided information that is false or misleading in a material particular as defined in PIC 4020(5).
In considering and weighing up the evidence, the Tribunal addressed each of the points raised in the applicant’s submissions, noting that it was the applicant’s responsibility to ensure any information provided to the Department was correct. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims that he was unaware the document was bogus and that this was caused by a family misunderstanding. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s knowledge of the family situation lent weight to the contention that he ought to have carefully checked any relevant information at the time of providing it to the Department. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant had provided information that did not appear credible in the circumstances and that he would have known that the information provided may have been bogus but proceeded anyway in an attempt to be granted the visa.
The Tribunal then turned to the requirements of the waiver provision under PIC 4020(4), which it set out at [21]-[22] of its reasons. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s submissions but found that nothing raised by the applicant engaged the provisions because they did not relate to compassionate or compelling circumstances that affected the interests of an Australian citizen, permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen, or compelling circumstances affecting the interest of Australia to otherwise justify granting the visa.
Having regard to the above, in the Court’s view, the Tribunal correctly applied the relevant law in cl 500.217 and PIC 4020 to the applicant’s particular circumstances.
No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground one.
Additional matter raised by the Minister
Counsel for the Minister, who is subject to a direction to behave as a model litigant, made the following further submission with respect to the PIC 4020 issue in ground one.
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal correctly identified, at [9] of its reasons, that it is not necessary for the applicant to be aware that the information is purposely untrue in order for PIC 4020 to be engaged, but there must still be an element of fraud or deception by some person to attract the operation of that provision (citing Trivedi).
In Trivedi, the Full Court of the Federal Court did not accept it was necessary that the first appellant be knowingly involved in the giving of false information for PIC 4020 to apply, but rather that the information or document itself have the necessary quality of purposeful falsity. Buchanan J concluded (Allsop CJ and Rangiah J concurring) (at [43]) (emphasis added):
In my view, it is not necessary…to show knowing complicity by a visa applicant. That would impose an impossible task on those administering the visa system. But it is necessary that the information or document have the necessary quality of purposeful falsity, whether or not the visa applicant can be shown to have knowledge of that fact.
Counsel for the Minister accepted that there is no express statement in the Tribunal decision that the document in question have the necessary quality of purposeful falsity. However, counsel submitted that it is implicit in the Tribunal’s reasons that it turned its mind to this and made such a finding about the First Community Bank statement of account. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal accepted there had been fraud or deception by some person such as to attract the operation of PIC 4020, which is implicit in its finding that the bank statement was a bogus document (citing Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 850 at [23]-[24]) (Singh).
In Singh, White J rejected the argument that the Tribunal had erred by not making such an express finding that the document in question was purposely untrue. The Court found that such a finding was necessarily implicit in the Tribunal’s acceptance of the information that had been provided about the documents and its conclusion that there was a reasonable suspicion, for the purposes of the Act, that the document had not been issued in respect of the relevant person. The Court reasoned that “[a] fraudulent alteration of the document could not occur without purposeful activity” (at [24]).
The Court accepts that the Tribunal’s approach does not demonstrate any jurisdictional error because it is implicit that the Tribunal had made the necessary findings to engage the provisions of PIC 4020.
It is quite clear that the Tribunal considered that the forged bank statement was purposely false. That much is implicit from the nature of a forged document and the Tribunal’s finding that the applicant would have known that the information provided may have been bogus but proceeded anyway in an attempt to be granted the visa. Accordingly, the Court finds that no jurisdictional error arises in this respect, however the Court is nevertheless grateful to counsel for addressing it.
Ground two: did the Tribunal fail to consider the materials and evidence before it?
By ground two, the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to take into meaningful consideration the materials and evidence before it, although he has not particularised what it is he says the Tribunal failed to consider.
It is well established that the Tribunal is required to give active intellectual or meaningful consideration to “a substantial, clearly articulated argument” advanced by an applicant (Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [24]).
At the hearing, counsel for the Minister referred the Court to passages within the Tribunal’s decision which demonstrated an active intellectual engagement with the evidence before it. The Tribunal referred to the delegate’s letter dated 4 September 2019 by which the applicant was invited to comment on adverse information about the bank statement, and the Tribunal took the applicant’s response into account (at [12]). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s submissions dated 4 May 2021 and noted that the applicant had also provided study information, personal information, family information and financial information (at [15]-[16]). The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s oral evidence given at the Tribunal hearing on 11 May 2021 (at [17], [24]-[25]).
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal took into account all relevant material and evidence before it in reaching its decision. Having carefully considered the passages referred to by the Minister, the Court agrees that the Tribunal clearly assessed, weighed up and engaged in meaningful consideration of that material throughout the course of its reasoning. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal’s reasons demonstrate clear and evident engagement with the evidence provided by the applicant.
No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground two.
Ground three: is the Tribunal’s decision unreasonable and illogical?
For a jurisdictional error to be made out on the ground of unreasonableness or illogicality, it is well established that the decision under challenge must demonstrate “extreme illogicality or irrationality, measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [148]).
The Minister submitted that the applicant appeared to accept (in written submissions and in oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing) that the bank statement provided in support of his visa application was bogus. The Court accepts that this is not in dispute. The applicant instead contends that the provision of the bogus document should be disregarded because he was not aware it was a bogus document at the time of providing it and that it was otherwise beyond his control. However, the Tribunal rejected this contention, noting that it was the applicant’s responsibility to ensure that all documents provided were correct and accurate, and that the applicant’s own evidence about his family misunderstanding should have alerted him to carefully check the documents.
Further, in considering its discretion to waive PIC 4020(1), the Tribunal noted that when invited to address the relevant considerations, the applicant offered no argument and said there was nothing he could think of that would engage the waiver provision.
The Minister submitted that, far from the Tribunal’s decision being illogical or irrational, the Tribunal applied the appropriate relevant tests and reached the only conclusion open to it under the circumstances. Whilst the court would not go so far as to find that the Tribunal reached the only conclusion open to it, the Court nevertheless accepts that the Tribunal’s findings were logical and reasonably open to it.
No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground three.
Ground four: failure to conduct a review
Ground four contends that the Tribunal failed to conduct a review but does not particularise how or why the applicant says the Tribunal failed to conduct a review.
In written submissions, the Minister set out the statutory steps the Tribunal relevantly undertook in conducting its review. On 23 April 2021, the applicant was invited to a hearing before the Tribunal pursuant to ss 360 and 360A of the Act. The applicant responded to the hearing invitation on 28 April 2021 and provided further evidence to the Tribunal on 4 May 2021. On 11 May 2021, the applicant attended the Tribunal hearing via telephone.
The Minister submitted that the applicant had ample opportunity to provide evidence and present arguments to the Tribunal in support of his review application. The Minister further submitted that the Tribunal performed its statutory function in compliance with Part 5 of the Act.
The Court accepts these submissions and finds nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons or the material before it to indicate that the Tribunal failed to conduct a review.
No jurisdictional error arises in respect of ground four.
The Court is satisfied that, even adopting the broad approach referred to in [38] of these reasons, no jurisdictional error is apparent.
CONCLUSION
The application for judicial review, supporting affidavit and additional submissions presented by the applicant have failed to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court is otherwise unable to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard. Associate:
Dated: 10 April 2025
0
25
2